Category: EU Members

European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 17 Dec. 2004

  • Turkey accuses EU of bigotry

    Turkey accuses EU of bigotry

    Turkey accused the European Union of bias and bigoted attitudes towards the EU candidate country on Monday and blamed it for undermining the Turkish public’s trust in the bloc.

    ErdoganTurkey criticised the European Commission’s latest report on its progress towards EU membership as it presented for the first time its own report highlighting its reforms over the last year.

    Turkey began accession talks in 2005 but the process has ground to a halt due to an intractable dispute over Cyprus, the divided island state which Turkey does not recognise, and opposition from core EU members France and Germany.

    Despite waning domestic support for joining the EU, Ankara has continued to push for full membership of the union and has said it wants to join before 2023, the centenary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey.

    “We observed that this year’s Turkey Progress Report was overshadowed by more subjective, biased, unwarranted and bigoted attitudes,” Turkey’s EU Affairs Minister Egemen Bagis said in a statement accompanying Turkey’s own 270-page report.

    Bagis said it was unacceptable that the European Commission report released in October had ignored Turkey’s “courageous” reforms over the last year and that this undermined the EU’s trustworthiness in the eyes of the Turkish public.

    The minister previously voiced his disappointment with the report in October, saying it failed to be objective, ignored the expansion of rights for religious minorities and had criticised the judiciary too sweepingly.

    A recent survey by the German Marshall Fund think-tank found a majority of Turks view the EU negatively, illustrating the declining enthusiasm for EU membership.

    Ankara has completed only one of the 35 policy “chapters” every candidate must conclude to join the EU. All but 13 of those chapters are blocked by France, Cyprus and the European Commission.

    Talks have also been blocked by the Commission which says Turkey does not yet meet required standards on human rights, freedom of speech and religion.

    “Today there is no government in Europe which is more reformist than our government,” Bagis said.

    “While EU countries are struggling in crisis, our country is experiencing the most democratic, prosperous, modern and transparent period in its history,” he said.

    “The ‘sick man’ of yesterday has got up and summoned the strength to prescribe medication for today’s Europe … and to share the EU’s burden rather than being a burden to it,” he said.

    The progress report prepared by Turkey, released on the website of its EU Affairs Ministry, cited the passage of reforms in the areas of the judiciary, education and workers rights as examples of progress over the year.

    Bagis told Reuters in Dublin earlier this month Turkey was hopeful France will unblock talks over EU membership on at least two policy chapters in the coming months ahead of a visit by President Francois Hollande.

    While Hollande has stopped short of endorsing Turkey’s EU candidacy, he has said it should be judged on political and economic criteria – a contrast to his predecessor Nicolas Sarkozy’s position that Turkey did not form part of Europe.

    German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said on Dec. 21 the current standstill in negotiations over Turkey’s membership bid was unsatisfactory and the new year offered an opportunity to tackle outstanding issues with renewed vigour.

    EurActiv.com with Reuters

    via Turkey accuses EU of bigotry | EurActiv.

  • Turkey’s Fifteenth EU Progress Report: On the Road to Guinness, rather than Europe?

    Turkey’s Fifteenth EU Progress Report: On the Road to Guinness, rather than Europe?

    By Erdinç Erdem and Çağrı Yıldırım*

    Balkanalysis.com Editor’s note: As the year 2012 draws to a close, this new articles look on the major points of contention between the European Union and Turkey, as articulated in the bloc’s October progress report on the country. These issues, primarily related to the judiciary and security sector, look likely to continue to remain vital well after the conclusion of the Cypriot EU presidency.

    …………………………………………

    On October 10, 2012 the European Commission issued its fifteenth Annual Progress Report on Turkey’s EU accession bid. According to the Progress Report, Turkey still seems to have a long way to go before it can reach the gates of the European Union.

    On the other hand, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy, Stefan Fule commented on Turkey’s membership negotiations in a humorous manner by pointing out that “no one had any intention to make Turkey’s negotiations a subject for the Guinness Book of Records. The negotiations will never be a subject for the Guinness Book of Records especially in the case of a key country like Turkey.”

    Despite Stefan Fule’s humorous approach, this year’s Progress Report signifies quite clearly that Turkey’s harmonization process with the EU acquis is not moving in the right direction. Concerning democracy, rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities, it is expressed in the report that Turkey still has a lot of duties to fulfill.

    However, what was more striking about this year’s report has been Turkey’s response to the report. This has manifested in a way that has caused increasing conflict in relations between Turkey and the European Union.

    Blame Cyprus!

    For Turkey’s Minister of EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator, Egemen Bağış, the main issue responsible for this so-called ‘unjust’ result is the term ‘presidency’ of Cyprus (regarding the Republic of Cyprus’ position in the EU’s rotating presidency).

    Bağış stated that “the Greek Cypriot term presidency in the EU had a negative impact on the progress report. With such a pessimistic approach the EU faces the risk of putting in jeopardy the Positive Agenda which began in early 2012. Progress Reports have never been a great card for us and will never be.”

