Category: EU Members

European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 17 Dec. 2004

  • Global Commitments vs. Regional Balances

    Global Commitments vs. Regional Balances

    Deglobalizing U.S. military commitments will require the “civilianization” of defense policy.

    Judah Grunstein | Bio | 09 Apr 2009
    WPR Blog

    More smart stuff from Sam Roggeveen, who points out that alert is not the same thing as alarmed, but nevertheless admits to a case of nerves:

    The thing to remember is that China does not have to match the U.S. in global capability terms for U.S. allies in the Pacific to start getting nervous about the strategic balance. All China has to do is be a credible competitor in the region, and that is already the case.

    Roggeveen goes on to argue that “. . . we have already passed the point at which the U.S. could militarily intervene in a Taiwan conflict at acceptable risk,” and that the coming years/decades will witness an inexorable expansion of that perimeter.

    Click through to see what he’s got to say about whether the budget priorities as signaled by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, compared to the alternatives, are a good thing or not for Australia. You might be surprised.

    The broader point here is that while the “American unipolar moment” might be drawing to a close, we’re still the only country that is forced to calculate in terms of global, as opposed to regional, military capability. That reflects the magnitude of our power, influence and interests. But while an advantage in a scenario of geologic resource scarcity, it becomes potentially problematic in a scenario of political resource scarcity and a distinct disadvantage in times of financial resource scarcity.

    This reinforces the need for scaling down our commitments by involving regional powers more prominently in advancing our foreign policy objectives, what I call Middle Power Mojo™. France and Turkey were my illustrative examples before they both started acting out. But part of the initial concept was the idea of identifying regional players that have got their mojo working, so that’s inevitably going to evolve with time.

    Perhaps most significantly, this provides a political context for U.S. defense policy. The limitations of discussing the U.S. defense budget without the context of a strategic vision have been pointed out elsewhere. But so far, that’s mainly been shorthand for, “Wait until the Quadrennial Defense Review comes out next year,” and reinforces the militarization of foreign policy. Deglobalizing America’s defense commitments, on the other hand, will require filling gaps with both friendly capability and stable regional security architectures. And that’s more of a long-term interagency project that will “civilianize” defense policy.

    Source:  www.worldpoliticsreview.com, 09 Apr 2009

  • The Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement: Implications for the South Caucasus

    The Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement: Implications for the South Caucasus

    Turkey’s recent and ongoing rapprochement with Armenia, addressed in last week’s Caucasus Update from the Turkish angle, has implications that could reverberate throughout the South Caucasus and beyond. Arguably, the normalisation of ties between Armenia and Turkey would be an event of equivalent regional significance as the Russo-Georgian war of last August.

    Details remain unclear. This diplomatic murkiness testifies to just how explosive the issue has become for the Turkish, Azerbaijani and Armenian governments. The outlines, however, are apparent – that Turkey and Armenia are expected to begin opening their mutual border and establishing diplomatic relations probably sooner than later. The Turkish overtures are contingent on two things: firstly, that US President Barack Obama does not openly acknowledge the Armenian ‘genocide’, and secondly (and much less publicly) that Armenia renounces or at least quietly suspends its own push for genocide recognition and its long-dormant claims to Turkey’s eastern provinces as part of its “Greater Armenia” concept.

    A third condition – that any formal moves are also conditional on Armenian progress towards removing its troops from Nagorno-Karabakh and the territories around it – is unconfirmed. The very idea that Turkey would go through with the border talks without attaching any conditions on Karabakh has provoked fury in Azerbaijan, especially since Turkey sealed the border in 1993 in response to the Armenian occupation of the regions, a reality which has clearly not changed. In Baku, the issue has created a rare patch of common ground for the government and the opposition (APA, April 7).

