Category: Europe

  • Azerbaijan: Public Angry at Russian Offensive

    Azerbaijan: Public Angry at Russian Offensive

    Ordinary Azeris outraged by Moscow’s intervention in Georgia – but officials largely silent.

    By Tamara Grigoryeva in Baku (CRS No. 455, 19-Aug-08)

    “Our home looks like a dormitory now, because so many relatives have arrived,” said 23-year-old Azerbaijani Parvana Mamedova who has helped take care of a stream of relatives from Georgia’s Marneuli region, which has an Azerbaijani minority. “We don’t have enough space in our three rooms, but it’s our duty to receive them.”

    After August 8, when Russian planes bombed the military base in Marneuli, two families of relatives decided to move to Baku, until the situation settles down. Only her uncle, Asif, stayed in Georgia and joined a unit of Azerbaijani volunteers to support the Georgian army.

    Azerbaijan has strong ties to both Georgia and Russia. The private reaction in Azerbaijan, Georgia’s partner in the GUAM organisation and in several energy projects, has been stronger than the public one.

    Azerbaijani foreign ministry spokesman Khazar Ibrahim has been virtually the only official to comment. “Azerbaijan recognises Georgia’s territorial integrity and believes that the conflict must be settled within [the] framework…of international law,” he said.

    President Ilham Aliev has remained at the Olympic Games for the duration of the crisis and made no public comment.

    Opposition politicians and commentators have criticised him for doing this at a time of conflict in the Caucasus and suggested that the president is too beholden to Russia, with which he signed a cooperation agreement last month.

    “Our president preferred to stay and watch the Olympics and keep silent while the presidents of several other friendly countries personally arrived in Tbilisi and expressed their support for President Saakashvili,” said analyst Ilgar Mamedov.

    “I think that this position can be explained by the president of Azerbaijan’s commitment to good relations with the leadership of Russia, and his wish to preserve stability in the country on the eve of the forthcoming presidential elections.”

    Only last month, Aliev and Russian president Dmitry Medvedev signed a new cooperation treaty.

    Political analyst Hikmet Hajizade said the reaction was understandable. “Azerbaijan fears for of its own security,” he said. “It’s obvious that Russia shouldn’t be driven crazy, because we have seen the consequences.”

    The Azerbaijani public and media were much sharper in their reactions. There have been several statements accusing Russia of supporting separatists and urging it to withdraw. Six protest rallies have been held outside the Russian embassy in Baku.

    In response, the Russian ambassador to Azerbaijan Valery Istratov has held two press conferences. At the first, only four journalists, mainly representing Russian media accredited in Baku, were invited, a decision the Azerbaijani news internet site day.az described as “the ambassador’s desire to evade tricky questions from Azerbaijani journalists”.

    Inevitably, Azerbaijanis have also drawn parallels between the war over South Ossetia and their own unresolved conflict with Armenia over Nagorny Karabakh. “The parallels between these conflicts are obvious,” said Hajizade. “The conflict between Georgia and Ossetia will definitely have an impact on the Karabakh conflict. If the conflict ends with Russia’s full control over Georgia, it will be very bad for Azerbaijan. Georgia is our only route for our energy and transport projects to reach the outside world.”

    Hajizade also believes that “many of those in Azerbaijan, who have called for a military solution to the Nagorny Karabakh conflict have learned what lies in store for a country which defies Russia but has no real allies. On the other hand, Hajizade sees one advantage in the current crisis, “The forgotten Caucasian conflicts have become a focus of attention of the world.”

    As the situation deteriorated, Georgia announced it was quitting the Commonwealth of Independent States and urged other countries to follow suit. But Azerbaijan was cautious on this. “The decision to leave the CIS is Georgia’s internal affair. Each country has the right to take decisions independently,” said Azerbaijani deputy foreign minister Hafiz Pashayev.

    The conflict over South Ossetia is hurting Azerbaijan economically. The country’s main oil export route, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, was shut down anyway on August 5 after an explosion in eastern Turkey claimed by the PKK Kurdish rebels. The conflict ensured the closure of the other pipeline via Georgia, Baku-Supsa. Azerbaijan was forced to rely only on the alternative, Baku-Novorossisk via Russia. According to the Caspian Alliance Group, every day that the pipelines do not operate Azerbaijan loses more than 70 million dollars.