    In addition to what Bağış said, the head of the parliamentary Constitutional Commission, Burhan Kuzu, expressed his protest by throwing the Progress Report on the ground while appearing on one of the Turkish news channels. He further claimed that this progress report is a ‘vicious’ one prepared during the presidency of the “so-called state of ‘Southern Cyprus,’” which is not recognized by Turkey. Although he does not reject all the criticisms raised in the report, for Kuzu, “it is unjust to give such a bad grade to this hardworking student.”

    The initial reactions from the AKP government were thus very firm; mainly accusing the EU of having lost its objectiveness during Cyprus’ presidential term. Both statements put forth by Bağış and Kuzu underline that the EU has an unjust approach to the democratization and reform process of Turkey. Moreover, they claim that such a bad report full of harsh criticisms is largely because of Cyprus’s presidency, and thus, far from justice and objectivity.

    Contrary to the Progress Report, the Turkish side believes that Turkey is day by day getting better in terms of democracy, rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities since the coming of the AKP government. Since the accession negotiations began in 2005, the AKP government has made some alleged reforms concerning political criteria. In this respect, it has always emphasized that Turkey is already prepared for full membership. In other words, Turkey believes that it has long been ready to become a member, but suffers from the EU reluctance to accept it. Hence, Turkey tends to see the situation from the ‘Ankara perspective’ rather than that of Brussels.

    Continuation of the ‘Ankara Criteria’

    In perhaps one of his most cited remarks, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan indicated in 2005 that “Turkey should be accepted into the European Union. If not we will change the name of the Copenhagen Criteria to the Ankara Criteria and continue the reforms.” Although the Prime Minister made this speech before the opening accession negotiations in 2005, the ‘Ankara Criteria’ concept has since then become one of the main arguments of the AKP government.

    In this way, the government seems to be arguing that the reforms required for full membership are duties not only to become a part of the EU but for the consolidation of democracy and human rights inside the country. Hence, the ‘Ankara Criteria’ imply reforms that will be undertaken even if the EU does not accept Turkey as a full member. On the other hand, shortly after the accession negotiations started, the AKP government decelerated the quite conscientious reform process undergoing in Turkey since it gained its candidacy status at the Helsinki Summit in 1999.

    Accession Reform Efforts since Helsinki: Some Progress

    The Helsinki Summit marked the beginning of Turkey’s candidacy status granted by the European Council, with an official statement made that “Turkey is a candidate country destined to join the EU.” Turkey’s candidacy status was a great encouragement towards reinforcing its process of Europeanization in terms of its institutional infrastructure. From then on, Turkey has made some efforts to align its institutions, legislations, and policies with the EU acquis.

    To expedite this transformation process, the Commission prepared an Accession Partnership Document for Turkey in 2000. In line with the Accession Partnership Document, Turkey prepared and submitted its National Programme for the Adoption of the EU acquis in 2001. In this direction, the coalition government composed of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Motherland Party (ANAP), and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) adopted a major Constitutional package that addressed the articles on freedom of expression and revised the death penalty with 34 amendments to the 1982 Constitution. Two more harmonization packages and one civil penal code package followed these reforms. The extensive third harmonization package included the abolition of the death penalty. It was the last constitutional package the coalition government promulgated in August 2001.

    When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power the next year, the reform process gained more speed. Between 2002 and 2004, the AKP government adopted six harmonization packages and the new Turkish Penal Code. Therefore, at the Brussels Summit in 2004, the European Council concluded that Turkey had complied sufficiently with the Copenhagen political criteria so that the accession process could officially begin on 3 October 2005. Paradoxically, however, Turkey’s membership process has since been stalled by a number of domestic and external factors.

    As external factors, the accession process of Turkey has been slowed down because of the changing view on Turkish membership. Former accession processes clearly show that the membership process strongly depends on the support of member states; especially the more populous and economically developed ones. For example, Germany played a critical role in opening negotiations with Turkey at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, but when the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) under Angela Markel came to power, the policy towards Turkey immediately changed after the opening of accession negotiations. Several economic crises in smaller countries further eroded support for Turkey in the EU. Therefore, the views within individual EU member states seem to be coming together and hardening into an essentially negative position towards Turkey.

    Selective Implementation of Reforms under the AKP

    On the domestic front, the AKP government has increasingly shown signs of ‘reform fatigue,’ hesitating to push hard for implementation and enforcement of the rights-based reforms that it had so assertively legislated previously. Therefore, the question of whether or not EU’s political conditionality has lost its credibility over Turkey has become one of the main topics in EU studies. In 2010, Ankara’s policy of creating more leeway for itself in its synchronization efforts with the EU was formalized with the publication of European Union Strategy for Turkey’s Accession Process by the Turkey’s Secretariat General of EU Affairs. The report explicitly states that:

    “regardless of whether the chapters have been opened, suspended or blocked, the objective is to revive the commitments laid down in the programme for Alignment with the Acquis that was prepared earlier and based on Turkey’s own priorities and timetables, and to keep on the agenda the priorities of Turkey’s National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, prepared in line with the Accession Partnership.”