    Essentially, what has developed appears to be an enormous three-way game.  Firstly, Turkey’s determination to go ahead with the thaw – including the establishment of an alleged framework for talks in the areas of border openings, diplomatic representations, and dispute commissions (Wall Street Journal, April 2) – has been curbed by its recognition of the obvious, and urgent, need to keep their ethnic and linguistic brethren in Azerbaijan on side. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on April 7 that “The Azerbaijani-Armenian dispute should be resolved first. Then, problems between Turkey and Armenia can be solved, too”. According to Today’s Zaman, Turkey’s bluff may be to limit the thaw to occasional border openings and limited diplomatic contact until October, when a World Cup qualifying match between Armenia and Turkey (the return leg of the fixture which began the whole process last September with Turkish President’s visit to Yerevan) is due to take place in Istanbul (Today’s Zaman, April 9). This would give Ankara time to push Azerbaijan and Armenia into a compromise over Karabakh, probably under the auspices of Turkey’s much-discussed Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform.

    Secondly, Yerevan’s strategy is to decouple the issue of the Turkish border from the Karabakh issue, ensuring that Armenia receives the economic and political benefits of relations with Turkey without having to concede ground vis-à-vis Azerbaijan. Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian clearly illustrated this bluff on April 5 when he warned Mr. Erdogan that attempts to link the two issues were an attempt to impede progress (RFE/RL, April 7).

    Clearly, Yerevan anticipates that Turkey is unwilling to exasperate President Obama and – more importantly – undermine its role as a regional stabiliser by allowing the talks to fail. It is also attempting to ensure that the status quo in Karabakh is maintained. Armenia has no particular interest in altering the situation in the disputed territories hoping that one day Azerbaijan will be demanded by the world to reconcile with the loss of its territories (a belief that has been reinforced by the recognition of Kosovo). So without a continuing Turkish blockade Yerevan is unlikely to offer any concessions to Baku, and may in time feel emboldened enough to start demanding that Azerbaijan back down.

    Azerbaijan, thirdly, is hoping that Turkey is not willing to betray its Turkic-speaking ally. However, it reflects the level of concern in Baku that Azerbaijan is not simply relying on ethnic and linguistic solidarity but has been actively (if unofficially) challenging Turkey’s strategic interests. President Ilham Aliyev reportedly said that if Turkey made a deal with Armenia that did not consider Karabakh, Azerbaijan could cut the gas supplies to Turkey (Jamestown Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 9). In this light one should consider recent cooperation between Baku and Russian energy giant Gazprom and discussions between President Aliyev and Ukrainian President Viktor Yuschenko on alternative gas routes via the Black Sea: in other words, the White Stream pipeline across the Black Sea to Ukraine, which would avoid Turkey (APA, April 10). Given these recent moves, it seems very likely that Azerbaijan will begin seriously reconsidering its participation in the planned Nabucco pipeline to Europe, a project with which it has already grown impatient.

    More significantly, the country could start to reconsider its whole geopolitical orientation. President Aliyev hinted at both of these possibilities at a meeting of Azerbaijan’s Security Council on April 6, in which he stressed the independence of Baku’s foreign policy and the importance of Azerbaijan for the execution of any transnational energy projects in the region (APA, April 6). The voices are getting louder in Baku arguing that the policy of trusting Turkey and the West to support it over Karabakh, incurring Russian displeasure in the process, has achieved nothing. Azerbaijan’s confidence in the West was already damaged by the Russo-Georgian war, in which Washington and Brussels indicated that they would not respond materially to any conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Turkey’s decision to negotiate with Armenia, and the vocal support of the US and the EU for the talks, has struck a further blow to Baku’s faith in the West.

    So why not turn towards Russia? Turkey clearly has diminished its leverage in any Karabakh peace talks and the OSCE’s Minsk Group has made painfully slow progress. The only actor who possesses clear and significant influence in the peace process is Russia, Armenia’s most important ally. Russia is one of the Minsk Group co-chairs but has demonstrated a willingness to act more or less unilaterally, for instance in the Moscow Declaration which it brokered between the two sides last November. Although few Azerbaijanis desire the return of Russian suzerainty, Karabakh is predominant. If Russia can help solve the conflict in a way which is acceptable to Azerbaijan, then all other considerations are secondary. Gas supplies and the cooling of ties with NATO and Washington are a small price to pay.

    The West, and Turkey, must recognise the implications of the Armenian thaw. Clearly, peace in the Caucasus is desirable. Closed borders and mutual distrust are not to be welcomed. But if Turkey’s AKP party rushes ahead, it will embolden nationalists at home who could impede the country’s progress towards the EU. This sounds counter-intuitive: opening the border with Armenia is expected to boost Turkey’s EU accession hopes. But this analysis is from Brussels’ perspective. Domestically, the AKP is weaker than before after March’s local elections, and hasty, unpopular foreign policy gestures may cripple its hopes for the 2011 general election (especially if the EU continues to block accession, regardless of the thaw) and give nationalists the upper hand.