    Energy experts and officials say this is a temporary disruption and that the pipelines via Georgia will soon be operating again.

    Political analyst Rasim Musabekov called Russia’s actions in Georgia “deliberate energy blackmail towards Europe and Azerbaijan”.

    “As soon as we started oil deliveries via the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, Russia started experiencing some problems,” he said. “This once again shows that the Baku-Novorossisk pipeline cannot be used as the main route to export Azerbaijani resources to Europe. Our main routes pass through Georgia. In the future we must pay more attention to their security.”

    Tamara Grigoryeva is an AFP correspondent in Baku.

  • America Must Choose Between Georgia and Russia

    America Must Choose Between Georgia and Russia

    By SERGEY LAVROV
    August 20, 2008

    In some Western nations an utterly one-sided picture has been painted of the recent crisis in the Georgia-South Ossetia conflict. The statements of American officials would lead one to conclude that the crisis began when Russia sent in its troops to support its peacekeepers there.

    Meticulously avoided in those statements: The decision of Tbilisi to use crude military force against South Ossetia in the early hours of Aug. 8. The Georgian army used multiple rocket launchers, artillery and air force to attack the sleeping city of Tskhinvali.

    Some honest independent observers acknowledge that a surprised Russia didn’t respond immediately. We started moving our troops in support of peacekeepers only on the second day of Georgia’s ruthless military assault. Yes, our military struck sites outside of South Ossetia. When the positions of your peacekeepers and the civilian population they have been mandated to protect are shelled, the sources of such attacks are legitimate targets.

    Our military acted efficiently and professionally. It was an able ground operation that quickly achieved its very clear and legitimate objectives. It was very different, for example, from the U.S./NATO operation against Serbia over Kosovo in 1999, when an air bombardment campaign ran out of military targets and degenerated into attacks on bridges, TV towers, passenger trains and other civilian sites, even hitting an embassy.

    In this instance, Russia used force in full conformity with international law, its right of self-defense, and its obligations under the agreements with regard to this particular conflict. Russia could not allow its peacekeepers to watch acts of genocide committed in front of their eyes, as happened in the Bosnian city of Srebrenica in 1995.

    But what of the U.S.’s role leading up to this conflict? U.S. involvement with the Tbilisi regime—past and future—must be addressed to fully understand the conflict. When the mantra of the “Georgian democratic government” is repeated time and time again, does it mean that by U.S. standards, a democratic government is allowed to act in brutal fashion against a civilian population it claims to be its own, simply because it is “democratic”?

    Another real issue is U.S. military involvement with the government of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Did Washington purposely encourage an irresponsible and unpredictable regime in this misadventure? If the U.S. couldn’t control Tbilisi’s behavior before, why do some in the U.S. seek to rush to rearm the Georgian military now?

    Russia, by contrast, remains committed to a peaceful resolution in the Caucasus.

    We’ll continue to seek to deprive the present Georgian regime of the potential and resources to do more mischief. An embargo on arms supplies to the current Tbilisi regime would be a start.

    We will make sure that the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan endorsed in Moscow on Aug. 12 is implemented, provided the parties to the conflict cooperate in good faith. So far we are not sure at all that Tbilisi is ready. President Saakashvili keeps trying to persuade the world that the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali was destroyed not by the Georgian attack but by the Russian forces who, according to Mr. Saakashvili, bombed the city after they entered it.

    Russia is committed to the ongoing positive development of relations with the U.S. That kind of agenda is set forth in the Foreign Policy Concept—the framework document that sets out the basic directions of Russia’s foreign policy—recently approved by President Dmitry Medvedev.

    However, it must be remembered that, as between any other major world powers, our bilateral relationship can only advance upon the basis of reciprocity. And that is exactly what has been missing over the past 16 years. I meant precisely that when I said that the U.S. will have to choose between its virtual Georgia project and its much broader partnership with Russia.

