Category: EU Members

European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 17 Dec. 2004

Nabucco Hucksterism, Iran Pollyanishness, and a $5 Billion Bribe. The Oil and Glory Interview: Steven Mann

A Blog on Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus

Saturday, April 11, 2009

On Thursday, a ceremony in the State Department will mark the retirement of Steven Mann, Coordinator for Eurasian Energy Diplomacy, after 32 years with the U.S. diplomatic service. The 58-year-old Mann served most of the last 17 years in senior positions in the Caucasus and Central Asia: He opened the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan in 1992, was ambassador to Turkmenistan, and tried to negotiate a deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh. For the last several years, Mann was America’s man on the spot in the New Great Game on the Caspian Sea.

I visited Mann at his Chevy Chase home. Amid stacked up magazines and books, Mann told me that Europe’s “energy security” is not necessarily at peril. And, for O&G readers, he broke one bit of historical news: Remember the demise of the trans-Caspian pipeline in the chapter An Army for Oil? The one in which then-Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov persisted in demanding a $500 million bribe of the Bechtel-General Electric consortium? It turns out that Niyazov originally requested $5 billion. The edited interview:

Q – Does the U.S. need a high-level ambassador on Eurasian energy? And what is your advice going forward?

A – Yes it is helpful. But we also have to get away from Nabucco hucksterism.

Q – What is that?

A – In terms of the wrong lessons learned from [the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline], the wrong lesson learned is to adopt a project and attempt to bring it about through political will. I think so much of the governmental activism on both sides of the Atlantic the last few years has been devoid of a commercial context. There have been quite a number of officials who know very little about energy who have been charging into the pipeline debate. Nabucco is a highly desirable project, don’t get me wrong. But there are other highly desirable projects besides Nabucco. And the overriding question for all these projects is, Where’s the gas?

Q – South Stream was Putin’s response to Nabucco. Did the U.S. blunder by promoting Nabucco before having the commercial context?

A – In terms of whether we are talking EU or US diplomacy, I think you have to be credible. All too often we’ve gotten out ahead of the commercial realities of Nabucco. You have to be able to point to an upstream supply. You have to have a commercial champion. And governments don’t build successful pipelines. Consortia do. The object of any envoy should be to get all those stars aligned before you give the full embrace to any project.

I think Secretary Clinton will bring a more unified focus to the U.S. effort. In the previous administration, we had six special envoys on energy in the State Department, and three deputy national security advisers on the [National Security Council] staff.

Q – Is that too many?

A – It’s four too many in State. And three too many at NSC.

Q – The stated reason for Nabucco is to diversify Europe’s energy supply. Is that a valid enough reason for U.S. involvement? And is European energy security a genuine issue?

A – Anyone who makes that argument knows very little about energy. And I often heard those arguments in the White House Situation Room. Diversification is an objective good. But it can be achieved in ways other than pipelines. The best thing Europe could do for its security is to link its energy grid, which it’s already doing.

Q – Is there alarmism on the subject?

A – The January cutoff of gas through Ukraine only affected 2-3% of European consumers.

Q – So it is overplayed.

A – Yea, I think it was overplayed. What also was underplayed was how successful the Europeans were in shifting gas, linking grids. That’s the untold story of [the January cutoff].

Q – The corollary – that Russian domination of supply equals a political threat in Europe – is that also alarmist?

A – With the EU, I think it’s hard to make that case. That’s the kind of argument that has to be dissected on a country-by-country basis. But Gazprom has been an extremely reliable supplier for 25 years. And I think Gazprom will continue to be an extremely reliable supplier to Europe.

Q – So really one should not be vexed if and when Nord Stream and South Stream are built? And if it takes some time for the ducks to be lined in a row for Nabucco, so be it?

A – Basically, yes. I think Nabucco is far more important to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan than it is to the EU.

Q – In the late 1990s, there was the initial effort by Bechtel and GE Capital to build a trans-Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan to Baku.

A – What happened was that Niyazov, with his Soviet mentality, demanded so-called preliminary financing. That is, an upfront payment to do the project. [The consortium] already paid a signing bonus of $10 million. But then Niyazov demanded in the range of $5 billion. Then it came down to $3 billion. And the consortium said, ‘This is utterly unrealistic.’ Niyazov thought they were bargaining. So he dropped the demand to $1 billion; then it came down to $500 million. The consortium said, You have until March 2000 or we walk. And at that time, they walked.

