Category: Russian Federation

  • Georgia and Kosovo: A Single Intertwined Crisis

    Georgia and Kosovo: A Single Intertwined Crisis

    By George Friedman

    The Russo-Georgian war was rooted in broad geopolitical processes. In large part it was simply the result of the cyclical reassertion of Russian power. The Russian empire — czarist and Soviet — expanded to its borders in the 17th and 19th centuries. It collapsed in 1992. The Western powers wanted to make the disintegration permanent. It was inevitable that Russia would, in due course, want to reassert its claims. That it happened in Georgia was simply the result of circumstance.

    There is, however, another context within which to view this, the context of Russian perceptions of U.S. and European intentions and of U.S. and European perceptions of Russian capabilities. This context shaped the policies that led to the Russo-Georgian war. And those attitudes can only be understood if we trace the question of Kosovo, because the Russo-Georgian war was forged over the last decade over the Kosovo question.

    Yugoslavia broke up into its component republics in the early 1990s. The borders of the republics did not cohere to the distribution of nationalities. Many — Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and so on — found themselves citizens of republics where the majorities were not of their ethnicities and disliked the minorities intensely for historical reasons. Wars were fought between Croatia and Serbia (still calling itself Yugoslavia because Montenegro was part of it), Bosnia and Serbia and Bosnia and Croatia. Other countries in the region became involved as well.

    One conflict became particularly brutal. Bosnia had a large area dominated by Serbs. This region wanted to secede from Bosnia and rejoin Serbia. The Bosnians objected and an internal war in Bosnia took place, with the Serbian government involved. This war involved the single greatest bloodletting of the bloody Balkan wars, the mass murder by Serbs of Bosnians.

    Here we must pause and define some terms that are very casually thrown around. Genocide is the crime of trying to annihilate an entire people. War crimes are actions that violate the rules of war. If a soldier shoots a prisoner, he has committed a war crime. Then there is a class called “crimes against humanity.” It is intended to denote those crimes that are too vast to be included in normal charges of murder or rape. They may not involve genocide, in that the annihilation of a race or nation is not at stake, but they may also go well beyond war crimes, which are much lesser offenses. The events in Bosnia were reasonably deemed crimes against humanity. They did not constitute genocide and they were more than war crimes.

    At the time, the Americans and Europeans did nothing about these crimes, which became an internal political issue as the magnitude of the Serbian crimes became clear. In this context, the Clinton administration helped negotiate the Dayton Accords, which were intended to end the Balkan wars and indeed managed to go quite far in achieving this. The Dayton Accords were built around the principle that there could be no adjustment in the borders of the former Yugoslav republics. Ethnic Serbs would live under Bosnian rule. The principle that existing borders were sacrosanct was embedded in the Dayton Accords.

    In the late 1990s, a crisis began to develop in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Over the years, Albanians had moved into the province in a broad migration. By 1997, the province was overwhelmingly Albanian, although it had not only been historically part of Serbia but also its historical foundation. Nevertheless, the Albanians showed significant intentions of moving toward either a separate state or unification with Albania. Serbia moved to resist this, increasing its military forces and indicating an intention to crush the Albanian resistance.

    There were many claims that the Serbians were repeating the crimes against humanity that were committed in Bosnia. The Americans and Europeans, burned by Bosnia, were eager to demonstrate their will. Arguing that something between crimes against humanity and genocide was under way — and citing reports that between 10,000 and 100,000 Kosovo Albanians were missing or had been killed — NATO launched a campaign designed to stop the killings. In fact, while some killings had taken place, the claims by NATO of the number already killed were false. NATO might have prevented mass murder in Kosovo. That is not provable. They did not, however, find that mass murder on the order of the numbers claimed had taken place. The war could be defended as a preventive measure, but the atmosphere under which the war was carried out overstated what had happened.

    The campaign was carried out without U.N. sanction because of Russian and Chinese opposition. The Russians were particularly opposed, arguing that major crimes were not being committed and that Serbia was an ally of Russia and that the air assault was not warranted by the evidence. The United States and other European powers disregarded the Russian position. Far more important, they established the precedent that U.N. sanction was not needed to launch a war (a precedent used by George W. Bush in Iraq). Rather — and this is the vital point — they argued that NATO support legitimized the war.