    The signs are ominous. Several joint military exercises have been cancelled by the Americans. Now Washington suggests our Navy ships are no longer welcome to take part in the Active Endeavour counterterrorism and counterproliferation operation in the Mediterranean. Washington also threatens to freeze our bilateral strategic stability dialogue.

    Of course, that strategic dialogue has not led us too far since last fall, including on the issue of U.S. missile defense sites in Eastern Europe and the future of the strategic arms reduction regime. But the threat itself to drop these issues from our bilateral agenda is very indicative of the cost of the choice being made in Washington in favor of the discredited regime in Tbilisi. The U.S. seems to be eager to punish Russia to save the face of a failed “democratic” leader at the expense of solving the problems that are much more important to the entire world.

    It is up to the American side to decide whether it wants a relationship with Russia that our two peoples deserve. The geopolitical reality we’ll have to deal with at the end of the day will inevitably force us to cooperate.

    To begin down the road of cooperation, it would not be a bad idea to do a very simple thing: Just admit for a moment that the course of history must not depend entirely on what the Georgian president is saying. Just admit that a democratically elected leader can lie. Just admit that you have other sources of information—and other objectives—that shape your foreign policy.

    Mr. Lavrov is the foreign minister of the Russian Federation.

  • NATO’s ‘Caucasus Council’

    NATO’s ‘Caucasus Council’

    19/08/2008 22:01 MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political observer Andrei Fedyashin) – The emergency NATO Council session held in Brussels on August 19 at America’s request to give Russia its “comeuppance” did not go smoothly. It took the ministers several hours to hammer out the final communique.

    In the end it turned out to be utterly predictable: the bloc’s 26 members decided that they would, after all, live with Russia, but they should talk to it in a tactful, but tough way. They heard the Georgian Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili (who, addressing the bloc’s headquarters, pressed for all thinkable punishments, including Russia’s expulsion from many international organizations), but refused to give a hearing to our Ambassador, Dmitry Rogozin.

    The latter had sought a meeting with NATO ministers and ambassadors every day since August 8 to explain the Russian position and actions. Rogozin threatened to spoil the party so much that he was barred from the meeting and was not even allowed to hold a press conference on the heels of the emergency meeting. Still, NATO officials have never tried to conceal the fact that their task was to protect the interests of the bloc and its members rather than to provide information and political objectivity.

    Speaking of the outcome of the meeting, Russia knew all along what NATO’s political response would be.

    At U.S. insistence, the bloc agreed to form a NATO-Georgia Commission (similar to the one it already has with Ukraine) to coordinate the strengthening of military ties with Tbilisi, and confirmed it was ready to admit Georgia to NATO at an unspecified future date. But NATO failed to back George Bush and curtail military cooperation and high-level meetings with Russia.

    The U.S. was counting on much more. U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, upon arrival in Brussels confirmed Greater Europe’s fears that the Americans had fallen prey to another bout of “diplomatic frenzy” which happens each time after major setbacks. Europe is not happy when America behaves like this because it is prone to get carried away and opens all the cards. The Old World prefers the slowly-slowly, softly-softly approach. Rice, however, declared that NATO would not allow Moscow to win a “strategic victory”. “We have to deny Russian strategic objectives, which are clearly to undermine Georgia’s democracy… We are not going to allow Russia to draw a new line at those states that are not yet integrated into the Transatlantic structures.”

    If one strips away the usual “democratic litany” what Condie said was that the U.S. and NATO must not allow Russia to prevent a new enlargement of the bloc by taking in Ukraine and Georgia. This is Washington’s long-term strategic objective: to close the NATO ring in the region where Russia is most vulnerable.

    “Russia’s strategic victory” was meant to come as a horrible revelation to European ears. True, Russia has never concealed that not allowing Georgia and Ukraine, especially under their present regimes, to join NATO was its “strategic objective.” The Europeans do not mind admitting them, but not all of them are quite sure that it is necessary and worthwhile to quarrel with and break relations with Moscow over Yushchenko’s Ukraine and Saakashvili’s Georgia. What is the point? NATO has moved up to Russia’s borders already.

