Category: Egypt

  • Iran and Turkey After Egypt: Time for Regional Realignments?

    Iran and Turkey After Egypt: Time for Regional Realignments?

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    U.S.-Europe Analysis | Number 51

    Iran and Turkey After Egypt: Time for Regional Realignments?

    Iran, Turkey, Middle East Unrest, Middle East, Transatlantic Relations

    Emiliano Alessandri, Former Visiting Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe

    Ruth H. Santini, Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe

    The Brookings Institution

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    April 19, 2011 —

    INTRODUCTION

    ahmadinejad gulBoth Iran and Turkey have a major stake in how the political landscape in North Africa and the Middle East is reshaped in the months ahead. Tehran and Ankara have developed their own separate narratives on regional events that take credit for providing the political inspiration for the Arab uprisings. Simultaneously, they have aimed to reinterpret reality on the ground to deflect attention away from their own domestic problems. While regional uprisings (with the possible exception of a resurgence of Kurdish separatism) do not necessarily threaten the stability of the Turkish state, Iran is experiencing its own waves of protests.

    U.S.-Europe Analysis

    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (R) and his Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gul attend an official meeting in Tehran February 14, 2011.

    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (R) and his Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gul attend an official meeting in Tehran February 14, 2011.

    As European and American leaders formulate policies toward North Africa and the Middle East, Iran and Turkey will have to be factored in and engaged in very different ways. This commentary offers a snapshot of Iranian and Turkish perceptions and reactions to the democratic protests in the Arab world, and explores ways in which the United States and the European Union might interact with Tehran and Ankara in channeling the currents of change.

    In Iran’s initial public commentary on the first uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, Iranian leaders portrayed the protests as “Islamic awakenings” inspired by Iran’s 1979 revolution. As events in Libya unfolded, the Iranian narrative shifted away from the protests to criticize the United States and its allies for staging a military intervention, and for being motivated—according to Iranian leaders—primarily by oil interests. Tehran’s narrative on Libya pointedly ignored United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1973, and the endorsement of the Arab League for the intervention.

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    via Iran and Turkey After Egypt: Time for Regional Realignments? – Brookings Institution.

  • Russian tourists will prefer Armenia for Turkey and Egypt

    Russian tourists will prefer Armenia for Turkey and Egypt

    56026YEREVAN. – Armenia has great chances to increase influx of Russian tourists considerably, said Russian official during round-table discussions on tourism held in Yerevan.

    Head of Federal Agency on Tourism Alexander Radkov said Egypt and Turkey, traditional directions preferred by Russians, experience hard times. Therefore, Russians show stronger interest in cultural tourism.

    “Due to cold climate in Russia, the sun and the sea are always in demand, but people do not want to visit the same places every time. Nowadays, Russians have become more interested in cultural tourism and Armenia has a good chance to receive more Russian tourists,” he said.

    Armenia is interesting for its religious monuments, skiing resorts and cultural directions. He stressed there should be “an Armenian brand” to attract Russians. Alexander Radkov promised to lobby Armenia’s interests in Russia.

    via Russian tourists will prefer Armenia for Turkey and Egypt | Armenia News – NEWS.am.

  • Turkey: The growing power

    Turkey: The growing power

    Gavin Hewitt

    In the era of awakenings, upheavals and revolutions: watch Turkey.

    It has become a hugely ambitious country, bristling with self-belief. In a turbulent Middle East it believes it is the democratic role model. It eyes the role as spokesman for the region as a whole. When disputes need to be settled, it offers itself as the mediator. The State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Cicek summed it up: “Everybody has to see Turkey’s power.”

    TR PM ErdoganOver Libya it is the country that the West watches more carefully than any other. For the moment, Turkey is supporting Nato’s campaign whilst refraining from joining in any attacks on Gaddafi’s ground forces. It is holding itself back, ready to step forward as the indispensable locator when the hour of negotiation approaches.

    On the Libyan conflict it has flipped and flopped however. Early on, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan denounced any Western intervention as “absurd”. He raised fears of a “second Iraq”. Turkish officials seemed to lash out at what they portrayed as an oil grab by the West. They picked a fight with the French interior minister Claude Gueant who unwisely said the French President was leading a “crusade” to stop Gaddafi’s barbarism. He didn’t mean it of course in the historical sense but Turkish officials pounced on the tongue-slip.