    This transformed NATO from a military alliance into a quasi-United Nations. What happened in Kosovo was that NATO took on the role of peacemaker, empowered to determine if intervention was necessary, allowed to make the military intervention, and empowered to determine the outcome. Conceptually, NATO was transformed from a military force into a regional multinational grouping with responsibility for maintenance of regional order, even within the borders of states that are not members. If the United Nations wouldn’t support the action, the NATO Council was sufficient.

    Since Russia was not a member of NATO, and since Russia denied the urgency of war, and since Russia was overruled, the bombing campaign against Kosovo created a crisis in relations with Russia. The Russians saw the attack as a unilateral attack by an anti-Russian alliance on a Russian ally, without sound justification. Then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin was not prepared to make this into a major confrontation, nor was he in a position to. The Russians did not so much acquiesce as concede they had no options.

    The war did not go as well as history records. The bombing campaign did not force capitulation and NATO was not prepared to invade Kosovo. The air campaign continued inconclusively as the West turned to the Russians to negotiate an end. The Russians sent an envoy who negotiated an agreement consisting of three parts. First, the West would halt the bombing campaign. Second, Serbian army forces would withdraw and be replaced by a multinational force including Russian troops. Third, implicit in the agreement, the Russian troops would be there to guarantee Serbian interests and sovereignty.

    As soon as the agreement was signed, the Russians rushed troops to the Pristina airport to take up their duties in the multinational force — as they had in the Bosnian peacekeeping force. In part because of deliberate maneuvers and in part because no one took the Russians seriously, the Russians never played the role they believed had been negotiated. They were never seen as part of the peacekeeping operation or as part of the decision-making system over Kosovo. The Russians felt doubly betrayed, first by the war itself, then by the peace arrangements.

    The Kosovo war directly effected the fall of Yeltsin and the rise of Vladimir Putin. The faction around Putin saw Yeltsin as an incompetent bungler who allowed Russia to be doubly betrayed. The Russian perception of the war directly led to the massive reversal in Russian policy we see today. The installation of Putin and Russian nationalists from the former KGB had a number of roots. But fundamentally it was rooted in the events in Kosovo. Most of all it was driven by the perception that NATO had now shifted from being a military alliance to seeing itself as a substitute for the United Nations, arbitrating regional politics. Russia had no vote or say in NATO decisions, so NATO’s new role was seen as a direct challenge to Russian interests.

    Thus, the ongoing expansion of NATO into the former Soviet Union and the promise to include Ukraine and Georgia into NATO were seen in terms of the Kosovo war. From the Russian point of view, NATO expansion meant a further exclusion of Russia from decision-making, and implied that NATO reserved the right to repeat Kosovo if it felt that human rights or political issues required it. The United Nations was no longer the prime multinational peacekeeping entity. NATO assumed that role in the region and now it was going to expand all around Russia.

    Then came Kosovo’s independence. Yugoslavia broke apart into its constituent entities, but the borders of its nations didn’t change. Then, for the first time since World War II, the decision was made to change Serbia’s borders, in opposition to Serbian and Russian wishes, with the authorizing body, in effect, being NATO. It was a decision avidly supported by the Americans.

    The initial attempt to resolve Kosovo’s status was the round of negotiations led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari that officially began in February 2006 but had been in the works since 2005. This round of negotiations was actually started under U.S. urging and closely supervised from Washington. In charge of keeping Ahtisaari’s negotiations running smoothly was Frank G. Wisner, a diplomat during the Clinton administration. Also very important to the U.S. effort was Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried, another leftover from the Clinton administration and a specialist in Soviet and Polish affairs.

    In the summer of 2007, when it was obvious that the negotiations were going nowhere, the Bush administration decided the talks were over and that it was time for independence. On June 10, 2007, Bush said that the end result of negotiations must be “certain independence.” In July 2007, Daniel Fried said that independence was “inevitable” even if the talks failed. Finally, in September 2007, Condoleezza Rice put it succinctly: “There’s going to be an independent Kosovo. We’re dedicated to that.” Europeans took cues from this line.