    The European ministers in Brussels were faced with a classic conundrum: “punish or pardon.” Some NATO members formed “interest groups” even before the meeting on this issue. For example, Old Europe (Germany, France and Italy) was loath to continue rocking the “Transatlantic foundations.” But it was being pressed to go further than it wanted.

    The Europeans had, in fact, wondered for some time whether Bush would depart calmly or try to make his mark in history by springing yet another surprise. Much to Greater Europe’s chagrin, “friend George” is not someone who goes quietly. He had to bring Saakashvili’s Georgia into NATO through the slaughter of civilians in Tskhinvali. Now that it has turned into an indisputable disaster for Saakashvili, Washington is trying to bring pressure to bear on NATO allies and prevail over the Kremlin which refused to have another puppet government controlled by NATO, or rather Washington, on its doorstep. Washington is genuinely surprised as to why Moscow disagrees with such an elementary thing…

    NATO’s political response, as expected, boiled down to mere symbolism because NATO’s European old-timers were not ready to curtail links with Russia. Against this background, one finds some of NATO’s actions perplexing. According to our General Staff information unveiled during the meeting, U.S., Polish and Canadian naval ships would enter the Black Sea by the end of August. An encounter between Russian and NATO ships in times of crisis is not conducive to an early settlement of the “Caucasus conflict.”

    However, despite some disagreements between the Europeans and Washington, no one should have the slightest doubt that America, be it the America of George Bush or Barak Obama, will cease to be the Old World’s main ally. Illusions about a Transatlantic rift are no more than illusions. Russia should not kid itself about “Europe’s growing dependence” on its gas, oil, timber and other commodities. That will never be a prize “for good behavior”.

    There is nothing wrong with somebody in Europe, the European Union, NATO, the UN, the OSCE and so on giving Moscow bad marks for behavior. Instead of feeling outrage, we should long have done the same. We can even give marks on the European scale, although clearly, we have not yet adapted it to our way of thinking.

  • Russia-NATO relations in tatters

    Russia-NATO relations in tatters

    HONOR MAHONY

    Today @ 09:25 CET

    Moscow’s relations with NATO were left in tatters on Tuesday (19 August) after the Kremlin dismissed the results of an emergency meeting of the military alliance on Russia’s actions in Georgia as “empty words.”

    NATO foreign ministers gathered in the Brussels headquarters yesterday to discuss what actions it could take following the five-day war between Russia and its small Caucasian neighbour, Georgia, amid a hesitant withdrawal of Russian troops.

    NATO – the Tuesday statement contained little of substance (Photo: nato.int)

    But NATO itself is internally divided on how to approach energy-rich Russia. The EU relies on it for around a quarter of its energy needs, a factor said to influence the more cautious approach of Germany, France and Italy towards condemning Moscow, meaning the alliance cobbled together a political statement but little more.

    It said it would freeze regular contacts with Russia and said there would be “no business as usual under present circumstances” while urging Moscow to “take immediate action to withdraw its troops from the area.”

    There were no promises of troops in Georgia to give weight to the statement, however. Instead, the alliance said it would help with certain non-military “support measures.”

    NATO plans to send a “team of 15 civil emergency planning experts to help Georgia assess damage to its civil infrastructure” and “support the re-establishment of the air traffic system and assist the Georgian government in understanding the nature of cyber attacks.”

    There was no real push for giving Georgia and Ukraine NATO membership. French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner also said the EU would not rethink its support for Russia’s attempt to join the World Trade Organisation.

    The lack of substance was immediately picked up on by Russia.

    Empty words

    “On the whole, all of these threats that have been raining down on Russia turned out to be empty words,” said Dimitri Rogozin, the Russian ambassador to NATO.

    Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, described the statement as “unobjective and biased.”

    Russia continues to only pull back its troops slowly from Georgia even though it agreed to a France-brokered ceasefire over the weekend and announced the withdrawal on Monday.

    The most recent pledge by Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, is that all bar 500 Russia troops would be pulled out of Georgia by Thursday and Friday.