    That was then. Now Turkey is committing five or six vessels to police the arms embargo and is running Benghazi airport to co-ordinate humanitarian assistance.

    Turkey wanted to disguise its hand, to see which way the battle flowed. Twenty thousand of its citizens work in Libya and it has lucrative contracts there. Commercial self-interest made it cautious.

    The u-turn was driven by the realisation that the international community, including the Arab League, was determined that the killing of civilians had to stop.

    Turkey had two positions. Firstly, it would not attack Gaddafi’s forces directly. Secondly, it was fiercely opposed to a coalition, led by France, setting the agenda.

    Its problem with France is simple. President Sarkozy is against Turkey joining the EU as a full member. Ankara feels insulted and it is easy to meet Turkish officials with a mouthful of rage against the French president.

    So Turkey wanted the operation run under Nato, where it has a role in decision-making and drafting the rules of engagement. Its position is hard-headed. “We are one of the very few countries that is speaking to both sides,” said one official. It waits for that moment when the mediator is summoned on to the field of play.

    On the turmoil in the Arab world, Turkey has sold itself as the role-model. Early on it urged Hosni Mubarak to stand down. Many of the Egyptian demonstrators wanted Egypt to be like Turkey; secular yet certain of its Muslim identity but with free elections.

    When the killings started in Syria, Prime Minister Erdogan was immediately on the phone. “I have made two calls to President Assad in the last three days and I have sent top intelligence official to Syria. I have called for a reformist approach.”

    It is all skilfully balanced; on the side of reform but keeping a hand in with the man in power.

    Sometimes it seems Turkish officials are everywhere. Such as when the prime minister shows up in Baghdad. It is Turkish goods and companies that so far have conquered Iraq’s markets. With the prime minister were 200 businessmen.

    President Ahmadinejad of Iran may be isolated, but not with Turkey. Ankara has again positioned itself as the deal-maker. There is also the not-so-small matter of $10 billion in trade with Tehran.

    Turkey has also helped shine its credentials in the Middle East with a major row with Israel over the interception of a boat heading for Gaza. Turkish citizens died in the incident.

    So Turkey’s sphere of influence widens but, even so, there are the problems.

    Since 2005 it has been engaged in accession talks with the EU. For the moment they are going nowhere. President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel favour instead of membership “a privileged partnership”. Turkey wants none of it and seethes with resentment.

    Some – but not all – in the EU are wary. There are 24 million without work in Europe and the appetite for enlargement has dimmed. Not everyone is convinced that a Muslim country should be in the EU. It would be difficult to have Turkey join without its people being consulted.

    Turkey knows this and asks the searching question: “Is the EU a Christian Club or is it the address of a community of civilisations? The current picture shows the EU is a Christian Club. This must be overcome.” It touches a raw nerve. But plenty in Europe ask whether Turkey would accept becoming a community of civilisations.

    You could sense the strains and tensions when recently Prime Minister Erdogan went to Germany, where two million people of Turkish origin live. He caused huge offence when he told an audience in Dusseldorf: “Our children must learn German but they must learn Turkish first.” It was an open challenge to the German government which had been insisting that those who live in Germany must speak the language and integrate. The German chancellor opined that multiculturalism had failed because it led to separation.

    There is, too, friction over Cyprus, and the disturbing detentions of reporters and writers. It forced the European Commission to warn Turkey over its democratic credibility.

    And then there are the doubts as to how committed the ruling party is to secularism. Recently Ayse Sucu, who headed a woman’s group, was squeezed out after suggesting women themselves should decide whether to cover their hair.

    There is an ongoing struggle within Turkey which will demonstrate its commitment to tolerance. That, more than anything, will determine whether it is indeed a role model.

    But Turkey is on a roll. Sometimes – irritated at being rebuffed – it contemplates abandoning its pursuit of EU membership. It survived the economic downturn and its growth is an enviable 5%. It may prefer to go it alone and, like the Ottomans, revel in newfound influence.

    But when it comes to Libya, Turkey demands to be listened to. And the West needs Turkey on side.

    Gavin HewittI’m Gavin Hewitt, the BBC’s Europe editor and this blog is where you and I can talk about the stories I’m covering in Europe.

