Category: EU Members

European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 17 Dec. 2004

  • Turkish Cypriots Serve Notice on Peace Talks

    Turkish Cypriots Serve Notice on Peace Talks

    Hugh Pope

    23 April 2009

    After the morale-raising 6-7 April trip to Turkey by U.S. President Barack Obama, Turkey is back to facing the reality of its tough neighbourhood: last-minute stresses in its hopeful recent talks on normalisation with Armenia (see our 14 April 2009 report), isolation for Turkey at the 4-5 April NATO summit as it resisted the eventual choice of a new secretary general and now new challenges for the ongoing talks on a Cyprus settlement, a dispute which, left unsolved, remains Turkey’s biggest obstacle on the road to the EU.

    In parliamentary elections on 19 April, Turkish Cypriots gave victory to the right-wing nationalist National Unity Party (UBP – Ulusal Birlik Partisi), handing it 44 per cent of the vote and 26 of the 50 seats. They voted out the ruling left-wing Republican Turkish Party (CTP – Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi), giving it 29 per cent of the vote and 15 parliamentary seats. After years in which Turkish media has all but ignored Cyprus, victory for the Turkish Cypriot opposition suddenly put the issue centre stage for commentators and politicians – some of whom used it to argue that it showed how the ruling AK Party’s “defeatist” policy of compromise with Greek Cypriots and the EU had failed.

    In fact, the Turkish Cypriot results did not reflect new disapproval of the modest achievements of inter-communal talks in progress since September (see our 23 June 2008 report), but rather represented frustrations over domestic governance and the steep local economic downturn. UBP’s policy options are limited, too. It will have to trim its sails to the winds from Turkey, which finances much of the Turkish Cypriot administration, runs Turkish Cypriot security and has been supporting a compromise Cyprus settlement since 2004.

    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan immediately warned the new Turkish Cypriot government not to upset the inter-communal peace talks. Turkish President Abdullah Gül repeated Ankara’s strong support for the firmly pro-settlement President Mehmet Ali Talat, who is responsible for negotiating on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots. The UBP has quickly promised to support the talks, has toned down its anti-European Union rhetoric and has softened its old policy of a two-state solution to one that has confederal elements.

    Still, there remains a risk that UBP returns to its long-time role as the party of hardline nationalists including the retired former President Rauf Denktas, and that it voices demands for extreme self-determination that are anathema to the Greek Cypriot side. Such ideas are already being encouraged by the Turkish opposition, whose nationalists are urging Turkish Cypriots to forget the “false paradise” of compromise.

    New pressure is clearly on Talat and his Greek Cypriot counterpart Demetris Christofias to show results sooner rather than later. Talat, the former leader of the CTP, faces re-election in April 2010. Christofias won a strong mandate for a settlement when he was elected to a five-year term in February 2008, but nationalist hardliners in his main coalition partner, DIKO, dominated elections for senior party posts in March. The new Turkish political interest in Cypriot events is partly the result of Turkish local elections on 29 March, in which Prime Minister Erdogan and his ruling AK Party saw their grip on power slip slightly.

    Here again the main reason appears to be frustration with economic woes, as well as Erdogan’s legendary displays of impatience with his opponents and the government’s attempts to minimize the impact of the global crisis. Even if Turkey’s banks appear to have weathered the worst of the financial storms, the Turkish economy contracted sharply in the first quarter of 2009 for the first time after six years of uninterrupted economic growth. Exports fell by one third and unemployment surged to a record high. More than one quarter of Turkey’s youth is now out of work.

    In the election, AK Party won 39 per cent of votes for provincial councils, versus 47 per cent in the parliamentary elections of 2007 and 42 per cent in the last local elections. In Turkey’s fractured political system, 39 per cent remains a high figure and rules out bringing the next parliamentary elections forward from 2012. But this is Erdogan’s first electoral setback of any kind. On election night, he admitted he was unsatisfied and would be drawing the necessary lessons.

    Notably, AK Party lost strength in Western and coastal districts, progressive parts of Turkey that usually point to where Turkey’s future lies. The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) scored 36 per cent in the country’s cultural and financial capital, Istanbul, and captured Antalya and other major tourism centers along the Turkish riviera. Some commentators believed that this was a reaction to a perceived threat to contemporary lifestyles by the conservative AK Party’s pro-Islamic tendencies. Overall, CHP came second with 23 per cent of the vote. The right-wing National Action Party (MHP) also experienced a surge in its vote to 16 per cent, scoring high among unemployed youth. The ultra-conservative Felicity Party scored 5.2 per cent with its specifically religious messages.

