The Turkish government has signed an agreement with the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR) to train imams and mullahs for Russian mosques. The SMR leadership hailed this decision because of what it described as the secular nature of Turkey and hence that country’s understanding of what Islam should be in a country like Russia (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=27334).
Category: Russian Federation
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U.S. State Department strives to put Kyrgyzstan under control
14/11-2008 14:46, Bishkek – News Agency “24.kg”,
By Anton LYMAR
“Kyrgyzstan is located in the very heart of Central Asia, which makes it possible to influence Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and even China. To have this region under control is the main aim of the U.S. State Department’s current policy,” independent experts of the Russian media observer Russian Peacekeeper said.
Today Condoleezza Rice is the main idea generator in issues of the “Central Asian states’ domestication”. Here she has overbid even her teacher Zbigniew Brzezinski. Kyrgyzstan, in her eyes, is a key to settling all tensions in Central Asian region. If Kyrgyzstan is a ‘key’, it should be ‘kept in a pocket’. It is a long-studied method.
“It is enough to remember that before the ‘tulip revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan, staff of the U.S. embassy in Bishkek counted at least 30-40 persons. This number grew dramatically right before the revolution, and now counts up to 150 workers. It is strange why the United States has such a large-numbered diplomatic mission in a country, which is way far from the world leading states,” the experts wonder.
Source: eng.24.kg, 14-11-2008
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Russia Supports Kurdish Future
by Martin Zehr
November 11, 2008
In the latest Presidential election the U.S. has chosen to withdraw from Iraq. There will be an inevitable vacuum in the region. Many expect Turkey and Iran to become dominate in the region. Clearly, in a region that has depended on the U.S. to define the balance of powers for so many years, this is a possibility. Turkey has been pumped up over the years with U.S. military aid and supplies and looks to aggressively define its role. Syria as a Ba´athist power would be most likely to align with the militaristic Turkish regime.
Iran has social forces in the region but no real military power. Iran´s effort to acquire a nuclear weapon is clearly an attempt to address this. Should some power demonstrate a willingness to act decisively the influences of Hezbollah and Hamas on the ground could be eliminated in a week´s time. Iranian influence is based on its programs for dispossessed populations and military supplies to its sponsored militias. Iran´s performance in the Iran-Iraq war demonstrated that its military capabilities are limited. Iran may be able to influence the political landscape of Lebanon and Gaza, but it is unable to consolidate these gains territorially or economically. Militarily, Hamas and Hezbollah are engaged in a war for the Safavid Empire and its restoration. The Palestinian national question has been subordinated and redefined as an Islamic trust.
At issue is land power versus military power. Russia presents itself in this context as the dominating Asian power in the region. Economically, Turkey is dependent on Russia depends on Russia for 29 percent of its oil and 63 percent of its natural gas. Turkey´s bubble as a regional power is dependent on its alliance with the United States. Otherwise, it pops and becomes just one of several Islamist powers trying to configure a new caliphate capable of governing. Turkey´s secular status is based on its military rule and is decreasing as the Turkish military accommodates the Islamism of Justice and Development (AK). Russia has obviously faced a contentious Turkey in agricultural trade disputes, energy issues and in Turkey´s supplying Georgia with military equipment.
Last year Russia opened a consulate within the Kurdish Autonomous Region. The statement by Nechirvan Barzani Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government declared: “We in the Kurdistan Region believe in friendship and good relations with the international community, and have been trying hard to achieve this, especially with countries like Russia with whom we share a common history.” Russia´s economic and political role in the region is growing. Its recognition of the KRG and its work with the KRG on economic and political issues are significant.
Moving forward means learning to address old problems with new solutions. Turkey remains a threat poised on the border of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region. Russia is a power that has recognized the Kurdish nation. IntelliBriefs website reports: “Russia has made significant strategic forays in the Middle East especially in countries which were known to be strong military allies of the United States. Today it has both a political and strategic foothold in the Middle East.”
Russia has not been oblivious to Turkish actions on the border of northern Iraq in its plans against the Kurdish peoples and nation. In 2007, Leonid Ivashov, president of the Academy of Geopolitical Sciences in Moscow, elaborated that such an invasion would create a “hotspot” for Russia close to its borders. He predicted that such a Turkish invasion would create “instability, risks and challenges that would be very hard to deal with.” The Russian parliament passed an appeal in 2007 to the Turkish government calling on it to show “wisdom and restraint,” and warning about possible negative consequences of a cross-border military campaign.
In the meantime, in October the Turkish Parliament passed 511-18 an extension authorizing Turkish troops to invade Iraq. As indicated in my article “Turkish Troops Enforce Baghdad´s Violation of the Kirkuk Referendum” such an action is simply a means of enforcing what Baghdad is not capable of enforcing itself, the refusal to implement Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution. It is clear that Russia is a more significant power in the region and has a much longer historical role in the region than the United States. As the United States relinquishes its influence in the region there will be new decisions to be made. One thing is assured: Turkish antipathy towards the Kurdish nation and peoples has shown no indications of changing.