    But even more concerning is the danger that Turkey and the West could ‘lose’ Azerbaijan to Russia. This would not only sound the death knell for Nabucco, but it would also alter the geopolitical profile of the whole of Eurasia and pose a new and serious risk in the Karabakh conflict. Patience is a virtue – Ankara, as well as Brussels and Washington, should bear this maxim in mind.

     

  • Will there be a new Camp David of Turkey?

    Will there be a new Camp David of Turkey?

    Armenian problem of Turkey took an important dimension while regional balances are changing regional nations’ characteristics in this time section. Armenia that have seen double reaction by two countries since invasion on Karabakh region has an inevitable chance. Two brother countries’ opposition conducts because of dilemmas by foreign affairs gave some advantages for Armenia and their diaspora.

    Although Turkey’s demand about giving up by Armenian insistences on Karabakh, genocide lie and new territory of east Anatolia points, this country didn’t improve relations. Additionally Armenia’s desires about their unreal pronunciations had grew up in period of Sarkisyan. Turkey and other states can not understand different thoughts of an irredentist state.

    Of course absolute definitons like “Can be a country collapsed with historical confession which is combining many words?” of some liberal and global defenders in Turkey created this period. It doesn’t matter to interpret these responsible groups which formed new critical relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey. For example: “Azerbaijan didn’t recognize Turkish Cyprus, so this is unnecessary to defend their self interests, Karabakh conflict is an internal problem of them and Turkish foreign policy can not depend on it, Azerbaijan reailty finishes western support to Turkey while guarantees of the USA are enough for us…” To understand truth reality you can search all documents about these subjects.

    Today public opinion of Azerbaijan feels unwell about last news. All messages are followed and columnists debate possible circumstances. Additionally to political dimension, economical and energical subjects are different debate areas. Unfortunately some alternative energy line projects are debated today. About border opening effects and reaction of public opinion of Azerbaijan circumstances, we ask to Araz Aslanli who is an academic person in Khazar University and president of Caucasus Research Center for International Relations and Strategic Analysis :

    “ I don’t expect that borders will be opened. If actors look at the local and regional dynamics and Turkey want to stiff its position here, it shouldn’t be opened. But if they say that we have some guarantees of our position as regional power, no issues can influence this reality, and Turkey is only interested about global issues, they can open as minimum concession about this problem.

    Border problem is strategical but it has psychological among relations with Azerbaijan. It is important for two countries. Example; Turkey is a single country which had been sponsored and protected by Azerbaijan if we compare global powers. It is originally psychological that is shored up ethnic, religious and cultural connections. Commonlu this question can collapse “trustworthy brother” image of Turkey in Turkish world and Azerbaijan. I think that it is another target of groups which are desire border opening idea. Public opinion is very sensitive in Azerbaijan about this question. Reaction of government can be limited but it can put a psychological mine because of sensitivity of public.”

    Another symbol of public sensitive representation is a media organ that is Turkistan Newspaper. We ask this question to Aqil Camal who is a head director of Turkistan Newspaper. According to him, this case can end Turkish image in this geography:

    “We are unwell as Turkish nationalists. There are some pressures as “Is it your defensivity?”
    Some pro-Russian groups are working to create bad image about Turkey in public opinion. We should look at a point. If Turkey will open borders and Azerbaijani government agree this reality, all of the works about Turkish union will die. Because Azerbaijan is a bridge between Turkey and Central Asia because of Central Asian countries were near us. If Azerbaijan give up these works, Turkey can not be successful. This is a great problem all of us who are working to create Turkish union.

    Sometimes politicians talk about state interests. But states are existing to serve nation. Who wants a state that is not interested about demands of nation? If there will be a cold time with Turkey, Azerbaijan consider relations with Russia, like Central Asian bandwagoning.