    This statement indicates that the Ankara government aims to implement the EU acquis, albeit selectively, whether relevant chapters are opened or not. Because Turkey still rejects opening its ports and airports to traffic from Cyprus, eight chapters have been frozen by the European Council. Eleven others are blocked by France, Greece and Cyprus due to their problematic bilateral relations with Turkey. Paradoxically, these adverse circumstances have created a unique situation in which Turkey can choose which parts of the acquis to implement relatively, without the pressure of EU conditionality and negotiations.

    In other words, while the AKP government is continuing the reform process with respect to the ones that serve their purposes, it is largely neglecting the ones that do not; and these ones are the epitome of political criteria that are criticized in the 2012 Progress Report. In the report, the main areas criticized include the trials of the Union of Communities of Kurdistan (KCK), Ergenekon and the alleged ‘Sledgehammer,’ coup, as well as the lingering Kurdish issue in general. Criticism was also reserved for the perceived absence of transparent public inquiry, and the lack of discussion of political responsibility in the event of Uludere (Roboski), where 34 civilians were killed by a military air strike in December 2011.

    The report also shows concerns about the prevalence of lengthy pre-trial detentions, and long and catch-all indictments that overshadow the reliability and legitimacy of these judicial proceedings. It further states that the Turkish “judiciary even accepts evidence collected by police only or via secret witnesses.”

    Human Rights Concerns: still an Issue

    It is not known whether Cyprus in its role as rotating EU president played a deliberate role in specifying these criticisms expressed in the Progress Report. If this is the case, it can only be said that Cyprus has made fair criticisms. Indeed, this report does not say anything new about the political situation in Turkey. There are many NGOs expressing their concerns about human rights violations going on in Turkey. For example, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CFJ) has criticized Turkey in terms of the allegedly repressive penal code, its anti-terror law, and oppression of the media. It states that 76 journalists have been imprisoned since August 2012, at least 61 of whom were sentenced due to their published works or news-gathering activities.

    Moreover, approximately seventy percent of these journalists are Kurdish, and they have been accused of engaging in terrorist activities. However, in response to the question of Stephen Sackur on BBC’s Hard Talk, Minister Bağış claims that “there is no journalist who has been detained because of his profession. There are some people who carry journalist identification cards, who have been caught while raping another person or have been caught robbing a bank.” However, it is very well known that these journalists in question are neither rapists nor robbers, but that they are on trial mostly due to the existing anti-terror law.

    CFJ is not the only organization that criticizes Turkey other than the European Union. Amnesty International expresses its worries regarding the rights of prisoners on hunger strike since 12 September for which the Turkish media largely remains muted. Moreover, Human Rights Watch underlines that “the government has not prioritized human rights reforms since 2005, and freedom of expression and association have both been damaged by the ongoing prosecution and incarceration of journalists, writers, and hundreds of Kurdish political activists, particularly through the misuse of overly broad terrorism laws. Violence against women in Turkey remains endemic. Police continue to use excessive force, particularly against demonstrators, and are rarely held accountable for such violence.”

    Waiting for the Constitution

    In conclusion, it is not very surprising that the EU’s fifteenth Progress Report released in October emphasizes Turkey’s backsliding in meeting the political criteria. It seems from the EU report that the EU is waiting for the new constitution (which itself has generated internal political controversies) that will perhaps come into force in 2013.

    Other than the seemingly joint preparation of this civil constitution, the report does not indicate any other positive signs regarding political reforms. Rather, in contrast it suggests that “the rest of political life was characterized by limited dialogue and frequent tensions.”

    Therefore, as the former Green Left Member of the European Parliament Joost Lagendijk very precisely put it, Turkey should “not blame the doctor” for not being able to enter the European Union. Thus, the 2012 progress report should not be considered as a sort of European hatred for Turkey; rather, it should be viewed as a diagnosis of the illnesses of democracy in Turkey today.

    ……………………………………..

    Erdinç Erdem is currently a master’s student at LSE, enrolled in the MSc European Studies: Ideas and Identities Programme. He was previously a master’s student on political science at Sabanci University, and earned an undergraduate degree on international relations and the European Union at the Izmir University of Economics in Turkey. His research interests are mainly continental political philosophy, critical theory, Turkish politics, and EU-Turkey relations.

    Çağrı Yıldırım is a visiting researcher at Kadir Has University. He completed his M.A. degree on European Studies at Sabancı University and holds a B.A. in International Relations and the EU from Izmir University of Economics. His research interests include Europeanization (External impacts of EU), EU–Turkey relations and energy politics.

  • Revisiting Lausanne Part I: Greece-Turkey Population Exchange in Turkey

    Revisiting Lausanne Part I: Greece-Turkey Population Exchange in Turkey

     By Agnes Czajka and Bora Isyar

     

     

    Agnes Czajka joined the Department of Sociology at the University College Cork in January of 2012. Prior to joining UCC, she was Assistant Professor of Sociology at the American University in Cairo.

    Bora Isyar is Lecturer in Politics, Department of Sociology, National University of Ireland, Maynooth.