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Moscow’s Moves in Georgia Open Door for Pan-Turkist Projects in North Caucasus
Paul Goble
Tallinn, November 14 – By recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow has opened the door for an expansion of pan-Turkist activity in the North Caucasus, thus falling into a trap set by Western countries when they recognized Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia and setting the stage for a new “parade of sovereignties” in the North Caucasus.
And consequently, however much the Russian moves in Georgia corresponded to Russia’s national interests in the short term, commentator Igor Bokov argues in an essay posted online this week, they could prove fatal to Russian control of the broader region unless Moscow takes preventive measures (www.apn.ru/publications/article20992.htm).
In recent months, many analysts have focused on the growing activism of Circassian groups in the North Caucasus not only because of their support for the independence of Abkhazia and opposition to the Sochi Olympics but also because of the large and influential Circassian diasporas in Turkey and Jordan.
Much less attention has been given to the Turkic language groups in the region, which include the Karachay, Balkars, Nogays and Kumyks, but because of their location near Russia’s southern border and the activities of Turks abroad, they may prove even more important in the political development of the Caucasus in the coming months, the Moscow researcher argues.
Like many Russian analysts, Bokov discusses these trends in terms of what he sees as a broader effort by the West to promote the disintegration of multi-national states like the Russian Federation in order to strengthen the power of capitalist economics by weakening any alternative political arrangements.
But despite that, his article represents an intriguing contribution to the understanding of the Caucasus not only because of what he writes about two major Turkic groups in the North Caucasus but also because of what he says about the “unofficial” efforts by Turkey and other countries to reach out to them.
The Turkic-speaking Balkars, who form 10 percent of the population of Kabardino-Balkaria, have nonetheless formed a Council of Elders of the Balkar People and demanded that the constitution of that republic be amended to give them equal representation in the parliament to the much larger Kabardinian (Circassian) and Russian communities.
If that does not happen by January 31, 2009, this group says, the Council of Elders has declared, then it will proclaim the independence of Balkaria, an action that would undermine not only all the other multi-national republics in the North Caucasus but create a new hotspot for Moscow there.
What makes this movement intriguing, Bokov says, is not just the small size of the Balkar community but the fact that most of the leaders of the Balkar Council of Elders are militia officers who were fired after Arsen Kanokov became president of the republic and who seek to return to power and a new element in their ideology.
For the first time ever, the Balkars are saying “we are not simply a minority, there are 500 million of us” – “the first time in history of Russia or at least post-Soviet Russia,” the Moscow analyst says, when an openly “pan-Turkist” ideological agenda was articulated in the region with such vigor.
The situation in neighboring Karachayevo-Cherkessia represents another Turkic challenge, Bokov suggests. There, “the Turkic ethnos, the Karachay, is the dominant one, and the Cherkess [Circassians] the minority. But again the Turkic group is advancing its interests by ignoring the practice of giving the second most powerful position in the republic to a Cherkess.
Bokov argues that Turkey and other countries interested in weakening Russia. While Ankara carefully avoids public support of such groups lest it offend the Europeans or stimulate its own Kurdish minority, various groups in Turkey are increasingly active because “what is impossible at the official level is completely permissible at others.”
He points to groups like TIKA, the Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Development, Turksoy, an organization involved in cultural ties with Turkic peoples abroad, and Tusam, an information-analytic center supported by the metal workers union, as being especially active in this regard.
But he suggests that pan-Turkist ideas are being pushed not only by Turkey but by various Western countries and by both Georgia and Ukraine, who have an obvious interest in weakening Moscow’s influence and power in the region. And he concludes by arguing that Moscow must be prepared to counter all these groups.http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2008/11/window-on-eurasia-moscows-moves-in.html
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CAUCASUS UPDATE, November 10, 2008
Note from the Editor-in-Chief, Nasimi Aghayev
The election of Barack Obama to the presidency of the United States last week was welcomed around the world as an end to the unpopular Bush presidency and the chance to rebuild America ’s standing in the world. Expectations are, of course, going to be disappointed, both domestically and internationally. For all the significance of a US president with a Kenyan heritage and a Muslim middle name, President Obama will still have to face tough and unpopular decisions in the world.
On November 5, the day after election day, Moscow announced that it would deploy a number of short-range missiles in Kaliningrad , the Russian exclave between Lithuania and Poland , as a means to ‘neutralise – if necessary – the planned US missile defence system in eastern Europe. The decision was announced by President Dimitri Medvedev in his first state of the nation address, and was a clear warning that the Kremlin will not be appeased by a mere change of occupant in the White House.
Is it viable to expect a significant shift in policy towards Russia and the Caucasus once Obama is inaugurated? It is unlikely. Much has been made of John McCain’s hard-line policy approach to dealing with Moscow , and Obama’s relative inexperience in the area, and it is true that domestic opinion in the region tended to favour McCain, especially in states nervous about Russian adventurism such as Georgia and Ukraine . But in reality the room for maneuver will not allow a radical departure from the Bush administration, for both a general reason and a number of specific ones. The exception might seem to be Nagorno-Karabakh.