    Mr. Öztarsu, you know that I said these sentences as a Turkish idealist on Turkish union way, not as an angry person on ordinary public sphere. At least Turkey shouldn’t open borders in this period. Chances shouldn’t be given to defeatists of our brotherhood. Punishment should be given when necessary, not serve them. As like as Çanakkale War…”

    There is a long time period to open borders and debate its historical and political subjects as like speeches of Armenian president. But only beaten side will be conscience and thought of Turkish nation in this psychological war. Defenses of opposition groups from the likes of economic development, brotherhood of Armenians for Turkey, independent situation of Turkish foreign policy thoughts will be main actors in this process. We know that Turkish bureaucrats don’t want a new Camp David of Turkish world and be remembered a new Anwar Sadat.

    Mehmet Fatih ÖZTARSU
    Baku Qafqaz University
    International Research Club

  • Incoming NATO chief: Confront religious prejudice

    Incoming NATO chief: Confront religious prejudice

    ISTANBUL(AP)

    The incoming head of NATO called on Monday for a balance between free speech and respect for religious feelings after a dispute over his support for the right to caricature the Prophet Muhammad had threatened his appointment.

    Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who overcame objections from Turkey about his suitability for the alliance top job, said he will pay close attention to religious sensibilities when he becomes NATO secretary-general in August. His stance over the caricatures had angered Muslims around the world.

    “I would never myself depict any religious figure, including the Prophet Muhammad, in a way that could hurt other people’s feelings,” the former Danish prime minister said at a conference in Istanbul, Turkey.

    “I respect Islam as one of the world’s major religions,” said Fogh Rasmussen, wearing a sling after dislocating his shoulder in an accident earlier Monday.

    In 2005, twelve cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad were published in Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten.

    The drawings triggered massive protests from Morocco to Indonesia in early 2006, and rioters torched Danish and other Western embassies and diplomatic missions. Islamic law generally opposes any depiction of the prophet, even favorable, for fear it could lead to idolatry.

    Throughout the crisis, Fogh Rasmussen distanced himself from the cartoons but resisted calls to apologize for them, citing freedom of speech and saying his government could not be held responsible for the actions of Denmark’s free press.

    “My position was clear before, during and after the crisis,” Fogh Rasmussen said.

    In his speech to the Alliance of Civilizations, a forum sponsored by Turkey and Spain to promote understanding between the Western and Islamic worlds, Fogh Rasmussen said prejudice must be confronted.

    He said dialogue between cultures and religions should be “based on mutual respect and understanding” and that all kinds of censorship hamper that process.

    “That’s exactly the balance that we have to strike,” he said, referring to free speech and respect for religions.

    On another contentious issue, Fogh Rasmussen said Denmark was continuing a four-year investigation of Turkish claims that Copenhagen-based Roj TV has ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. The rebel group has been fighting the Turkish state since 1984 and is considered by Denmark and other Western countries to be a terrorist organization.

    “If sufficient evidence is provided, we will of course do all we can to close this television station,” Fogh Rasmussen said. “I do hope that the work can be concluded as soon as possible, but it’s up to the public prosecutor to decide.”

    The station has its newsroom and production facilities in Belgium, but transmits its satellite signal to Kurdish viewers via Denmark because it does not have a Belgian broadcasting license. Danish-Turkish relations have long been strained over Kurdish groups based in Denmark.

    Turkey’s Dogan news agency reported that Fogh Rasmussen was injured in his hotel.

    “I had a small accident in my room,” said the former Danish prime minister. He joked that he appeared “in a condition which might give you a wrong impression of the character of my new job.”

    ___

    Associated Press Writer Jan M. Olsen contributed to this report from Copenhagen

    Source:  www.cfnews13.com, April 10, 2009

  • Did Barack Obama talk out of turn about Turkey?

    Did Barack Obama talk out of turn about Turkey?

    RICHARD LAMING

    Today @ 08:19 CET

    EUOBSERVER / COMMENT – On his tour of Europe earlier this week, US president Barack Obama spoke warmly about the prospect of Turkey joining the European Union. In address to members of the Turkish parliament in Ankara, he observed that “Turkey is bound to Europe by more than bridges over the Bosporus.