    The Kurdish nationalist Democratic Society Party (DTP) won just 5.6 per cent of the national vote, but it displaced AK Party as the top vote puller in the mainly Kurdish southeast and dramatically beat AK Party in a high-profile battle for the main southeastern city of Diyarbakir, where it won 65 per cent of the vote, up from 43 per cent.

    Turkey’s EU negotiator and AK Party minister Egemen Bagis said that the result was “just great” considering the financial crisis and the wear and tear of AK Party’s seven years in power, noting with some justification that the distribution of results proved that his party dominated the political centre and was the only one able to attract votes all over the country. He said that upcoming three years with no elections meant that “now is the time to do reforms.” He said this would have to be in consultation with the opposition CHP, and listed as priorities reform of the political parties law, the election law, and urgent legal preparations to allow two chapters of the EU negotiations to open in June. AK Party leaders suggest they will first work to make it harder to close down political parties, an area where Turkish democracy is particularly vulnerable.

    Olli Rehn, EU commissioner for englargement, did not mince his words in a 31 March speech to the joint EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. “The main ‘fuel’ of the process remains reforms in Turkey,” he said. Citing threats to freedom of expression, he specifically criticized the government for its $500 million tax charge in February on the Dogan media group. He sought more respect for women’s rights and Christian religious institutions. He warned was that “it is now time that Turkey takes the necessary steps, including changes in the Constitution, to align Turkey’s legislation with the guidelines of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe and European best practices. This is essential to respect the Copenhagen criteria.” Finally, he called for Turkey to put all its weight and support to the UN-led process on Cyprus, since a settlement there had the most direct impact on clearing obstacles on Turkey’s path to the EU.

  • OTTOMAN EMPIRE & EUROPEAN THEATRE

    OTTOMAN EMPIRE & EUROPEAN THEATRE

    International Symposium in Two Acts
    OTTOMAN EMPIRE & EUROPEAN THEATRE

    II
    The Time of Joseph Haydn (1732-1809)

    From Sultan Mahmud I to Mahmud II (r.1730-1839)
    Organized by
    Don Juan Archiv Wien
    In cooperation with
    The UNESCO International Theatre Institute in Vienna
    and
    The Austrian Cultural Forum in Istanbul

    Vienna / Istanbul
    2009

    Vienna
    Dates: April 24 – 25, 2009 
    Venue: UNESCO – ITI 
    Palais Khevenhüller
    Türkenstraße 19
    A-1090 Wien 

    Istanbul
    Dates: June 4 – 5, 2009
    Venue: Austrian Cultural Forum 
    Palais Yeniköy
    Köybaşı Cadesi 44, Yeniköy
    TR-34464 Istanbul 

     

    Attached please find the symposium program with details, also including the abstracts and the short biographies of the speakers.

  • Romanian journalist appointed Euronews senior editor

    Romanian journalist appointed Euronews senior editor

    Romanian journalist appointed Euronews senior editor

    BRUSSELS, April 16 /UKRINFORM/. Romanian journalist Lucian Sarb has been appointed new director of Euronews’s news and programmes room. The decision to this effect was made by the Euronews Executive Board, UKRINFORM’s own correspondent reports.

    Journalist Lucian Sarb, aged 41, will join Euronews on May 4, as head of editorial staff. He will lead an editorial staff composed of 350 journalists, making up eight linguistic teams of Euronews. The channel broadcasts simultaneously into German, English, Arabic, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese and Russian, and as of January 2010, it will also broadcast in Turkish.

    Lucian Sarb started its journalistic career in 1994, at the Romanian Television. He has had an important role in the development of the cooperation between Euronews and TVR, which led, to the launch, in 2004, of the first daily news broadcast in the Romanian language, which is broadcast on the second channel of the public television. Currently, Lucian Sarb is editorial director of The Money Channel, part of Realitatea-Catavencu trust. After 2006, he has participated in the creation and development of the first economic and financial TV channel in Romania.