     

    Without doubt, throughout history, the question of democracy has predominantly been addressed through discourses of rights.1 Yet the space minority rights occupy in the Turkish case deserves particular attention, as it reveals that minority rights need to be addressed separately from so-called universal citizenship rights. What Turkey illustrates is that proliferation of citizenship rights does not necessarily mean a proliferation of minority rights, as minorities, despite being formally recognised as citizens, do not necessarily enjoy citizenship rights to the extent those recognised as bona fide members of the national community do. This dissonance between the rights of bona fide nationals and minorities, we argue, constitutes one of the biggest obstacles the Turkish Republic must overcome in order to be able to initiate a genuine democratisation process.

    In the first part of this two-part series, we examine the historical context of the Greece-Turkey population exchange, focusing on the emergence of national identity as the dominant way in which to identify and govern populations, and the ascendancy of the racialised meaning of nation. It is in this context that the exchange of minority populations emerges not only as a possibility, but in fact, a necessity. As such, the context is crucial to an understanding of the nature of the minority question in contemporary Turkey.

    All social and political phenomena are in essence historical, and their particular histories shape the manner in which they are interpreted today. We argue that to address the aforementioned dissonance we must first comprehend the manner and circumstances in which it emerged, and the power relations that were at play in the constitution of minorities as a particular group of citizens, distinct from bona fide nationals. We suggest that only by attending to these circumstances can we fully apprehend the salience of the minority rights question in Turkey, and the continued differentiation between bona fide and minority citizens. What is needed, therefore, is a revisiting of the tumultuous foundational years of the Turkish Republic, with an eye to the manner in which minorities were problematised at this particular historical juncture. The pivotal event in this problematisation, we suggest, was the population exchange between Greece and Turkey.

    The most monumental of these exchanges was indeed the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey. The Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, signed by the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Government of Greece on 30 January 1923 constituted the legal framework according to which the exchange was to take place. The rights and duties of groups who were exempt from the exchange were outlined in by the Treaty of Lausanne (henceforth, Treaty) signed by the Turkish, Greek, British, Italian, and Japanese governments on 24 July 1923. As such, most scholarly work on the population exchange has engaged in socio-legal analyses of the aforementioned documents.2

    With the notable exception of Bruce Clark,3 these analyses have generally taken the “letter of the treaty”4 as not only expressive of what was happening, so to speak, on the ground, but also as representative of the subjects of the exchange, and the practices through which it materialised. It is our contention that in order to understand both the exchange and its legacy for contemporary minority politics, it is necessary to not only interrogate the legal framework according to which the exchange was to take place, but also the context in which it emerged as a possibility, the discourses through which it was constructed, and most importantly, the practices through which it actually took place, and the discourses through which it was constructed as an exchange between racialised, national populations. We suggest that by situating the population exchange in this broader historical and political context, and by attending to its role in the construction of a caesura between bona fide and minority citizens, we can more fully apprehend the nature of the minority question in contemporary Turkey, and the continuing disconnect between citizenship and minority rights.

    The Context of 1923 Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey

    As previously mentioned, it is crucial to examine the historical context of the exchange as the exchange was itself a culmination of a series of events and struggles through which groups that were constituted as different on a variety of grounds began to be constituted as different on the grounds of a racialised, national identity. It is, of course, impossible for us to do justice to the manner in which groups were governed during the 600 year long history of the Ottoman Empire, let alone to the always complex and multi-layered manner in which individuals and groups governed and interpreted themselves, and constructed their own subjectivities.5 Yet, if we are to understand the population exchange and its legacy for minority rights in contemporary Turkey, we must attend at least to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a transformative period in the governance of European (and Ottoman) subjects. It is in this period that national identity emerges as the dominant way in which to identify and govern populations, and the racialised meaning of nation gains ascendancy over competing meanings. These two transformations, we argue, are crucial to understanding the population exchange itself, and the shadow it continues to cast over minority politics in Turkey.

    Our contention that national identity emerges at this historical juncture as the dominant way in which to identify and govern populations, and that the racialised meaning of nation gains ascendancy over competing meanings does not imply the absence or total annihilation of other meanings of nation, or for that matter, of religion as a category through which populations were identified and governed. The dominance of one discourse or meaning is never secure, and struggles to monopolise or determine the meaning of a particular concept never completely cease. It is possible, however, to interpret the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a moment in which the dominant meaning of nation was determined by the discourse of race, and the most fundamental and irreconcilable of differences became difference grounded in racialised, national identity. The context of the population exchange can thus be interpreted as one during which both the discourses of nation are able to monopolise the constitution of difference, and the discourses of race dominate the meaning of nation. It is this binary that not only conditions the possibility of a population exchange between Greece and Turkey, but makes such exchange seem both natural and desirable.

    Attesting to the dominance of this binary is the failure of Ottomanism, a policy deployed to govern the population of the late Ottoman Empire. Operating for less than a century, Ottomanism was unsustainable at the moment of its emergence, and unable to preserve itself in the face of competing models of being and belonging. It is precisely its unsustainability that makes Ottomanism so revealing. Its disintegration discloses the obsolescence of non-racialised nationality as a basis of belonging, and the coming into dominance of the racialised nation as the only legitimate form of belonging, and the most primary fault line of difference. The failure of Ottomanism can thus be interpreted as the precipice between the possibility of differently constituted populations and minorities, and the closing off of such possibilities. It is the moment at which the possibilities of being, doing and thinking otherwise-than-the-racialised-nation recede into the distance, and populations and their politics appear as having been always already national.