     

     

    bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/gavinhewitt/2011/03/turkey_the_growing_power.html, 30 March 2011

  • Tony Blair: We can’t just be spectators in this revolution

    Tony Blair: We can’t just be spectators in this revolution

    BOP KA

    The following op-ed by Tony Blair first appeared in The Times and the Wall Street Journalon Saturday 19th March 2010

    The crisis in Libya has forced back on to the agenda all the tough choices of modern-day foreign policy. Should we intervene? Do we do so for moral reasons as well as those of national interests? How do we balance the need for a policy that is strong, assertive and well articulated with the desire not to appear overmighty and arrogant, disrespecting others and their culture?

    Two preliminary points must be made. In today’s world the distinction between moral outrage and strategic interests can be false. In a region where our strategic interests are dramatically and profoundly engaged, it is unlikely that the effect of a regime going rogue and brutalising its own people will remain isolated within its own borders. If Colonel Gaddafi were allowed to kill large numbers of Libyans to squash the hope of a different Libya, we shouldn’t be under any illusion. We could end up with a pariah government at odds with the international community — wounded but still alive and dangerous. We would send a signal of Western impotence in an area that analyses such signals keenly. We would dismay those agitating for freedom, boosting opposition factions hostile to us.

    This underlines the other preliminary point: inaction is also a decision, a policy with consequence. The wish to keep out of it all is entirely understandable; but it is every bit as much a decision as acting.

    So the decision to impose a no-fly zone and authorise all necessary measures to protect threatened civilians comes not a moment too soon. It is a shift to a policy of intervention that I welcome. Such a policy will be difficult and unpredictable. But it is surely better than watching in real time as the Libyan people’s legitimate aspiration for a better form of government and way of life is snuffed out by tanks and planes.

    Events in Libya cannot be divorced from what is happening across the Middle East. It is here that Western policy is still evolving. The implications are vast.

    Decisions taken now will define attitudes to us for a generation; they will also heavily influence the outcomes. They will have to be taken, as ever, with imperfect knowledge and the impossibility of accurate foresight.

    The key to making those decisions is to develop a strategic framework for helping to shape this revolutionary change sweeping the region. We need a policy that is clear, explicable and that marries our principles to the concerns of realpolitik. It also has to recognise that we are not spectators in what is happening. History, attitude and interests all dictate that we are players.

    First, there is no doubt that the best, most secure, most stable future for the Middle East lies in the spread of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. These are not “Western” values; they are the universal values of the human spirit. People of the Middle East are no different in that sense from the people of Europe or America.

    Second, however, getting there is a lot more complex than it was for Eastern Europeans when the Soviet Union collapsed. In that case you had hollowed-out regimes that were despised by a people eager for change and, vitally, agreed as to the type of society the change should produce. They looked over the Wall, saw the West and said: that’s what we want. By and large, that is what they now have.

    In the Middle East those protesting agree completely on removing existing regimes, but then thoroughly disagree on the future. There are two competing visions. One represents modernising elements who essentially want to share the freedom and democracy we have; the other, Islamist elements who have quite a different conception of how change should go.

    In saying this, I am not “demonising” the Muslim Brotherhood or ignoring that they too have their reformists. But there is no point, either, in being naive. Some of those wanting change want it precisely because they regard the existing regimes as not merely too oppressive but too pro-Western; and their solutions are a long way from what would provide modern and peaceful societies.

    So our policy has to be very clear: we are not just for change; we are for modern, democratic change, based on the principles and values intrinsic to democracy. That does not just mean the right to vote, but the rule of law, free speech, freedom of religion and free markets too.

    Third, working in that framework, we should differentiate when dealing with different countries. This too will require difficult decisions in instances where things are often not clean and simple, but messy and complex.

    In the case of Libya, there is no way out being offered to its people. It is status quo or nothing. When Libya changed its external policy — renouncing terrorism, co-operating against al-Qaeda, giving up its nuclear and chemical weapons programme — I believe we were right to alter our relationship with it. At the onset of the popular uprising, the Gaddafi regime could have decided to agree a proper and credible process of internal change. I urged Colonel Gaddafi to take that route out. Instead he decided to crush it by force. No credible path to a better constitution was put forward.