    How and when independence was brought about was really a European problem. The Americans set the debate and the Europeans implemented it. Among Europeans, the most enthusiastic about Kosovo independence were the British and the French. The British followed the American line while the French were led by their foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, who had also served as the U.N. Kosovo administrator. The Germans were more cautiously supportive.

    On Feb. 17, 2008, Kosovo declared independence and was recognized rapidly by a small number of European states and countries allied with the United States. Even before the declaration, the Europeans had created an administrative body to administer Kosovo. The Europeans, through the European Union, micromanaged the date of the declaration.

    On May 15, during a conference in Ekaterinburg, the foreign ministers of India, Russia and China made a joint statement regarding Kosovo. It was read by the Russian host minister, Sergei Lavrov, and it said: “In our statement, we recorded our fundamental position that the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo contradicts Resolution 1244. Russia, India and China encourage Belgrade and Pristina to resume talks within the framework of international law and hope they reach an agreement on all problems of that Serbian territory.”

    The Europeans and Americans rejected this request as they had rejected all Russian arguments on Kosovo. The argument here was that the Kosovo situation was one of a kind because of atrocities that had been committed. The Russians argued that the level of atrocity was unclear and that, in any case, the government that committed them was long gone from Belgrade. More to the point, the Russians let it be clearly known that they would not accept the idea that Kosovo independence was a one-of-a-kind situation and that they would regard it, instead, as a new precedent for all to follow.

    The problem was not that the Europeans and the Americans didn’t hear the Russians. The problem was that they simply didn’t believe them — they didn’t take the Russians seriously. They had heard the Russians say things for many years. They did not understand three things. First, that the Russians had reached the end of their rope. Second, that Russian military capability was not what it had been in 1999. Third, and most important, NATO, the Americans and the Europeans did not recognize that they were making political decisions that they could not support militarily.

    For the Russians, the transformation of NATO from a military alliance into a regional United Nations was the problem. The West argued that NATO was no longer just a military alliance but a political arbitrator for the region. If NATO does not like Serbian policies in Kosovo, it can — at its option and in opposition to U.N. rulings — intervene. It could intervene in Serbia and it intended to expand deep into the former Soviet Union. NATO thought that because it was now a political arbiter encouraging regimes to reform and not just a war-fighting system, Russian fears would actually be assuaged. To the contrary, it was Russia’s worst nightmare. Compensating for all this was the fact that NATO had neglected its own military power. Now, Russia could do something about it.

    At the beginning of this discourse, we explained that the underlying issues behind the Russo-Georgian war went deep into geopolitics and that it could not be understood without understanding Kosovo. It wasn’t everything, but it was the single most significant event behind all of this. The war of 1999 was the framework that created the war of 2008.

    The problem for NATO was that it was expanding its political reach and claims while contracting its military muscle. The Russians were expanding their military capability (after 1999 they had no place to go but up) and the West didn’t notice. In 1999, the Americans and Europeans made political decisions backed by military force. In 2008, in Kosovo, they made political decisions without sufficient military force to stop a Russian response. Either they underestimated their adversary or — even more amazingly — they did not see the Russians as adversaries despite absolutely clear statements the Russians had made. No matter what warning the Russians gave, or what the history of the situation was, the West couldn’t take the Russians seriously.

    It began in 1999 with war in Kosovo and it ended in 2008 with the independence of Kosovo. When we study the history of the coming period, the war in Kosovo will stand out as a turning point. Whatever the humanitarian justification and the apparent ease of victory, it set the stage for the rise of Putin and the current and future crises.