    The Collapse of Ottomanism and the Racialisation of Nation

    Before attending to the collapse of Ottomanism, it is necessary to take a brief look at the perceived unsustainability of the millet system6, to which Ottomanism was one response. The late Ottoman Empire was shaken by a number of national liberation movements whose aim was the establishment of sovereign states for communities whose national consciousness was on the rise. With each passing year, the rulers of the empire found it increasingly difficult to sustain its unity and preserve its territorial integrity. Greek independence (in 1821) solidified their belief that the millet system was no longer sustainable. A bond between the distinct populations of Ottoman subjects, and a different way of arranging relations between them and the ruling bodies were necessary if the empire were to survive7. What emerged was the policy of Ottomanism, and its attendant Ottoman citizenship.

    Article 8 of the 1876 Ottoman Constitution defined Ottoman citizenship in the following manner: “Irrespective of religion, race, creed, or sect, every person who is a subject of the Ottoman Empire is called an Ottoman citizen”.8 Article 16 of the same constitution declared all Ottoman citizens to be absolutely equal before the law and in the eyes of the state.9 This was the first time in the history of the empire when all subjects were recognised to be equal before the law, and when all inhabitants were supposed to engage in public life (in the broadest sense of the term) as Ottomans, and not in accordance with their religious confessions.10 In addition to the legal construction of Ottoman citizenship, the state initiated numerous reforms designed to fabricate this universal citizenry. Non-Muslims were authorised to take up official government posts;11 schools for pupils of all religious confessions were opened;12 the poll tax, previously levied exclusively on non-Muslim subjects of the Empire had been abolished in 1855.13 That same year non-Muslims were, for the first time conscripted into the army.14 What needs to be kept in mind, however, is that legal and discursive declarations of universality are just that – legal and discursive declarations that tell us little about the manner in which subjects themselves interpreted and practiced Ottomanism. As the relatively swift disintegration of Ottomanism reveals, the subjects that this universalist policy attempted to produce were not willing to enact themselves as such.

    Like the unsustainability of the millet system before it, the unsustainability of Ottomanism shows the slow but steady closing off of the possibilities of thinking about people in non-racially defined national terms. The unsustainability of millet system marked the foreclosure of the possibility of constituting and governing the inhabitants of the empire in non-national terms. The unsustainability of Ottomanism, in turn, marked the foreclosure of the possibility of constituting the national in non-racial terms. Thus, the question at hand is this: Why were non-national (specifically non-racially defined national) ways of constituting and governing people increasingly closed off in the late Ottoman Empire? The answer lies in the rise, at the turn of the century, of a particular kind of nationalism, and its attendant constructions of nation.

    Hannah Arendt’s15 analysis of the origins of totalitarianism offers an insight into this historical struggle, and thus, into the unsustainability of Ottoman citizenship. Arguing that both as a concept and an institution the state is much older than nationality, Arendt suggests that prior to the nineteenth century, the state’s function was the protection of all those inhabiting its territory.16 The nineteenth century identification of the state with nation, or “the conquest of the state by the nation”17 precipitated a significant transformation in the function of the state. “In the name of the will of the people,” argues Arendt, “the state was forced to recognise only ‘nationals’ as citizens, to grant full social and political rights only to those who belonged to the national community by right of origin and fact of birth.” It was thus, “partly transformed from an instrument of the law into an instrument of the nation”.18

    Yet, it was only once the nation was constructed as a natural community that the conquest of the state by the nation could be realised.19 For the nation’s dominance to become naturalised and taken-for-granted it had to be constructed and enacted as something grounded in and defined through elements that were essential and non-transferable. Thus, as Étienne Balibar argues, neither language (which could be acquired), nor culture (which could be adopted) sufficed;20 only race, biologically defined, could naturalise the nation and thus construct it as the only legitimate basis for belonging, and the only natural form of community. The naturalisation of the nation form, in other words, could only take place through its racialisation.21 This racialisation of the nation form (and the naturalisation of the national way of being and the national order of things) was in turn made possible by the contemporaneous coming into dominance of race as the most fundamental category into which the peoples of the world could and should be divided.

    It was in this manner that the racialised national started to provide the dominant lens through which the world was interpreted, and began to give sense and meaning to the world. The failure of Ottomanism, and emergence of the “non-Muslim issue” as a national minority issue needs to be interpreted against this background. The emergence of national liberation movements, the conquest of state by nation, and the racialisation of the nation have a pivotal and detrimental effect on Ottomanism. It is in their wake that Ottoman citizenship begins to be perceived as unnatural, precisely because it is a form of belonging that is non-national, in the racialised, naturalised sense of nation that is dominant at the time. A brief interrogation of the debates in the empire on the causes of Ottomanism’s failure points clearly in this direction.

