Category: France

  • Turkish accession adds spark to French election

    Turkish accession adds spark to French election

    By Ben Hall in Paris

    ft1France’s political parties clashed this week over the question of Turkish membership of the European Union, providing a polemical spark to an otherwise lacklustre European parliament election campaign.

    Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, was accused by his opponents of lying to voters by campaigning against Turkey joining the block even though he allowed negotiations on its accession to enter a new phase during France’s presidency of the EU last year.

    Mr Sarkozy’s governing centre-right UMP party has made Turkey a theme of its campaign to the point of ensuring that its leading candidates issue formal -declarations promising not to let Turkey in.

    In a speech on Europe this month, Mr Sarkozy made much of his well-established opposition to Turkey’s membership saying the country did not have the “vocation” to join.

    Instead, he called for a “privileged partnership”, the same relationship he espouses for Russia, which is not even a candidate.

    Benoît Hamon, spokesman for the opposition Socialist party which supports Turkish accession, accused Mr Sarkozy of “lying” to the public because the president had “systematically given his backing to the pursuit of the negotiation process”.

    Two new “chapters”, or policy areas, that form part of Turkey’s accession process entry application were opened up to negotiation during the French EU -presidency.

    Paris has allowed the negotiation process to continue, thereby avoiding a direct confrontation with Ankara and supporters of Turkish membership within the EU, but is against opening up chapters which it judges only relevant to full membership, such as the question of monetary union.

    Philippe de Villiers, a -conservative eurosceptic, pointed out that Mr Sarkozy had also ensured that a requirement for a French referendum on all new EU entrants was dropped in last year’s reform of the constitution, removing a potential French obstacle to eventual Turkish membership.

    The row over Turkey has injected an element of -interest into a low profile campaign in which the main parties seem reluctant to engage in confrontation.

    The UMP does not want the campaign to turn into a referendum on Mr Sarkozy’s handling of the economic crisis while the Socialists, under the new leadership of Martine Aubry, are hesitant about investing themselves fully in a battle they appear destined to lose. Recent opinion polls put the UMP on 28 per cent and the Socialists on 22 per cent.

    Mr Sarkozy’s electioneering on the Turkish question is carefully calculated. With voters preoccupied with the economy, turnout is expected to fall well below 43 per cent, the rate at the last elections in 2004.

    The UMP needs to mobilise its core voters while wooing those tempted to vote for eurosceptic and far-right candidates who together could win 12 per cent, polls suggest.

  • Turkey ‘Should Not Link’ Armenia Thaw To Karabakh: Negotiator

    Turkey ‘Should Not Link’ Armenia Thaw To Karabakh: Negotiator

    May 20, 2009

    ANKARA (Reuters) — Turkey should not link its efforts to normalize ties with Armenia to a settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, a French negotiator has said.

    Ankara and Yerevan have been engaged for months in high-level talks aimed at establishing diplomatic relations after a century of hostility and last month announced a “road map” to reopen their borders.

    But after Turkey’s Muslim ally Azerbaijan condemned the reconciliation moves, Ankara said there would be no progress until the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was resolved.

    Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993 in solidarity with Azerbaijan, which fought a war with ethnic Armenian separatists in the 1990s over the Caucasus enclave.

    Last week, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan promised Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev during a visit to Baku that Turkey would not open the border with Armenia until the “occupation” of Nagorno-Karabakh ended.

    “Normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations and the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute are two separate processes which should continue in parallel but along their own paths,” the French Embassy in Ankara said in a statement after a visit earlier this week by Bernard Fassier, a co-chairman of the Minsk Group.

    The Minsk Group — set up in 1992 and co-chaired by Russia, the United States, and France — is seeking a solution to Nagorno-Karabakh, one of the most intractable conflicts arising from the Soviet Union’s collapse.

    A thaw between Turkey and Armenia, who trace their dispute to the mass killing of Christian Armenians by Ottoman Turks during World War I, would shore up stability in the Caucasus and boost Turkey’s drive to join the European Union.

    U.S. President Barack Obama has urged Ankara and Yerevan to reach a solution soon, but Turkey has been careful not to harm energy projects with Azerbaijan.

    The two countries, which share linguistic and cultural ties, are in talks to sign energy deals, including the purchase of Azeri gas which could be used for the planned Nabucco pipeline to transport Caspian gas to Europe.