    But the promise was condemned by British foreign minister, David Miliband, who noted that it was already the third commitment on the withdrawal made by Russia.

    “I think we should still engage with the Russians but in a hard-headed way, and we mustn’t allow the Russians to feel they are the victims of this affair when they are the transgressors,” he said in a statement in UK daily The Times.

    The newspaper notes that a British diplomat had been stopped at a Russian checkpoint in Georgia and was told that he could not proceed without a Russian visa.

    According to Georgian officials, Russian troops remain in charge of about a third of Georgia, including Poti, the Black Sea port, and Gori, a key city near the South Ossetia border, the breakaway region at the heart of the conflict.

    Bloomberg news agency reports that Russia on Tuesday set out fresh conditions for its withdrawal.

    Fresh conditions

    “For the withdrawal of Russian troops to happen, two things are necessary: the pullback of Georgian forces to their barracks and, secondly, we need to be assured that our peacekeepers are not going to be attacked again,” Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations, Vitaly Churkin, said.

    The conflict also dominated a meeting of the United Nations Security Council, where veto-holding Russia on Tuesday refused to support a draft resolution calling for immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia.

    The political bartering comes just 10 days after the war started. On 7 August, Georgia attempted to retake South Ossetia, prompting a massive retaliation from Russia. The UN estimates the fighting has created 150,000 new refugees.

  • Turkey bows to the dark side

    Turkey bows to the dark side

    From the Los Angeles Times
    Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit is a sign that the West can no longer take Turkey for granted as a staunch ally against Iran.

    By Soner Cagaptay

    August 19, 2008

    ISTANBUL, TURKEY — Praying in Istanbul’s Blue Mosque on Friday, I witnessed firsthand Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s international publicity coup.

    Ahmadinejad’s visit produced little in terms of substantive policy; the signing of a multibillion-dollar natural gas pipeline deal was put off. But Ahmadinejad got something just as valuable: a chance to spin his own image, court popularity and bash the United States and Israel.

    I’ve long been fond of the Blue Mosque because it is where, many years ago, I attended my first Friday prayers. Last Friday, though, I felt uncomfortable in the prayer hall, where I found myself in front of God but next to Ahmadinejad, who turned the ritual into a political show.

    Departing from established practice of having visiting Muslim heads of state pray in a smaller mosque in Istanbul, the government allowed Ahmadinejad to pray in the Blue Mosque, Turkey’s symbol of tolerant Ottoman Islam. With permission from Turkish authorities, he also allowed Iranian television to videotape him during the entire prayer, in violation of Islamic tradition, which requires quiet and intimate communion between God and the faithful. There was so much commotion around Ahmadinejad that the imam had to chide the congregants. Then, as he left the mosque, Ahmadinejad got out of his car to encourage a crowd of about 300 to chant, “Death to Israel! Death to America!”

    Even without this behavior, any visit from a leader representing an authoritarian, anti-Western autocracy would have created controversy in Turkey just a few years ago. Not today. The ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, government not only opened the Blue Mosque to Ahmadinejad but accommodated his refusal to pay respects at the mausoleum of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern, secular Turkey — a major violation of protocol for an official visit.

    In 1996, when Iran’s president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, refused to go to Ataturk’s mausoleum, snubbing Turkey’s identity as a secular pro-Western state, it led to a public outcry and sharp criticism of Iran. Relations soured. When the Iranian ambassador suggested a few months later that Turkey should follow Sharia law, he was forced to leave the country.

    This time, though, the AKP government has taken a different stance, playing down the diplomatic insult. It moved the meeting from the capital, Ankara, to Istanbul and labeled it a “working” meeting rather than an official visit. Yet all sorts of AKP officials flocked to Istanbul to meet with the Iranian president.

    Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan asked the Turkish public to ignore the snub and instead “focus on the big picture.” It is the “big picture,” though, that is most disconcerting. By extending an invitation to Ahmadinejad, the first such move by any NATO or European Union member country, Turkey has broken ranks with the West. The West can no longer take Turkey for granted as a staunch ally against Tehran.