    According to one set of arguments, the failure of Ottomanism could be attributed to the inauthenticity of the bond it sought to construct. Ottomanism, it was argued, attempted to fabricate a bond between peoples who in fact “naturally” belonged to different national communities. What Ottomanism attempted to transgress through the construction of the Ottoman citizen was not religious differences (already perceived as an inauthentic way of belonging) but innate and essential national differences. In this vein, Yusuf Akçura, one of the founding fathers of Turkish nationalism, argued that Ottomanism had arrived in the empire a century later than it should have. Now, such an artificial bond would most certainly be overshadowed by the natural and instinctual will-to-national-existence of the various peoples who comprised the empire.22 The second set of arguments likewise took the existence of racialised national identities for granted. However, it interpreted Ottomanism as a euphemism for Turkish nationalism. According to this set of arguments, proponents of Ottomanism were actually Turkish nationalists, masking their true agenda behind the ostensibly universalist principle of Ottoman citizenship.23

    While both of these sets of arguments (both taking as given that national belonging was the natural, instinctual way of belonging) gained immense strength in the late Ottoman Empire, it was the 1912-3 Balkan Wars that effaced the Ottoman as a potential political subjectivity and ground of belonging.24 Again, what is important for the purposes of the argument being made in this paper are dominant interpretations of the Balkan Wars circulating in the late Ottoman Empire. Like in the case of the aforementioned debates regarding Ottomanism, the ‘validity’ or ‘truthfulness’ of these accounts is immaterial. What matters is that at this time accounts that divided Ottoman citizens into racial-national groups emerged and gained strength and legitimacy in the political discursive field. Once again, two dominant interpretations were in circulation. The first interpretation attributed the losses suffered by the empire at least in part to the unwillingness of some Ottoman citizens (especially those of Greek and Armenian descent) to fight in the name of the empire.25 The second, and related interpretation attributed the losses to the fact that the empire was fighting nascent nation-states, each comprised of a single race whose members always acted as one.26 As one of the founders of Turkism put it, “it was only the pride in one’s racial being that could bring success to the nation in war, in cultural development, and in political spheres”.27

    It is in this context, and at the intersection of these discursive strands that Ottomanism becomes not only unsustainable, but in fact undesirable and unnatural as a policy through which to forge a people. The nation form (now defined through racial discourse) emerges as the only natural and viable basis for community formation, and Turkism, a nationalist movement that racialises Turkishness and constructs it as the determinative identity of the citizens of the empire (and later republic) attains dominance.28 As it is the racial homogeneity of a polity that makes it viable and secures its existence, what matters most for Turkism is not the religious persuasion of the population of the empire, but the racially defined nations to which they belong. It is in this context that the minority emerges as the national minority and as a problem.29 It is also in this context that the exchange of minority populations emerges as a possibility.

     

     

     

     

     

    1. See Frank Cunningham, Theories of Democracy: A Critical Introduction (Routledge: London, 2002) and Charles Tilly, Democracy (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2007). For an example of the separation of the questions of democracy and rights, see Stephen White, ‘Is Russia a Democracy?’, Unpublished paper delivered at Centre for the Study of Wider Europe, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, December 13, 2010.

    2. See Alexis Alexandris, ‘Religion or Ethnicity: The Identity Issue of the Minorities in Greece and Turkey’, in R. Hirschon, ed., Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey (New York: Berghahn, 2003), 117-32; Raoul Blanchard, ‘The Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey’, Geographical Review, 15, 3 (1925), 449-56; Van Coufoudakis, ‘International Law and Minority Protection: The Fate of Greeks of Imbros and Tenedos’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 19, 4 (2008), 14-28; M. A. Gökaçtı, Nüfus Mübadelesi: Kayıp Bir Kuşağın Hikayesi (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002); Anastasia Lekka, ‘Legislative Provisions of the Ottoman/Turkish Governments Regarding Minorities and Their Properties’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 18, 1 (2007), 135-154.

    3. Bruce Clark, Twice a Stranger: How Mass Expulsion Forged Modern Greece and Turkey (London: Granta, 2006).

    4. Clark, Stranger, 16.

    5. This history has been addressed by others including Benjamin Braude, ‘Foundation Myths of the Millet System’, in B. Braude and B. Lewis, ed., Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, Volume I: The Central Lands (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982); Roderic Davison, ‘Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century’, American Historical Review, 59, 4 (1954), 844-64; Fatma Göçek, Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of the Empire: Ottoman Westernisation and Social Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600 (London: Phoenix, 1973); Halil İnalcık, From Empire to Republic: Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History (İstanbul: ISIS, 1995); Kemal Karpat, The Politicisation of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Riva Kastoryano, ‘From Millet to Community: The Jews of Istanbul’, in A. Rodrigue, ed., Ottoman and Turkish Jewry: Community and Leadership (Bloomington, IN.: Indiana University Press, 1992); Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Victor Roudemetof, ‘From Rum Millet to Greek Nation: Enlightenment, Secularisation, and National Identity in Ottoman Balkan Society, 1453-1821’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 16 (1998), 11-48.

