Category: Russian Federation

  • Russia Signs Georgia Truce, Uncertainty Remains / Russian forces still entrenched in Georgia

    Russia Signs Georgia Truce, Uncertainty Remains / Russian forces still entrenched in Georgia

     

    Video:

    by: Christopher Torchia, The Associated Press

        Igoeti, Georgia – Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a truce with Georgia on Saturday, a definitive step toward ending the fighting there despite the uncertainty on the ground reflected by Russian soldiers digging in just 30 miles from the Georgian capital.

        Medvedev spokesman Alexei Pavlov said Medvedev signed the agreement in the resort city of Sochi, where the president has a summer residence, but did not give further details. It was not immediately clear if any troops had begun pulling back after Medvedev signed the cease-fire.

        The agreement was signed by Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili the day before. It calls for both sides forces to pull back to positions they held before fighting erupted Aug. 8 after Georgia launched a massive barrage to try to take control of the Russian-backed separatist region of South Ossetia. The Russian army quickly overwhelmed the forces of its small U.S.-backed neighbor and then drove deep into Georgia.

        The Russian seizure of territory including the strategic city of Gori about 20 miles from Igoeti, raised fears that Russia aimed for a permanent occupation of the country that was once was part of its empire.

        The shallow foxholes being gouged out of the earth at Igoeti on Saturday could indicate the Russians’ intention to stay awhile. But they could be meant for defensive positions to guard their comrades as they withdraw.

        Farther up the road toward Gori, a Russian armored personnel carrier sat behind a newly made earthen embankment. Other military vehicles were on the roadside, camouflaged by tree branches.

        Refugees have begun returning to the heavily damaged South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali. On Saturday, many were sweeping up glass and debris from the fighting.

        Teams of ethnic Georgians, some under armed guard, were being forced to clean the streets of South Ossetia’s capital on Saturday. It was the first apparent evidence of humiliation or abuse of Georgians in the breakaway republic.

        Mikhail Mindzayev, the interior minister for South Ossetia said police were cracking down on looters. Officers shot and killed two looters on Thursday, he said, and if they catch someone with a car or truck loaded with furniture or TV sets — and the driver does not seem to be the rightful owner — both the goods and the car will be burned.

        Mindzayev described the situation in the city Saturday as “complicated and nervous.” He said that there were many unexploded shells laying on the ground. He also accused Georgian agents of shooting at people in the city, a claim that could not be independently confirmed.

        Russian Emergency Situations Ministry troops were erecting a camp near the scorched shell of the South Ossetian parliament building. For the first time in days, there were more cars on the street than tanks.

        Farther south, the Russian presence in Gori is strategically critical: The city sits along Georgia’s only significant east-west highway, allowing the Russians effectively to split the nation in two.

        As in many parts of Georgia, aid has been slow to come. On Thursday, staff from the United Nations refugee agency and its World Food Program hoped to enter Gori to assess whether it was safe to deliver humanitarian aid.

        The situation turned ugly. South Ossetian militiamen appeared, pointing weapons, and began shoving civilians and shouting at people to leave the area.

        Georgian police had come to enter Gori but turned back when confrontation developed between the Russian military and the Georgian army.

        On Friday, Russian military vehicles were blocking the eastern road into the city, although they allowed in one Georgia bus filled with loaves of bread.

        Garadzim Tamgiashvili, 46, an unemployed electrician with graying red hair, said there was a lot of looting in the city by South Ossetians and Russians before the Russian military arrived. He said they killed civilians.

        He said the Russian soldiers told him they planned to “give it to the Americans.”

        “We know this is a war between the West and Russia,” he said.

        Residents reported atrocities in the villages between Gori and Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian provincial capital. Outside Gori, an Associated Press reporter saw a burning wheat field. In the village of Tirdznise, the body of a Georgian soldier lay swollen in the heat.

        But for the moment, Gori itself seemed to be a showcase. The Russian troops had stopped the looting, restored order.

        One of the few younger women left was Iya Kinvilashvili, 30, the owner of a now-empty shop. Standing next to a church that has organized handouts of bread and flour, she said the Russians were behaving well.

        “When is peace coming?” she asked. “We only want peace. We never wanted this war.”

        ———

        Associated Press writers Mansur Mirovalev in Gori and Tskhinvali and Jim Heintz in Moscow contributed to this report

    =============

    Russian forces still entrenched in Georgia

     

    By CHRISTOPHER TORCHIA, Associated Press Writer Sat Aug 16, 6:38 PM ET

    IGOETI, Georgia – Russian forces built ramparts around tanks and posted sentries on a hill in central Georgia on Saturday, digging in despite Western pressure for Moscow to withdraw its forces under a cease-fire deal signed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.

    The United States and France said it appeared Russia was defying the truce already. Russian troops still controlled two Georgian cities and the key east-west highway between them Saturday, cities well outside the breakaway provinces where earlier fighting was focused.

    “From my point of view — and I am in contact with the French — the Russians are perhaps already not honoring their word,” U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said.

    U.S. President George W. Bush warned Russia Saturday that it cannot lay claim to the two separatist regions in U.S.-backed Georgia even though their sympathies lie with Moscow. “There is no room for debate on this matter,” the president, with Rice, told reporters at his Texas ranch.

    But Georgia’s Foreign Ministry accused Russian army units and separatist fighters in one of the regions, Abkhazia, of taking over 13 villages and the Inguri hydropower plant Saturday, shifting the border of the Black sea province toward the Inguri River.

    Abkhaz officials could not immediately be reached for comment on the late-night claim, and there was no information on whether the seizure involved violence.

    The villages and plant are in a U.N.-established buffer zone on Abkhazia’s edge, and it appeared that the separatists were bolstering their control over the zone after Russian-backed fighters forced Georgians out of their last stronghold in Abkhazia earlier this week.

