KYIV, August 10 /UKRINFORM/. About 200 delegates from Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Bulgaria, Australia, Macedonia, Romania, Turkey, the Netherlands and other states have registered to participate in the 14th Kurultai (Council) of the International Union of Turk Youth in Yalta (Crimea), the Majlis of Crimean Tatar People reported.
Majlis head Mustafa Jemilev said the delegates have gathered together to discuss their problems and conjointly find nonviolent methods of their solving. According to him, the major task of the Yalta international forum is promoting friendly mutual relations of Turk nations, cultural integration of youth and mutual support to the members of the single Turk family.
Crimean Tatars continue to protest in front of the government building in Kyiv, demanding the return of land seized during World War II.
August 09, 2009
By Claire Bigg
For the 88th day in a row, Lyubov Halilova packed her banners and headed to government headquarters in central Kyiv.
The elderly Halilova has spent the last four months camped outside the building in the Ukrainian capital with some 20 other protesters, banging on drums, sounding horns, and calling on Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to hear their grievances.
The protesters are Crimean Tatars, the indigenous people of Crimea, and they are in Kyiv to voice their nation’s longstanding demand: the return of land seized during the World War II deportation of Tatars from the Crimean peninsula, in what is today Ukraine.
So far, Ukrainian officials have largely ignored the protest on their doorstep.
“There has been no progress,” sights Halilova. “Nobody is coming out, nobody is taking an interest in us.” ‘Please Go Home’
President Viktor Yushchenko last year set up a committee to settle the dispute. But critics accuse the new working group, which has yet to distribute a single plot of land, of deliberately dragging its feet.
Volodymyr Haptar, a spokesman for the Environment Ministry which oversees the committee, insists the issue is in capable hands.
Crimean Tatars gathered in Simferopol in May to commemorate the 65th anniversary of the mass deportation.
“We’re doing wearisome, difficult work trying to create a register of people who are to be allotted land. We are trying to determine the state of the land in these regions and to whom it belongs,” he told RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service. “Crimean Tatars are displaying their strength of will, but not everything can be settled through force and strikes. People, please go home. Sooner or later, this issue will be settled.”
Soviet dictator Josef Stalin ordered the mass deportation of Crimea’s Turkic, Muslim Tatars in May 1944 on grounds that they had allegedly collaborated with Nazi Germany.
In a three-day operation, the peninsula’s more than 180,000 Tatars were rounded up and loaded onto cattle trains bound for Central Asia and Siberia.
An estimated 40 percent of them died during the journey or in the first year of exile.
Although the Tatars were rehabilitated by the Kremlin and allowed to return in the late 1980s, neither the Soviet regime nor post-Soviet Ukraine has helped them resettle in their historical region.
Paradise Lost
Ismet Sheikh-Zade, a well-known Crimean Tatar artist, was born in Uzbekistan.
His parents had settled down in the Central Asian republic after being deported from Crimea as children, together with their entire families.
Today, Ismet and his parents are back in their ancestral land. But he says they are treated like intruders.
“Five Russian families now live in the house in Feodosia where my mother was born and from which she was deported. Six Russian families live in my father’s house in Belogorsk,” he says.
“We are not asking for these houses, because we know this would create a conflict. We’ll compromise and take empty land instead. But the surrounding population doesn’t understand that Crimean Tatars are making concessions by not demanding the restitution of their property,” Ismet says.
Some 270,000 Crimean Tatars have returned to the peninsula over the past two decades. Many live in chaotic settlements erected in recent years, sometimes without running water.
Although they now represent just 12 percent of their homeland’s total population, Crimean Tatars have been extremely vocal in lobbying for land and for recognition of the crimes perpetuated against their people.
They held the first-ever World Congress of Crimean Tatars this year on May 18, the 65th anniversary of the deportation. Some 20,000 protesters rallied in Crimea’s main city of Simferopol on the congress’ sidelines to renew demands for greater rights.
The Crimean Tatar community, however, is divided over how to promote its interests.