    Source:  bsanna-news.ukrinform.ua, 16.04.2009

  • EU Urges Turkey To Reopen Armenia Border

    EU Urges Turkey To Reopen Armenia Border

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    Georgia — Peter Semneby, EU’s special envoy to the South Caucasus, in Tbilisi, 08Sep2008

    15.04.2009

    A top European Union official urged EU aspirant Turkey to reopen its border with Armenia, piling pressure on Ankara to normalize ties with Yerevan after U.S. President Barack Obama made a similar call last week.

    Peter Semneby, the EU’s special envoy for the South Caucasus, said normalizing Turkish-Armenian ties would benefit the region and would help Turkey’s hopes of joining the bloc.

    “Fundamentally this would be a development that I think could lead to further positive developments that would in return benefit us, benefit the region and would therefore benefit Turkey and the European Union,” Semneby told a panel interview including Reuters late on Tuesday. “It (opening the border) will certainly not hurt Turkey’s EU perspectives,” he said.

    Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993 to lend support to its traditional Muslim ally Azerbaijan. Armenia and Turkey trace their own dispute to 90-year-old claims that Ottoman Turks committed genocide against Armenia in World War I.

    Semneby said the EU is not putting pressure on Turkey to recognize the mass killings of Armenians by Ottoman Turks in 1915 as genocide, a claim which Ankara strongly denies. “I can only talk on the behalf of the European Union, and there is absolutely no such pressure, absolutely not. This is not an issue of ours. We are not involved on that issue.”

    Obama, in a visit to NATO ally Turkey earlier this month, also pressed Ankara and Yerevan to complete talks soon. But Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has said the deadlock over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, over which Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a war in the late 1980s and early 1990s, must be resolved before Turkey and Armenia strike a deal.

    Azerbaijan, which sells gas and oil to Turkey, opposes its ally opening the border because such a deal could take away the incentive for Armenia to negotiate over Nagorno-Karabakh.

    In a related development, the International Crisis Group (ICG) said on Tuesday that Turkey should open its borders and normalize relations with Armenia without waiting for a settlement to Armenia’s long dispute with Azerbaijan. “The politicized debate whether to recognize as genocide the destruction of much of the Ottoman Armenian population and the stalemated Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh should not halt momentum” in the talks, the ICG said.

    The ICG offers governments advice and policy proposals on how to bring an end to conflicts. Armenia has said that Turkish recognition of the genocide is not a precondition for opening diplomatic relations.

    “The unresolved Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh still risks undermining full adoption and implementation of the potential package deal between Turkey and Armenia,” the report said. “Bilateral detente with Armenia ultimately could help Baku recover territory better than the current stalemate,” it said.

    (Reuters)

  • War, Oil and Gas Pipelines: Turkey is Washington’s Geopolitical Pivot

    War, Oil and Gas Pipelines: Turkey is Washington’s Geopolitical Pivot

     by F. William Engdahl

     

     

    13171

     

     

    Global Research, April 14, 2009

      

    The recent visit of US President Obama to Turkey was far more significant than the President’s speech would suggest. For Washington Turkey today has become a geopolitical “pivot state” which is in the position to tilt the Eurasian power equation towards Washington or significantly away from it depending on how Turkey develops its ties with Moscow and its role regarding key energy pipelines. 

     

    If Ankara decides to collaborate more closely with Russia, Georgia’s position is precarious and Azerbaijan’s natural gas pipeline route to Europe, the so-called Nabucco Pipeline, is blocked. If it cooperates with the United States and manages to reach a stable treaty with Armenia under US auspices, the Russian position in the Caucasus is weakened and an alternative route for natural gas to Europe opens up, decreasing Russian leverage against Europe.

    For Washington the key to bringing Germany into closer cooperation with the US is to weaken German dependence on Russian energy flows. Twice in the past three winters Washington has covertly incited its hand-picked President in Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko to arrange an arbitrary cut off of Russian gas flows to Germany and other EU destinations. The only purpose of the actions was to convince EU governments that Russia was not a reliable energy partner. Now, with the Obama visit to Ankara, Washington is attempting to win Turkish support for its troubled Nabucco alternative gas pipeline through Turkey from Azerbaijan which would theoretically at least lessen EU dependence on Russian gas.

    The Turkish-EU problem

    However willing Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan might be to accommodate Obama, the question of Turkish relations with the EU is inextricably linked with the troublesome issue of Turkish membership to the EU, a move vehemently opposed by France and also less openly by Germany.