    The tense peace pact in Georgia, a U.S. ally that has emerged as a proxy for conflict between an emboldened Russia and the West, calls for both Russian and Georgian forces to pull back to positions they held before fighting erupted Aug. 7 in the other breakaway province, South Ossetia in central Georgia.

    But freshly dug positions of Russian armor in the town of Igoeti, about 30 miles west of the capital Tbilisi, showed that Russia was observing the truce at the pace and scope of its choosing.

    Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, acknowledged that Medvedev had signed the cease-fire deal and ordered its implementation, but he said Russian troops would not withdraw until Moscow is satisfied that security measures its forces are allowed to take under the agreement are effective.

    He also said Russia would strengthen its peacekeeping contingent in South Ossetia, the separatist Georgian region at the center of more than a week of warfare that sharply soured relations between Moscow and the West.

    “As these additional security measures are taken, the units of the Russian armed forces that were sent into the zone of the South Ossetian conflict … will be withdrawn,” he said.

    Asked how much time it would take, he responded: “As much as is needed.”

    Rice bristled at this, saying that the text of the cease-fire agreement, negotiated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the current leader of the European Union, outlined a very limited mandate only for Russian peacekeepers who were in Georgia at the time hostilities escalated. She said the agreement specifies that these initial peacekeepers can have limited patrols in a prescribed area within the conflict zone and would not be allowed to go into Georgian urban areas or tie up a cross-country highway.

    According to Rice, Medvedev told Sarkozy that the minute the Georgian president signed the cease-fire agreement, Russian forces would begin to withdraw.

    Sarkozy said Saturday that the truce explicitly bars Russian troops from Gori or “any major urban area” of Georgia.

    Earlier Saturday, Russian forces dug shallow foxholes in the middle of Igoeti and parked tanks, one flying a Russian flag, along the road. In the afternoon, they withdrew from those positions to the town’s western outskirts. There, they set up defensive positions with tank cannons pointed back toward Georgian-held territory, where police and soldiers milled about, awaiting Russia‘s next move.

    West of Igoeti, Russian troops were deployed in large numbers in and around the strategic city of Gori, which endured an intense Russian bombardment during the fighting that began when Georgia attacked its breakaway region of South Ossetia. Military vehicles on the side of the road were camouflaged with branches; a couple of soldiers slept on stretchers in the shade of the hulking machines.

    Russian troops effectively control the main artery running through the western half of Georgia, because they surround the strategic central city of Gori and the city and air base of Senaki in the west. Both cities sit on the main east-west highway that slices through two Georgian mountain ranges.

    Controlling Senaki, which sits on a key intersection, also means the Russians control access to the Black Sea port city of Poti and the road north to another breakaway region, Abkhazia. AP reporters have seen Russian troops there for days but noted a growing contingent Saturday and artillery guns and tanks pointed out from the city, which they appear to be using as a base for their sorties elsewhere in western Georgia.

    An Associated Press Television News team saw Russian soldiers pulling out of the Black Sea port of Poti Saturday after sinking Georgian naval vessels and ransacking the port. A picture of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili in the looted office of the Navy and Coast Guard had been vandalized, with the face scratched out.

    “They have robbed the military base and taken almost everything, and they have burned or sunk the stuff they could not carry,” port worker Zurab Simonia said.

    Lavrov was not specific about the security measures planned, but suggested they would be limited mostly to South Ossetia, not Georgia proper. He accused Georgia of undermining security, citing the Russian military’s claim that it had averted an attack on a highway tunnel by stopping a car laden with grenade launchers and ammunition.

    “We are constantly encountering problems from the Georgian side, and everything will depend on how effectively and quickly these problems are resolved,” he said.

    Georgia, meanwhile, claimed that Russian forces blew up a railroad bridge Saturday. Russia denied it.

    The rival claims underscored the fragility of the cease-fire. Lavrov said the deal Saakashvili signed Friday differed from the one with Medvedev’s signature, with Saakashvili’s version lacking an introductory preamble. While that difference may appear to be a technicality, it could be one either side could cite if it wants to abandon the deal.

    The conflict erupted after Georgia launched a massive barrage to try to take control of South Ossetia. The Russian army quickly overwhelmed its neighbor’s forces and drove deep into Georgia, raising fears that it was planning on a long-term occupation.

    Even if Russian forces do withdraw from the rest of Georgia, Moscow appears likely to maintain strong control over South Ossetia. Lavrov said Thursday that Georgia can “forget about” South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which broke from Georgian government control in early 1990s wars, and their future status is shaping up as a potentially explosive source of tension.

    In Texas, Bush said, “A major issue is Russia’s contention that the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia may not be a part of Georgia’s future. These regions are a part of Georgia and the international community has repeatedly made clear that they will remain so.”

    Russia views the growing relationship between the U.S. and Georgia as an encroachment on its traditional sphere of influence and a threat to its clout. The fighting came amid U.S. efforts to close a deal on a missile shield based in former Soviet satellites in Europe, an issue already damaging ties with its former Cold War foe.

    ___

    Associated Press writers Mansur Mirovalev in Gori and Tskhinvali, Jim Heintz, Angela Charlton and Steve Gutterman in Moscow, and Deb Riechmann in Crawford, Texas contributed to this report.

