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European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 17 Dec. 2004

  • Israel’s apology to Turkey was anticipated, says minister

    Israel’s apology to Turkey was anticipated, says minister

    COMMERCE Minister Giorgos Lakkotrypis said yesterday that Israel’s apology to Turkey over the raid on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara had been anticipated.

    Lakkotrypis is due to visit Israel next month, ahead of a visit by President Nicos Anastasiades in May.

    “I assure you we are monitoring the situation and we will secure our state’s sovereign rights,” Lakkotrypis said.

    The head of the Hydrocarbons State Company (KRETYK), Charles Ellinas, said that Israel has taken no decisions.

    “I was in Israel last week and over there they examine all options…  there is a chance they would sell natural gas to Turkey but at the same time they are looking into exporting to Cyprus,” Ellinas said.

    Ankara Anatolia news agency has quoted Turkish energy minister Taner Tildiz as saying Turkey would suspend projects with Italian energy giant ENI in retaliation against the company’s involvement in oil and gas drilling off the coast of Cyprus.

    The ENI/Kogas consortium is due to begin drilling for hydrocarbons in Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone by early next year.

    ENI is also one of the partners in a pipeline project – the Samsun-Ceyhan – project from the Black Sea to the southern Mediterranean Turkish coast aiming to deliver Russian and Kazakh crude oil to Turkey.

    ‘We have decided not to work with ENI in Turkey, including suspending their ongoing projects,’ Taner Yildiz said.

    But Fox Business said that ENI chief, Paolo Scaroni, told reporters on the sidelines of a conference in Rome that the Samsun-Ceyhan project was not viable as yet.

    “This project is dormant as it isn’t profitable as long as the oil tanker rates to transport crude through the Bosphorous Straits remain at these (low) levels,” Scaroni was quoted as saying, adding that he was sorry about Turkey’s statements and was “hopeful” they could “find an accord”.

    via Israel’s apology to Turkey was anticipated, says minister – Cyprus Mail.

  • Turkey Arrests Extremist Wanted by Germany

    Turkey Arrests Extremist Wanted by Germany

    By DAVID RISING Associated Press

    BERLIN March 22, 2013 (AP)

    An Islamic extremist wanted by Germany for allegedly calling for terrorist attacks on Europe has been arrested in Turkey and Berlin is negotiating his extradition, an official said Friday.

    Austrian-born Mohamed Mahmoud, 27, was picked up Tuesday in the southeastern province of Hatay near the Syrian border, a German security official with knowledge of the talks said. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the matter. He said Germany has already begun preliminary proceedings to have Mahmoud extradited.

    “We are very confident we will get him to Germany,” he said.

    Nina Bussek, a spokeswoman for the Vienna public prosecutor’s office, said Austria was also seeking Mahmoud’s extradition on “suspicion of forming a terrorist organization.”

    Mahmoud was jailed Austria in 2007 for being a leader of the Global Islamic Media Front, which creates and distributes terrorist propaganda videos. Among the accusations, police said he threatened both Austria and Germany with attacks if they did not withdraw military personnel from Afghanistan.

    Following his release in 2011, Mahmoud moved to Germany and became an imam with the ultraconservative Salafi movement, which has been growing rapidly in the country by attracting both Muslims and converts. They have been under close observation since 2010, and that was stepped up further last year after they clashed with police in Bonn last year at a rally of a far-right party.

    His group, Millatu Ibrahim, was banned last June. Officials at the time said it taught followers to reject German law and follow Islamic Shariah law and that “the unbelievers are the enemy.” Mahmoud, who had already been expelled from Germany ahead of the ban, resurfaced in Egypt — where his father is from — and called on his followers to join him. German security officials say dozens of “jihad travelers” responded, traveling to Egypt and then going on to fight elsewhere — largely in Mali, Syria and Yemen.

    While in Egypt, Mahmoud is also alleged to have produced online German-language videos for the Global Islamic Media Front calling for terrorist attacks in Europe.

    It was not immediately clear when he left Egypt or whether he was on his way to Syria when he was arrested in Turkey.

    Police officials in Ankara and Hatay province said they did not have any information on the arrest.

    —————

    Suzan Fraser in Ankara and George Jahn in Vienna contributed to this story.

    via Turkey Arrests Extremist Wanted by Germany – ABC News.

  • The EU’s non-negotiations with Turkey

    The EU’s non-negotiations with Turkey

    The EU’s negotiations, or rather non-negotiations with Turkey, turned out to be tricks, jeopardising the EU’s reputation and respectability. What the Germans and others don’t seem to realise is that they expect more from Turkey than they do from themselves, writes Dr. Petra Erler.