The fundamental problem, and it’s relevant today, is that a foreign investor cannot rely on a governmental entity [in Turkmenistan] to supply the upstream, to supply the product.

Q – Was it ever realistic that Niyazov was going to hook up with the East-West Corridor?

A – It was and it is realistic. Without alternatives to the Gazprom monopoly, Turkmenistan has to accept the price that Gazprom is willing to pay. There is a powerful commercial logic to a trans-Caspian pipeline.

Q – What is the best way today for a Caspian republic to get along in the region?

A – Kazakhstan is a good model of how to develop a Eurasian energy sector. You’re good partners with Russia, but you take advantage of foreign technology and capital.

Q – Does Russia have a role in helping to create a thaw between the U.S. and Iran?

A – Every time there is a substantial political change in the U.S., the oil and gas industry gets up on its tip-toes and says, ‘Aren’t we about to have a change in policy?’ You saw this with the Bush-Cheney election in 2000; the industry thought now was the time it would happen. You saw it after the [2001] invasion of Afghanistan, with certain cooperation and contact between the U.S. and Iran. You’re seeing it now with the advent of the Obama administration. So this is something that the oil and gas industry is always waiting for – that change.

Q – You are saying that this is nothing new.

A – It is nothing new.

Labels: Azerbaijan, Caspian, Kazakhstan, Nabucco, nord stream, oil, south stream

http://oilandglory.com/

April 14, 2009
Global Commitments vs. Regional Balances

Deglobalizing U.S. military commitments will require the “civilianization” of defense policy.

Judah Grunstein | Bio | 09 Apr 2009
WPR Blog

More smart stuff from Sam Roggeveen, who points out that alert is not the same thing as alarmed, but nevertheless admits to a case of nerves:

The thing to remember is that China does not have to match the U.S. in global capability terms for U.S. allies in the Pacific to start getting nervous about the strategic balance. All China has to do is be a credible competitor in the region, and that is already the case.

Roggeveen goes on to argue that “. . . we have already passed the point at which the U.S. could militarily intervene in a Taiwan conflict at acceptable risk,” and that the coming years/decades will witness an inexorable expansion of that perimeter.

Click through to see what he’s got to say about whether the budget priorities as signaled by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, compared to the alternatives, are a good thing or not for Australia. You might be surprised.

The broader point here is that while the “American unipolar moment” might be drawing to a close, we’re still the only country that is forced to calculate in terms of global, as opposed to regional, military capability. That reflects the magnitude of our power, influence and interests. But while an advantage in a scenario of geologic resource scarcity, it becomes potentially problematic in a scenario of political resource scarcity and a distinct disadvantage in times of financial resource scarcity.

This reinforces the need for scaling down our commitments by involving regional powers more prominently in advancing our foreign policy objectives, what I call Middle Power Mojo™. France and Turkey were my illustrative examples before they both started acting out. But part of the initial concept was the idea of identifying regional players that have got their mojo working, so that’s inevitably going to evolve with time.

Perhaps most significantly, this provides a political context for U.S. defense policy. The limitations of discussing the U.S. defense budget without the context of a strategic vision have been pointed out elsewhere. But so far, that’s mainly been shorthand for, “Wait until the Quadrennial Defense Review comes out next year,” and reinforces the militarization of foreign policy. Deglobalizing America’s defense commitments, on the other hand, will require filling gaps with both friendly capability and stable regional security architectures. And that’s more of a long-term interagency project that will “civilianize” defense policy.

Source: www.worldpoliticsreview.com, 09 Apr 2009

April 14, 2009
The Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement: Implications for the South Caucasus

Turkey’s recent and ongoing rapprochement with Armenia, addressed in last week’s Caucasus Update from the Turkish angle, has implications that could reverberate throughout the South Caucasus and beyond. Arguably, the normalisation of ties between Armenia and Turkey would be an event of equivalent regional significance as the Russo-Georgian war of last August.