  • Italy hails Turkey’s presence at EUROGENDFOR

    Italy hails Turkey’s presence at EUROGENDFOR

    eurogendforItaly has praised Turkey’s presence in the European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR/EGF), an initiative comprising six European Union member states: France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Spain, while applauding Turkey’s role in strengthening European security.

    In a written statement released on Tuesday, the Italian Embassy in Ankara expressed pleasure over the fact that Turkey would for the first time participate in an executive committee meeting of the EGF which was scheduled to be held in Paris yesterday.

    “On the occasion of the previously mentioned meeting, Turkey’s entrance into the EGF with the title of observer will be registered. Italy has always pointed out the importance of having Turkey included in the EGF. The aforementioned development is once more proving the importance of the role played by Turkey in strengthening the European security system,” the statement said.

    Last month, France, which had thus far resisted Turkey’s participation in the EGF, finally gave up its objection, with French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner recently sending a letter to his then-Turkish counterpart, Ali Babacan, about the issue.

    Source: Today’s Zaman, 14 May 2009

  • Merkel and Sarkozy Call for Privileged Partnership Angers Turkey

    Merkel and Sarkozy Call for Privileged Partnership Angers Turkey

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 92
    May 13, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicholas Sarkozy reignited the debate on Turkey’s place within Europe by questioning the wisdom of Turkey seeking full membership of the European Union. Attending a meeting in Berlin, the two leaders emphasized their objection to the EU’s enlargement to include Turkey, arguing that any misguided expansion might endanger its operational effectiveness, and that it should stop making empty promises to Turkey. They instead reiterated their support for “privileged partnership” as an alternative framework to regulate Turkish-EU relations (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 10).

    Sarkozy is known for his frequent objections to Turkey’s membership. Before his election in 2007, he spoke against the country’s accession and instead proposed an alternative partnership through his Mediterranean Union project. Due to objections from Turkey and other EU member states most notably the UK, Sarkozy dropped the idea, which enabled the creation of the Mediterranean Union as a separate organization -which Turkey also joined (EDM, July 15, 2008).

    Although he has since softened his rhetoric and avoided blocking Turkish-EU accession negotiations during the French presidency of the European Union, Sarkozy has remained Turkey’s most vocal opponent. For instance, when President Obama tried to promote Turkish-EU accession talks during his recent European trip, Sarkozy immediately dismissed these comments as an unwarranted intervention in European affairs, and led other likeminded states to mobilize resistance against Turkey (Hurriyet, April 7).

    Merkel shares similar views on Turkish-EU relations. Nonetheless, her policies have been tempered by the coalition partnership with the Social Democrats, who hold more positive views on the issue. However, Merkel uses electoral considerations and her conservative grassroots’ discomfort with Turkey to justify her objections. Referring to the upcoming European elections in June, Merkel said: “It is right that we say to people [during the campaign]… our common position is: a privileged partnership for Turkey, but no full membership” (Hurriyet Daily News, May 11).

    Sarkozy does not hide the role electoral politics play in shaping his position on Turkey. Indeed, he has accelerated his objections to Turkish accession ahead of the European election campaign. He is advocating that the EU considers the creation of a common platform with Turkey, perhaps including Russia, to regulate economic and security relations (Hurriyet Daily News, May 6).

    Inside the EU, the Franco-German position is countered by the member states more sympathetic to Turkey and the representatives of the EU institutions. Portugal’s President Anibal Cavaco Silva, while currently visiting Turkey reiterated his country’s support for Turkish accession, noting the many benefits it would bring to the EU (Anadolu Ajansi, May 12). Last week, Finland’s Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, also ruled out a privileged partnership, and reaffirmed Helsinki’s commitment to bring Turkey into the EU as a full member (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 8). A statement from the office of the EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn, responded swiftly to the statements by Sarkozy and Merkel, saying that the decisive factor from the commission’s perspective was Turkey’s fulfilment of the membership criteria (ANKA, May 11).

    Although Merkel and Sarkozy’s views on Turkey were well known, their recent statements surprised many within Turkish domestic politics. Some Turkish dailies labeled this development, particularly Merkel’s remarks, as “shocking” (Milliyet, May 11). Deniz Baykal, the leader of the main opposition party, called their statements “rude, harsh and negative” and argued that since they were made during the ongoing membership talks, they should be taken as a sign of disrespect toward Turkey. Baykal also criticized the government’s failure to take action to protest more forcefully against this development (Anadolu Ajansi, May 12).