    Dr. Petra Erler is managing director of the European Experience Company GmbH in Potsdam and served as Head of Cabinet of the former EU Commissioner Günter Verheugen in Brussels.

    This article was translated from German.

    “In the enlargement negotiations, Chapter 19 on social policy deals with all questions regarding the adoption of EU law by applicant countries in this area, ensuring that future member states fully comply with Community law.

    For several years now, the progress of negotiations has clearly depended on applicant countries having to meet so-called opening benchmarks, in other words specific requirements formulated by the EU.

    Anyone wishing to delay the negotiations or set the bar extremely high has to get creative with regard to these opening benchmarks, as in the case of Turkey and Chapter 19.

    Unlike other chapters, this chapter is not being blocked for political reasons. Opening this chapter would thus send a strong signal of the willingness of both sides to advance Turkey’s accession process. However, it is precisely this willingness which seems to be lacking.

    Trade union rights

    In chapter 19, the EU requires Turkey to comply with ‘EU standards’ as well as conventions no. 87 and 98 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) before accession talks can begin. These conventions include important trade union rights concerning, inter alia, the right to organise and the right to strike.

    At first glance, one is tempted to genuinely thank the Commission and the member states leading the negotiations for addressing this important issue and thus also influencing the situation in Turkey for the better. After all, only a minority of Turkish workers are organised in trade unions.

    On second look, however, one begins to wonder what exactly is meant by “EU standards”. A closer look at the Commission’s screening report on Turkey shows that this actually refers to articles 5 and 6 of the European Social Charter, which have not yet been ratified by Turkey.

    Sobering comparison with EU member states

    Anyone who concludes from this that all EU members have ratified the articles mentioned would be mistaken. Spain and Germany have issued statements on this. Four other member states have not made commitments to all sections of these articles.

    There’s also the issue of the revised European Social Charter which was implemented in Turkish national law in 2007. Although this revised Charter has long been signed by ten EU member states including Germany, it has not yet been ratified, let alone implemented.

    With regard to the ILO conventions, it could be argued that once a state has entered into international obligations it must fully comply with these obligations. One has to agree with that, and the ILO has indeed criticised Turkey for the poor implementation of the conventions mentioned above.

    ILO criticises right to strike in Germany

    However, the ILO has expressed serious criticism as to the German understanding of who is allowed to strike and who is not. So what are the factors that define an EU standard? Moreover, why is this addressed under the section “adoption of the acquis” rather than in the part covering the political criteria? And why is the full implementation of these important rights considered the basis of the negotiations rather than the result?

    Don’t the Germans and others realise that they demand more from Turkey than they do from themselves? Or is simply that no one bothered to address the issue, relying blindly on the Commission, which is probably more than willing to consider the enforcement of international treaties as Community law. Did all this happen on purpose? Was it designed as a provocation?

    As it happens, Turkey did not complain and complied with the EU requirements. The legislative provisions were critically revised and updated in 2012 by the social partners. By consensus.

    And once again Brussels is not satisfied.

    It is a lesson for all those obliged to conduct negotiations they do not wish to have or doing so without paying attention. No one seems to care that such tricks jeopardise the EU’s reputation and respectability.

    via The EU’s non-negotiations with Turkey | EurActiv.

  • Belgium or Iran, Where’s The Nuclear Threat? Europe’s Five “Undeclared Nuclear Weapons States”

    Belgium or Iran, Where’s The Nuclear Threat? Europe’s Five “Undeclared Nuclear Weapons States”

    Are Turkey, Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands and Italy Nuclear Powers?

    By Prof Michel Chossudovsky
    Region: Europe
    Theme: Militarization and WMD, US NATO War Agenda
    In-depth Report: Nuclear War
    [This article was originally published by Global Research  in February 2010 under the title: Europe’s Five “Undeclared Nuclear Weapons States” ]

    According to a recent report, former NATO Secretary-General George Robertson confirmed that Turkey possesses 40-90 “Made in America” nuclear weapons at the Incirlik military base.(en.trend.az/)

    Does this mean that Turkey is a nuclear power?