Like Mustafa Dzhemilyov, the head of the Crimean Tatars’ Mejlis representative body, some disapprove of the current protest in Kyiv and say Tatars should instead seek to resolve the land dispute through diplomatic channels.
“We were against it from the start. We formed a commission, and that commission is working,” he says. “There are 47 million people in this country. If everyone came to the ministers’ cabinet and started beating drums, I don’t think problems would get solved in our country.”
Others, weary of waiting, believe only rallies, hunger strikes, and other protests can draw attention to their plight.
Mounting Resentment
In May, Yushchenko ordered the creation of a special unit to investigate the deportation of Crimean Tatars and other minorities from the peninsula.
But this has done little to soothe feelings of anger and disappointment among Crimean Tatars.
Many say Yushchenko and his former ally Tymoshenko, whom Crimean Tatars massively supported during the 2004 Orange Revolution, have not made good on promises to improve their fate.
“They’ve gone to extreme lengths to repatriate in a peaceful manner, but I often wonder about their patience with the amount of resistance that they’ve had to push through,” says Dr. Greta Uehling, a U.S. anthropologist and an expert on Crimean Tatars.
“I worry about that in terms of the sheer frustration level of having tried so hard for so long and to continue to meet all these barriers and obstacles, to the point where their needs simply aren’t met,” Uehling says.
The simmering discontent among Crimean Tatars is particularly alarming since it is playing out on the backdrop of souring relations between Moscow and Kyiv.
Many Ukrainians accuse Moscow of plotting to stoke unrest in Crimea, an increasingly disputed region that is home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and growing pro-independence sentiment among its majority ethnic Russian population.
Russia has reportedly handed passports to thousands of Crimean residents.
“I think the region is very unstable and very vulnerable to various parties’ attempts to bring it into their sphere of influence,” says Uehling. “On that score, I see things getting worse before they get better, because there is such intense interest and so many factions within Crimea that can be recruited onto various sides.”
The current protest in Kyiv illustrates how desperate many Crimean Tatars have become in recent years.
One month into their sit-in, seven of the protesters launched a hunger strike that lasted two weeks and resulted in the hospitalization of three participants.
The demonstrators have also accused Ukraine of genocide, and have issued a declaration threatening to disrupt the country’s efforts to integrate with the West and ensure the Crimean Tatar question becomes “the main problem” in Ukraine.
One year on from the outbreak of war between Georgia and Russia, events precipitating that conflict bear a striking resemblance to the situation today.
First, it must be said that things are never quiet in the Caucasus. Russo-Georgian relations are cold in the best of times, and they certainly are not going to warm while the pro-Western government that took power Georgia in the 2003 Rose Revolution remains in place. Under this “Rose” government, Tbilisi has courted the West politically, economically and militarily in order to solidify its independence of Russia, with the goal of joining the NATO alliance – something that Russia has resisted at every turn.
In 2008, the Russians shifted from resistance to invasion. The reasons are many, but one stands out: 2008 marked the final dissolution of Serbia, with Western institutions recognizing the independence of Kosovo. Serbia was Russia’s last ally in Europe, and the idea that Russia’s protests could not sway the West’s actions in the least was daunting for Moscow. Russia had to prove that not only was it still relevant, but that it could and would move militarily against an American and European ally. The target was Georgia, and the five-day war that followed was as decisive as it was swift.
Events appear to be moving along a similar track in the early days of August 2009.
Last month, following a trip to Georgia, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden gave an interview in which he called Russia out not only for being weak but, to put it bluntly, doomed to collapse. Needless to say, the Russians might be feeling the urge to prove Biden wrong in the court of global opinion. Russian officials are loudly and regularly warning that they stand ready for war, while Vladislav Surkov – a Kremlinite arguably second in power only to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin himself – has spent some personal time of late in South Ossetia, the tiny (Russian-allied) breakaway province of Georgia that was the proximate cause for the 2008 war.
Biden’s comments are only one possible reason why the war drums are being beaten; there are others.