  • STRATFOR : Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

    STRATFOR : Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

     

    Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (L) and Turkish President Abdullah Gul in Istanbul
    Summary
    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s two-day trip to Ankara ended Aug. 15. While the Iranian government and state media have touted his trip as proof that Iran and Turkey are close allies, the Turkish government is far more concerned with containing the current situation in the Caucasus, which could have major implications for Turkey’s ally Azerbaijan.
    Analysis
    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wrapped up a two-day trip to Ankara on Aug. 15. The Iranian government and state media have been hyping Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey for days in an attempt to showcase to the world the Iranian belief that Iran and Turkey, as the two principle non-Arab regional powerhouses, are close and natural allies.
    But while Iran is eager to forge closer ties with Turkey, the Turks do not have much time for Ahmadinejad right now. Ankara has bigger things on its mind, namely the Russians.
    Turkey is heir to the Ottoman Empire, which once extended deep into the southern Caucasus region where Russia just wrapped up an aggressive military campaign against Georgia. Turkey’s geopolitical interests in the Caucasus have primarily been defensive in nature, focused on keeping the Russians and Persians at bay. Now that Russia is resurging in the Caucasus, the Turks have no choice but to get involved.
    The Turks primarily rely on their deep ethnic, historical and linguistic ties to Azerbaijan to extend their influence into the Caucasus. Azerbaijan was alarmed, to say the least, when it saw Russian tanks crossing into Georgia. As far as Azerbaijan was concerned, Baku could have been the next target in Russia’s military campaign.
    However, Armenia — Azerbaijan’s primary rival — remembers well the 1915 Armenian genocide by the Turks, and looks to Iran and especially Orthodox Christian Russia for its protection. Now that Russia has shown it is willing to act on behalf of allies like South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Caucasus, the Armenians, while militarily outmatched by the Azerbaijanis, are now feeling bolder and could see this as their chance to preempt Azerbaijan in yet another battle for the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region— especially if it thinks it can look to Russia to militarily intervene on its behalf.
    The Turks and their ethnic kin in Azerbaijan are extremely wary of Russia’s intentions for the southern Caucasus beyond Georgia. Sources told Stratfor that Azerbaijan has learned that the Russian military jets that bombed Gori and Poti were based out of Armenia. This development not only signaled a significant expansion of Russia’s military presence in the southern Caucasus, but it also implied that Armenia had actually signed off on the Russian foray into Georgia, knowing that Russian dominance over Georgia would guarantee Armenian security and impose a geographic split between Turkey and Azerbaijan. If the Armenians became overly confident and made a move against Azerbaijan for Nagorno-Karabakh, expecting Russian support, the resulting war would have a high potential of drawing the Turks into a confrontation with the Russians — something that both NATO member Turkey and Ru ssia have every interest in avoiding.
    The Turks also have a precarious economic relationship with Russia. The two countries have expanded their trade with each other significantly in recent years. In the first half of 2008, trade between Russia and Turkey amounted to $19.9 billion, making Russia Turkey’s biggest trading partner. Much of this trade is concentrated in the energy sphere. The Turks currently import approximately 64 percent of the natural gas they consume from the Russians. Though Turkey’s geographic position enables it to pursue energy links in the Middle East and the Caucasus that can bypass Russian territory, the Russians have made it abundantly clear over the past few days that the region’s energy security will still depend on Moscow’s good graces.
    Turkey’s economic standing also largely depends on its ability to act as a major energy transit hub for the West through pipelines such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which was recently forced offline due to a purported Kurdish militant attack and the war in Georgia. Turkey simply cannot afford to see the Russians continue their surge into the Caucasus and threaten its energy supply.
    For these reasons, Turkey is on a mission to keep this tinderbox in the Caucasus contained. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan spent the last couple of days meeting with top Russian leaders in Moscow and then with the Georgian president in Tbilisi. During his meetings with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, President Dmitri Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Erdogan pushed the idea of creating a Caucasus union that would include both Russia and Georgia. Though this organization would likely be little more than a talk shop, it is a sign of Turkey’s interest in reaching a mutual understanding with Russia that would allow both sides to maintain a comfortable level of influence in the region without coming to blows..
    The Iranians, meanwhile, are sitting in the backseat. Though Iran has a foothold in the Caucasus through its support for Armenia, the Iranians lack the level of political, military and economic gravitas that Turkey and Russia currently hold in this region. Indeed, Erdogan did not even include Iran in his list of proposed members for the Caucasus union, even though Iran is one of the three major powers bordering the region. The Turks also struck a blow to Iran by holding back from giving Ahmadinejad the satisfaction of sealing a key energy agreement for Iran to provide Turkey with natural gas, preferring instead to preserve its close relationship with the United States and Israel. Turkey simply is not compelled to give Iran the attention that it is seeking at the moment.
    The one thing that Turkey can look to Iran for, however, is keeping the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict under control. Iran’s support for Armenia has naturally put Tehran on a collision course with Ankara when dealing with the Caucasus in the past. But when faced with a common threat of a resurgent Russia, both Turkey and Iran can agree to disagree on their conflicting interests in this region and use their leverage to keep Armenia or Azerbaijan from firing off a shot and pulling the surrounding powers into a broader conflict. In light of the recent BTC explosion claimed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey can also look to Iran to play its part in cracking down on PKK rebels in the region, many of whom have spent the past year fleeing a Turkish crackdown in northern Iraq by traversing through Iran to reach the southern Caucasus.
    While Iran and Turkey can cooperate in fending off the Russians, it will primarily be up to Turkey to fight the battle in the Caucasus. Russia has thus far responded positively to Turkey’s diplomatic engagements, but in a region with so many conflicting interests, the situation could change in a heartbeat.
  • Azerbaijan: The Stark New Energy Landscape

    Azerbaijan: The Stark New Energy Landscape

     

     

     

    August 15, 2008 | 1817 GMT

    Yoray Liberman/Getty Images

    Workers at the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline terminal in Turkey

    Summary

    Russia’s military defeat of Georgia puts Azerbaijan in a difficult position. With all of its existing energy export routes now back under Russian control, Baku faces a stark set of choices that may force it to reach an accommodation with Moscow.

    Analysis

    Related Links

    • Turkey: An Oil Pipeline Fire and the Russian Alternative
    • Russia: Courting Azerbaijan for Natural Gas
    • Global Market Brief: BP Takes a Hit in the Georgia Conflict

    Related Special Topic Pages

    • Central Asian Energy: Circumventing Russia
    • The Russian Resurgence
    • Russian Energy and Foreign Policy
    • Crisis in South Ossetia

    Azerbaijan is losing some $50 million to $70 million per day due to the closure of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, the Caspian Energy Alliance said Aug. 14, adding that Baku’s total losses from the closure amounted to some $500 million. The 1 million barrel per day (bpd) BTC line, which passes from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia, was shut down Aug. 6 following an attack on the Turkish part of the line, claimed by a Kurdish separatist group. If not for that attack, however, it might well have been shut down anyway amid the military conflict in Georgia that began two days later.