    “Turkish accession to the EU, or not, may be a European decision, but the Americans are entitled to have a view” (Photo: EUobserver.com)

    Centuries of shared history, culture, and commerce bring you together. Europe gains by diversity of ethnicity, tradition and faith – it is not diminished by it. And Turkish membership would broaden and strengthen Europe’s foundation once more.”

    Those words have led him into a diplomatic and political storm.

    French president Nicolas Sarkozy rebuffed his American counterpart in an interview on French television, saying on the subject “When it comes to the European Union it is up to member states of the European Union to decide”.

    His foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, echoed these remarks. “It’s not for the Americans to decide who comes into Europe or not,” he said. “We are in charge in our own house.”

    So what did Barack Obama think he was doing?

    The facts about the relationship between Turkey and the EU are quite straightforward. Turkey first applied for membership in 1987 and negotiations are, after a fashion, ongoing. The Copenhagen criteria set down the economic and political conditions for membership and, right now, Turkey falls short of most of them. That in itself is not an obstacle to negotiations about membership, of course: the 10 former communist countries negotiated and reformed at the same time.

    The negotiations with Turkey, however, have been remarkably slow, because the EU member states are themselves divided. Countries like Britain are firmly in favour of Turkish membership, while others such as France and Austria are against.

    The reasons for these different positions have been well-rehearsed. What’s more interesting today is the discussion about who decides and why.

    The formal procedure is that negotiations are led by the European Commission, with unanimous agreement by the member states plus the approval of the European Parliament. The member states’ views therefore individually matter, as do the views of the MEPs to be elected in June – ask your candidates about this in the coming election campaign – but where does Barack Obama fit in all of that?

    The reason lies in the changing nature of EU membership. As time passes, the economic difference for Turkey between membership and non-membership of the EU is likely to decrease, as trading barriers fall and market access increases. Both bilateral and global trade agreements will speed this process along.

    On the other hand, the political difference between membership and non-membership is likely to grow. If the EU fulfils the ambitions set out in the Lisbon treaty and becomes a more coherent and influential actor on the world stage, then Turkish membership of the EU will affect both the EU opinion on world events and also the Turkish view of them. Among the issues that might be affected in this way are relations with Iraq and Iran – Turkey shares a border with both of them – and the future security of Israel, with which Turkey has a close relationship. These are questions where the Americans have a strong geopolitical interest, too.

    In other words, it’s not the economy, stupid.

    And Barack Obama understands this. In his own words to the EU leaders at a summit meeting in Prague, he said that “The United States and Europe must approach Muslims as our friends, neighbours and partners in fighting injustice, intolerance and violence. Moving forward towards Turkish membership in the EU would be an important signal of your commitment to this agenda and ensure that we continue to anchor Turkey firmly in Europe.”

    No-one can look at the history of the past 100 years and deny that America has an interest in the geopolitical health of Europe. A look at the last 10 years shows how America has an interest in good relations with the Muslim world. Turkish accession to the EU, or not, may be a European decision, but the Americans are entitled to have a view.

    Barack Obama gets this too. “It is true that the United States is not a member of the EU, so it’s not our decision to take, but that doesn’t prevent me from having an opinion,” he said.

    “I’ve noticed that the Europeans have a lot of opinions about US policy for a long time and they’ve not been shy about expressing them. That’s what friends do.”

    The writer is a commentator on European affairs, based in London, and a member of the board of Federal Union.

    https://euobserver.com/opinion/27938

  • Interview transcript: Abdullah Gul

    Interview transcript: Abdullah Gul

    Published: April 8 2009 15:24 | Last updated: April 8 2009 15:24

    In an interview with Delphine Strauss in Ankara after Barack Obama’s visit, Abdullah Gul, Turkey’s president spoke of his reaction to the US president’s initiatives and warned that European criticisms could pose a threat to western security interests. The following is a transcript of the interview

    What do you expect the impact of President Obama’s visit to be inside Turkey?

    Gul: First of all we were very happy because this is the first overseas visit – the first bilateral visit of the new US president – to our country and the fact that he has chosen Turkey and has chosen to address the Islamic world from the Turkish parliament made us very happy.

    We have seen that they realise the place of Turkey. I told him, take out a piece of paper and write down the priorities for US foreign policy. I’d also take a paper and write down the issues Turkey has been dealing with. You will not see such similarities with any other country in the issues they are dealing with.

