Category: Cyprus

One Island, Many Histories:
Rethinking the Politics of the Past in Cyprus
A conference sponsored by Peace Research International Oslo (PRIO) Cyprus
Centre
21-24 November 2008, Nicosia, Cyprus

One of the most divisive elements of the Cyprus conflict is the writing of
Cyprus’ history.  That history has been dominated by the two main
communities, Greek and Turkish, who have written very different versions of the
past five hundred years in the island.  Those differing narrative strands have
often come into conflict and have constituted one of the major impediments to
reconciliation.  At the same time, the dominance of these nationalist
narratives has led to the exclusion of other groups, of other histories, and of
other narrative possibilities.  This conference aims to investigate how those
narratives have emerged, how they are reproduced, and what questions we might
ask about the production of those narratives that would help us reorient
history writing from a form of division to a form of dialogue.

With this aim in mind, the conference is organized around a set of
methodological and historiographical questions.  Because the questions that
historians ask shape the results that they find, this conference proposes that
new questions are important for a new orientation.  Through this
historiographical approach, we seek to investigate the ways in which history is
and has been written in the island, as well as what new ways of thinking about
the past may be productive for the future.

Because the initial point of diversion for the island’s hegemonic histories
is 1571, the conference concentrates on the Ottoman, British, and postcolonial
periods.  We seek proposals from historians and social scientists working on
the following themes:

1.  Concepts of belonging: Beyond dichotomous identities?
Histories of Cyprus have often questioned the emergence or transformation of
identities in the island.  “Identity,” however, implies sameness and is
defined by difference.  In the current context, this means that polls in both
sides of the island attempt to measure the extent to which persons living in
Cyprus feel “Turkish,” “Greek,” “Cypriot,” or a combination of
these.  Such concepts of identity, furthermore, are often written back into
Cyprus’ history to explain the meanings of difference even in the period
before nationalisms became hegemonic in the island.  How might we rethink the
meanings of identity and difference in a pre-nationalist period?  And can the
concepts of identity currently in use in the academic literature about Cyprus
really encompass or exhaust peoples’ senses of belonging to the island?  What
other concepts might be employed to think, both historically and currently,
about those senses of belonging?

2.  Historical traumas and collective memory
There are certain events in all communities of the island that may be
considered “historical traumas,” or traumatic events that play an important
role in their collective memory as a people.  These include, for instance, the
hanging of the archbishop and clergy in 1821; the massacre of Muslims in Crete
in 1897; and the Armenian Genocide of 1915.  This panel asks how we might
understand the formation of such events as historical traumas; their
reproduction in collective memory; and the influence of such historical traumas
on the writing of history.

3.  Other histories and “others’” histories
The hegemony of the two main nationalist narratives in the island has left
little historical space for other groups, whether linguistic, religious, or
ideological.  The two primary histories have, moreover, been dominated by
masculinist narratives that emphasize relations of power and moments of
conflict.  In what way might other histories contribute to a rethinking of the
politics of history, as well as the history of politics, in Cyprus?

4.  Writing official histories
This panel seeks to turn a historiographical gaze specifically to the 1960-74
period, asking how the divisive official histories of that period have been
written.  We seek here to investigate the conditions of those histories’
production, looking at the specific moments in which what came to be the
“official” versions of those histories emerged.  What are the particular
conditions in which certain narratives appeared to reflect Cypriot realities? 
How did those narratives take on institutional form?  And what forms of
critique were brought at the moment of their emergence?

5.  Official vs. unofficial histories
While official histories have often been studied and recognized as such, less
attention has been given to the formation of “unofficial” histories,
despite the fact that these are often histories that are as well known and well
formulated as the “official” ones.  The history of the Left on both sides
of the island, for instance, falls under the heading of “unofficial”
history even as its stories are equally well known.  In addition, in the
“official” vs. “unofficial” dichotomy, the “unofficial” often
acquires the meaning of a hidden “truth” that “official” histories have
denied.  Is this, in fact, what “unofficial” histories represent?  Might
there also be other ways of thinking about histories that oppose the main
nationalist narratives?

6.  Popular histories
Popular histories are those ways of explaining the past that may interweave
with legends, myths, rumor, and other forms of folk narrative.  One
particularly potent form of popular history in Cyprus has been the conspiracy
theory, but urban legends and the power of rumor have been equally important in
shaping the ways in which Cypriots perceive histories, especially local ones. 
This panel asks what the role of such histories may be in shaping popular
discourse, and how such popular histories may in turn influence the writing of
academic histories in the island.