    By contrast, round the Gulf, countries are reforming in the right direction. The pace may need to quicken but here it is right to support such a process and to stand by our allies. Even in Bahrain, although there can be no justification for the use of violence against unarmed civilians, there is a strong case for supporting the process of negotiation led by the Crown Prince that does offer a means of peaceful transition to constitutional monarchy. This is not realpolitik over principle. It is a recognition that it is infinitely preferable to encourage reform that happens with stability than to push societies into a revolution whose motivations will be mixed and whose outcome will be uncertain.

    Fourth, in respect of Tunisia and Egypt, they now need our help. Protests don’t resolve policy questions. Demonstrations aren’t the same as governments. It is up to the emerging leaders of those nations to decide their political systems. But that is only one part of their challenge. They have young populations, often without jobs. Whatever the long-term benefits of political change, the short-term cost, in investment and the economy, will be big. This will require capital. It will also require the right policy framework, public sector reform and economic change that will sometimes be painful and controversial. Otherwise be clear: the danger is that in two or three years the political change is unmatched by economic progress and then in the disillusion that follows, extreme elements start to get traction. So talk of a Marshall Plan-type initiative is not overexcitable. It is completely to the point.

    Fifth, we ignore the importance of the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians at our peril. This absolutely must be revitalised and relaunched. I know it is said that this wasn’t the issue behind the uprisings. That is true. But we are deluding ourselves if we don’t think that its outcome matters profoundly to the region and the direction in which it develops. In any event, the change impacts immediately and directly on the parties. For Israel it makes peace all the more essential; it also sharpens acutely its security challenge. For the Palestinians it gives them a chance to be part of the democratic change sweeping the region, but only if they are on the march to statehood. If not they are highly vulnerable to their cause being hijacked yet again by extremists.

    Sixth, we should keep up pressure on the regime in Iran. We should be open and forthright in supporting change in Tehran. If there were such change, it would be possibly the single most important factor in stimulating optimism about change elsewhere. Tehran’s present influence is negative, destabilising and damaging. It needs to know what our red lines are and that we intend to enforce them.

    Finally, in the Middle East religion matters. Nothing in this region can be fully explained or understood without analysing the fundamental struggle within Islam. That struggle can only ultimately be resolved by Muslims. But how non-Muslims have a dialogue and, if possible, a partnership with Islam can influence crucially the debate between reform and reaction.

    This is a large agenda. Some will object to the very notion of our having such an agenda: “Leave them to solve their own problems.” The difficulty is that their problems swiftly become ours. That is the nature of the interdependent world we inhabit today.

    Others will say we should be careful of forming “our agenda”: it will be “resented”; we will heighten “anti-Western feeling”, “remember Iraq and Afghanistan” and so on.

    One essential part of handling this right is to liberate ourselves from a posture of apology that is not merely foolish but contrary to the long-term prospects of the region. Of course you can debate whether the decisions to go to war in Iraq or Afghanistan were right. But the idea that the prolonged nature of both battles invalidates intervention or is the “West’s” fault is not only wrong, it is at the root of why we find what is happening today not just in the Middle East but also in Pakistan and elsewhere so perplexing. The reason why Iraq was hard, Afghanistan remains hard and Pakistan, a nation with established institutions, is in difficulty, is not because the people don’t want democracy. They do. They have shown it time and again. It is because cultural and social modernisation has not taken hold in these countries, and proper religion has been perverted to breed fanatics, not democrats.

    What this means is not that we turn away from encouraging democracy; but rather that we do so with our eyes open and our minds fully aware of the need for a comprehensive agenda so the change that occurs is the change that people really want and need.

    Some years ago, under the previous US Administration, there was a concept called the Greater Middle East Initiative, about how to help to bring about change in the region. The circumstances of the time were not propitious. They are today. We should politely but firmly resist those who tell us this is not our business. It is. In dealing with it, we should show respect, but also strength, the courage of our convictions, and the self- confident belief we can achieve them.

    www.tonyblairoffice.org, Mar 18, 2011

  • Egypt protests: America’s secret backing for rebel leaders behind uprising

    Egypt protests: America’s secret backing for rebel leaders behind uprising

    The American government secretly backed leading figures behind the Egyptian uprising who have been planning “regime change” for the past three years, The Daily Telegraph has learned.