The United States appears to be sliding toward conflict with Iran, and Russia has invested no small amount of political capital in bolstering the Iranians against the Americans. In Moscow’s mind, a United States fixated on the Persian Gulf is one that cannot fixate on Russia, and a United States that is at war with Iran is one that cannot stop Russia from adjusting borders in places like Georgia.
And of course, there is Georgia itself. President Mikhail Saakashvili is no stranger to dramatic performances, and as the leader of a fractured country with next to no military capability (even before Georgia’s defeat in August 2008), he has few means of countering Russia at all. One option is to provoke a crisis with his northern neighbor in the hopes that the West will ride to the rescue. Considering what happened a year ago, this is perhaps not the wisest strategy, but it is not as though Saakashvili – personally or as Georgia’s president – has a wide array of options to peruse.
War is not a process that Russia would choose carelessly, even if it would be a very, very easy war to win. What simply doesn’t fit in current circumstances is the boldness with which the Russians are acting. They have all but stated that war is imminent, they are backing the Iranians to the hilt, sending top Kremlin strategists to the region to coordinate with allies, and have even resumed nuclear submarine patrols off the east coast of the United States. The Russians have a well-earned reputation for being far more circumspect than this in the shell game that is international relations. It is almost as if all of this is simply noise designed to keep the Americans off balance while something else, something no one is watching, is quietly put into play.
STRATFOR doesn’t have a good answer for this. All we can say is that the Russians are up to something – and if it is not a war, it is something big enough that a war would seem to make a good distraction. Now that bears some watching.
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s August 6 visit to Ankara marked a new era for “enhanced multi-dimensional partnership,” between Ankara and Moscow. Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed some twenty agreements covering energy, trade and other fields. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi also attended part of the talks between Erdogan and Putin, considering the involvement of Italian companies in some of these projects. The most remarkable dimension of the various joint projects concerns energy cooperation, most notably Turkey’s expression of support for Russia’s South Stream project (Anadolu Ajansi, www.cnnturk.com, www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 6).
In oil transportation, Russia committed to participate in the planned Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline (SCP), connecting the Turkish Black Sea city of Samsun to the Mediterranean terminal Ceyhan. Turkey has solicited Russian participation in the SCP, which will bypass the congested Turkish Straits. Moscow has proven reluctant, and has instead promoted another bypass option through Burgas-Alexandroupolis between Bulgaria and Greece. Meanwhile, Turkey took further steps to make the SCP attractive for the Russian side, by linking this project with the Turkish-Israeli-Indian energy partnership (EDM, November 25, 2008).
Erdogan expressed his pleasure with the Russian decision to commit its crude. Ankara can consider this development as its greatest success in this grand bargain, given that Turkey has worked to convert Ceyhan, where the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline also terminates, into a global energy hub. However, Putin did not rule out interest in Burgas-Alexandroupolis, and instead emphasized that the two pipelines might be complementary in meeting the growing demand for export routes. This statement raises questions about how committed Russia will be to the SCP, given that Russian companies own the majority of shares in the other Burgas-Alexandroupolis option.
In terms of gas cooperation, Turkey will allow Russia to conduct explorations and feasibility studies in the Turkish exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, as part of Russian plans to construct South Stream. Since this move comes against the background of Turkey’s decision to sign the rival Nabucco pipeline agreement last month, it raises many questions, as to how it will affect Nabucco, which Turkey considers a “strategic priority,” as well as European energy security issues. Despite the questions surrounding its feasibility and high costs, as well as its negative implications for Nabucco, Erdogan maintained that both projects contribute to diversification efforts.