    Of course the US is a superpower, so they have duties, but in this region we are one of the important countries. In this region, from Afghanistan to the Balkans, from energy security to the Middle East, from terrorism to nuclear disarmament, these are issues not only of interest to Turkey but to all of the world.

    Therefore the visit of the US president to Turkey was not only aiming at strengthening bilateral relations between the two countries but also of great relevance to regional and international issues.

    One of the most important messages Obama gave yesterday was his support for the talks going on between Armenia and Turkey. He also met yesterday evening with both foreign ministers. What is left to resolve before we see public steps on this issue?

    Gul: As I’m sure you know there have been efforts at normalisation from time to time between the two countries, but as you see these efforts accelerated after my visit to Armenia. This visit was a historical visit because this was the first time a Turkish president was in Yerevan and from that time on from telephone calls and other communications we have come to a certain mutual understanding on normalisation of relations. Through bilateral talks, I can say that we have reached a good understanding towards normalisation. In fact, after last summer there has been a new situation in the Caucasus. Everybody saw that these problems which we thought were frozen could immediately become big problems.

    Therefore we have started an initiative named Stability and Cooperation in the Caucasus. From this perspective the major problem in the Caucasus is the Karabagh question between Armenia and Azerbaijan, We wish that this problem is resolved so that a new climate emerges in the Caucasus, because in fact although this is a relatively small area it can become a wall between East and West or it can become a gateway.

    We are in a great effort to resolve these problems in the Caucasus and I believe that the year 2009 is a year of opportunity in that respect. And therefore I would like to invite everybody, beginning with the Minsk group, to multiply their efforts to come up with a solution.

    We heard from president Obama that a breakthrough in these talks could be very close. Are you saying we should not expect a public step forward before there has been progress in the Minsk group?

    Gul: I can say that there is a good level of understanding between the parties and goodwill on both sides

    There is a clear statement that partnership with Turkey is crucial to US policies in the region. What role exactly does the US want Turkey to play, for example, in Afghanistan?

    Gul: Frankly in this visit there was no concrete demand. Based on our understanding of our responsibility in that matter we have increased our efforts, our contributions, not only in terms of our military presence but also in our civilian activities.

    As you know we had the command of ISAF twice before and we will now take over the command of the forces in Afghanistan. There are other sides of our military activities but what’s more important is the civilian activities that we’re undertaking and I’ve shared this extensively in our Nato meeting. I’ve visited Kabul. I stayed there two days, I visited everywhere in that city and I saw that we cannot win people’s hearts and minds no matter how much we spend on the military side. I said before that the streets of Kabul are flooded with mud. People are walking there as if they are just floating on mud. We’ve now allocated $100m for asphalting streets in Kabul. We’ve almost finished the tender process and started actually preparing the roads. In a country where the girls are not allowed to go out in the street, we’ve open tens of schools for girls. In total we’ve opened hundreds of schools.

    You might have followed that five days ago we had the president of Afghanistan and Pakistan and also the general chiefs of joint staff [for meetings in Ankara]… This was very important… Our sole objective in this was to establish a working relationship between these institutions and it actually materialised.

    I have obtained in full the opinion of both of these presidents so that I can convey these views to the Nato leaders and to president Obama. I was very happy that I shared our assessments and the realities and the facts in a very open manner and I think it was of great service.

    Our foreign minister has visited all three regions in Afghanistan, many cities, with his wife. We are not leaders to go to Afghanistan and to visit our troops there in an isolated manner and come back. So the capacity of contribution in Turkey in those matters is very large. Why are we doing all of this? We are doing all of this for peace and stability and to expand our common values.

    I understand that as Turkey takes over command in Afghanistan that will involve increasing the numbers of troops. Is that correct?

    Gul: Yes, as I’ve said we’re increasing our military and civilian presence. The way in which we do these things, the military authorities are working on that.

    Do you have a sense of the numbers involved?

    Gul: This will certainly be an important contribution but there will not be any combat forces.

    Turkey has been very assertive in its foreign policy recently, for example making its objections to the appointment of Mr Rasmussen very clear. Is there a risk of all this antagonising its European partners?