    By Tim Ross, Matthew Moore and Steven Swinford

    The American Embassy in Cairo helped a young dissident attend a US-sponsored summit for activists in New York, while working to keep his identity secret from Egyptian state police.

    On his return to Cairo in December 2008, the activist told US diplomats that an alliance of opposition groups had drawn up a plan to overthrow President Hosni Mubarak and install a democratic government in 2011.

    The secret document in full

    He has already been arrested by Egyptian security in connection with the demonstrations and his identity is being protected by The Daily Telegraph.

    The crisis in Egypt follows the toppling of Tunisian president Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali, who fled the country after widespread protests forced him from office.

    The disclosures, contained in previously secret US diplomatic dispatches released by the WikiLeaks website, show American officials pressed the Egyptian government to release other dissidents who had been detained by the police.

    Mr Mubarak, facing the biggest challenge to his authority in his 31 years in power, ordered the army on to the streets of Cairo yesterday as rioting erupted across Egypt.

    Tens of thousands of anti-government protesters took to the streets in open defiance of a curfew. An explosion rocked the centre of Cairo as thousands defied orders to return to their homes. As the violence escalated, flames could be seen near the headquarters of the governing National Democratic Party.

    Police fired rubber bullets and used tear gas and water cannon in an attempt to disperse the crowds.

    At least five people were killed in Cairo alone yesterday and 870 injured, several with bullet wounds. Mohamed ElBaradei, the pro-reform leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner, was placed under house arrest after returning to Egypt to join the dissidents. Riots also took place in Suez, Alexandria and other major cities across the country.

    William Hague, the Foreign Secretary, urged the Egyptian government to heed the “legitimate demands of protesters”. Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, said she was “deeply concerned about the use of force” to quell the protests.

    In an interview for the American news channel CNN, to be broadcast tomorrow, David Cameron said: “I think what we need is reform in Egypt. I mean, we support reform and progress in the greater strengthening of the democracy and civil rights and the rule of law.”

    The US government has previously been a supporter of Mr Mubarak’s regime. But the leaked documents show the extent to which America was offering support to pro-democracy activists in Egypt while publicly praising Mr Mubarak as an important ally in the Middle East.

    In a secret diplomatic dispatch, sent on December 30 2008, Margaret Scobey, the US Ambassador to Cairo, recorded that opposition groups had allegedly drawn up secret plans for “regime change” to take place before elections, scheduled for September this year.

    The memo, which Ambassador Scobey sent to the US Secretary of State in Washington DC, was marked “confidential” and headed: “April 6 activist on his US visit and regime change in Egypt.”

    It said the activist claimed “several opposition forces” had “agreed to support an unwritten plan for a transition to a parliamentary democracy, involving a weakened presidency and an empowered prime minister and parliament, before the scheduled 2011 presidential elections”. The embassy’s source said the plan was “so sensitive it cannot be written down”.

    Ambassador Scobey questioned whether such an “unrealistic” plot could work, or ever even existed. However, the documents showed that the activist had been approached by US diplomats and received extensive support for his pro-democracy campaign from officials in Washington. The embassy helped the campaigner attend a “summit” for youth activists in New York, which was organised by the US State Department.

    Cairo embassy officials warned Washington that the activist’s identity must be kept secret because he could face “retribution” when he returned to Egypt. He had already allegedly been tortured for three days by Egyptian state security after he was arrested for taking part in a protest some years earlier.

    The protests in Egypt are being driven by the April 6 youth movement, a group on Facebook that has attracted mainly young and educated members opposed to Mr Mubarak. The group has about 70,000 members and uses social networking sites to orchestrate protests and report on their activities.

    The documents released by WikiLeaks reveal US Embassy officials were in regular contact with the activist throughout 2008 and 2009, considering him one of their most reliable sources for information about human rights abuses.

    www.telegraph.co.uk, 28 Jan 2011

    Egypt protests: secret US document discloses support for protesters

    Here is the secret document sent from the US Embassy in Cairo to Washington disclosing the extent of American support for the protesters behind the Egypt uprising.