    In the past, Turkey stood with the West, especially after the 1979 Islamist revolution in Iran. Also, Tehran gave refuge to the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, which carried out terror attacks in Turkey from bases in Iran. Since the Iraq war began, however, Iran has shifted tactics to win Turkey’s heart. While the U.S. delayed taking action, Iran actually bombed PKK camps in northern Iraq.

    Meanwhile, since the AKP assumed power in Turkey in 2002, bilateral visits with Iran have boomed; Ahmadinejad’s trip crowns dozens of visits by high-level officials. Trade has boomed as well, increasing from $1.2 billion in 2002 to $8 billion today. And even though the two countries didn’t formalize the deal last week, plans are still going forward for a $3.5-billion Turkish investment in Iranian gas fields — this at a time when the West is adopting financial sanctions against Iran to cripple Tehran’s ability to make a nuclear bomb. If there were any doubts about a Turkish-Iranian rapprochement, they were laid to rest last week: During Ahmadinejad’s visit, the two countries agreed to make 2009 an “Iran-Turkey year of culture” — marked by regular cultural and political programs and exchanges — to bring the two countries closer.

    Ahmadinejad’s visit also speaks volumes about the future of Turkish-U.S. ties regarding Iran. According to a recent opinion poll in Turkey, when asked what the country should do in the event of a U.S. attack against Iran, only 4% of respondents said Turkey should support the U.S., while 33% wanted to back Iran and 63% chose neutrality.

    As I shared the canopy of the Blue Mosque’s divine dome with Ahmadinejad, I could not help but ponder how far Turkish foreign policy has shifted since 2002. Before, Turkey picked allies based on shared values — democracy, Western identity, secular politics and the principle of open society — that appeared to reflect the Turkish soul. Iran has not become a pro-Western, secular democracy since 1996, nor have Tehran’s mullahs accepted gender equality or the idea of a free society. Yet Ankara has had a change of heart toward Tehran. Years from now, Ahmadinejad’s visit to Istanbul will be remembered as the tipping point at which the West lost Turkey, and Turkey lost its soul.

    Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a visiting professor at Bahcesehir University in Istanbul.

  • Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

    Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

     
    18/08/2008 14:49  (18:05 minutes ago)
    STRATFOR — Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s two-day trip to Ankara ended Aug. 15. While the Iranian government and state media have touted his trip as proof that Iran and Turkey are close allies, the Turkish government is far more concerned with containing the current situation in the Caucasus, which could have major implications for Turkey’s ally Azerbaijan. Read STARTFOR analysis. 

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    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wrapped up a two-day trip to Ankara on Aug. 15. The Iranian government and state media have been hyping Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey for days in an attempt to showcase to the world the Iranian belief that Iran and Turkey, as the two principle non-Arab regional powerhouses, are close and natural allies.
     
    But while Iran is eager to forge closer ties with Turkey, the Turks do not have much time for Ahmadinejad right now. Ankara has bigger things on its mind, namely the Russians.
     
    Turkey is heir to the Ottoman Empire, which once extended deep into the southern Caucasus region where Russia just wrapped up an aggressive military campaign against Georgia. Turkey’s geopolitical interests in the Caucasus have primarily been defensive in nature, focused on keeping the Russians and Persians at bay. Now that Russia is resurging in the Caucasus, the Turks have no choice but to get involved.
     
    The Turks primarily rely on their deep ethnic, historical and linguistic ties to Azerbaijan to extend their influence into the Caucasus. Azerbaijan was alarmed, to say the least, when it saw Russian tanks crossing into Georgia. As far as Azerbaijan was concerned, Baku could have been the next target in Russia’s military campaign.
     
    However, Armenia — Azerbaijan’s primary rival — remembers well the 1915 Armenian genocide by the Turks, and looks to Iran and especially Orthodox Christian Russia for its protection. Now that Russia has shown it is willing to act on behalf of allies like South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Caucasus, the Armenians, while militarily outmatched by the Azerbaijanis, are now feeling bolder and could see this as their chance to preempt Azerbaijan in yet another battle for the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region— especially if it thinks it can look to Russia to militarily intervene on its behalf.
     