The general reason is that, for all the talk after the Georgian war of a new (albeit ‘19th-century’) geopolitical order in Eurasia, the relationship with Russia is not the incoming administration’s top priority. The economy is a far more pressing concern. And even within the sphere of foreign affairs, negotiations with European and Chinese leaders on the world financial crisis will take up a lot more time than Russia and the Caucasus . Much will of course depend on President Obama’s personnel selection, in particular the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs, but for a while at least we are likely to see policy towards Eurasia as a secondary concern.
The specific reasons vary, but boil down to the fact that there is only so much that the US can do without breaking its prior commitments or undertaking a major volte-face on its whole foreign policy front which Mr Obama has neither the experience nor the desire (despite his commitment to multilateralism) to countenance. Firstly, the missile defence shield. By November 7, Mr. Obama had spoken to Lech Kaczynski, the Polish President, affirming his commitment to the project, which includes interceptor missiles based in Poland . A telephone call whilst President-elect, of course, does not equate to a policy whilst President. But it is nonetheless difficult to imagine Mr. Obama withdrawing from the missile shield project during his tenure, although it may be modified to make it less unpalatable to the Kremlin.
Secondly, Georgia . Mr Obama criticized Russia ’s invasion of the country in August and called Russia ’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia “deeply troubling”. He has warned Moscow that a failure to abide by the ceasefire will lead to difficulties in its attempts to gain membership to the World Trade Organisation, as well as dialogue frameworks such as the NATO-Russia Council. So far, so orthodox. He has expressed support for Georgia and Ukraine in their NATO aspirations, and declared in September that Tbilisi was ready for a Membership Action Plan, although it will be interesting to see how far he is willing to push it. He may be less willing to antagonize European leaders by insisting on this explosive issue than President Bush (or indeed Mr. McCain), especially if he has been cooperating closely with them over the financial crisis.
Thirdly, Nagorno-Karabakh. The clearest sign of a presumed change here could be Mr. Obama’s relationship with the huge Armenian diaspora in the United States : during his election campaign he welcomed their support and promised to find a resolution to the Karabakh conflict that is based upon “principles of democracy and self determination”. He has also expressed strong support for formally recognizing the so-called “Armenian genocide” of 1915, a notoriously controversial issue, and has stated that he will seek an end to the Turkish and Azerbaijani blockades of Armenia (imposed on Armenia by the latter after the Armenian forces occupied the territories of Azerbaijan in 1992-1993). Vice President-elect Joe Biden is also known for his strong support of Yerevan . However,it is now to be watched how far Obama as a president will be able to go to keep his promises in this regard.
On the ground, Turkey ’s recent moves to thaw relations with Armenia will be looked on favorably by the Obama White House, which must try and keep the momentum going. However, if Obama’s administration chooses to lean on Armenia , it could prove detrimental to the détente process currently taking place in the Caucasus ( Turkey has already warned Obama of breaking off the rapprochement process with Armenia in case if the US recognizes the “Armenian genocide”) and grant Russia a perfect opportunity to gather disaffected players to itself. In particular, in case of obvious US support for Armenia, Baku could find the warm relationship it has fostered with the Bush Administration cooling somewhat and find that its interests are better served by Moscow. Russia has already started taking important steps in that direction making use of the “lame-duck situation” in Washington . By holding a trilateral meeting of presidents of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan last week in Moscow as a result of which a declaration on the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process (first time since the cease-fire agreement of 1994) was signed by the presidents, Russia, frequently accused of wishing the continuation of frozen conflicts in the region, has intended to send a signal of its “good will” in the Caucasus, thus aiming on the one hand to rectify its damaged image after its invasion of Georgia, and on the other hand to have an upper hand in case of an ultimate settlement of the conflict. It is noteworthy that the only international mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – the OSCE Minsk Group (including beyond Russia , US and France as well), paralyzed after the Georgia war, was totally excluded from the above-mentioned meeting. Russia ’s attempts to pose itself as a mediator being capable to produce “tangible results” (e.g. the above-said declaration) cannot but cause great suspicions and concerns in Washington .
If Moscow exploits the opportunity further and begins to push for a resolution which emphasizes territorial integrity above all others (as unlikely as this may be), and if President Obama keeps his above-mentioned promises, we could begin to see a serious alteration of the Baku-Washington relationship which could potentially introduce significant changes to the present geopolitical order in the region. So if the new administration wants to avoid heightened tensions, it must try to balance regional interests and avoid alienating key players as the Bush Administration has repeatedly done. President Obama must attempt to find a solution to the problem that satisfies Turkey , accommodates Azerbaijan and Armenia , and circumscribes Russia .
We should not expect a new era under Obama. The Russian bear is not about to abandon its suspicion of the American eagle just because of a new face, and the feeling is mutual. The Georgian conflict was a significant rupture in relations and has created a potential for the emergence of a new geopolitical situation in the region. Despite his pre-electoral calls for a Russia policy based on “cooperation instead of confrontation”, Obama will have to continue the US support for the pro-American government in Tbilisi , no matter how much Saakashvili might have bothered him. It is obvious that if Georgia is gone, it will not last much till the region will be gone as well.
In the Caucasus , as elsewhere, it looks as if President Obama will have to start lowering expectations.
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