    Turkey is one of the only routes energy from new sources can cross to Europe from the Middle East, Central Asia or the Caucasus. If Turkey — which has considerable influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Ukraine, the Middle East and the Balkans — is prepared to ally with the United States, Russia is on the defensive and German ties to Russia weaken considerably. If Turkey decides to cooperate with Russia instead, Russia retains the initiative and Germany is dependent  on Russian energy. Since it became clear in Moscow that US strategy was to extend NATO to Russia’s front door via Ukraine and Georgia, Russia has moved to use its economic “carrot” its vast natural gas resources, to at the very least neutralize Western Europe, especially Germany, towards Russia. It is notable in that regard that the man chosen as Russia’s President in December 1999 had spent a significant part of his KGB career in Germany.   

    Turkey and the US Game

    It is becoming clear that Obama and Washington are playing a deeper game. A few weeks before the meetings, when it had become obvious that the Europeans were not going to bend on the issues such as troops for Afghanistan or more economic stimulus that concerned the United States, Obama scheduled the trip to Turkey.


    During the recent EU meetings in Prague Obama actively backed Turkey’s application for EU membership knowing well that that put especially France and Germany in a difficult position as EU membership would allow free migration which many EU countries fear. Obama deliberately confronted EU states with this knowing he was playing with geopolitical fire, especially as the US is no member of the EU. It was a deliberate and cheap way to score points with the Erdogan government of Turkey.

     
    During the NATO meeting, a key item on the agenda was the selection of a new alliance secretary-general. The favorite was former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Turkey opposed him because of his defense of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed published in a Danish magazine. NATO operates on consensus, so any one member can block Rasmussen. The Turks backed off the veto, and in return won two key positions in NATO, including that of deputy secretary-general.

     

    Turkey

    thereby boosted its standing in NATO, got Obama to vigorously defend the Turkish application for membership in the European Union, which of course the United States does not belong to. Obama then went to Turkey for a key international meeting that will allow him to further position the United States in relation to Islam.

    gasmap 
    Obama has a Grand Strategy to use Turkey to isolate Russia via Nabucco pipelines through Georgia and Armenia to the EU

    obamaerdogan 
    The Obama Erdogan talks were perhaps the most strategic of the recent Obama tour

    During US-Russian talks there had been no fundamental shift by Obama from the earlier position of the Bush Administration. Russia rejects Washington’s idea of pressuring IUran on their nuclear program in return for a bargain of an undefined nature with Washington over US planned missile and radar bases in Poland and the Czech Republic. The US claimed it need not rely on Russia to bring military and other supplies into Afghanistan, claiming it had reached agreement with Ukraine to transship mililtary supplies, a move designed by Washington to increase friction between Moscow and Kiew. Moreover, the NATO communique did not abandon the idea of Ukraine and Georgia being admitted to NATO. The key geopolitical prize for Washington remains Moscow but clearly Turkey is being wooed by Obama to play a role in that game.

     
    Germany will clearly not join Obama in blocking Russia. Not only does Germany depend on Russia for energy supplies. She has no desire to confront a Russia that Berlin sees as no real immediate threat to Germany. For Berlin, at least now, they are not going to address the Russian question.

    At the same time, an extremely important event between Turkey and Armenia is shaping up. Armenians had long held Turkey responsible for the mass murder of Armenians during and after World War I, a charge the Turks have denied. The US Congress is considering a provocative resolution condeming “Turkish genocide” agianst Armenians. Turkey is highly sensitive to these charges, and Congressional passage of such a resolution would have meant a Turkish break in diplomatic relations with Washington. Now since the Obama visit Ankara has begun to discuss an agreement with Armenia including diplomatic relations which would eliminate the impact of any potential US Congress resolution.

     

    A Turkish opening to Armenia would alter the balance of power in the entire region. Since the August 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict the Caucasus, a strategically vital area to Moscow has been unstable. Russian troops remain in South Ossetia. Russia also has troops in Armenia meaning Russia has Georgia surrounded.