    “Far from making Europe safer, and far from producing a less nuclear dependent Europe, [the policy] may well end up bringing more nuclear weapons into the European continent, and frustrating some of the attempts that are being made to get multilateral nuclear disarmament,”     (Former NATO Secretary-General George Robertson quoted in Global Security, February 10, 2010)

    “‘Is Italy capable of delivering a thermonuclear strike?…

    Could the Belgians and the Dutch drop hydrogen bombs on enemy targets?…

    Germany’s air force couldn’t possibly be training to deliver bombs 13 times more powerful than the one that destroyed Hiroshima, could it?…

    Nuclear bombs are stored on air-force bases in Italy, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands — and planes from each of those countries are capable of delivering them.” (“What to Do About Europe’s Secret Nukes.”Time Magazine, December 2, 2009)

    The “Official” Nuclear Weapons States

    Five countries, the US, UK, France, China and Russia are considered to be “nuclear weapons states” (NWS), “an internationally recognized status conferred by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)”. Three other “Non NPT countries” (i.e. non-signatory states of the NPT) including India, Pakistan and North Korea, have recognized possessing nuclear weapons.

    Israel: “Undeclared Nuclear State”

    Israel is identified as an “undeclared nuclear state”. It produces and deploys nuclear warheads directed against military and civilian targets in the Middle East including Tehran.

    Iran

    There has been much hype, supported by scanty evidence, that Iran might at some future date become a nuclear weapons state. And, therefore, a pre-emptive defensive nuclear attack on Iran to annihilate its non-existent nuclear weapons program should be seriously contemplated “to make the World a safer place”. The mainstream media abounds with makeshift opinion on the Iran nuclear threat.

    But what about the five European “undeclared nuclear states” including Belgium, Germany, Turkey, the Netherlands and Italy. Do they constitute a threat?

    Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands, Italy and Turkey: ”Undeclared Nuclear Weapons States”

    While Iran’s nuclear weapons capabilities are unconfirmed, the nuclear weapons capabilities of these five countries including delivery procedures are formally acknowledged.

    The US has supplied some 480 B61 thermonuclear bombs to five so-called “non-nuclear states”, including Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. Casually disregarded by the Vienna based UN Nuclear Watchdog (IAEA), the US has actively contributed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

    As part of this European stockpiling, Turkey, which is a partner of the US-led coalition against Iran along with Israel, possesses some 90 thermonuclear B61 bunker buster bombs at the Incirlik nuclear air base. (National Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons in Europe , February 2005)

    By the recognised definition, these five countries are “undeclared nuclear weapons states”.

    The stockpiling and deployment of tactical B61 in these five “non-nuclear states” are intended for targets in the Middle East. Moreover, in accordance with  “NATO strike plans”, these thermonuclear B61 bunker buster bombs (stockpiled by the “non-nuclear States”) could be launched  “against targets in Russia or countries in the Middle East such as Syria and Iran” ( quoted in National Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons in Europe , February 2005)

    Does this mean that Iran or Russia, which are potential targets of a nuclear attack originating from one or other of these five so-called non-nuclear states should contemplate defensive preemptive nuclear attacks against Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Turkey? The answer is no, by any stretch  of the imagination.

    While these “undeclared nuclear states” casually accuse Tehran of developing nuclear weapons, without documentary evidence, they themselves have capabilities of delivering nuclear warheads, which are targeted at Iran.  To say that this is a clear case of “double standards” by the IAEA and the “international community” is a understatement.

    nucleareurope

    Those estimates were based on private and public statements by a number of government sources and assumptions about the weapon storage capacity at each base

    The stockpiled weapons are B61 thermonuclear bombs.  All the weapons are gravity bombs of the B61-3, -4, and -10 types.2 .

    .(National Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons in Europe , February 2005)

    Germany: Nuclear Weapons Producer

    Among the five “undeclared nuclear states”, “Germany remains the most heavily nuclearized country with three nuclear bases (two of which are fully operational) and may store as many as 150 [B61 bunker buster ] bombs” (Ibid). In accordance with “NATO strike plans” (mentioned above) these tactical nuclear weapons are also targeted at the Middle East.

    While Germany is not categorized officially as a nuclear power, it produces nuclear warheads for the French Navy. It stockpiles nuclear warheads (made in America) and it has the capabilities of delivering nuclear weapons. Moreover,  The European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company – EADS , a Franco-German-Spanish  joint venture, controlled by Deutsche Aerospace and the powerful Daimler Group is Europe’s second largest military producer, supplying .France’s M51 nuclear missile.

    Germany imports and deploys nuclear weapons from the US. It also produces nuclear warheads which are exported to France. Yet it is classified as a non-nuclear state.

  • Guest post: Turkey to the rescue?

    Guest post: Turkey to the rescue?

    By Timothy Ash of Standard Bank

    Greek Cypriots must be thinking that with friends like these (the EU and Russia, both seeking to extract their pound of flesh for any bail-out), who needs enemies?

    Well, what if Cyprus begins to think outside the box, and what if it goes to its erstwhile enemy, Turkey, for assistance?