    6. For detailed analyses of the millet system see Braude, ‘Foundation Myths’; Davison, ‘Turkish Attitudes’; İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire; Aron Rodrigue, ‘Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire’, SEHR, 5, 1 (2005).

    7. Renee Worringer, ‘‘Sick Man of Europe’ or ‘Japan of the Near East’?: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 36, 2 (2004), 209.

    8. Quoted in Şeref Gözübüyük and Suna Kili, Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Sened-i İttifak’tan Günümüze (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2000), 43.

    9. Gözübüyük and Kili, Türk, 44.

    10. Bora Isyar, Fuat Keyman, Bahar Rumelili, ‘Non-Muslim Acts of European Citizenship’, Report prepared for ENACT: Enacting European Citizenship project funded by the European Commission, 2009.

    11. Selçuk Somel, ‘Osmanlı Modernleşme Döneminde Periferik Nüfus Grupları’, Toplum be Bilim, 83 (2000), 179.

    12. Mehmet Alkan, ‘Resmi İdeolojinin Doğuşu ve Evrimi Üzerine Bir Deneme’, in M. Alkan, ed., Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Cilt I: Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası, Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 379.

    13. Gülnihal Bozkurt, ‘Tanzimat and Law’, in Tanzimat’ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu (Ankara: TTK, 1994), 284.

    14. Naim Turfan, Rise of Young Turks: Politics, the Military, and Ottoman Collapse, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 19.

    15. Arendt, Origins.

    16. Arendt, Origins, 230.

    17. Arendt, Origins, 230.

    18. Arendt, Origins, 230.

    19. Bora Isyar, ‘Invention of the Turk: A Genealogy of the Nation’, Ph.D. thesis, York University, 2007.

    20. Balibar, ‘Nation Form’, 143.

    21. A note of caution is necessary regarding the relationship between racialisation and racism. As Foucault argues, racism is a technology made possible by and grounded in the process of racialisation, where racialisation is understood as a process through which societies, peoples and nations are defined in racial terms, and as such, their existence as a group is naturalised (Foucault, Society, 65). Racism is thus a chapter in the history of racialisation. As such, the absence of explicit racism in a polity does not necessarily mean it is not a racialised one.

    22. Yusuf Akçura, Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset (Ankara: TTK), 28-34.

    23. Karpat, Politicisation, 320.

    24. Bora Isyar, ‘The Origins of Turkish Republican Citizenship: The Birth of Race’, Nations and Nationalism, 11, 3 (2005), 344-8.

    25. Isyar, ‘Origns of Turkish Republican Citizenship’, 346. For examples of this argument see, Yusuf Akçura, ‘Yeni Hayata Doğru’, Türk Yurdu, 3, 2 (1912), 1-3; Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam (İstanbul: Remzi, 1967); Cemal Kutay, 1913’te Garbi Trakya’da Kurulan İlk Türk Cumhuriyeti (İstanbul: TTK, 1962); Ömer Seyfettin, Efruz Bey (İstanbul: Kanaat, 1914).

    26. Isyar, ‘Origns of Turkish Republican Citizenship’, 346.

    27. Ziya Gökalp, Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak (İstanbul: Türk Kültür Yayınları, 1913), 24.

    28. Isyar, ‘Origns of Turkish Republican Citizenship’, 343.

    29. We use the terminology of problem in the Foucauldian sense, to indicate that which becomes an object of debate, interpretation or struggle, or that which emerges at a particular time as a matter of concern, as something to be attended to, addressed or remedied.

  • Turkey official condemns French paper’s bio of Prophet Muhammad

    Turkey official condemns French paper’s bio of Prophet Muhammad

    ANKARA (AFP) – A senior Turkish government official lashed out on Monday at plans by a French satirical newspaper to release a comic book biography of the Prophet Mohammed, calling it a “provocation” and advising Muslims to ignore it.

    The reaction from Mr Ibrahim Kalin, a close aide to Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, came a day after satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo announced plans to release a comic biography of Islam’s founder on Wednesday that the paper said would be researched and educational.

    “Charlie Hebdo’s editor says the cartoons won’t be offensive to Muslims. Turning the prophet of Islam into a cartoon character is itself wrong,” Mr Kalin said in a message on Twitter.

    “No matter what Charlie Hebdo people say, this is a provocation. My advise to Muslims: ignore it. Don’t give them what they want.”

    via Turkey official condemns French paper’s bio of Prophet Muhammad.

  • Turkey accuses EU of bigotry, says its reforms are ignored

    Turkey accuses EU of bigotry, says its reforms are ignored

    Egemen Bağış

    ISTANBUL (Reuters) – Turkey accused the European Union of bias and bigoted attitudes towards the EU candidate country on Monday and blamed it for undermining the Turkish public’s trust in the bloc.

    Turkey criticised the European Commission’s latest report on its progress towards EU membership as it presented for the first time its own report highlighting its reforms over the last year.

    Turkey began accession talks in 2005 but the process has ground to a halt due to an intractable dispute over Cyprus, the divided island state which Turkey does not recognise, and opposition from core EU members France and Germany.