It appears that the “grand bargain” was between the SCP and Blue Stream. Ahead of the meeting, Yuri Ushakov, the Deputy Head of the Russian Government Staff said that “Turkey made concessions in South Stream and we made concessions in SCP,” but added that he had doubts over the SCP’s feasibility (Anadolu Ajansi, August 5). A statement from Berlusconi’s office also claimed that he had helped broker a rapprochement between both countries on these two issues (Hurriyet Daily News, August 6). However, domestically, there are concerns that in this “exchange” of concessions, Turkey did not gain much. The SCP’s importance was inflated, because it was developed by business interests close to the government (www.turksam.org.tr, August 7). Another gas deal concerned Ankara’s request to renew the contract under which it purchases Russian gas through the Western pipeline via the Balkans. Erdogan announced that the contract (which expires in 2011) will be renewed for 20 years. Turkey had complained about the high prices and the leave-or-pay conditions in its gas deals with Russia. Putin said it was renewed on favorable terms to Turkey, but the contract’s details are unclear.
Erdogan also said that they discussed the extension of Blue Stream II to transport Russian gas to Israel, Lebanon and even Cyprus. Blue Stream, running underneath the Black Sea, is the second route carrying Russian gas to Turkey. Moscow previously raised the possibility that it could use Blue Stream II in order to transport gas to Europe, but this option was rejected, since it contradicted Nabucco and Russia sought to use Turkey only as a transportation route. Now, Ankara wants to revive it as part of a North-South corridor. Based on the leaders’ statements, it appears that the existing capacity of Blue Stream might be improved and gas could be transferred to the Mediterranean through this pipeline.
However, although Erdogan praised this development as another major success, there is no guarantee that Russia will grant “re-export rights,” which indicates that if Blue Stream II is implemented, Moscow will continue to view Turkish territory as a mere conduit for its gas, which raises the question: how will Turkey benefit from the agreement? Russian priorities also involve Turkey’s first nuclear power plant tender, which was awarded to a Russian-Turkish consortium. As the original price was too high, the tender has long awaited cabinet approval (EDM, January 26). Meanwhile, the Russian side lowered the price, and offered a compromise. Prior to Putin’s visit, it was expected that with further “bargaining,” a final deal might be reached, but apparently it failed. Nevertheless, Ankara and Moscow signed protocols regarding energy cooperation, including the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, early notification of accidents, exchange of information on facilities, and to continue talks on the nuclear tender.
The most controversial development is perhaps Ankara’s support for South Stream. Erdogan reiterated his belief that Nabucco and South Stream are complementary, yet turned a blind eye to several Russian officials’ (including Putin) statements to the contrary. It is assumed in Ankara that growing European energy demand will accommodate both projects; but this ignores the competition between both projects over the same downstream markets. Moreover, the Turkish side fails to appreciate the challenges Russia is facing in investing in its domestic gas industry, and acts on the assumption that “Russia has enormous reserves,” while failing to realize that Russia is also planning to tap into the same upstream producers, namely Central Asian and Caspian gas, just as the Nabucco project envisages (www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 6).
Putin also added that a consensus was reached on Russia building gas storage facilities in the Salt Lake. Taken together with the announced joint investments between Turkish and Russian firms, including Gazprom, it is unclear whether the Turkish government recognizes the consequences of these decisions. Russia has effectively used the practice of co-opting the gas infrastructure of transport and consumer countries, as part of its efforts to monopolize downstream markets. It is unclear how this penetration into the Turkish grid might affect Ankara’s future energy policies.
Eskender Bariyev, a Crimean Tatar activist and head of the congress organizing committee
July 09, 2009
SIMFEROPOL, Ukraine — The second World Kurultay (Congress) of the Turkic Youth will be held in Crimea in August, RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service reports.
The head of the congress’s organization committee, Eskender Bariyev, told RFE/RL that over 200 delegates from Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Uzbekistan, as well as representatives of Turkic minorities from Afghanistan, Bulgaria, China, Iran, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine would attend the event.
The one-week congress is scheduled to start on August 9.
The first World Congress of the Turkic Youth was held in Tatarstan in 1992.