    How about this: Turkey provides €7bn in assistance, saving Cypriot savers from the chop in exchange for Cyprus agreeing to the terms of the 2004 Annan peace plan for the unification of the island.

    In return for its cash, Turkey would get agreement on the peace plan it backed back in 2004 and which was supported then by two thirds of Turkish Cypriots in an island-wide referendum. Admittedly, it was rejected by three quarters of Greek Cypriots but this was in no small part due to the intransigence of the then Papadopoulos administration.

    By so doing, Turkey would save a very big chunk of the substantial aid (and significant military spending) it pumps into northern Cyprus every year, and the north would gain access to EU structural funds. Turkey would also remove a big Achilles heel in terms of its own EU accession bid, stalled by disagreement over the divided island.

    Turkey would win huge international kudos for doing the right thing by helping a neighbour in need. And it would send a clear message to some of its foes in core continental Europe that Turkey has indeed matured and is worthy of a place at the heart of Europe – though after developments this week I am not sure that Europe would be worthy of Turkey.

    Any financial assistance could be backed by stakes in the Cypriot banks – although, as the Russian banks seem to be indicating, these may offer little value given the holes in their balance sheets.

    Peace and unification on the island could then perhaps open up the energy reserves south of the island for joint exploration by Cypriot (Turkish and Greek) and Turkish companies. Remember here that perhaps Turkey’s biggest current strategic priority is to reduce its dependency on energy imports, which cost the country around $55bn a year, and in 2012 came in larger than the country’s current account deficit (equal to 6 to 7 per cent of GDP).

    For Turkey, €7bn is relatively small change, equivalent to just over 1 per cent of GDP, especially when set against the “peace dividend” which could come with the unification of the island, progress on EU accession and the associated “feel good factor” for the economy and business more generally, alongside the potential energy dividend. The Turkish treasury has ample funds in its cash reserves and could easily tap markets for an injection into Cyprus, perhaps borrowing under a new Cyprus-Turkey friendship bond programme, for which the likely cost would be only 4 to 4.5 per cent at most. The US would no doubt be happy, as it would remove one further regional dispute in a tricky region, and it would also counter talk of Russia moving its naval base in Syria to Cyprus in exchange for a bail-out.

    In times of crisis, you really find out who your friends are. The hope is that the neighbours will rally around. On the Kurdish problem, prime minister Erdogan seems willing to take a (huge) gamble for peace. The current crisis in the Republic of Cyprus could present a similar opportunity for peace and prosperity for both sides.

    Timothy Ash is head of emerging markets research ex-Africa at Standard Bank. A version of this post was issued as a note to clients on Thursday.

    via Guest post: Turkey to the rescue? | beyondbrics.

  • The Israel-Turkey-Greece Triangle

    The Israel-Turkey-Greece Triangle

    Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak (L) and his Greek counterpart, Dimitris Avramopoulos, watch a military parade at the Defense Ministry in Athens, Jan. 10, 2012. (photo by REUTERS/Yiorgos Karahalis ) Read more: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2013/03/israel-turkey-greece-relations-improve-gas-cooperation.html#ixzz2O9qvK1BW
    Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak (L) and his Greek counterpart, Dimitris Avramopoulos, watch a military parade at the Defense Ministry in Athens, Jan. 10, 2012. (photo by REUTERS/Yiorgos Karahalis )
    Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/israel-turkey-greece-relations-improve-gas-cooperation.html#ixzz2O9qvK1BW

    By: Jean-Loup Samaan for Al-Monitor

    Earlier this month, the navies of Israel, Greece and the United States gathered to conduct a two-week joint military exercise. This operation, named “Noble Dina,” was launched in 2011 and has since then been conducted each year. It can be seen as one of the various indicators that Israel and Greece are in the process of strengthening their bilateral ties. Indeed, for the last three years, both countries have moved closer to each other.

    About This Article

    Summary :

    Jean-Loup Samaan writes that the Israel-Turkey split is not really grounded in substance but rather in the personal ties of their leaders, and that a thaw may be in the works.

    Author: Jean-Loup Samaan

    It all started through various high-level visits at the level of presidents, prime ministers and defense ministers. In 2010, former Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou visited Jerusalem and signed a cooperation memorandum. The following year, Israel defense Minister Ehud Barak and his Greek counterpart, Panos Beglitis, went further by passing a security cooperation agreement. Meanwhile, the Greek parliament approved the purchase of Israeli bomb-precision upgrade kits, which cost $155 million for 400 systems.