    In reacting to calls to downgrade the Turkish-EU relationship, officials in Ankara have highlighted three points. They have restated Turkey’s position that privileged partnership is unacceptable, and maintain that since the EU has initiated membership talks, it must honor this commitment. Shortly after assuming his post last week, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stressed this argument. Noting that he would revitalize the stalled membership process, Davutoglu expressed his discomfort over speculation on privileged partnership. Offering Turkey other alternatives short of full membership would betray Turkey and also undermine the EU’s own values, Davutoglu contended (Yeni Safak, May 9). In his reaction to the Merkel-Sarkozy statement, President Abdullah Gul also echoed Davutoglu, arguing that European leaders had agreed on membership negotiations with a unanimous decision, which still legally binds all member states (www.cnnturk.com, May 12).

    Turkish officials maintain that European politicians are using the debate about its future membership as a tool calculated to achieve domestic political gains. Gul suggested that the Merkel-Sarkozy remarks reflected “short-term thinking,” caused by a lack of strategic vision on the part of some European leaders (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 12).

    Turkish leaders emphasize their commitment to the membership process, and say they will do more to conclude the negotiations successfully. Following a cabinet meeting, the state minister and government spokesman Cemil Cicek, told reporters that the government will take further steps to implement domestic reforms. This will involve preparing a new constitutional amendment package in consultation with the opposition. Cicek added that the government will shortly forward a draft law to parliament, which will reorganize the under-secretariat for the European Union in order to streamline reforms (www.cnnturk.com, May 12).

    The Turkish government seeks to counteract objections to membership by reminding the EU of its commitments to the accession process, and by downplaying those objections -attributing them to short-term calculations. The government implicitly believes that if the discussions on Turkey are conducted on the basis of the contractual framework of the accession process, it may de-legitimize European objections to Turkey. However, it fails to appreciate that its track record on domestic reforms is far from satisfactory. Despite promises to revitalize the membership process in 2009, little has been accomplished (EDM, January 12, 20). Although it might be justified in calling on its EU partners to fulfil their promises, the Turkish government must acknowledge that it is time to deliver on domestic reforms.

    https://jamestown.org/program/merkel-and-sarkozy-call-for-privileged-partnership-angers-turkey/

  • OPINION: An alliance of equals

    OPINION: An alliance of equals

    OPINION: An alliance of equals —Michel Rocard

    michel-rocardNATO needs to shift its focus from organising and administering a unified military command to building real confidence that every member’s voice will be heard. To that end, all members must stand on an equal footing

    During NATO’s recent 60th anniversary ceremony in Strasbourg, the Alliance welcomed two new members, Albania and Croatia, bringing its total membership to 28. This expansion is a good thing, for history has tormented these two countries. Being welcomed within the great international family of the West will reassure them, stabilise them, and contribute to their political, cultural, and economic development.

    But the good news was limited, because NATO addressed only a routine agenda. No core problem was really tackled.

    The controversy that arose in France over the country’s return to NATO’s unified military command makes this abundantly clear. Was France losing its autonomy, perhaps even its sovereignty? Was it capitulating to American hegemony? These are real questions, yet at the NATO summit people spoke of them more in terms of symbols than as realities.

    But what is the reality here? NATO is a military alliance composed of 28 countries. One of them, the United States, has a military budget that is more than three times that of all the other members combined. Hence, the US runs most NATO civilian and military commands with the consent of the others. Of course, there is a collective consultation and deliberative process that enables any member to be heard. But in reality a member’s actual power is what affects common decisions.

    This structure harks back to the conditions of NATO’s birth, when it was forged to thwart the Soviet threat to Western civilisation. At the time, no one ever doubted that American power — already endowed with nuclear weapons — was the only counterpart. For this reason, the US came to preside over the alliance.

    During the 41 years of the Cold War, 14 of NATO’s 16 members strictly obeyed and complied with American decisions and policies. French President Charles de Gaulle was the only one to question whether an American president would actually ever be ready to launch a nuclear attack on the USSR in order to protect one or several Alliance members if vital US interests were not directly at stake.

    Based on that doubt, France — a nuclear power since 1960 — withdrew in 1966 from the Alliance’s permanent centralised military command in order to assert its own deterrent capability. This decision was mainly grounded on the American doctrine, adopted in 1962, of “flexible response”, which said to the Soviets: “As long as you do not use nuclear weapons, we will not use them, either.” This very doctrine left Europe exposed.

    Indeed, while it is a much disputed question, de Gaulle was probably right about America’s lack of commitment to the nuclear defence of Europe. Both Henry Kissinger and Robert McNamara left office admitting that de Gaulle had been correct. Nevertheless, de Gaulle’s insights left a legacy that still causes some mistrust and dissent within NATO. France was right on this key strategic point, but it was never able to explain its position to its allies.