Details remain unclear. This diplomatic murkiness testifies to just how explosive the issue has become for the Turkish, Azerbaijani and Armenian governments. The outlines, however, are apparent – that Turkey and Armenia are expected to begin opening their mutual border and establishing diplomatic relations probably sooner than later. The Turkish overtures are contingent on two things: firstly, that US President Barack Obama does not openly acknowledge the Armenian ‘genocide’, and secondly (and much less publicly) that Armenia renounces or at least quietly suspends its own push for genocide recognition and its long-dormant claims to Turkey’s eastern provinces as part of its “Greater Armenia” concept.

A third condition – that any formal moves are also conditional on Armenian progress towards removing its troops from Nagorno-Karabakh and the territories around it – is unconfirmed. The very idea that Turkey would go through with the border talks without attaching any conditions on Karabakh has provoked fury in Azerbaijan, especially since Turkey sealed the border in 1993 in response to the Armenian occupation of the regions, a reality which has clearly not changed. In Baku, the issue has created a rare patch of common ground for the government and the opposition (APA, April 7).

Essentially, what has developed appears to be an enormous three-way game. Firstly, Turkey’s determination to go ahead with the thaw – including the establishment of an alleged framework for talks in the areas of border openings, diplomatic representations, and dispute commissions (Wall Street Journal, April 2) – has been curbed by its recognition of the obvious, and urgent, need to keep their ethnic and linguistic brethren in Azerbaijan on side. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on April 7 that “The Azerbaijani-Armenian dispute should be resolved first. Then, problems between Turkey and Armenia can be solved, too”. According to Today’s Zaman, Turkey’s bluff may be to limit the thaw to occasional border openings and limited diplomatic contact until October, when a World Cup qualifying match between Armenia and Turkey (the return leg of the fixture which began the whole process last September with Turkish President’s visit to Yerevan) is due to take place in Istanbul (Today’s Zaman, April 9). This would give Ankara time to push Azerbaijan and Armenia into a compromise over Karabakh, probably under the auspices of Turkey’s much-discussed Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform.

Secondly, Yerevan’s strategy is to decouple the issue of the Turkish border from the Karabakh issue, ensuring that Armenia receives the economic and political benefits of relations with Turkey without having to concede ground vis-à-vis Azerbaijan. Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian clearly illustrated this bluff on April 5 when he warned Mr. Erdogan that attempts to link the two issues were an attempt to impede progress (RFE/RL, April 7).

Clearly, Yerevan anticipates that Turkey is unwilling to exasperate President Obama and – more importantly – undermine its role as a regional stabiliser by allowing the talks to fail. It is also attempting to ensure that the status quo in Karabakh is maintained. Armenia has no particular interest in altering the situation in the disputed territories hoping that one day Azerbaijan will be demanded by the world to reconcile with the loss of its territories (a belief that has been reinforced by the recognition of Kosovo). So without a continuing Turkish blockade Yerevan is unlikely to offer any concessions to Baku, and may in time feel emboldened enough to start demanding that Azerbaijan back down.

Azerbaijan, thirdly, is hoping that Turkey is not willing to betray its Turkic-speaking ally. However, it reflects the level of concern in Baku that Azerbaijan is not simply relying on ethnic and linguistic solidarity but has been actively (if unofficially) challenging Turkey’s strategic interests. President Ilham Aliyev reportedly said that if Turkey made a deal with Armenia that did not consider Karabakh, Azerbaijan could cut the gas supplies to Turkey (Jamestown Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 9). In this light one should consider recent cooperation between Baku and Russian energy giant Gazprom and discussions between President Aliyev and Ukrainian President Viktor Yuschenko on alternative gas routes via the Black Sea: in other words, the White Stream pipeline across the Black Sea to Ukraine, which would avoid Turkey (APA, April 10). Given these recent moves, it seems very likely that Azerbaijan will begin seriously reconsidering its participation in the planned Nabucco pipeline to Europe, a project with which it has already grown impatient.

More significantly, the country could start to reconsider its whole geopolitical orientation. President Aliyev hinted at both of these possibilities at a meeting of Azerbaijan’s Security Council on April 6, in which he stressed the independence of Baku’s foreign policy and the importance of Azerbaijan for the execution of any transnational energy projects in the region (APA, April 6). The voices are getting louder in Baku arguing that the policy of trusting Turkey and the West to support it over Karabakh, incurring Russian displeasure in the process, has achieved nothing. Azerbaijan’s confidence in the West was already damaged by the Russo-Georgian war, in which Washington and Brussels indicated that they would not respond materially to any conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Turkey’s decision to negotiate with Armenia, and the vocal support of the US and the EU for the talks, has struck a further blow to Baku’s faith in the West.