    The Israel-Greece rapprochement is not only visible in the military realm but also in other sectors such as tourism, culture, education and trade. Prior to the Papandreou visit of 2010, there were around 150,000 Israeli tourists each year coming to Greece. For 2012, they were estimated to reach 400,000. Furthermore, since late 2011, Israel has been working closely with Greece and Cyprus in the extraction of the newly found natural gas reserves in the Southeastern Mediterranean. The discovery of these reserves in the exclusive economic zones of Israel, Cyprus and Greece has generated a new area of cooperation for the three countries. Israeli Energy Minister Uzi Landau talked in 2010 of “an axis of Greece, Cyprus and Israel, and possibly more countries, which will offer an anchor of stability.”

    With regards to the gas reserves in the Mediterranean, this huge project is valued at 10 billion euros ($13 billion), so far mostly funded by Israel. Experts evaluate that it will take about six to seven years to complete. On the long haul, for Israel, Greece may become a hub through which it could transport and export gas supplies to Europe and the Balkans. This Israel-Greece-Cyprus initiative has logically triggered strong opposition from Turkey, which does not recognize the government in Nicosia and objects to the claims of the Greek Cypriot Administration over the gas reserves in the south of the island. Ankara responded by conducting air and sea military drills close to the area of the planned project and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu threatened that Turkey would take appropriate measures if the three countries were to go on with the project. This has been denounced by Israel as “gunboat diplomacy.”

    This is where the logic of Israel-Greece starts to unfold: this rapprochement clearly grew in earnest following the degradation of Israel-Turkey relations. The rift between Ankara and Jerusalem became palpable after Israel’s Cast Lead operation in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and Prime Minister Erdogan’s strong condemnation of Israeli military adventurism. Turkey then decided to put a halt to its mediation efforts between Israel and Syria. The split got worse a year later with the crisis of the Mavi Marmara flotilla. On May 31, 2010, the Israeli military shot and killed nine Turkish citizens who were on board the “Freedom Flotilla” that was heading toward the Gaza Strip. Since then, political dialogue between both countries is in a deadlock, with Israel’s government refusing to apologize for the clash over the Turkish flotilla and the authorities of Turkey blocking not only bilateral cooperation but Israel-NATO cooperation as well.

    It is in this specific context that Israel-Greece relations have been improved. True, the Israelis and the Greeks emphasize that cooperation did not come out of the blue in 2010, that the first bilateral economic agreement was written in 1992 and the first military agreement in 1994 — in fact before the one between Israel and Turkey. Still, this move has all the features of a classic balance-of-power move by Israel vis-à-vis Turkey. Noticeably, the Greek-Israeli military exercises in the last years have taken place close to Turkish borders and, needless to say, they engendered major concerns in Ankara. This logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” is not without embarrassment for the Greeks who want to see more than bitter politics in the rapprochement. In fact, it is in the interest of neither Greece nor Israel to confine their rapprochement to a move to counterbalance Turkey.

    Athens is not so keen on using its Israeli policy to antagonize Ankara: The new Greek prime minister, Antonis Samara visited Turkey this month to commit his country to the enhancement of the relationship with its historical rival. Specifically Samara, along with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan pledged to double their annual trade over the next three years.

    Meanwhile even though Israelis might have been tempted to use their Greek policy to counter Turkey’s strategy and to proclaim it as a long-term strategic realignment, decision makers are eventually aware that in no way can Greece provide them with the kind of strategic reach Turkey was providing. Not only is Greece enduring a financial crisis that is eroding its military capabilities, but it never had the type of leverage Turkey enjoys in the Middle East and that Israel crucially needs today.

    In fact, after three years of euphoria on the rapprochement with Greece, Israeli diplomats and officers are toning down the idea of geopolitical shift or the one of a zero-sum game. In reality, diplomats in Jerusalem and the military in Tel Aviv are eager to fix the partnership with Turkey. This reflects how the Israel-Turkey split is not really grounded in substance but rather in the personal relationship of its leaders.

    In the last months, there have been numerous signs that both countries may be in the process of restoring their political relations. Several high-level meetings have taken place, including the heads of intelligence in Cairo. Besides, far away from the political upheaval, bilateral trade did not really suffer and its volume is in fact at its highest level in history.

    All in all, this means that the speculation over Israel-Greece rapprochement should be treated with caution due to the strategic limitations of the bilateral relations as well as to the clear need of both countries to avoid portraying it as a zero-sum game vis-à-vis Turkey.

    Jean-Loup Samaan is a researcher in the Middle East Department of the NATO Defense College. His current research projects include the Israel-Hezbollah stand-off since the 2006 war, the Syrian civil war and its impact on the region as well as the evolution of regional security system in the Gulf.

    Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/israel-turkey-greece-relations-improve-gas-cooperation.html#ixzz2O9qWaVEV