    Azerbaijan exports oil and natural gas to Western energy markets via three pipelines — all of which pass through Georgia, and all of which experienced cutoffs in the past several days. Two
    of them — the BTC and the 150,000 bpd Baku-Supsa — carry oil. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum line carries natural gas at 9 billion cubic meters per year. The pipelines were built to provide a transport route for Caspian Sea energy to reach Western markets without having to pass through Russia, which controls the majority of pipeline infrastructure into Europe. Now that Russia has established a firm military presence in Georgia, however, it is highly likely that all three lines will continue to operate, or not, at the pleasure of the Kremlin.

    This puts Azerbaijan in a predicament. With its export routes to the West blocked by the Russian presence in Georgia, Baku is carefully considering its options. Though other potential pipeline routes exist, they are plagued with problems that could prove insurmountable. Azerbaijan may have no real option but to try to reach some sort of accommodation with Moscow.

    Initially, Baku was excited by the conflict in Georgia’s South Ossetia region because it provided a possible blueprint for dealing with Azerbaijan’s own restive separatist enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh — and for potentially imposing a new military reality on Baku’s regional rival, Armenia.. If successful, such a campaign could have allowed Baku to use Armenian territory for a new energy export route. Sources tell Stratfor that, following the Georgian military’s Aug. 8 invasion of South Ossetia, Azerbaijan’s leadership convened an emergency meeting at which they reportedly gave serious consideration to invading Nagorno-Karabakh, contingent on the eventual success of the Georgian operation.

    However, the Georgian offensive not only failed, it resulted in the Russian invasion of Georgia proper — which has effectively suspended Tbilisi’s ability to control its own territory. Russia also used air bases in Armenia to assist in the Georgian intervention, which marked a significant change in the dynamic between Baku and Yerevan. Russia keeps military assets in both Azerbaijan and Armenia, and sells weapons to both — indeed, part of Moscow’s strategy in the Caucasus is to ensure that the two rivals remain distracted by their tense relations — but from Baku’s perspective, the Russian decision to activate its assets in Armenia means Moscow is choosing sides. However possible it might have been for Azerbaijan to invade its neighbor, it has suddenly become inconceivable.

    For Baku, this is the worst-case scenario. Its energy lifelines, intended to circumvent Russian territory, are now under the overt control of the Kremlin, while its alternative of forcing a new path through Armenia is completely taken out.

    Baku also suddenly found itself trying to block the flood of Azeri volunteers heading to Georgia to fight the invading Russians. Azerbaijan’s government did not want to provoke Russia, especially with Russian tanks only a couple of hundred miles from Baku itself. For that matter, with a presidential election set for Oct. 15, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev does not want a security crisis on his hands. Even though Azerbaijan has been using its energy revenues to build up its military in recent years, it is nowhere near ready to defend itself from a Russian invasion. Its security situation is in many ways even more dire than that of Georgia (or even Ukraine).

    Turkey, Baku’s strongest ally in the region, theoretically would not stand by if Russia invaded Azerbaijan — but then, Ankara has been silent on the Russian intervention in Georgia. To the Azeris, this is a sign that they cannot depend on the Turks to commit themselves to a fight with Moscow if push should come to shove. Also, now that Georgia is under effective Russian military control, the only route for Turkish aid to Azerbaijan is cut off — neither Iran nor Armenia would provide passage.

    With the Russians in control of Georgia and with domination of Armenia out of the picture, Azerbaijan’s only other feasible export route would be southward through Iran, hooking into existing Turkish pipeline infrastructure or sending exports out via the Persian Gulf. The problem with this option is one of timing: Any move into Iran would have to wait for an accommodation between Tehran and the United States over Iraq, which appears to be getting ever nearer but could still be derailed. At $50 million in losses per day, however, Azerbaijan does not have the time to wait for these pieces to fall into place and then build a new pipeline into Iran. A Russian move to cut off all three pipelines going through Georgia would make the cost unbearable. Baku counts on i ts energy export revenues in order to maintain military parity with Armenia, so a sharp drop in funding could quickly become a national security issue.

    That leaves one other option, which from Baku’s perspective is the least desirable but the most realistic: seeking accommodation with Russia.

    Russia now effectively controls the entire already-built energy transport infrastructure between Baku and Western markets. Russia could accommodate transport of Azeri energy through Georgia for the right price. That price would be both financial and political: Azerbaijan would need to align with Moscow on matters of import in order to keep the pipelines open. Baku also could ship its natural gas through Russia proper via pipelines such as Baku-Rostov-on-Don, which used to provide Azerbaijan with natural gas supplies before it became a net exporter. There also is the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline, which has a capacity of nearly 200,000 bpd, although very little Azeri crude normally goes through it.

    Azerbaijan has tried to avoid shipping its energy exports through Russian pipelines while other feasible options were open. But Baku may have to reconsider now that Russia holds all the cards.

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  • separate and unequal

    separate and unequal

    From: Arch Getty <getty@ucla.edu>
    Subject: separate and unequal
    Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2008

    Things look very different from here in Moscow,
    almost as if one is observing things from another planet.

    The other night I watched a story on Russia
    Today, a semi-official Russian news channel.  It
    showed CNN footage purporting to come from the
    apparent Russian “capture” of the Georgian town
    of Gori.  Actually, the film was (unattributed)
    Russia Today footage of damage from the Georgian
    attack days ago on Tskhinvali, the So. Ossetian capital.