    Despite waning domestic support for joining the EU, Ankara has continued to push for full membership of the union and has said it wants to join before 2023, the centenary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey.

    “We observed that this year’s Turkey Progress Report was overshadowed by more subjective, biased, unwarranted and bigoted attitudes,” Turkey’s EU Affairs Minister Egemen Bagis said in a statement accompanying Turkey’s own 270-page report.

    Bagis said it was unacceptable that the European Commission report released in October had ignored Turkey’s “courageous” reforms over the last year and that this undermined the EU’s trustworthiness in the eyes of the Turkish public.

    The minister previously voiced his disappointment with the report in October, saying it failed to be objective, ignored the expansion of rights for religious minorities and had criticised the judiciary too sweepingly.

    A recent survey by the German Marshall Fund think-tank found a majority of Turks view the EU negatively, illustrating the declining enthusiasm for EU membership.

    Ankara has completed only one of the 35 policy “chapters” every candidate must conclude to join the EU. All but 13 of those chapters are blocked by France, Cyprus and the European Commission.

    Talks have also been blocked by the Commission which says Turkey does not yet meet required standards on human rights, freedom of speech and religion.

    “Today there is no government in Europe which is more reformist than our government,” Bagis said.

    “While EU countries are struggling in crisis, our country is experiencing the most democratic, prosperous, modern and transparent period in its history,” he said.

    “The ‘sick man’ of yesterday has got up and summoned the strength to prescribe medication for today’s Europe … and to share the EU’s burden rather than being a burden to it,” he said.

    The progress report prepared by Turkey, released on the website of its EU Affairs Ministry, cited the passage of reforms in the areas of the judiciary, education and workers rights as examples of progress over the year.

    Bagis told Reuters in Dublin earlier this month Turkey was hopeful France will unblock talks over EU membership on at least two policy chapters in the coming months ahead of a visit by President Francois Hollande.

    While Hollande has stopped short of endorsing Turkey’s EU candidacy, he has said it should be judged on political and economic criteria – a contrast to his predecessor Nicolas Sarkozy’s position that Turkey did not form part of Europe.

    German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said on December 21 the current standstill in negotiations over Turkey’s membership bid was unsatisfactory and the new year offered an opportunity to tackle outstanding issues with renewed vigour.

     

     

     

     

     

    Reuters

     

  • UK: Bomb under policeman’s car

    UK: Bomb under policeman’s car

    A viable bomb placed under a serving police officer’s car in Belfast was a murder attempt by dissident republican paramilitaries, the police have said.

    The unexploded device was discovered on the Upper Newtownards Road at about 14:00 GMT on Sunday.

    Army bomb disposal officers have been called to deal with the device and have carried out a controlled explosion.

    The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) said the bomb was “clearly intended to kill the police officer”.

    Evacuated

    In a statement, PSNI Assistant Chief Constable George Hamilton said: “It is very fortunate that this device was detected before it exploded and that no one was killed or seriously injured.

    “Initial investigations would indicate that this was a viable device placed below an officer’s car sometime in the last 48 hours.”

    ACC Hamilton added that the officer’s family and neighbours “were also put at risk of serious harm”.

    A number of houses in the area have been evacuated. The nearby Stormont Presbyterian Church has been opened for residents forced to leave their homes.

    The Upper Newtownards Road has been closed to traffic between the Knock Road junction and Cabin Hill Park.

    ACC Hamilton added: “Our belief is that this attempted murder was carried by those opposed to peace from within dissident republicanism.

    “They don’t care who they attack, they don’t care who they kill. They are simply anti-peace and determined to carry on bringing pain and devastation to families and communities by maiming and killing.”

    Booby-trap

    In recent years, dissident republican paramilitary groups have carried out a number of attacks on PSNI officers.

    In April 2011, Constable Ronan Kerr was killed when a booby-trap car bomb exploded under his car in Omagh, County Tyrone.

    The previous year, Constable Peadar Heffron lost a leg in a similar attack as he drove to work in Randalstown, County Antrim.

    The SDLP’s spokesperson on policing, Conall McDevitt, condemned the latest attack, describing it as a “cynical and deplorable act”.

    He said: “Those seeking to target police officers are undermining not only the stated will of the people of Ireland who have long since rejected violence, but also the desire for a new beginning for policing in the north, which is shared by the majority of citizens.”

    Mr McDevitt urged anyone with information about the attack to contact the PSNI.

    ‘Cowardly act’

    Robin Newton from the DUP said the attack was an attempt to murder.

    “Those who placed this potential bomb have nothing to offer the community except heartache and sorrow,” the East Belfast MLA said.

    “I pay tribute to the PSNI officers and the bomb squad officers who risked their lives to make the area safe, not only for the intended victim but all who live in close proximity,” Mr Newton said.

    The Alliance MLA for the area, Chris Lyttle, said: “My immediate thoughts and prayers are with the officer and the family directly affected by this cowardly act.”

    “I’d also give my full support to every serving PSNI officer working to uphold the rule of law at this difficult time,” he added.

     

     

     

     

    BBC