     

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 002572 SIPDIS FOR NEA/ELA, R, S/P AND H NSC FOR PASCUAL AND KUTCHA-HELBLING E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2028 TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, EG SUBJECT: APRIL 6 ACTIVIST ON HIS U.S. VISIT AND REGIME CHANGE IN EGYPT REF: A. CAIRO 2462 B. CAIRO 2454 C. CAIRO 2431 Classified By: ECPO A/Mincouns Catherine Hill-Herndon for reason 1.4 (d ).

    1. (C) Summary and comment: On December 23, April 6 activist xxxxxxxxxxxx expressed satisfaction with his participation in the December 3-5 \”Alliance of Youth Movements Summit,\” and with his subsequent meetings with USG officials, on Capitol Hill, and with think tanks. He described how State Security (SSIS) detained him at the Cairo airport upon his return and confiscated his notes for his summit presentation calling for democratic change in Egypt, and his schedule for his Congressional meetings. xxxxxxxxxxxx contended that the GOE will never undertake significant reform, and therefore, Egyptians need to replace the current regime with a parliamentary democracy. He alleged that several opposition parties and movements have accepted an unwritten plan for democratic transition by 2011; we are doubtful of this claim.

    xxxxxxxxxxxx said that although SSIS recently released two April 6 activists, it also arrested three additional group members. We have pressed the MFA for the release of these April 6 activists. April 6’s stated goal of replacing the current regime with a parliamentary democracy prior to the 2011 presidential elections is highly unrealistic, and is not supported by the mainstream opposition. End summary and comment.

    —————————- Satisfaction with the Summit —————————-

    2. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx expressed satisfaction with the December 3-5 \”Alliance of Youth Movements Summit\” in New York, noting that he was able to meet activists from other countries and outline his movement’s goals for democratic change in Egypt. He told us that the other activists at the summit were very supportive, and that some even offered to hold public demonstrations in support of Egyptian democracy in their countries, with xxxxxxxxxxxx as an invited guest. xxxxxxxxxxxx said he discussed with the other activists how April 6 members could more effectively evade harassment and surveillance from SSIS with technical upgrades, such as consistently alternating computer \”simcards.\” However, xxxxxxxxxxxx lamented to us that because most April 6 members do not own computers, this tactic would be impossible to implement. xxxxxxxxxxxx was appreciative of the successful efforts by the Department and the summit organizers to protect his identity at the summit, and told us that his name was never mentioned publicly.

    ——————- A Cold Welcome Home ——————-

    3. (S) xxxxxxxxxxxx told us that SSIS detained and searched him at the Cairo Airport on December 18 upon his return from the U.S. According to xxxxxxxxxxxx, SSIS found and confiscated two documents in his luggage: notes for his presentation at the summit that described April 6’s demands for democratic transition in Egypt, and a schedule of his Capitol Hill meetings. xxxxxxxxxxxx described how the SSIS officer told him that State Security is compiling a file on him, and that the officer’s superiors instructed him to file a report on xxxxxxxxxxxx most recent activities.

    ——————————————— ———-

    Washington Meetings and April 6 Ideas for Regime Change

    ——————————————— ———-

    4. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx described his Washington appointments as positive, saying that on the Hill he met with xxxxxxxxxxxx, a variety of House staff members, including from the offices of xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx), and with two Senate staffers. xxxxxxxxxxxx also noted that he met with several think tank members. xxxxxxxxxxxx said that xxxxxxxxxxxx’s office invited him to speak at a late January Congressional hearing on House Resolution 1303 regarding religious and political freedom in Egypt. xxxxxxxxxxxx told us he is interested in attending, but conceded he is unsure whether he will have the funds to make the trip. He indicated to us that he has not been focusing on his work as a \”fixer\” for journalists, due to his preoccupation with his U.S. trip. 5. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx described how he tried to convince his Washington interlocutors that the USG should pressure the GOE to implement significant reforms by threatening to reveal CAIRO 00002572 002 OF 002 information about GOE officials’ alleged \”illegal\” off-shore bank accounts. He hoped that the U.S. and the international community would freeze these bank accounts, like the accounts of Zimbabwean President Mugabe’s confidantes. xxxxxxxxxxxx said he wants to convince the USG that Mubarak is worse than Mugabe and that the GOE will never accept democratic reform. xxxxxxxxxxxx asserted that Mubarak derives his legitimacy from U.S. support, and therefore charged the U.S. with \”being responsible\” for Mubarak’s \”crimes.\”

    He accused NGOs working on political and economic reform of living in a \”fantasy world,\” and not recognizing that Mubarak — \”the head of the snake\” — must step aside to enable democracy to take root.