     

    Turkey is the key link in this complex game of geopolitical balance of power between Washington and Moscow. If Turkey decides to collaborate with Russia Georgia’s position becomes very insecure and Azerbaijan’s possible pipeline route to Europe is blocked. If Turkey decides to cooperate with Washington and at the same time reaches a stable agreement with Armenia under US guidance, Russia’s entire position in the Caucasus is weakened and an alternative route for natural gas to Europe becomes available, reducing Russian leverage against Western Europe.

     
    Therefore, having sat through fruitless meetings with the Europeans, Obama chose not to cause a pointless confrontation with a Europe that is out of options. Instead, Obama completed his trip by going to Turkey to discuss what the treaty with Armenia means and to try to convince the Turks to play for high stakes by challenging Russia in the Caucasus, rather than playing Russia’s junior partner.

     

    The most important Obama speech in his European tour came after Turkey won key posts in the NATO political structure with US backing. In his speech Obama sided with Turkey against the EU and in effect showed Turkey Washington was behind her. Obama’s speech addressed Turkey as an emerging regional power, which was well received in Ankara. The sweet words will cost Turkey dearly if it acts on them.

     

    Moscow is not sitting passively by as Washington woos Turkey. Turkish President Abdullah Gul paid a four-day visit to the Russian Federation this February, where he met with President Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister Putin, and also traveled to Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, where he discussed joint investments. Gul was accompanied by his minister for foreign trade and minister of energy, as well as a large delegation of Turkish businessmen. The stakes in this complex three-way Great Game for domination of Eurasia have been raised significantly following the Obama trip to Ankara. Turkey imports 65 percent of its natural gas and 25 percent of its oil from Russia. Therefore, Turkey is also developing a growing dependency on Russian energy resources, including coal.

     

    On March 27, 2009, a memorandum was signed between the Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR and Russia’s Gazprom. The memorandum includes a statement of deliveries, beginning in January 2010, of Azerbaijani natural gas to Russia.

     

    Gazprom was particularly interested in signing such an agreement with Azerbaijan, not the least because Azerbaijan is the only state outside Iran or Turkmenistan, both of which are problematic, that could supply gas to the planned EU Nabucco pipeline, for transporting natural gas from Azerbaijan and the Central Asia states through Turkey to south-eastern Europe. In reality, gas may come only from Azerbaijan. Russia has proposed an alternative to Nabucco project, South Stream, also in need of Azerbaijani gas, so in effect Russia weakens the chances of realization of Nabucco. Obama strategy is clearly not less confrontational with Russia. It is merely playing with a slightly different deck of cards than did Cheney and Bush.

     

     

     

     

    F. William Engdahl is a frequent contributor to Global Research.

    https://www.globalresearch.ca/war-oil-and-gas-pipelines-turkey-is-washington-s-geopolitical-pivot/13171

    The Russian Dimension

  • Nabucco Hucksterism, Iran Pollyanishness, and a $5 Billion Bribe. The Oil and Glory Interview: Steven Mann

    Nabucco Hucksterism, Iran Pollyanishness, and a $5 Billion Bribe. The Oil and Glory Interview: Steven Mann

    A Blog on Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus

    Saturday, April 11, 2009

    On Thursday, a ceremony in the State Department will mark the retirement of Steven Mann, Coordinator for Eurasian Energy Diplomacy, after 32 years with the U.S. diplomatic service. The 58-year-old Mann served most of the last 17 years in senior positions in the Caucasus and Central Asia: He opened the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan in 1992, was ambassador to Turkmenistan, and tried to negotiate a deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh. For the last several years, Mann was America’s man on the spot in the New Great Game on the Caspian Sea.

    I visited Mann at his Chevy Chase home. Amid stacked up magazines and books, Mann told me that Europe’s “energy security” is not necessarily at peril. And, for O&G readers, he broke one bit of historical news: Remember the demise of the trans-Caspian pipeline in the chapter An Army for Oil? The one in which then-Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov persisted in demanding a $500 million bribe of the Bechtel-General Electric consortium? It turns out that Niyazov originally requested $5 billion. The edited interview:

    Q – Does the U.S. need a high-level ambassador on Eurasian energy? And what is your advice going forward?

    A – Yes it is helpful. But we also have to get away from Nabucco hucksterism.

    Q – What is that?