    But even aside from the difficulty of getting
    anything resembling accurate news here, the
    Russian point of view is, predictably, vastly
    different from the knee-jerk Russophobia in the
    U.S. press.  And to many of us here, the Russian
    point of view is at least as compelling as the
    mainstream U.S. attitudes we hear about.

    Russians have always been sensitive to western
    views of them and are particularly alert for
    attitudes  that smack of inequality and
    hypocrisy.  The vast majority of people here are
    amazed, sad, and confused at the way the western
    media has transformed the Georgian side, which
    started the war, into the victims.  When Prime
    Minister Putin decried the west’s cynical
    “turning black into white” he spoke for large numbers of Russians.

    People here were amazed and insulted when
    President Bush bragged about his “stern” warnings
    to Putin.  Like Putin, they cannot imagine a
    reason to pay any attention to such a person,
    whose paternalistic but helpless schoolmarm
    lectures are considered here to be “not serious.”

    Russians wonder how, before Russian intervention,
    something more than a thousand deaths including
    the destruction of villages and shooting of
    civilians by the Georgians escape western notice.

    They wonder why Georgian attempts to suppress the
    Ossetian alphabet were not cultural genocide and
    Russian defense against Georgian attack is.

    They wonder how prying Kossovo away from Serbia
    was popular self-determination but So. Ossetian
    independence from Georgia is not.

    They wonder how President Bush, who for the sake
    of regime change invaded Iraq far from his
    shores, nevertheless managed to denounce Russian
    use of force and complain that the days of regime change had passed.

    They wonder why, in 1942 when attacked by Japan,
    the U.S. did not follow its own advice about a
    “measured response” and stop her counterattack on
    Japan at Pearl Harbor.  “Were the Japanese the
    victims then, just like the Georgians?”

    They wonder why, as one puzzled but sincere
    friend put it, “you Americans hate us so much when we do what you do.”

    But mostly they wonder why US leaders cannot come
    up with a more sophisticated world view for the
    21st century than surrounding Russia (which after
    all has nuclear weapons and much of the world’s
    oil) with verbal abuse, hostile alliances and
    provocations.  They don’t understand why US
    leaders cannot see beyond or outgrow the cold
    war.  Another asked,  “So Cheney and Rice, they
    aren’t your most advanced global thinkers, right?”

    J. Arch Getty
    Moscow
    [Professor of History, UCLA]

    Johnson’s Russia List
    2008-#150
    15 August 2008

  • Putin Is Not Hitler

    Putin Is Not Hitler

    Washington Post

    By Michael Dobbs (dobbsm@washpost.com)
    Michael Dobbs covered the collapse of the Soviet
    Union for the Washington Post. His latest book is
    “One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and
    Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War.”

    It did not take long for the “Putin is Hitler”
    analogies to start, following the eruption of the
    ugly little war between Russia and Georgia over
    the breakaway Georgian province of South Ossetia.
    A neo-conservative commentator, Robert Kagan,
    compared the Russian attack on Georgia with the
    Nazi grab of the Sudetenland in 1938. President
    Jimmy Carter’s former national security adviser
    Zbigniew Brzezinski said that the Russian leader
    was following a course “that is horrifyingly
    similar to that taken by Stalin and Hitler in the 1930s.”

    Others invoked the infamous Brezhnev doctrine of
    limited sovereignty, under which Soviet leaders
    claimed the right to intervene militarily in
    Eastern Europe, in order to prop up their
    crumbling imperium. “We’ve seen this movie before
    in Prague and Budapest,” said presumptive
    Republican nominee John McCain, referring to the
    Soviet invasions of Czecholovakia in 1968 and Hungary in 1956.

    Actually, the events of the past week in Georgia
    have little in common either with Hitler’s
    dismemberment of Czechoslovakia on the eve of
    World War II or Soviet policies in Eastern
    Europe. They are better understood against the
    background of the complicated ethnic politics of
    the Caucasus, a part of the world where
    historical grudges run deep, and the oppressed
    can become oppressors in the bat of an eye.

    Unlike most of the armchair generals now posing
    as experts on the Caucasus, I have actually
    visited Tskhinvali, a sleepy provincial town in
    the shadow of the mountains that rise up along
    Russia’s southern border. I was there in March
    1991, shortly after the city was occupied by
    Georgian militia units loyal to Zviad
    Gamsakhurdia, the first freely elected leader of
    Georgia in seven decades. One of Gamsakhurdia’s
    first acts as Georgian president was to cancel
    the political autonomy that had been granted to
    the republic’s 90,000-strong Ossetian minority
    under the Stalinist constitution.

    After negotiating safe passage with Soviet
    interior ministry troops who had stationed
    themselves between the Georgians and the
    Ossetians, I discovered the town had been
    ransacked by Gamsakhurdia’s militia. The
    Georgians had trashed the Ossetian national
    theater, decapitated the statue of an Ossetian
    poet, and pulled down monuments to Ossetians who
    fought with Soviet troops in World War II. The
    Ossetians were responding in kind, firing on
    Georgian villages and forcing Georgian residents
    of Tskhinvali to flee their homes.

    It soon became clear to me that the Ossetians
    viewed Georgians much the same way Georgians view
    Russians: as aggressive bullies bent on taking
    away their independence. “We are much more
    worried by Georgian imperialism than Russian
    imperialism,” an Ossetian leader, Gerasim
    Khugaev, told me. “It is closer to us, and we feel its pressure all the time.”

    When it comes to apportioning blame for the
    latest flareup in the Caucasus, there is plenty
    to go around. The Russians were clearly itching
    for a fight, but the behavior of Georgian
    president Mikheil Saakashvili has been erratic
    and provocative. The United States may have
    stoked the conflict by encouraging Saakashvili to
    believe he enjoyed American protection, when the
    West’s ability to impose its will in this part of
    the world is actually quite limited.

    Let us examine the role played by the three main parties one by one.

