Category: EU Members

Wednesday, Feb. 25, 2009

By DOMINIQUE MOISI

Dominique Moisi is a visiting professor at Harvard University and the
author of “The Geopolitics of Emotions.” © 2009 Project Syndicate

CAMBRIDGE, Mass.  “Who lost Turkey?” That question, often raised in
the past, has been heating up in the aftermath of Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan’s emotional outburst during the recent World Economic
Forum 2009 in Davos, when he abruptly left a panel he was sharing with
Israeli President Shimon Peres.

And the Turkish question matters greatly, because it touches on some
of the most unstable and unsettling of the world’s diplomatic disputes.

If Turkey has indeed been “lost,” those responsible include the
European Union, the United States, Israel and Turkey itself. The EU’s
growing reservations about Turkey’s membership have been expressed
unambiguously by French President Nicolas Sarkozy. In the U.S., former
President George W. Bush gets some of the blame because of the war in
Iraq. Israel, too, has played its part in Turkey’s alienation from the
West, as a result of the Lebanon war of 2006 and its recent military
operations in Gaza.

All of these events have disturbed and disoriented Turkey, and are
magnified by the domestic impact of worst global economic crisis since
the 1930s.

Of course, Turkey’s secular, pro-Western elites may still consider the
EU and the U.S. important, if not indispensable, allies and partners,
and they may consider Islamic fundamentalism, Hamas, Hezbollah and
Iran real or at least potential threats. Yet they are also convinced
that Europe has behaved improperly toward Turkey, through a
combination of short-term populist reflexes and the absence of a
long-term strategic vision.

The Turkish question is, of course, complex. Turkey’s geography is
predominantly Asian, Turkey’s emotions are increasingly Middle
Eastern, i.e., Muslim on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and yet
Turkey’s elites remain resolutely pro-Western and pro-European. But
for how long?

At the beginning of the 21st century, when dialogue with the Islamic
world is one of the Western world’s key challenges, Europe would
commit a historic strategic blunder if it were to close its doors to
Turkey. To do so would push back the inheritors of the Ottoman Empire
back onto an Asian, Muslim and Middle Eastern historical trajectory.

In the question of Turkish accession to the EU, the journey matters
more than the destination. The reforms that Turkey has already
implemented in a very short period of time, thanks to its EU candidate
status, are impressive. Should we in Europe really put at risk that
progress by expressing an all-too-audible “no”?

The EU desperately needs a strategic and diplomatic partner that can
significantly reinforce its clout in the Middle East. Europe also
needs the dynamism of a youthful Turkey. Above all, it needs the
message of reconciliation sent to Islam that Turkey’s entrance into
the union would represent.

Of course, to want Turkey “in” is an act of will, if not an act of
faith that is in many ways counterintuitive. Most Europeans do not
perceive Turkey as a “European Other” but as a “non-European Other.”
Even in Istanbul, the most Westernized of Turkish cities, as soon as
one leaves the main arteries, one seems to be immersed in a Middle
Eastern or Asian culture.

Israel is not in the European Union, but it, too, is in great danger
of losing Turkey. Far from reinforcing Israel’s security, its last two
military adventures, in Lebanon and now in Gaza, have caused further
self-isolation and loss of world sympathy. Nowhere has this phenomenon
been stronger than in Turkey, where those military escapades have
strained the two countries’ strategic alliance almost to the breaking
point.

It is too early to speak of Obama’s policy toward Turkey; suffice it
to say that in his willingness to open a respectful dialogue with
Islam, he is the only Western leader to move in the right direction.
But can positive American gestures toward Turkey, a key NATO member,
be sufficient to offset Israel’s insensitive, if not reckless,
policies? The answer is unclear.

Turkey, too shares some of the responsibility for this mounting
process of estrangement. Erdogan’s behavior in Davos was, at the very
least, irresponsible. He may have gained popularity back home, but in
today’s difficult economic times, the temptations of cheap populism
are more dangerous than ever. One does not play lightly with matches
next to a pile of dry wood.