So why not turn towards Russia? Turkey clearly has diminished its leverage in any Karabakh peace talks and the OSCE’s Minsk Group has made painfully slow progress. The only actor who possesses clear and significant influence in the peace process is Russia, Armenia’s most important ally. Russia is one of the Minsk Group co-chairs but has demonstrated a willingness to act more or less unilaterally, for instance in the Moscow Declaration which it brokered between the two sides last November. Although few Azerbaijanis desire the return of Russian suzerainty, Karabakh is predominant. If Russia can help solve the conflict in a way which is acceptable to Azerbaijan, then all other considerations are secondary. Gas supplies and the cooling of ties with NATO and Washington are a small price to pay.

The West, and Turkey, must recognise the implications of the Armenian thaw. Clearly, peace in the Caucasus is desirable. Closed borders and mutual distrust are not to be welcomed. But if Turkey’s AKP party rushes ahead, it will embolden nationalists at home who could impede the country’s progress towards the EU. This sounds counter-intuitive: opening the border with Armenia is expected to boost Turkey’s EU accession hopes. But this analysis is from Brussels’ perspective. Domestically, the AKP is weaker than before after March’s local elections, and hasty, unpopular foreign policy gestures may cripple its hopes for the 2011 general election (especially if the EU continues to block accession, regardless of the thaw) and give nationalists the upper hand.

But even more concerning is the danger that Turkey and the West could ‘lose’ Azerbaijan to Russia. This would not only sound the death knell for Nabucco, but it would also alter the geopolitical profile of the whole of Eurasia and pose a new and serious risk in the Karabakh conflict. Patience is a virtue – Ankara, as well as Brussels and Washington, should bear this maxim in mind.

April 13, 2009
Will there be a new Camp David of Turkey?

Armenian problem of Turkey took an important dimension while regional balances are changing regional nations’ characteristics in this time section. Armenia that have seen double reaction by two countries since invasion on Karabakh region has an inevitable chance. Two brother countries’ opposition conducts because of dilemmas by foreign affairs gave some advantages for Armenia and their diaspora.

Although Turkey’s demand about giving up by Armenian insistences on Karabakh, genocide lie and new territory of east Anatolia points, this country didn’t improve relations. Additionally Armenia’s desires about their unreal pronunciations had grew up in period of Sarkisyan. Turkey and other states can not understand different thoughts of an irredentist state.

Of course absolute definitons like “Can be a country collapsed with historical confession which is combining many words?” of some liberal and global defenders in Turkey created this period. It doesn’t matter to interpret these responsible groups which formed new critical relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey. For example: “Azerbaijan didn’t recognize Turkish Cyprus, so this is unnecessary to defend their self interests, Karabakh conflict is an internal problem of them and Turkish foreign policy can not depend on it, Azerbaijan reailty finishes western support to Turkey while guarantees of the USA are enough for us…” To understand truth reality you can search all documents about these subjects.

Today public opinion of Azerbaijan feels unwell about last news. All messages are followed and columnists debate possible circumstances. Additionally to political dimension, economical and energical subjects are different debate areas. Unfortunately some alternative energy line projects are debated today. About border opening effects and reaction of public opinion of Azerbaijan circumstances, we ask to Araz Aslanli who is an academic person in Khazar University and president of Caucasus Research Center for International Relations and Strategic Analysis :

“ I don’t expect that borders will be opened. If actors look at the local and regional dynamics and Turkey want to stiff its position here, it shouldn’t be opened. But if they say that we have some guarantees of our position as regional power, no issues can influence this reality, and Turkey is only interested about global issues, they can open as minimum concession about this problem.

Border problem is strategical but it has psychological among relations with Azerbaijan. It is important for two countries. Example; Turkey is a single country which had been sponsored and protected by Azerbaijan if we compare global powers. It is originally psychological that is shored up ethnic, religious and cultural connections. Commonlu this question can collapse “trustworthy brother” image of Turkey in Turkish world and Azerbaijan. I think that it is another target of groups which are desire border opening idea. Public opinion is very sensitive in Azerbaijan about this question. Reaction of government can be limited but it can put a psychological mine because of sensitivity of public.”