    Georgia. Saakashvili’s image in the West, and
    particularly in America, is that of the great
    “democrat,” the leader of the “Rose revolution”
    who spearheaded a popular uprising against former
    American favorite Eduard Shevardnadze in November
    2003. It is true that he has won two, reasonably
    free, elections, but he has also displayed some
    autocratic tendencies; he sent riot police to
    crush an opposition protest in Tbilisi last
    November and shuttered an opposition television station.

    While the U.S. views Saakashvili as a pro-Western
    modernizer, a large part of his political appeal
    in Georgia has stemmed from his promise to
    re-unify Georgia by bringing the secessionist
    provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia under
    central control. He has presented himself as the
    successor to the medieval Georgian king, David
    the Builder, and promised that the country will
    regain its lost territories by the time he leaves
    office, by one means or another. American
    commentators tend to overlook the fact that
    Georgian democracy is inextricably intertwined with Georgian nationalism.

    The restoration of Georgia’s traditional borders
    is an understandable goal for a Georgian leader,
    but is a much lower priority for the West,
    particularly if it involves armed conflict with
    Russia. Based on their previous experience with
    Georgian rule, Ossetians and Abhazians have
    perfectly valid reasons to be opposed to
    reunification with Georgia, even if it means
    throwing in their lot with the Russians.

    It is unclear how the simmering tensions between
    Georgia and South Ossetia came to the boil last
    week. The Georgians say they were provoked by the
    shelling of Georgian villages from
    Ossetian-controlled territory. While this may be
    well be the case, the Georgian response was
    disproportionate. On the night of Aug. 7-8,
    Saakashvili ordered an artillery barrage against
    Tskhinvali, and sent an armored column to occupy
    the town. He apparently hoped that Western
    support would protect Georgia from major Russian
    retaliation, even though Russian “peacekeepers”
    were almost certainly killed or wounded in the Georgian assault.

    It was a huge miscalculation. Russian Prime
    Minister Vladimir Putin (and let there be no
    doubt that he is calling the shots in Moscow
    despite handing over the presidency to his
    protege, Dmitri Medvedev) now had the ideal
    pretext for settling scores with the uppity
    Georgians. Rather than simply restoring the
    status quo ante, Russian troops moved into
    Georgia proper, cutting the main east-west
    highway at Gori and attacking various military bases.

    Saakashvili’s decision to gamble everything on a
    lightning grab for Tskhinvali brings to mind the
    comment of the 19th century French statesman
    Maurice de Talleyrand: “it was worse than a crime, it was a mistake.”

    Russia. Putin and Medvedev have defended their
    incursion into Georgia as motivated by a desire
    to stop the “genocide” of Ossetians by Georgians.
    It is difficult to take their moral outrage very
    seriously. There is a striking contrast between
    Russian support for the right of Ossetian
    self-determination in Georgia and the brutal
    suppression of Chechens who were trying to
    exercise that very same right within the boundaries of Russia.

    Playing one ethnic group off against another in
    the Caucasus has been standard Russian policy
    ever since tzarist times. It is the ideal wedge
    issue for the Kremlin, particularly in the case
    of a state like Georgia, which is made up of
    several different nationalities. It would be
    virtually impossible for South Ossetia to survive
    as an autonomous entity without Russian support.
    Over the last few months, Putin’s government has
    issued passports to Ossetians and secured the
    appointment of Russians to key positions in Tskhinvali.

    The Russian incursion into Georgia proper has
    been even more “disproportionate” — in
    President’s Bush phrase — than the Georgian
    assault on Tskhinvali. The Russians have made no
    secret of their wish to replace Saakashvili with
    a more compliant leader. Targets for Russian
    shelling included the Black Sea port of Poti —
    more than 100 miles from South Ossetia.

    The real goal of Kremlin strategy is to reassert
    Russian influence in a part of the world that has
    been regarded, by tzars and commissars alike, as
    Russia’s backyard. Russian leaders bitterly
    resented the eastward expansion of NATO to
    include Poland and the Baltic states — with
    Ukraine and Georgia next on the list — but were
    unable to do very much about it as long as
    America was strong and Russia was weak. Now the
    tables are turning for the first time since the
    collapse of Communism in 1991, and Putin is seizing the moment.

    If Putin is smart, he will refrain from occupying
    Georgia proper, a step that would further alarm
    the West and unite Georgians against Russia. A
    better tactic would be to wait for Georgians
    themselves to turn against Saakashvili. The
    precedent here is what happened to Gamsakhurdia,
    who was overthrown by the same militia forces he
    had sent into to South Ossetia a year later, in January 1992.

    The United States. The Bush administration has
    been sending mixed messages to its Georgian
    clients. U.S. officials insist that they did not
    give the green light to Saakashvili for his
    attack on South Ossetia. At the same time,
    however, the U.S. has championed NATO membership
    for Georgia, sent military advisers to bolster
    the Georgian army, and demanded the restoration
    of Georgian territorial integrity. American
    support might well have emboldened Saakashvili as
    he was considering how to respond to the “provocations” from South Ossetia.

    Now the United States has ended up in a situation
    in the Caucasus where the Georgian tail is
    wagging the NATO dog. We were unable to control
    Saakashvili or to lend him effective assistance
    when his country was invaded. One lesson is that
    we need to be very careful in extending NATO
    membership, or even the promise of membership, to
    countries we have neither the will nor the ability to defend.

    In the meantime, American leaders have paid
    little attention to Russian diplomatic concerns,
    both inside the former borders of the Soviet
    Union and farther abroad. The Bush administration
    unilaterally abrogated the 1972 anti-missile
    defense treaty and ignored Putin when he objected
    to Kosovo independence on the grounds that it
    would set a dangerous precedent. It is difficult
    to explain why Kosovo should have the right to
    unilaterally declare its independence from
    Serbia, while the same right should be denied to
    places like South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

    The bottom line is that the United States is
    overextended militarily, diplomatically, and
    economically. Even hawks like Vice President
    Cheney, who have been vociferously denouncing
    Putin’s actions in Georgia, have no stomach for a
    military conflict with Moscow. The United States
    is bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, and needs
    Russian support in the coming trial of strength
    with Iran over its nuclear ambitions.