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  • Turkey: Ankara’s S-300 Curiosity

    Turkey: Ankara’s S-300 Curiosity

     
     

    A Russian S-400 air defense battery, which is based on the S-300 design
    Summary
    Turkey is reportedly in the process of acquiring late-model Russian air defense technology from Ukraine and Belarus, Turkish daily Today’s Zaman reported Aug. 25. Bought second-hand, these systems would be used for the Turkish air force to train against, rather than to upgrade Ankara’s aging air defense network. That training could prove an important tool for both Turkey specifically and NATO in general.
    Analysis
    Turkey is in the process of acquiring several variants of the Russian S-300 air defense system, Turkish daily Today’s Zaman reported Aug. 25. The systems — reportedly to be acquired second-hand from Belarus and Ukraine — are not meant to revitalize Ankara’s aging air defense network; they are intended to be a training tool for the Turkish air force. Turkey decided to make the purchase July 22 — before the Russo-Georgian conflict — but should the deal go through, the lessons Turkey hopes to learn will almost certainly proliferate to NATO as a whole.
    The S-300 encompasses a number of long-range strategic air defense systems (some variants also have a limited ballistic missile defense capability). Turkey has its sights set on both the S-300 and S-300V. The former, known to NATO as the SA-10B/C/D, encompasses several models of varying capability, but in short approaches the height of Soviet strategic air defense systems. Though neither Ukraine nor Belarus has the most modern S-300 variants — the PMU series — Turkey will likely attempt to acquire a PMU-series variant from them if it can, because Ankara knows Greece fields a PMU1 variant on Crete.
    The S-300V, meanwhile, shares the same design heritage as the S-300 (including some component parts). But while its spectrum of coverage and engagement envelope are quite similar, it is a distinct air defense system (known to NATO as the SA-12) characterized by the large tracked vehicles on which it is mounted. The S-300V was designed with a higher degree of mobility in mind. Russian troops deployed near the Turkish border in Armenia are protected by an S-300V battery.
    Both the United States and Israel reportedly were able to acquire some S-300 components during the 1990s (including, in the U.S. case, parts of the S-300V), but the Turkish effort could include a later model or a more complete system.
    Should Turkey succeed in this acquisition, Ankara’s subsequent work would take two important approaches. The first is reverse engineering, where key components are disassembled and their inner workings closely examined.. The second is training in electronic warfare against actual systems.
    Ukraine and Belarus have neither the newest nor the best-maintained air defense hardware. The condition of the equipment Ankara seeks to buy is unclear, and Russia may be in a position to block at least the Belarusian part of the sale. But perhaps the most significant aspect of this news is the intention to train against it — not just dissecting the missile, but actually flying against functional systems.
    A training range at Konya, less than 150 miles south of Ankara, is reportedly slated to host this Russian hardware, along with the shorter-range Russian Tor-M1. According to the report, the systems will be integrated with an electronic warfare training system with which Turkey’s F-16s will conduct exercises.
    If Turkey is able to acquire even one of the three S-300 variants it seeks, it will undoubtedly work at the training range to learn and test the technology’s performance parameters. This will allow Turkey (and any other NATO allies who happen to train with Turkish forces at the Konya facility) to test tactics and challenge the system over and over again. Whether it will succeed in acquiring a PMU1 remains to be seen, but even older variants could offer very real insight into some of the overall S-300 design’s ultimate limitations and weaknesses. And the result will be a Turkish air force more capable of addressing the two most advanced air defense systems positioned on its periphery: the Greek S-300PMU1 batteries (which were originally slated for Cyprus) to its southwest and the Russian S-300V battery in Armenia, on its eastern border.
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  • Armenia Hit By Fuel Shortages

    Armenia Hit By Fuel Shortages

     

     

     

     

     

    By Shakeh Avoyan

    Armenia was grappling with its worst fuel shortages since the early 1990s on Monday despite the reported reopening of Georgia’s east-west railway that serves as the main supply line of the two South Caucasus states.

    A section of that railway close to the central Georgian town of Gori was damaged by a weekend fuel train explosion which Georgian officials said was caused by a landmine. It occurred just over a week after another, powerful explosion downed a nearby rail bridge. Russia denied Georgian accusations that it was behind the attack.

    The August 16 blast left the Armenian government scrambling to restore supplies of wheat, fuel and other basic commodities from the Georgian Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi which process more than 90 percent of Armenia’s external cargo turnover. The government sent a convoy of about 40 fuel trucks to collect gasoline stranded in the ports.

