Category: Russian Federation

Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders

Europe Report N°199
14 April 2009

To access the media release of this report in Turkish, please click here.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Turkey and Armenia are close to settling a dispute that has long roiled Caucasus politics, isolated Armenia and cast a shadow over Turkey’s European Union (EU) ambition. For a decade and a half, relations have been poisoned by disagreement about issues including how to address a common past and compensate for crimes, territorial disputes, distrust bred in Soviet times and Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani land. But recently, progressively intense official engagement, civil society interaction and public opinion change have transformed the relationship, bringing both sides to the brink of an historic agreement to open borders, establish diplomatic ties and begin joint work on reconciliation. They should seize this opportunity to normalise. The politicised debate whether to recognise as genocide the destruction of much of the Ottoman Armenian population and the stalemated Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh should not halt momentum. The U.S., EU, Russia and others should maintain support for reconciliation and avoid harming it with statements about history at a critical and promising time.

Turks’ and Armenians’ once uncompromising, bipolar views of history are significantly converging, showing that the deep traumas can be healed. Most importantly, the advance in bilateral relations demonstrates that a desire for reconciliation can overcome old enmities and closed borders. Given the heritage and culture shared by Armenians and Turks, there is every reason to hope that normalisation of relations between the two countries can be achieved and sustained.

Internal divisions persist on both sides. Armenia does not make normalisation conditional on Turkey’s formal recognition as genocide of the 1915 forced relocation and massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire. But it must take into account the views of Armenians scattered throughout the global diaspora, which is twice as large as the population of Armenia itself and has long had hardline representatives. New trends in that diaspora, however, have softened and to some degree removed demands that Turkey surrender territory in its north east, where Armenians were a substantial minority before 1915.

Over the past decade, Turkey has moved far from its former blanket denial of any Ottoman wrongdoing. Important parts of the ruling AK Party, bureaucracy, business communities on the Armenian border and liberal elite in western cities support normalisation with Armenia and some expression of contritition. Traditional hardliners, including Turkic nationalists and part of the security services, oppose compromise, especially as international genocide recognition continues and in the absence of Armenian troop withdrawals from substantial areas they occupy of Turkey’s ally, Azerbaijan. These divisions surfaced in events surrounding the assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007. That the new tendencies are gaining ground, however, was shown by the extraordinary outpouring of solidarity with Armenians during the Dink funeral in Istanbul and a campaign by Turkish intellectuals to apologise to Armenians for the “Great Catastrophe” of 1915.

The unresolved Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh still risks undermining full adoption and implementation of the potential package deal between Turkey and Armenia on recognition, borders and establishment of bilateral commissions to deal with multiple issues, including the historical dimension of their relations. Azerbaijan has strong links to Turkey based on energy cooperation and the Turkic countries’ shared linguistic and cultural origins. Ethnic Armenian forces’ rapid advance into Azerbaijan in 1993 scuttled plans to open diplomatic ties and caused Turkey to close the railway line that was then the only transport link between the two countries. For years, Turkey conditioned any improvement in bilateral relations on Armenian troop withdrawals. Baku threatens that if this condition is lifted, it will restrict Turkey’s participation in the expansion of Azerbaijani energy exports. While Azerbaijani attitudes remain a constraint, significant elements in Turkey agree it is time for a new approach. Bilateral détente with Armenia ultimately could help Baku recover territory better than the current stalemate.

Outside powers have important interests and roles. The U.S. has long fostered Armenia-Turkey reconciliation, seeking thereby to consolidate the independence of all three former Soviet republics in the south Caucasus and to support east-west transit corridors and energy pipelines from the Caspian Sea. Washington was notable in its backing of efforts that kick-started civil society dialogue between Turkey and Armenia. The Obama administration is working hard at repairing the damage done to U.S. relations with Turkey by the war in Iraq. Although Obama repeatedly promised on the campaign trail to formally recognise the 1915 forced relocation and massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as genocide, he should continue to steer the prudent middle course he has adopted as president. The U.S. Congress, which has a draft resolution before it, should do the same. At this sensitive moment of Turkish-Armenian convergence, statements that focus on the genocide term, either to deny or recognise it, would either enrage Armenians or unleash a nationalist Turkish reaction that would damage U.S.-Turkish ties and set back Turkey-Armenia reconciliation for years.