After scolding the West for interfering in the internal affairs of Iran, Beijing’s public relations department will now be on the defensive following riots in Urumqi, the capital of the westernmost region of Xinjiang. Chinese state media has admitted that 140 people have been killed and almost 1,000 arrested. Hundreds had taken to the streets to protest the local government’s handling of a clash between Han Chinese and Uighur factory workers in far southern China in late June, in which two Uighurs died. The police responded to the rallies with force, claiming that the unrest was the work of extremist forces abroad and that a heavy reaction was necessary to bring the situation under control.
Given the region’s population of 20 million — barely 1.5 percent of the country’s people — many are wondering: Why has Beijing taken such a hard line in Xinjiang? The reason is summed up in one of the ruling party’s favorite mantras: “stability of state.” Unrest of even a small magnitude, the Chinese authorities believe, can spell big consequences if it spirals out of control.
Instability of the sort in Xinjiang today is hardly new for China. Behind Shanghai’s glamour and the magnificence of Beijing, there are large swaths of disunity and disorder. Taiwan, which mainland China still claims as its own, remains recalcitrant and effectively autonomous. Residents of Hong Kong want guarantees that Beijing will not dismantle the rights they enjoyed under British colonial rule. And traditional Tibetans, who fear a complete political and religious takeover by the ethnically Han majority, want cultural and administrative autonomy — even if most have abandoned hopes of achieving outright secession. Many of the 10 million Uighurs in Xinjiang want the same. The current violence is just the latest manifestation of their simmering anger.
There is widespread disorder even in provinces that pose no challenge to Beijing’s right to rule. In 2005, for example, there were 87,000 officially recorded instances of unrest (defined as those involving 15 or more people) — up from just a few thousand incidents a decade ago. Most protests are overwhelmingly spontaneous rather than political; they arise out of frustration among the 1 billion or so “have-nots” who deal with illegal taxes, land grabs, corrupt officials, and so on. To deal with the strife, Beijing has built up a People’s Armed Police of some 800,000 and written several Ph.D.-length manuals to counsel officials on how to manage protests. Those documents detail options to deal with protest leaders: namely the tactical use of permissiveness and repression, and compromise and coercion, on a case-by-case basis. The tactics are designed to take the fuel out of the fire. Sometimes leaders of protests are taken away; other times they are paid off; still other times they are given what they want.
Much of this is done quietly, which is perhaps why the current riots stand out. When it comes to what Beijing sees as separatist behavior, subtlety is no longer an option. Although their populations are relatively small, Xinjiang and Tibet together constitute one third of the Chinese land mass, and Beijing will not tolerate losing control over these territories. To be sure, the protesters in Urumqi and their supporters cannot spark an uprising throughout China. The protests will eventually be quelled, and their leaders will no doubt be dealt with brutally. But as the history of the Chinese Communist Party tells us, when the regime’s moral and political legitimacy is threatened, the leadership almost always chooses to take a hard, uncompromising line.
President Hu Jintao, who incidentally earned early brownie points within the party by leading a crackdown of political dissidents in Tibet in 1989, understands better than anyone that authoritarian regimes appear weak at their own peril. Losing face, he believes, will only embolden the “enemies of the state.” The Communist Party’s Leading Group on Foreign Affairs, which is chaired by Hu, has often spoken warily about the democratic “viruses” behind the “color revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia, and perhaps eventually Iran — the same kind that could conceivably take root in places such as Xinjiang and Tibet. This is why Chinese authorities are deeply suspicious of any group with loyalties that might transcend the state and regime or at least cannot be easily controlled by the state, such as the Falun Gong, Catholics, or independent trade unions.
It’s important to remember that, at home, the government’s hard line is not wholly unpopular. Most Chinese do not support the separatist agendas of Tibet, Xinjiang, or Taiwan. They would rather see a strong and unified China restored to historic glory. No wonder then that the Chinese state media has been quite upfront about reporting on the current unrest in Urumqi.
Chinese leaders learned much about control in their extensive studies of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their conclusion is clear: It was Mikhail Gorbachev’s ill-fated attempts to be reasonable that brought down that empire. The current generation of Chinese leaders is determined not to make the same mistake. And that means no compromise in Xianjiang.