    Officials said on Monday that the convoy returned to Armenia at the weekend with more than 500 tons of petrol. The government does not plan to send more heavy vehicles to Georgia in view of the renewed rail communication, they said.

    Meanwhile, the situation with fuel supplies only deteriorated, with the vast majority of filling stations in Yerevan resorting to severe fuel rationing on Sunday. They stopped selling petrol altogether the next morning. Only holders of prepaid corporate vouchers issued by the country’s largest station chains could buy a limited amount of petrol on Monday.

    “We have run out of gas and are selling it only to company cars. This is all the information I have at this point,” said a worker at one filling station besieged by angry motorists.

    “The war is in Georgia, but it’s Armenia that is in crisis,” one of them complained. “They keep saying that petrol is coming and there are no problems. But there is a problem.”

    “Even in the most remote Georgian village there is no petrol shortage,” said another driver. “Why? Because there are many petrol importers in Georgia but only three of them in this country.”

    The cargo company Apaven, which was assigned by the government to organize the emergency fuel imports, downplayed the crisis. “The [Georgian] railway has begun functioning at a fraction of its capacity,” Apaven’s executive director, Gagik Aghajanian, told RFE/RL. “But even that is enough. If there is any deficit, I think it will be eliminated shortly.”

    Aghajanian referred to the start of rail traffic through a smaller, disused rail bridge which Georgia, helped by Armenia and Azerbaijan, has prepared for use until the damaged bridge is repaired.

    According to the Armenian Ministry of Transport and Communications, the August 16 blast left a total of 178 rail cars, 108 of them loaded with wheat, stranded on Georgian railway sections west of Gori. “In all likelihood, 35 cars loaded with wheat will head to Armenia today,” a ministry spokeswoman, Susanna Tonoyan, told RFE/RL.

    “Besides, we have a lot of freight in the ports of Poti and Batumi awaiting shipment,” she said. “In particular, in Poti there are two ships carrying 6,700 tons of wheat and 93 rails cars of other goods. In Batumi, we have 2,500 tons of wheat, ten cars of petrol and another one thousand tons of petrol.”

    Tonoyan added that the government has also organized “intensive” fuel and wheat supplies from neighboring Iran. More than 400 tons of flour have already bee imported to Armenia through Iranian territory, she said.

     

  • Should Russia recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia?

    Should Russia recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia?

     
    19:00 | 25/ 08/ 2008
     

    MOSCOW. (Fyodor Lukyanov for RIA Novosti) – The Georgian-Russian conflict has dramatically changed the position of the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The idea of recognizing their independence has been put to the vote in Moscow.

    By trying to use military force to restore the country’s territorial integrity, Tbilisi has killed the last hope of a political settlement to the conflict. The return of the breakaway republics to Georgian sovereignty, unlikely before Mikheil Saakashvili’s ill-advised adventure, is now completely impossible.

    But this does not mean the future is predetermined. There are two precedents that developments may follow: that of Kosovo or that of Cyprus. Russia must be very careful when choosing between them.

    The Kosovo scenario seems to promise more lasting results. Judging by the sixth paragraph on the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan, or at least its Moscow version, which provides for international discussion of the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Kremlin would prefer the Kosovo scenario.

    But it can only be implemented if the UN Security Council approves a relevant resolution, similar to Resolution 1244 adopted in June 1999 after the end of NATO’s air raids on Yugoslavia.

    The international community already knew then that Kosovo, which had refused to bow to the central authorities long before the Yugoslav army pulled out, would never accept the sovereignty of Belgrade. However, it was impossible to announce this publicly, as this could have provoked unpredictable developments in Serbia and would amount to the crude dismemberment of a sovereign state.

    The issue was put on hold, and at Moscow’s insistence a clause was added to the resolution affirming the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.

    This did not save Belgrade, but Russia and Serbia doggedly quoted that clause when contesting Kosovo’s unilateral proclamation of independence and its recognition by several Western countries.

    The Russian leaders only state the facts when they say that Saakashvili has dealt a deadly blow to Georgia’s territorial integrity. Yet the Security Council cannot approve a document that does not affirm it. Not only the West, bent on supporting Tbilisi, but also most other countries, would oppose it.