    6. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed that several opposition forces — including the Wafd, Nasserite, Karama and Tagammu parties, and the Muslim Brotherhood, Kifaya, and Revolutionary Socialist movements — have agreed to support an unwritten plan for a transition to a parliamentary democracy, involving a weakened presidency and an empowered prime minister and parliament, before the scheduled 2011 presidential elections (ref C). According to xxxxxxxxxxxx, the opposition is interested in receiving support from the army and the police for a transitional government prior to the 2011 elections.

    xxxxxxxxxxxx asserted that this plan is so sensitive it cannot be written down. (Comment: We have no information to corroborate that these parties and movements have agreed to the unrealistic plan xxxxxxxxxxxx has outlined. Per ref C, xxxxxxxxxxxx previously told us that this plan was publicly available on the internet. End comment.)

    7. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx said that the GOE has recently been cracking down on the April 6 movement by arresting its members. xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that although SSIS had released xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx \”in the past few days,\” it had arrested three other members. (Note: On December 14, we pressed the MFA for the release of xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx, and on December 28 we asked the MFA for the GOE to release the additional three activists. End note.) xxxxxxxxxxxx conceded that April 6 has no feasible plans for future activities.

    The group would like to call for another strike on April 6, 2009, but realizes this would be \”impossible\” due to SSIS interference, xxxxxxxxxxxx said. He lamented that the GOE has driven the group’s leadership underground, and that one of its leaders, xxxxxxxxxxxx, has been in hiding for the past week.

    8. (C) Comment: xxxxxxxxxxxx offered no roadmap of concrete steps toward April 6’s highly unrealistic goal of replacing the current regime with a parliamentary democracy prior to the 2011 presidential elections. Most opposition parties and independent NGOs work toward achieving tangible, incremental reform within the current political context, even if they may be pessimistic about their chances of success. xxxxxxxxxxxx wholesale rejection of such an approach places him outside this mainstream of opposition politicians and activists.

    SCOBEY02008-12-307386PGOV,PHUM,KDEM,EGAPRIL 6 ACTIVIST ON HIS U.S. VISIT AND REGIME CHANGE IN EGYPT

    www.telegraph.co.uk, 28 Jan 2011

     

     


  • “Revolutions” in Egypt and Tunisia Highlight Dilemmas of Turkey’s Democracy Promotion Agenda

    “Revolutions” in Egypt and Tunisia Highlight Dilemmas of Turkey’s Democracy Promotion Agenda

    “Revolutions” in Egypt and Tunisia Highlight Dilemmas of Turkey’s Democracy Promotion Agenda

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 24

    February 3, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey has been following closely the unfolding popular “revolutions” in Tunisia and Egypt. While the Turkish public expressed support towards the masses demanding political liberalization, the Turkish government adopted a cautious approach initially, indicative of some of the contradictions that have been inherent in its policies towards the Middle East for some time.

    Turkey, like many other countries, was taken by surprise over a crisis of this magnitude. Nonetheless, Turkish leaders’ rather delayed response to the popular demands in the region points to larger factors underpinning the government’s foreign policy. Especially, as this development risks straining the delicate balancing act Turkey has been performing in the region, between the Arab states on the one hand and the undemocratic authoritarian or monarchic regimes on the other. The Turkish government has gained the sympathy of the “Arab streets” owing to the successes of Turkish cultural products and to Turkey’s recent foreign policy activism in defense of some Arab causes, such as the Palestine issue. Partly in order to avoid antagonizing many of the regimes in the region, with whom it has been trying to forge closer ties, Turkey at the same time has refrained from pursuing an openly pro-democratization agenda.

    Despite the emphasis Turkish government occasionally places on democracy as a foundational principle for its domestic and foreign policies, it has come under criticism on the grounds that it prioritized its relations with these regimes at the expense of people’s demands for greater democratic rights. The most controversial case in point was the Iranian elections in 2009, where Turkey was one of the first countries to congratulate President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and remained silent on the regime’s ensuing violent crackdown on the opposition (EDM, June 18, 2009).