    A – In terms of the wrong lessons learned from [the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline], the wrong lesson learned is to adopt a project and attempt to bring it about through political will. I think so much of the governmental activism on both sides of the Atlantic the last few years has been devoid of a commercial context. There have been quite a number of officials who know very little about energy who have been charging into the pipeline debate. Nabucco is a highly desirable project, don’t get me wrong. But there are other highly desirable projects besides Nabucco. And the overriding question for all these projects is, Where’s the gas?

    Q – South Stream was Putin’s response to Nabucco. Did the U.S. blunder by promoting Nabucco before having the commercial context?

    A – In terms of whether we are talking EU or US diplomacy, I think you have to be credible. All too often we’ve gotten out ahead of the commercial realities of Nabucco. You have to be able to point to an upstream supply. You have to have a commercial champion. And governments don’t build successful pipelines. Consortia do. The object of any envoy should be to get all those stars aligned before you give the full embrace to any project.

    I think Secretary Clinton will bring a more unified focus to the U.S. effort. In the previous administration, we had six special envoys on energy in the State Department, and three deputy national security advisers on the [National Security Council] staff.

    Q – Is that too many?

    A – It’s four too many in State. And three too many at NSC.

    Q – The stated reason for Nabucco is to diversify Europe’s energy supply. Is that a valid enough reason for U.S. involvement? And is European energy security a genuine issue?

    A – Anyone who makes that argument knows very little about energy. And I often heard those arguments in the White House Situation Room. Diversification is an objective good. But it can be achieved in ways other than pipelines. The best thing Europe could do for its security is to link its energy grid, which it’s already doing.

    Q – Is there alarmism on the subject?

    A – The January cutoff of gas through Ukraine only affected 2-3% of European consumers.

    Q – So it is overplayed.

    A – Yea, I think it was overplayed. What also was underplayed was how successful the Europeans were in shifting gas, linking grids. That’s the untold story of [the January cutoff].

    Q – The corollary – that Russian domination of supply equals a political threat in Europe – is that also alarmist?

    A – With the EU, I think it’s hard to make that case. That’s the kind of argument that has to be dissected on a country-by-country basis. But Gazprom has been an extremely reliable supplier for 25 years. And I think Gazprom will continue to be an extremely reliable supplier to Europe.

    Q – So really one should not be vexed if and when Nord Stream and South Stream are built? And if it takes some time for the ducks to be lined in a row for Nabucco, so be it?

    A – Basically, yes. I think Nabucco is far more important to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan than it is to the EU.

    Q – In the late 1990s, there was the initial effort by Bechtel and GE Capital to build a trans-Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan to Baku.

    A – What happened was that Niyazov, with his Soviet mentality, demanded so-called preliminary financing. That is, an upfront payment to do the project. [The consortium] already paid a signing bonus of $10 million. But then Niyazov demanded in the range of $5 billion. Then it came down to $3 billion. And the consortium said, ‘This is utterly unrealistic.’ Niyazov thought they were bargaining. So he dropped the demand to $1 billion; then it came down to $500 million. The consortium said, You have until March 2000 or we walk. And at that time, they walked.

    The fundamental problem, and it’s relevant today, is that a foreign investor cannot rely on a governmental entity [in Turkmenistan] to supply the upstream, to supply the product.

    Q – Was it ever realistic that Niyazov was going to hook up with the East-West Corridor?

    A – It was and it is realistic. Without alternatives to the Gazprom monopoly, Turkmenistan has to accept the price that Gazprom is willing to pay. There is a powerful commercial logic to a trans-Caspian pipeline.

    Q – What is the best way today for a Caspian republic to get along in the region?

    A – Kazakhstan is a good model of how to develop a Eurasian energy sector. You’re good partners with Russia, but you take advantage of foreign technology and capital.

    Q – Does Russia have a role in helping to create a thaw between the U.S. and Iran?

    A – Every time there is a substantial political change in the U.S., the oil and gas industry gets up on its tip-toes and says, ‘Aren’t we about to have a change in policy?’ You saw this with the Bush-Cheney election in 2000; the industry thought now was the time it would happen. You saw it after the [2001] invasion of Afghanistan, with certain cooperation and contact between the U.S. and Iran. You’re seeing it now with the advent of the Obama administration. So this is something that the oil and gas industry is always waiting for – that change.

    Q – You are saying that this is nothing new.

    A – It is nothing new.

    Labels: Azerbaijan, Caspian, Kazakhstan, Nabucco, nord stream, oil, south stream

    http://oilandglory.com/