Another symbol of public sensitive representation is a media organ that is Turkistan Newspaper. We ask this question to Aqil Camal who is a head director of Turkistan Newspaper. According to him, this case can end Turkish image in this geography:

“We are unwell as Turkish nationalists. There are some pressures as “Is it your defensivity?”
Some pro-Russian groups are working to create bad image about Turkey in public opinion. We should look at a point. If Turkey will open borders and Azerbaijani government agree this reality, all of the works about Turkish union will die. Because Azerbaijan is a bridge between Turkey and Central Asia because of Central Asian countries were near us. If Azerbaijan give up these works, Turkey can not be successful. This is a great problem all of us who are working to create Turkish union.

Sometimes politicians talk about state interests. But states are existing to serve nation. Who wants a state that is not interested about demands of nation? If there will be a cold time with Turkey, Azerbaijan consider relations with Russia, like Central Asian bandwagoning.

Mr. Öztarsu, you know that I said these sentences as a Turkish idealist on Turkish union way, not as an angry person on ordinary public sphere. At least Turkey shouldn’t open borders in this period. Chances shouldn’t be given to defeatists of our brotherhood. Punishment should be given when necessary, not serve them. As like as Çanakkale War…”

There is a long time period to open borders and debate its historical and political subjects as like speeches of Armenian president. But only beaten side will be conscience and thought of Turkish nation in this psychological war. Defenses of opposition groups from the likes of economic development, brotherhood of Armenians for Turkey, independent situation of Turkish foreign policy thoughts will be main actors in this process. We know that Turkish bureaucrats don’t want a new Camp David of Turkish world and be remembered a new Anwar Sadat.

Mehmet Fatih ÖZTARSU
Baku Qafqaz University
International Research Club

April 12, 2009
Incoming NATO chief: Confront religious prejudice

ISTANBUL(AP)

The incoming head of NATO called on Monday for a balance between free speech and respect for religious feelings after a dispute over his support for the right to caricature the Prophet Muhammad had threatened his appointment.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who overcame objections from Turkey about his suitability for the alliance top job, said he will pay close attention to religious sensibilities when he becomes NATO secretary-general in August. His stance over the caricatures had angered Muslims around the world.

“I would never myself depict any religious figure, including the Prophet Muhammad, in a way that could hurt other people’s feelings,” the former Danish prime minister said at a conference in Istanbul, Turkey.

“I respect Islam as one of the world’s major religions,” said Fogh Rasmussen, wearing a sling after dislocating his shoulder in an accident earlier Monday.

In 2005, twelve cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad were published in Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten.

The drawings triggered massive protests from Morocco to Indonesia in early 2006, and rioters torched Danish and other Western embassies and diplomatic missions. Islamic law generally opposes any depiction of the prophet, even favorable, for fear it could lead to idolatry.

Throughout the crisis, Fogh Rasmussen distanced himself from the cartoons but resisted calls to apologize for them, citing freedom of speech and saying his government could not be held responsible for the actions of Denmark’s free press.

“My position was clear before, during and after the crisis,” Fogh Rasmussen said.

In his speech to the Alliance of Civilizations, a forum sponsored by Turkey and Spain to promote understanding between the Western and Islamic worlds, Fogh Rasmussen said prejudice must be confronted.

He said dialogue between cultures and religions should be “based on mutual respect and understanding” and that all kinds of censorship hamper that process.

“That’s exactly the balance that we have to strike,” he said, referring to free speech and respect for religions.

On another contentious issue, Fogh Rasmussen said Denmark was continuing a four-year investigation of Turkish claims that Copenhagen-based Roj TV has ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. The rebel group has been fighting the Turkish state since 1984 and is considered by Denmark and other Western countries to be a terrorist organization.

“If sufficient evidence is provided, we will of course do all we can to close this television station,” Fogh Rasmussen said. “I do hope that the work can be concluded as soon as possible, but it’s up to the public prosecutor to decide.”

The station has its newsroom and production facilities in Belgium, but transmits its satellite signal to Kurdish viewers via Denmark because it does not have a Belgian broadcasting license. Danish-Turkish relations have long been strained over Kurdish groups based in Denmark.