    It is one thing when some states act illegally, as when Kosovo’s independence was legalized. But it is quite another matter when the international community approves a resolution sanctioning the dissolution of a sovereign state. No country, including those that will never experience such problems, could approve it.

    On the other hand, Moscow will find it extremely difficult for domestic reasons to tolerate any mention of Georgia’s territorial integrity in a UN resolution. It has made quite a few public statements and pledged to pay for the restoration of South Ossetia. Besides, it will be impossible to explain to the public why a military victory has not translated into a political win.

    It will take refined diplomatic skills to formulate ideas in such a way that all sides can interpret them as victory. Otherwise, the danger is that developments in Georgia will follow the Cyprus scenario. Russia would unilaterally recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia according to the formula that has linked Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which only Turkey has recognized, since 1974.

    This would create new problems without solving old ones.

    If Russia opts for that scenario, the position of the breakaway republics will not change in terms of international law, even though many countries have lately been violating it. It should be said, for justice’s sake, that Moscow is not among the leaders in this ignoble race.

    The practical situation will not improve either. The United States encouraged a score of influential countries to recognize Kosovo’s independence, but Russia is unlikely to convince even one country to follow its example. International support for Russia’s actions, or rather lack thereof, became apparent during its clash with Georgia.

    Unilateral recognition of their independence will not help Abkhazia or South Ossetia to break out of international isolation, but will put powerful pressure on Russia. Moscow could not be blamed for its stance on Kosovo because it acted strictly according to international law, while Western countries appealed to expediency. The situation can be reversed this time, with Russia’s actions losing consistency and integrity.

    It would be extremely difficult to follow the Kosovo scenario even if the Security Council approved a resolution on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Their new status can be formalized only if the process becomes international, whereas Moscow and the two breakaway republics would like to decide the matter without international involvement. Unfortunately, they cannot do so, because Russia lacks the political resource.

    The issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s status will take some time to decide. It took nine years for Kosovo to gain independence, and even then only part of the international community recognized it. Northern Cyprus has been demanding independence for nearly 34 years.

    Hasty moves motivated by a desire to score political points at home or demonstrate Russia’s ability to disregard the opinions of others would seriously damage the Kremlin’s prestige. But hard daily political and diplomatic efforts will eventually bring about the desired effect.

    Fyodor Lukyanov is editor-in-chief of the Moscow-based magazine Russia in Global Affairs.

  • Russian military concerned by larger NATO presence in Black Sea

    Russian military concerned by larger NATO presence in Black Sea

     
    16:33 | 25/ 08/ 2008
     

    MOSCOW, August 25 (RIA Novosti) – Russia has to be concerned that NATO is continuing to get a stronger foothold in the Black Sea, the deputy chief of General Staff said Monday.

    “NATO’s naval deployments in the Black Sea, where nine foreign vessels have already been sent, cannot but provoke concern,” Col. Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn said.

    According to a Russian military intelligence source, the NATO warships that have entered the Black Sea carry over 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles between them.

    NATO has so far deployed the USS McFaul and the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Dallas, the Polish frigate General Pulaski, the German frigate FGS Lubeck, and the Spanish navy ship Admiral Juan de Borbon.

    “NATO is actually deploying a surface strike group in the Black Sea,” the unidentified source said Monday.

    The McFaul unloaded 55 tons of humanitarian aid in the Georgian port of Batumi on Sunday, with two more U.S. Navy ships due in port later this week. The Polish, Spanish and German ships also entered the Black Sea on Friday.

    Nogovitsyn said Russian peacekeepers, who continue to be deployed in Georgia after the country’s war with breakaway South Ossetia, would not carry out checks of foreign ships entering Georgian Black Sea ports.

    But he said peacekeepers at a checkpoint near the Poti port would conduct patrols in the area. “Patrols are a civilized form of control,” he said.

    The senior military official put it more colorfully on Saturday: “Poti is outside of the security zone, but that does not mean we will sit behind a fence watching them riding around in Hummers.”

    Nogovitsyn promised that Russia would not exceed the numbers defined by international agreements, including a 1992 pact, when sending peacekeepers to South Ossetia.