7.  Social imagination in the post-74 period and its influence on history
writing
Apart from popular histories, one of the factors shaping academic history in
Cyprus is what Charles Taylor has called “social imaginaries,” or “that
largely unstructured and inarticulate understanding of our whole situation,
within which particular features of our world show up for us in the sense they
have.”  Such social imaginaries may include forms of discourse, as well as
institutions that form the landscapes of daily life.  This panel asks what
social imaginaries, or concepts naturalized as a type of social background,
have shaped histories of Cyprus in the post-74 period.

8.  Is there a space for subaltern studies in Cyprus?
The past twenty years has seen the emergence of subaltern studies, a branch of
historical theory that investigates the conditions of colonialism, including
both colonial consciousness and the consciousness of the colonized.  In
contrast to subaltern studies’ focus on the social history of the colonial
period, Cyprus’ colonial history has been dominated by an elite history that
leaves little room for investigation of the emergence of discourses, or forms
of power and knowledge.  What are the reasons for this dominance of elite
history?  How has it affected our understanding of social movements in the
island?  And is there anything that we might learn from other colonial
historians’ focus on forms of consciousness that emerge in the colonial
period?

Practical information:
The conference will take place over in the buffer zone of Nicosia, Cyprus, over
two days, 21-22 November, with a third day, 24 November, set aside for closed
workshops amongst meeting participants.  We are currently seeking funding for
participants’ travel and accommodation and hope to be able to cover most of
participants’ expenses.

In order to facilitate both workshop discussions and the later publication of
an edited volume, participants will be required to send completed papers
(approx. 7500 words) by 10 November.  Within the framework of the conference
itself, participants will be expected to summarize those papers’ findings for
a general audience.

Please send abstracts of no more than 150 words to:

Rebecca Bryant
Associate Professor of Anthropology
George Mason University
Rbryant2@gmu.edu

Deadline for receipt of abstracts is 10 August 2008.

The Bloody Co-existence of
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots

(1963-1974)
George Nakratzas

     Any nationalist expansionist policy can be carried out only by means of war. And the people have to be psychologically prepared for this by a propaganda device which idealises their own acts and demonises those of the enemy.
     Greece has employed this device in the past, and continues to do so today, one typical exponent being the new Archbishop of Athens, Christodoulos, who has publicly, in the presence of the President of the Hellenic Republic, referred to the Turks as ‘the eastern barbarians’.
     It is a well-known fact that the Turks treated the Greek minority in Istanbul with great barbarity in 1955; and it is equally well known that dozens, if not hundreds, of Greek Cypriot captives were executed in Cyprus in 1974. Rauf Denktash has publicly admitted it.
     But what the young people of Greece have no idea of is that Turkish Cypriots were murdered by the parastatal groups run by Sampson, Yeorgadzis, and Lyssaridis between 1963 and 1967. It should be borne in mind that at that time the Cypriot government was responsible for safeguarding the life, the honour, and the property of all Cypriot citizens, irrespective of national or religious identity.
     A somewhat more detailed analysis of the Greek and foreign literature on the events in Cyprus in this period may fill the gap in young modern Greeks’ knowledge.
     The invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish army in 1974 resulted in the partition of the island into two zones, a northern zone populated by Turkish Cypriots and Turkish settlers and a southern zone populated by Greek Cypriots. Since then, the Cypriot government has steadfastly demanded the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation forces so that Cyprus may be restored to its former status. However, a study of the relations between the two communities between 1963 and 1967 may tell us something about the quality of their ‘peaceful co-existence’.
     Regarding the Greek Cypriots’ supposed intention to live in peace and equality with the Turkish Cypriots, an extract from a speech by Archbishop Makarios in the village of Panayia is particularly telling. It is quoted by Rustem and Brother, according to whom, on 4 September 1962, Makarios said:
Until this small Turkish community, forming a part of the Turkish race, which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism, is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered as terminated. (1, p. 47) A letter from Denktash protesting about the Panayia speech was never answered.
     Fourteen months later, on 30 November 1963, Makarios submitted his famous thirteen-point amendment of the Constitution, in direct contravention, as he himself publicly admitted, of the Geneva Convention (2, p. 56). The Geneva Convention ruled out any unilateral change to the Cypriot Constitution, as also any partition of the island or unification with Greece. It should be borne in mind that even today the Republic of Cyprus derives its legitimacy from the Geneva Convention.
     Makarios’s proposed changes would have meant that the Turkish Vice-President would lose his right of veto and would be elected not by the Turkish Cypriots but by the parliamentary majority, i.e. the Greek Cypriots. These two articles, together with another nine similar ones, would have lost the Turkish Cypriots the rights which the Cypriot Constitution had guaranteed them until then.
     The Cypriot mass media presented the Turkish Cypriots’ refusal to accept this unilateral amendment of the Constitution as ‘Turkish insubordination to the state’, which was quite untrue, because, as we have seen, from a legal point of view it was not the Turkish Cypriots, but Makarios who had made a unilateral, arbitrary attempt to violate the Constitution.
     General Karayannis, Commander of the Cypriot National Guard, confirmed that it was not the Turks who initiated the so-called insubordination in an interview in Ethnikos Kirix on 15 June 1965: When the Turks objected to the amendment of the Constitution, Archbishop Makarios put his plan into effect and the Greek attack began in December 1963. (3, p. 87)
     That Makarios had a premeditated plan to exterminate the Turks is also indirectly confirmed by the Communist Party of Cyprus, which published the following critique of the Archbishop in issue No. 57 of its organ Neos Dimokratis in July 1979: Armed by Makarios, Mr Lyssaridis . . . formed his own armed bands, which, in 1963-4, together with those of Yeorgadzis and Sampson, waged a ‘liberation struggle’ against the Turkish Cypriots and as a result brought
us the Green Line and, eventually, Attila. (2, p. 67) That the sole purpose of the so-called liberation struggle was to force the Turkish Cypriots to yield to Makarios’s unilateral amendment of the Constitution is also officially revealed by an article in the Cypriot newspaper Haravyi, which was published on the second day of the clashes, 22 December 1963: And since it is accepted that the tension is the result of the climate created by the Zurich and London agreements and the undemocratic terms of the Constitution, . . . the Turkish government, . . . which is inflaming the tempers of our fanatical compatriots, and the Turkish Cypriot leadership must reconsider their negative attitude and approach the President of the Republic’s proposals in a constructive manner. (2, p. 73) 
     The Greek Cypriot assault on the Turkish Cypriots started on 21 December 1963, when Greek Cypriot police officers shot and killed a Turkish Cypriot couple in the Turkish sector of Nicosia while attempting to carry out a spot check. 
     The most serious attack was the assault on Omorfita, a suburb of Nicosia inhabited by 5,000 Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot parastatals were headed by Nikos Sampson, whom the Greek Cypriot press henceforth dubbed ‘the conqueror of Omorfita’. The material damage wreaked by Sampson’s parastatals in Omorfita is described in the UN Secretary General’s report No. S/5950 to the Security Council, which states that 50 houses were totally destroyed and 240 partially destroyed (4, para. 180). As for the human losses, 4,500 Turkish Cypriots managed to flee to the Turkish sector
of Nicosia and 500 were captured and taken to Kykkos School in Nicosia, where they were held with 150 Turkish Cypriots from the village of Kumsal.
     On Christmas day, 150 of the 700 or so captives were selected and dragged away, and the sound of shooting followed.
     Gibbon reports that an English teacher at Kykkos School told the High Commission that she had seen the results of the shooting; whereupon, for security reasons, the British administration put her on the first plane to London, because she was the only eye witness to what had happened (5, p.