Turkey’s Dogan news agency reported that Fogh Rasmussen was injured in his hotel.

“I had a small accident in my room,” said the former Danish prime minister. He joked that he appeared “in a condition which might give you a wrong impression of the character of my new job.”

___

Associated Press Writer Jan M. Olsen contributed to this report from Copenhagen

Source: www.cfnews13.com, April 10, 2009

April 11, 2009
Did Barack Obama talk out of turn about Turkey?

RICHARD LAMING

Today @ 08:19 CET

EUOBSERVER / COMMENT – On his tour of Europe earlier this week, US president Barack Obama spoke warmly about the prospect of Turkey joining the European Union. In address to members of the Turkish parliament in Ankara, he observed that “Turkey is bound to Europe by more than bridges over the Bosporus.

“Turkish accession to the EU, or not, may be a European decision, but the Americans are entitled to have a view” (Photo: EUobserver.com)

Centuries of shared history, culture, and commerce bring you together. Europe gains by diversity of ethnicity, tradition and faith – it is not diminished by it. And Turkish membership would broaden and strengthen Europe’s foundation once more.”

Those words have led him into a diplomatic and political storm.

French president Nicolas Sarkozy rebuffed his American counterpart in an interview on French television, saying on the subject “When it comes to the European Union it is up to member states of the European Union to decide”.

His foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, echoed these remarks. “It’s not for the Americans to decide who comes into Europe or not,” he said. “We are in charge in our own house.”

So what did Barack Obama think he was doing?

The facts about the relationship between Turkey and the EU are quite straightforward. Turkey first applied for membership in 1987 and negotiations are, after a fashion, ongoing. The Copenhagen criteria set down the economic and political conditions for membership and, right now, Turkey falls short of most of them. That in itself is not an obstacle to negotiations about membership, of course: the 10 former communist countries negotiated and reformed at the same time.

The negotiations with Turkey, however, have been remarkably slow, because the EU member states are themselves divided. Countries like Britain are firmly in favour of Turkish membership, while others such as France and Austria are against.

The reasons for these different positions have been well-rehearsed. What’s more interesting today is the discussion about who decides and why.

The formal procedure is that negotiations are led by the European Commission, with unanimous agreement by the member states plus the approval of the European Parliament. The member states’ views therefore individually matter, as do the views of the MEPs to be elected in June – ask your candidates about this in the coming election campaign – but where does Barack Obama fit in all of that?

The reason lies in the changing nature of EU membership. As time passes, the economic difference for Turkey between membership and non-membership of the EU is likely to decrease, as trading barriers fall and market access increases. Both bilateral and global trade agreements will speed this process along.

On the other hand, the political difference between membership and non-membership is likely to grow. If the EU fulfils the ambitions set out in the Lisbon treaty and becomes a more coherent and influential actor on the world stage, then Turkish membership of the EU will affect both the EU opinion on world events and also the Turkish view of them. Among the issues that might be affected in this way are relations with Iraq and Iran – Turkey shares a border with both of them – and the future security of Israel, with which Turkey has a close relationship. These are questions where the Americans have a strong geopolitical interest, too.

In other words, it’s not the economy, stupid.

And Barack Obama understands this. In his own words to the EU leaders at a summit meeting in Prague, he said that “The United States and Europe must approach Muslims as our friends, neighbours and partners in fighting injustice, intolerance and violence. Moving forward towards Turkish membership in the EU would be an important signal of your commitment to this agenda and ensure that we continue to anchor Turkey firmly in Europe.”

No-one can look at the history of the past 100 years and deny that America has an interest in the geopolitical health of Europe. A look at the last 10 years shows how America has an interest in good relations with the Muslim world. Turkish accession to the EU, or not, may be a European decision, but the Americans are entitled to have a view.

Barack Obama gets this too. “It is true that the United States is not a member of the EU, so it’s not our decision to take, but that doesn’t prevent me from having an opinion,” he said.

“I’ve noticed that the Europeans have a lot of opinions about US policy for a long time and they’ve not been shy about expressing them. That’s what friends do.”

The writer is a commentator on European affairs, based in London, and a member of the board of Federal Union.

https://euobserver.com/opinion/27938

April 9, 2009