    Gul: That shouldn’t be the case. Especially in a defence organisation like Nato, it is necessary that you discuss these matters in decision making mechanisms and come to a decision. Since 1952 Turkey has been the most active member of nato and a major contributor. During the cold war period Turkey spent its own resources for the defence of Europe. This should be appreciated.

    We have discussed [Rasmussen’s candidacy] with all of our partners over the phone and we had some questions and we shared our concerns and so our concerns are met.

    Now we must look to the future and we have to work all together in order to make the new secretary general successful.

    In fact concerning the points you have raised I am aware of some opinions from various circles and this is worrying.

    [Breaking in on translator in English] It’s very dangerous and making us disturbed.

    [Switching back to Turkish] You know for example even in the EU, some countries whose contributions are smaller may be blocking or vetoing some strategic issues which can be extremely important.

    In this present case, if a country has a significant and vital contribution to the organisation, if they have concerns, rational concerns on a concrete subject it is very natural that this should be listened to and responded to. So these points should not be underestimated.

    We neither engaged in blackmail nor did we have an irrational request. We acted in a rational logical and in a modern way within the compromise which is a European culture. And indeed in the end we came to an understanding. Therefore I am surprised to see comments of that nature coming from certain countries. I don’t find it terribly in line with the European spirit.

    There’s been a lot of speculation about exactly what guarantees given allowed Turkey to overcome its objections [to Rasmussen’s appointment]. Can you able to tell me how president Obama was able to convince you?

    Gul: I prefer not to communicate through newspaper headlines. We should look to the future. We should make Nato and the new Secretary General successful.

    One issue in particular is causing friction in Nato now – the difficulties over EU-Nato cooperation where of course Cyprus plays a part. Is this an issue where Turkey would be able to make some kind of gesture that would make the issue less sensitive?

    Gul: In fact if there’s going to be a gesture I think there should be a gesture to us, not from us… We make more contribution, a more strategic contribution and more sacrifice. Not others.

    This is very important. I was foreign minister for 5/6 years and at all of our meetings in Nato in the EU I have told my colleagues time and again that we have to solve this problem on time, as soon as possible because in the future it is likely to poison some more important and strategic issues.

    So the world is a very fragile place and there is a big potential for problems, there are big threats and there may be times when we need even stronger cooperation. This problem might hijack the huge issues and prevent us having a huge solidarity so therefore I used to warn all my colleagues, let’s solve this problem in a fair manner. I was warning them many times…

    You are right, it’s a problem in the EU. It’s a problem that the EU and Nato have not been having very healthy and full cooperation. But it’s not because of us. It’s because of the others.

    Are you worried that time is running out for talks to solve the Cyprus issue?

    Gul: We are very serious for a solution. We really wish this problem to dissolve – I’m not making propaganda, we proved this in 2004. We took the risk, we compromised, we challenged inside and we made sacrifices and the plan was put to a referendum on both sides. So Turks and Turkey said yes, the other side rejected.

    What else we can do? Anyway, that’s old, we start again and we have a full intention to reach a comprehensive solution over there. That’s why we have full support behind president Talat. We wish this problem to be over very soon. Once the problem is over we believe that Turkey, Greece and the whole of Cyprus can be another pillar in the EU with full cooperation. This is our real desire, this is our vision. Once, when it was not a joke, in 2004 we proved ourselves, so we have the credibility.

    Is it helpful for the US to intervene in support for Turkey’s EU bid – or the reverse?

    Gul: We do not ask them to do it. They’ve done these public declarations because of their strategic approach, and nobody should be disturbed by this, because in the end the decision regarding Turkey is the decision of members of the European Union and nobody will be making this decision under pressure. All member states made their own decision – by unanimity and of their own free will – to start membership negotiations with Turkey… This is not likely to happen under pressure. They have elaborated and studied the matter to see whether Turkey is an asset or not and they came to the conclusion that it’s probably an asset

    [The decline in domestic support for EU process] is not because its taking a long time. But some public statements coming from some member states are upsetting public opinion and undermining the credibility of those states. Because they are then in conflict with their own signatures, their own commitments. In the meantime the negotiation process is going on and Turkey is amending its laws and regulations and constitution to harmonise with the Community acquis… In any case we are going to continue with our reform process because these are our reforms and we want to do them ourselves.