139). As for the 150 captives, the Greek Cypriot authorities told their families for many years that they should regard them as missing. Other major assaults by the Greek Cypriots near Nicosia targeted the villages of Mathiati, Ayos Vassilios, and Kumsal. In Kumsal, the Greek Cypriot parastatals executed 150 people in cold blood.
     The most apalling photograph, which went round the world, showed three small children and their mother lying dead in a pool of blood in the bath in their home. These unfortunates were the family of Major Ilhan, an officer in the Turkish expeditionary force in Nicosia (3, p. 95).
     In the surgical clinic in Nicosia Hospital, the Greek Cypriots dragged from their beds twenty-two Turkish Cypriot convalescents, all trace of whom vanished for ever (3, 91). 
     Government and parastatal armed forces continued their attacks on the Turkish Cypriots over the next four months. One notable incident, which almost provoked a Greek-Turkish war, took place at Famagusta, where, on 11 May 1964, three Greek officers and a Greek Cypriot policeman took their
car into the Turkish sector, possibly intending to make a display of power. A Turkish Cypriot policeman attempted to obstruct them, there was an exchange of fire, and in the end two of the Greek officers, the Greek Cypriot policeman, and a passing Turkish Cypriot lay dead. Two days later,
the Greek Cypriots abducted thirty-two Turkish Cypriots, who were never seen again. The abduction is confirmed by the UN Secretary General’s report No. S/5764 (6, para. 93).
     Lastly, on 9 August 1964, there was the attack on the Turkish Cypriot enclave of Kokkina-Mansoura, where the Turkish air force ended the hostilities by dropping napalm bombs.
     The UN Secretary General’s report No. S/5950, para. 142, tells us that, during the period of the hostilities ? from 21 December 1963 to 8 June 1964 ? 43 Greek Cypriots and 232 Turkish Cypriots disappeared and have been officially posted as missing ever since. The missing Turkish
Cypriots include the 150 hostages from Kykkos School in Nicosia and the 32 abductees from Famagusta.
     The Cypriot media constantly show pictures of Greek Cypriot women holding photographs of their nearest and dearest and seeking information about their whereabouts; yet the Greek media have never shown similar pictures of Turkish Cypriot women seeking information about their own lost
relations.
     The termination of the Cypriot government’s assaults on the Turkish Cypriots led to the creation of Turkish Cypriot enclaves, where the Turkish Cypriot refugees lived in wretched conditions for no less than eleven years. According to Kranidiotis, in his book Unfortified State: Cyprus 1960-74
(in Greek), these enclaves occupied 4.86 per cent of Cypriot territory Seeing that the Greek Cypriot armed bands were unable to assert themselves over the Turks, . . . on 26 December, Makarios was obliged to accept the Green Line. . . . Six large Turkish enclaves were formed, . . . which
corresponded to 4.86 per cent of the territory of Cyprus. (2, p. 75) From 1964 to 1967, owing to the restrictive measures imposed by the Greek Cypriot government, the day-to-day efforts of the confined Turkish Cypriots consisted exclusively in a struggle for survival. Apart from imposing an economic embargo on the enclaves, the Makarios administration also banned the supply of strategic commodities, such as cement, tractors, men’s socks, and wollen clothing.
     The imposition of the military dictatorship in Greece in 1967 heralded fresh oblems for Cyprus. On 15 November 1967, Greek and Greek Cypriot forces armed with cannon, machine-guns, and bazookas attacked the lightly armed Turkish Cypri- ots in the villages of Ayos Theodoros and Kofinou in the Larnaca area. As the defen- ces crumbled, the Greek Cypriots killed twenty-seven Turkish Cypriots (3, p. 139).
     The incident brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war, which was avoided only when the illicit Greek division and General Grivas were recalled from Cyprus.
     The slaughter and looting at Kofinou were confirmed in the Greek parliament on 21 February 1986 by Andreas Papandreou, who spoke, inter alia, of the ‘great provocation of 15 November 1967,’ and added that the operation had been ‘ordered by the Supreme Command of the Greek Armed Forces [and] killing and looting took place’ (2, p. 33).
     The military junta brought its political career to an end in 1974 with the invasion of Cyprus and an attempt on Makarios’s life. We shall not discuss subsequent events here, because both warring sides perpetrated crimes against humanity during that period.
     Even now, both the Greek and the Turkish propaganda do their best to convince us that such acts of barbarity were commited exclusively by the other side. But this sort of propaganda is mainly intended for domestic consumption.
     What needs noting is that a war was fought between two nations in 1974, and it is usually the case in any war situation that criminal elements seize the opportunity to legitimise acts that would land them in prison in peace time. The reason why the blame lies so heavily on the Greek Cypriot side is the fact that, between 1963 and 1967, the Cypriot government was exclusively responsible for any acts committed by Greek Cypriot government or parastatal armed forces.
     During the forthcoming talks on the island’s entry into the European Union, the Republic of Cyprus will have two questions to answer.  Since the Cypriot government refuses 
                  1)     either to recognise the Turkish Cypriot state
or
                  2)   to countenance a loose Greek-Turkish Cypriot confederation, 
                    which of the two remaining solutions has it in mind? 
1) That the Turkish Cypriots should return to the villages in which they were living before 963?            or 
2) That the Turkish Cypriots should return to the enclaves in which they were confined for eleven years?

Literatur 
1.   Rustem, and Brother,. (1998) : Excerpta Cypria For Today 
      Edited by Andrew Faulds MP , Lefkosha-Istanbul-London 
      The Friends of North Cyprus Parliamentary Group
      The House of Commons, London SW1,   ISBN 9963-565-09-3 
2.   Oberling, P., (1982) : The Road to Bellapais, Social Science
      Monographs, Boulder Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, ISBN
      88033-0000-7

3.   Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Counsil on the United
      Nations operation in Cyprus , Document S/5950, 10 September 1964. 

4.   Gibbons, H, S., (1997) : The Genocide Files 
      Charles Bravos, Publishers, London ,  ISBN 0-9514464-2-8

5.  Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Counsil on the United Nations
     operation in Cyprus , Document S/5764, 15 Juni 1964.

THE SO CALLED “DEMOCRAT-GREEKS” BLAMED 26 YEARS TURKISH GOVERMENT TO GAIN WORLDWIDE SUPPORT.. FOR THE CRIMES THEY WERE COMMITTED AGAINST HUMANITY.

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