    The Turks and their ethnic kin in Azerbaijan are extremely wary of Russia’s intentions for the southern Caucasus beyond Georgia. Sources told Stratfor that Azerbaijan has learned that the Russian military jets that bombed Gori and Poti were based out of Armenia. This development not only signaled a significant expansion of Russia’s military presence in the southern Caucasus, but it also implied that Armenia had actually signed off on the Russian foray into Georgia, knowing that Russian dominance over Georgia would guarantee Armenian security and impose a geographic split between Turkey and Azerbaijan. If the Armenians became overly confident and made a move against Azerbaijan for Nagorno-Karabakh, expecting Russian support, the resulting war would have a high potential of drawing the Turks into a confrontation with the Russians — something that both NATO member Turkey and Russia have every interest in avoiding.
     
    The Turks also have a precarious economic relationship with Russia. The two countries have expanded their trade with each other significantly in recent years. In the first half of 2008, trade between Russia and Turkey amounted to $19.9 billion, making Russia Turkey’s biggest trading partner. Much of this trade is concentrated in the energy sphere. The Turks currently import approximately 64 percent of the natural gas they consume from the Russians. Though Turkey’s geographic position enables it to pursue energy links in the Middle East and the Caucasus that can bypass Russian territory, the Russians have made it abundantly clear over the past few days that the region’s energy security will still depend on MOSCOW ’s good graces.
     
    Turkey’s economic standing also largely depends on its ability to act as a major energy transit hub for the West through pipelines such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which was recently forced offline due to a purported Kurdish militant attack and the war in Georgia. Turkey simply cannot afford to see the Russians continue their surge into the Caucasus and threaten its energy supply.
     
    For these reasons, Turkey is on a mission to keep this tinderbox in the Caucasus contained. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan spent the last couple of days meeting with top Russian leaders in MOSCOW and then with the Georgian president in Tbilisi . During his meetings with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, President Dmitri Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Erdogan pushed the idea of creating a Caucasus union that would include both Russia and Georgia. Though this organization would likely be little more than a talk shop, it is a sign of Turkey’s interest in reaching a mutual understanding with Russia that would allow both sides to maintain a comfortable level of influence in the region without coming to blows.
     
    The Iranians, meanwhile, are sitting in the backseat. Though Iran has a foothold in the Caucasus through its support for Armenia, the Iranians lack the level of political, military and economic gravitas that Turkey and Russia currently hold in this region. Indeed, Erdogan did not even include Iran in his list of proposed members for the Caucasus union, even though Iran is one of the three major powers bordering the region. The Turks also struck a blow to Iran by holding back from giving Ahmadinejad the satisfaction of sealing a key energy agreement for Iran to provide Turkey with natural gas, preferring instead to preserve its close relationship with the United States and Israel. Turkey simply is not compelled to give Iran the attention that it is seeking at the moment.
     
    The one thing that Turkey can look to Iran for, however, is keeping the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict under control. Iran’s support for Armenia has naturally put Tehran on a collision course with Ankara when dealing with the Caucasus in the past. But when faced with a common threat of a resurgent Russia, both Turkey and Iran can agree to disagree on their conflicting interests in this region and use their leverage to keep Armenia or Azerbaijan from firing off a shot and pulling the surrounding powers into a broader conflict. In light of the recent BTC explosion claimed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey can also look to Iran to play its part in cracking down on PKK rebels in the region, many of whom have spent the past year fleeing a Turkish crackdown in northern Iraq by traversing through Iran to reach the southern Caucasus.
     
    While Iran and Turkey can cooperate in fending off the Russians, it will primarily be up to Turkey to fight the battle in the Caucasus. Russia has thus far responded positively to Turkey’s diplomatic engagements, but in a region with so many conflicting interests, the situation could change in a heartbeat.
     
    Reprinted with permissions of STRATFOR.
    Strategic Forecasting, Inc., Stratfor, is a private intelligence agency founded in 1996 in Austin, Texas. George Friedman is the founder, chief intelligence officer, and CEO of the company.