    This inability to discuss, clearly and forthrightly, this strategic doctrine continues to hamper the Alliance. At the Strasbourg summit, confidence in the future could have been strengthened if a couple of troubling issues had been discussed. Instead, once again, there was an extended focus on the past.

    The key questions are whether NATO’s doctrine of common defence is currently directed at one country in particular, and whether nuclear force remains the Alliance’s major defensive tool.

    In the current global situation, no predictable conflict will require the use of a nuclear weapon. At the moment, there is no global threat and the Alliance only intervenes in regional conflicts, so why not have NATO admit this?

    But the most important matter that went unmentioned in Strasbourg is the relationship with Russia. NATO was founded to confront the threat that the USSR represented 60 years ago. But the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union’s “anti-NATO” alliance of socialist countries, was dissolved in 1991; communism imploded the same year, with Russia caught ever since in a struggle to build a market economy and define a new global position for itself.

    At a time when Russia was taking a more pacific course, NATO — unlike the Warsaw Pact — was not dismantled. On the contrary, the Allies chose to maintain the pact and to extend it to numerous Russian neighbours. NATO’s members essentially said: “We Western nations do not trust you. Even if you become a democracy, we will always be suspicious.”

    George Kennan, one of the greatest American diplomats of the post-war years, once wrote that the Western world was committing its biggest mistake in 50 years time by expanding NATO after Soviet communism collapsed. The resulting humiliation and blatant mistrust that Russia’s elite has felt ever since has led them to their current policy of rearmament. The only way to resolve this problem is for NATO to assert its pacific intentions before the world.

    The most convincing way to do that is to moderate America’s excessive taste for power, which it demonstrated in Iraq. NATO needs to shift its focus from organising and administering a unified military command to building real confidence that every member’s voice will be heard. To that end, all members must stand on an equal footing. France’s decision to return to full and equal Alliance membership was a good one, and France must now work from within to advance the principles in which it believes. —DT-PS

    Michel Rocard, former Prime Minister of France and leader of the Socialist Party, is a member of the European Parliament

    Source:  www.dailytimes.com.pk, April 25, 2009

  • Global Commitments vs. Regional Balances

    Global Commitments vs. Regional Balances

    Deglobalizing U.S. military commitments will require the “civilianization” of defense policy.

    Judah Grunstein | Bio | 09 Apr 2009
    WPR Blog

    More smart stuff from Sam Roggeveen, who points out that alert is not the same thing as alarmed, but nevertheless admits to a case of nerves:

    The thing to remember is that China does not have to match the U.S. in global capability terms for U.S. allies in the Pacific to start getting nervous about the strategic balance. All China has to do is be a credible competitor in the region, and that is already the case.

    Roggeveen goes on to argue that “. . . we have already passed the point at which the U.S. could militarily intervene in a Taiwan conflict at acceptable risk,” and that the coming years/decades will witness an inexorable expansion of that perimeter.

    Click through to see what he’s got to say about whether the budget priorities as signaled by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, compared to the alternatives, are a good thing or not for Australia. You might be surprised.

    The broader point here is that while the “American unipolar moment” might be drawing to a close, we’re still the only country that is forced to calculate in terms of global, as opposed to regional, military capability. That reflects the magnitude of our power, influence and interests. But while an advantage in a scenario of geologic resource scarcity, it becomes potentially problematic in a scenario of political resource scarcity and a distinct disadvantage in times of financial resource scarcity.

    This reinforces the need for scaling down our commitments by involving regional powers more prominently in advancing our foreign policy objectives, what I call Middle Power Mojo™. France and Turkey were my illustrative examples before they both started acting out. But part of the initial concept was the idea of identifying regional players that have got their mojo working, so that’s inevitably going to evolve with time.

    Perhaps most significantly, this provides a political context for U.S. defense policy. The limitations of discussing the U.S. defense budget without the context of a strategic vision have been pointed out elsewhere. But so far, that’s mainly been shorthand for, “Wait until the Quadrennial Defense Review comes out next year,” and reinforces the militarization of foreign policy. Deglobalizing America’s defense commitments, on the other hand, will require filling gaps with both friendly capability and stable regional security architectures. And that’s more of a long-term interagency project that will “civilianize” defense policy.

    Source:  www.worldpoliticsreview.com, 09 Apr 2009