    Despite the Turkish government’s rather ambiguous position on democracy promotion, it must be acknowledged what Turkish scholar Kemal Kirisci once called the “demonstration effect” Turkey has in the region. Turkey’s experiment with popular democracy and a free market economy, especially its integration of Islamic groups into legitimate political channels, has been closely followed by many reformists in the Muslim world. The transformation of political Islamist groups in Turkey and their renunciation of non-democratic methods, which culminated in the incumbent AKP Party adopting a liberal-democratic economic and political platform, are taken as the most obvious indication of the success of this so-called Turkish model. Seen from this perspective, it is possible to hear somewhat inflated arguments among many Turkish analysts to the effect that Turkey’s rising profile in regional affairs and its vocal advocating of Arab causes, which demonstrated the failures of the authoritarian regimes, played a role in the recent wave of revolutions. According to different versions of this argument, the Turkish model of democratization inspired the “Arab streets” and precipitated these revolutions. Such views are also raised by the members of the AKP Party (Hurriyet, January 30).

    Among Islamists and to some extent liberals, there is a tendency to identify positively with the demonstrators demanding for greater political rights and transparency. This struggle reminds many Turks of Turkey’s experience with democratization, whereby they managed to fight against authoritarianism or military control over civilian politics and move towards a government representative of popular will. For instance, many Islamist intellectuals draw parallels between Turkey’s experience with a one-party regime and the Kemalist ideology and the experience of Tunisia under Bin Ali. By labeling the ousted Tunisian leader’s rule as Kemalism par excellence, they seek to drive home the argument that such authoritarian forms of government are no longer sustainable in the region, including Turkey. Consequently, they use it as a basis to call for further reform of the Turkish political system (Today’s Zaman, January 25). That positive identification of Islamist with the transformations there also might have an ideological dimension to it, as the Tunisian Islamic thinker and the leader of the En-Nahda movement Rashid Al-Ghannushi and the Egyptian Muslim brotherhood have had an intellectual impact on the Islamic groups and intellectuals in Turkey.

    As a reflection of such widely-held sympathy towards these revolutions shared by Turkish people and many political groups, there have been protests outside Egyptian diplomatic representations, demanding Mubarak’s resignation. It is increasingly possible to hear arguments calling on the government to play a more proactive role towards the resolution of the deepening crisis Egypt. One Turkish expert on Egypt, Ahmet Uysal, called on the government to give up its complacency, and interject itself more resolutely to prevent Egypt’s descent into instability by showing a way out of this stalemate towards democracy. In this view, only then will the Turkish government be able live up to its promises that it will play a leadership role in the region (www.sde.org.tr, February 1).

    Davutoglu, however, denied the criticisms that Turkey has remained silent on the developments in Tunisia and Egypt. Davutoglu rather put the blame on the Turkish media, arguing that despite his statements in support of people’s democratic demands, Turkish commentators largely overlooked them and created such a false image about the government’s policy (IHA, February 1).

    Perhaps with such criticism accumulating, Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan finally came out and invited Mubarak to respond to his people’s desire for change. “Hear the people’s outcry and their humane demands… governments cannot stand against people,” Erdogan said (Anadolu Ajansi, February 1). Many Turkish media outlets provided wide coverage of Erdogan’s statement and took it as an indication of Turkey’s emergence as a major actor that could help to resolve this crisis. Nonetheless, during our conversation on the subject in Dubai, a long-time observer of Turkish and Middle Eastern politics, Yusuf Serif of Al-Arabiyya, underscored that Erdogan’s response came rather late. Though finding Erdogan’s statement daring compared to other regional leaders’ silence, Serif draw attention to the fact that Erdogan delivered it only after the United States and other Western actors made similar arguments publicly and US President, Barack Obama, telephoned Erdogan last weekend.

    The “revolutions” in the region are still unfolding and it will be interesting to observe as to whether and how the Turkish government will maneuver in a timely and efficient manner in these uncharted waters.

    https://jamestown.org/program/revolutions-in-egypt-and-tunisia-highlight-dilemmas-of-turkeys-democracy-promotion-agenda/