    Instead of speaking softly and wielding a big
    stick, as Teddy Roosevelt recommended, the
    American policeman has been loudly lecturing the
    rest of the world while waving an increasingly
    unimpressive baton. The events of the past few
    days serve as a reminder that our ideological
    ambitions have greatly exceeded our military
    reach, particularly in areas like the Caucasus,
    which is of only peripheral importance to the
    United States but is of vital interest to Russia.

  • The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power

    The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power

    By George Friedman

    The Russian invasion of Georgia has not changed the balance of power in Eurasia. It simply announced that the balance of power had already shifted. The United States has been absorbed in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as potential conflict with Iran and a destabilizing situation in Pakistan. It has no strategic ground forces in reserve and is in no position to intervene on the Russian periphery. This, as we have argued, has opened a window of opportunity for the Russians to reassert their influence in the former Soviet sphere. Moscow did not have to concern itself with the potential response of the United States or Europe; hence, the invasion did not shift the balance of power. The balance of power had already shifted, and it was up to the Russians when to make this public. They did that Aug. 8.

    Let’s begin simply by reviewing the last few days.

    On the night of Thursday, Aug. 7, forces of the Republic of Georgia drove across the border of South Ossetia, a secessionist region of Georgia that has functioned as an independent entity since the fall of the Soviet Union. The forces drove on to the capital, Tskhinvali, which is close to the border. Georgian forces got bogged down while trying to take the city. In spite of heavy fighting, they never fully secured the city, nor the rest of South Ossetia.

    On the morning of Aug. 8, Russian forces entered South Ossetia, using armored and motorized infantry forces along with air power. South Ossetia was informally aligned with Russia, and Russia acted to prevent the region’s absorption by Georgia. Given the speed with which the Russians responded — within hours of the Georgian attack — the Russians were expecting the Georgian attack and were themselves at their jumping-off points. The counterattack was carefully planned and competently executed, and over the next 48 hours, the Russians succeeded in defeating the main Georgian force and forcing a retreat. By Sunday, Aug. 10, the Russians had consolidated their position in South Ossetia.

    Georgia Conflict Map

    On Monday, the Russians extended their offensive into Georgia proper, attacking on two axes. One was south from South Ossetia to the Georgian city of Gori. The other drive was from Abkhazia, another secessionist region of Georgia aligned with the Russians. This drive was designed to cut the road between the Georgian capital of Tbilisi and its ports. By this point, the Russians had bombed the military airfields at Marneuli and Vaziani and appeared to have disabled radars at the international airport in Tbilisi. These moves brought Russian forces to within 40 miles of the Georgian capital, while making outside reinforcement and resupply of Georgian forces extremely difficult should anyone wish to undertake it.

    The Mystery Behind the Georgian Invasion
    In this simple chronicle, there is something quite mysterious: Why did the Georgians choose to invade South Ossetia on Thursday night? There had been a great deal of shelling by the South Ossetians of Georgian villages for the previous three nights, but while possibly more intense than usual, artillery exchanges were routine. The Georgians might not have fought well, but they committed fairly substantial forces that must have taken at the very least several days to deploy and supply. Georgia’s move was deliberate.

    The United States is Georgia’s closest ally. It maintained about 130 military advisers in Georgia, along with civilian advisers, contractors involved in all aspects of the Georgian government and people doing business in Georgia. It is inconceivable that the Americans were unaware of Georgia’s mobilization and intentions. It is also inconceivable that the Americans were unaware that the Russians had deployed substantial forces on the South Ossetian frontier. U.S. technical intelligence, from satellite imagery and signals intelligence to unmanned aerial vehicles, could not miss the fact that thousands of Russian troops were moving to forward positions. The Russians clearly knew the Georgians were ready to move. How could the United States not be aware of the Russians? Indeed, given the posture of Russian troops, how could intelligence analysts have missed the possibility that t he Russians had laid a trap, hoping for a Georgian invasion to justify its own counterattack?

    It is very difficult to imagine that the Georgians launched their attack against U.S. wishes. The Georgians rely on the United States, and they were in no position to defy it. This leaves two possibilities. The first is a massive breakdown in intelligence, in which the United States either was unaware of the existence of Russian forces, or knew of the Russian forces but — along with the Georgians — miscalculated Russia’s intentions. The United States, along with other countries, has viewed Russia through the prism of the 1990s, when the Russian military was in shambles and the Russian government was paralyzed. The United States has not seen Russia make a decisive military move beyond its borders since the Afghan war of the 1970s-1980s. The Russians had systematically avoided such moves for years. The United States had assumed that the Russians would not risk the consequences of an invasion.

    If this was the case, then it points to the central reality of this situation: The Russians had changed dramatically, along with the balance of power in the region. They welcomed the opportunity to drive home the new reality, which was that they could invade Georgia and the United States and Europe could not respond. As for risk, they did not view the invasion as risky. Militarily, there was no counter. Economically, Russia is an energy exporter doing quite well — indeed, the Europeans need Russian energy even more than the Russians need to sell it to them. Politically, as we shall see, the Americans needed the Russians more than the Russians needed the Americans. Moscow’s calculus was that this was the moment to strike. The Russians had been building up to it for months, as we have discussed, and they struck.

    The Western Encirclement of Russia
    To understand Russian thinking, we need to look at two events. The first is the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. From the U.S. and European point of view, the Orange Revolution represented a triumph of democracy and Western influence. From the Russian point of view, as Moscow made clear, the Orange Revolution was a CIA-funded intrusion into the internal affairs of Ukraine, designed to draw Ukraine into NATO and add to the encirclement of Russia. U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton had promised the Russians that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union empire.