    But he warned that Georgia was planning to deploy troops in the towns of Gori and Senaki.

    “The Georgian Armed Forces command is continuing to conduct acts aimed at restoring the combat readiness of its army directed at South Ossetia,” he said. “Communication systems are being restored, units are planned for deployment in the military towns of Gori and Senaki.”

    Georgia is also planning acts of sabotage on infrastructure and transportation facilities, Nogovitsyn said.

    “Georgian reconnaissance and sabotage groups are reinvigorating their efforts… and are preparing military actions along the routes of Russian armored columns, as well as acts of sabotage on transportation infrastructure,” he said.

  • Geopolitical Diary: U.S. Aid to Georgia Raises a Question for Russia

    Geopolitical Diary: U.S. Aid to Georgia Raises a Question for Russia

    Stratfor.com
    August 25, 2008

    The Russians still have not completed withdrawal
    from Georgia. It is clear that, at least for the
    time being, the Russians intend to use the clause
    in the cease-fire agreement that allows them
    unspecified rights to protect their security to
    maintain troops in some parts of Georgia. Moscow
    obviously wants to demonstrate to the Georgians
    that Russia moves at its own discretion, not at
    the West’s. A train carrying fuel was blown up
    outside of Gori, with the Georgians claiming that
    the Russians have planted mines. Whether the
    claim is true or not, the Russians are trying to
    send a simple message: We are your best friends
    and worst enemies. The emphasis for the moment is on the latter.

    It is essential for the Russians to demonstrate
    that they are not intimidated by the West in any
    way. The audience for this is the other former
    Soviet republics, but also the Georgian public.
    It is becoming clear that the Russians are intent
    on seeing Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili
    removed from office. Moscow is betting that as
    the crisis dies down and Russian troops remain in
    Georgia, the Georgians will develop a feeling of
    isolation and turn on Saakashvili for leading
    them into a disaster. If that doesn’t work, and
    he remains president, then the Russians have
    forward positions in Georgia. Either way, full
    withdrawal does not make sense for them, when the
    only force against them is Western public
    opinion. That alone will make the Russians more intractable.

    It is interesting, therefore, that a U.S. warship
    delivered humanitarian supplies to the Georgians.
    The ship did not use the port of Poti, which the
    Russians have effectively blocked, but Batumi, to
    the south. That the ship was a destroyer is
    important. It demonstrates that the Americans
    have a force available that is inherently
    superior to anything the Russians have: the U.S.
    Navy. A Navy deployment in the Black Sea could
    well be an effective counter, threatening Russian sea lanes.

    While it was a warship, however, it was only a
    destroyer ­ so it is a gesture, but not a threat.
    But there are rumors of other warships readying
    to transit into the Black Sea. This raises an
    important issue: Turkey. Turkey borders Georgia
    but has very carefully stayed out of the
    conflict. Any ships that pass through Turkish
    straits do so under Turkish supervision guided by
    the Montreux Convention, an old agreement
    restricting the movement of warships through the
    straits ­ which the Russians in particular have
    ignored in moving ships into the Mediterranean.
    But the United States has a particular problem in
    moving through the Bosporus. Whatever the
    Convention says or precedent is, the United
    States can’t afford to alienate Turkey ­ not if
    there is a crisis in the Caucasus.

    Each potential American move has a complication
    attached. However, at this moment, the decision
    as to what to do is in the hands of the United
    States. The strategic question is whether it has
    the appetite for a naval deployment in the Black
    Sea at this historical moment. After that is
    answered, Washington needs to address the Turkish
    position. And after a U.S. squadron deploys in
    the Black Sea, the question will be what Russia,
    a land power, will do in response. The Europeans
    are irrelevant to the equation, even if they do
    hold a summit as the French want. They can do
    nothing unless the United States decides to act,
    and they can’t stop the United States if it does decide to go.

    The focus now is on the Americans. They can let
    the Russo-Georgian war slide into history and
    deal with Russia later on, or they can act. What
    Washington will decide to do is the question the
    arrival of the U.S.S. McFaul in Georgia posed for the Russians.