    That promise had already been broken in 1998 by NATO’s expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic — and again in the 2004 expansion, which absorbed not only the rest of the former Soviet satellites in what is now Central Europe, but also the three Baltic states, which had been components of the Soviet Union.
    The Russians had tolerated all that, but the discussion of including Ukraine in NATO represented a fundamental threat to Russia’s national security. It would have rendered Russia indefensible and threatened to destabilize the Russian Federation itself. When the United States went so far as to suggest that Georgia be included as well, bringing NATO deeper into the Caucasus, the Russian conclusion — publicly stated — was that the United States in particular intended to encircle and break Russia.

    The second and lesser event was the decision by Europe and the United States to back Kosovo’s separation from Serbia. The Russians were friendly with Serbia, but the deeper issue for Russia was this: The principle of Europe since World War II was that, to prevent conflict, national borders would not be changed. If that principle were violated in Kosovo, other border shifts — including demands by various regions for independence from Russia — might follow. The Russians publicly and privately asked that Kosovo not be given formal independence, but instead continue its informal autonomy, which was the same thing in practical terms. Russia’s requests were ignored.

    From the Ukrainian experience, the Russians became convinced that the United States was engaged in a plan of strategic encirclement and strangulation of Russia. From the Kosovo experience, they concluded that the United States and Europe were not prepared to consider Russian wishes even in fairly minor affairs. That was the breaking point. If Russian desires could not be accommodated even in a minor matter like this, then clearly Russia and the West were in conflict. For the Russians, as we said, the question was how to respond. Having declined to respond in Kosovo, the Russians decided to respond where they had all the cards: in South Ossetia.

    Moscow had two motives, the lesser of which was as a tit-for-tat over Kosovo. If Kosovo could be declared independent under Western sponsorship, then South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two breakaway regions of Georgia, could be declared independent under Russian sponsorship. Any objections from the United States and Europe would simply confirm their hypocrisy. This was important for internal Russian political reasons, but the second motive was far more important.

    Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin once said that the fall of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical disaster. This didn’t mean that he wanted to retain the Soviet state; rather, it meant that the disintegration of the Soviet Union had created a situation in which Russian national security was threatened by Western interests. As an example, consider that during the Cold War, St. Petersburg was about 1,200 miles away from a NATO country. Today it is about 60 miles away from Estonia, a NATO member. The disintegration of the Soviet Union had left Russia surrounded by a group of countries hostile to Russian interests in various degrees and heavily influenced by the United States, Europe and, in some cases, China.

    Resurrecting the Russian Sphere
    Putin did not want to re-establish the Soviet Union, but he did want to re-establish the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union region. To accomplish that, he had to do two things. First, he had to re-establish the credibility of the Russian army as a fighting force, at least in the context of its region. Second, he had to establish that Western guarantees, including NATO membership, meant nothing in the face of Russian power. He did not want to confront NATO directly, but he did want to confront and defeat a power that was closely aligned with the United States, had U.S. support, aid and advisers and was widely seen as being under American protection. Georgia was the perfect choice.

    By invading Georgia as Russia did (competently if not brilliantly), Putin re-established the credibility of the Russian army. But far more importantly, by doing this Putin revealed an open secret: While the United States is tied down in the Middle East, American guarantees have no value. This lesson is not for American consumption. It is something that, from the Russian point of view, the Ukrainians, the Balts and the Central Asians need to digest. Indeed, it is a lesson Putin wants to transmit to Poland and the Czech Republic as well. The United States wants to place ballistic missile defense installations in those countries, and the Russians want them to understand that allowing this to happen increases their risk, not their security.

    The Russians knew the United States would denounce their attack. This actually plays into Russian hands. The more vocal senior leaders are, the greater the contrast with their inaction, and the Russians wanted to drive home the idea that American guarantees are empty talk.

    The Russians also know something else that is of vital importance: For the United States, the Middle East is far more important than the Caucasus, and Iran is particularly important. The United States wants the Russians to participate in sanctions against Iran. Even more importantly, they do not want the Russians to sell weapons to Iran, particularly the highly effective S-300 air defense system. Georgia is a marginal issue to the United States; Iran is a central issue. The Russians are in a position to pose serious problems for the United States not only in Iran, but also with weapons sales to other countries, like Syria.

    Therefore, the United States has a problem — it either must reorient its strategy away from the Middle East and toward the Caucasus, or it has to seriously limit its response to Georgia to avoid a Russian counter in Iran. Even if the United States had an appetite for another war in Georgia at this time, it would have to calculate the Russian response in Iran — and possibly in Afghanistan (even though Moscow’s interests there are currently aligned with those of Washington).

    In other words, the Russians have backed the Americans into a corner. The Europeans, who for the most part lack expeditionary militaries and are dependent upon Russian energy exports, have even fewer options. If nothing else happens, the Russians will have demonstrated that they have resumed their role as a regional power. Russia is not a global power by any means, but a significant regional power with lots of nuclear weapons and an economy that isn’t all too shabby at the moment. It has also compelled every state on the Russian periphery to re-evaluate its position relative to Moscow. As for Georgia, the Russians appear ready to demand the resignation of President Mikhail Saakashvili. Militarily, that is their option. That is all they wanted to demonstrate, and they have demonstrated it.

    The war in Georgia, therefore, is Russia’s public return to great power status. This is not something that just happened — it has been unfolding ever since Putin took power, and with growing intensity in the past five years. Part of it has to do with the increase of Russian power, but a great deal of it has to do with the fact that the Middle Eastern wars have left the United States off-balance and short on resources. As we have written, this conflict created a window of opportunity. The Russian goal is to use that window to assert a new reality throughout the region while the Americans are tied down elsewhere and dependent on the Russians. The war was far from a surprise; it has been building for months. But the geopolitical foundations of the war have been building since 1992. Russia has been an empire for centuries. The last 15 years or so were not the new reality, but simply an aberration that would be rectified. And now it is being rectified.

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