U.S. support for Turkey-Armenia reconciliation appears to be mirrored in Moscow. Russian companies have acquired many of Armenia’s railways, pipelines and energy utilities and seek to develop them; Russian-Turkish relations are good; and Moscow is looking for ways to mitigate the regional strains produced by its war with Georgia in August 2008. If sustained, the coincidence of U.S.-Russian interests would offer a hopeful sign for greater security and prosperity in the South Caucasus after years of division and conflict. All sides – chiefly Armenia and Turkey but potentially Azerbaijan as well – will gain in economic strength and national security if borders are opened and trade normalised.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Turkey:

1. Agree, ratify and implement a normalisation package including the opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic relations and bilateral commissions; continue to prepare public opinion for reconciliation; cultivate a pro-settlement constituency among Armenians; and avoid threatening or penalising Armenia for outside factors like resolutions or statements in third countries recognising a genocide.

2. Avoid sacrificing implementation of the normalisation package to demands for immediate resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and withdrawal of Armenian troops from occupied territories in Azerbaijan; and seek opportunities to show Baku that by easing Yerevan’s fears of encirclement, normalised Turkey-Armenia relations may ultimately speed up such an Armenian withdrawal.

3. Make goodwill towards Armenia clear through gestures such as joint work on preserving the ancient ruins of Ani, stating explicitly that Turkey will recognise and protect Armenian historical and religious heritage throughout the country.

4. Encourage universities and institutes to pursue broader research on matters pertaining to the events of 1915, preferably with the engagement of Armenian and third-party scholars; modernise history books and remove all prejudice from them; and increase funding for cataloguing and management of the Ottoman-era archives.

To the Government of Armenia:

5. Agree, ratify, and implement a normalisation package including the opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic relations and bilateral commissions; continue to prepare public opinion for reconciliation; and avoid statements or international actions relating to genocide recognition that could inflame Turkish public opinion against the current process.

6. Agree together with Azerbaijan to the OSCE Minsk Group basic principles on a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement; then start withdrawals from Armenian-occupied territories in Azerbaijan; and pursue peace with Azerbaijan in full consciousness that only in this way can normalisation with Turkey be consolidated.

7. Make clear that Armenia has no territorial claim on Turkey by explicitly recognising its territorial integrity within the borders laid out in the 1921 Treaty of Kars.

8. Encourage universities and institutes to pursue more research on matters relating to the events of 1915, preferably with the engagement of Turkish and third-party scholars; modernise history books and remove all prejudice from them; and organise the cataloguing of known Armenian archives pertaining to the events in and around 1915 wherever they may be located.

To the United States, Russia and the European Union and its Member States:

9. Avoid legislation, statements and actions that might inflame public opinion on either side and so could upset the momentum towards Turkey-Armenia normalisation and reconciliation.

10. Raise the seniority and intensify the engagement of the U.S., Russian and French co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group until Armenia and Azerbaijan reach final agreement on Minsk Group basic principles for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

11. Back up Turkey-Armenia reconciliation with projects to encourage region-wide interaction, heritage preservation and confidence building; and support as requested any new bilateral historical commission or sub-commission, development of archive management and independent Turkish- or Armenian-led scholarly endeavours to research into aspects of the 1915 events.

Istanbul/Yerevan/Baku/Brussels, 14 April 2009

April 14, 2009
Nabucco as a Chess Game: Azerbaijan’s Next Move

On March 27, 2009, a memorandum was signed between the Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR and Russia’s Gazprom. This memorandum includes a statement of deliveries, beginning in January 2010, of Azerbaijani natural gas to Russia on the boundary conditions, DAF Azerbaijan / Russia. In the near future the Baku – Novo Filya pipeline, part of the transmission system of Azerbaijan, which runs from Baku to the Russian border on the Caspian coast, will be inspected. The length of the pipeline is about 200 km; the diameter of the pipe is the same 1220 mm.

On March 27, 2009, a memorandum was signed between the Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR and Russia’s Gazprom. This memorandum includes a statement of deliveries, beginning in January 2010, of Azerbaijani natural gas to Russia on the boundary conditions, DAF Azerbaijan / Russia. In the near future the Baku – Novo Filya pipeline, part of the transmission system of Azerbaijan, which runs from Baku to the Russian border on the Caspian coast, will be inspected. The length of the pipeline is about 200 km; the diameter of the pipe is the same 1220 mm.

This agreement is important because for the first time since its independence Azerbaijan, which imported gas from Russia, has become an exporter to this country. The signing of this memorandum has led to a number of preconditions, which are the causes of events occurring in the region. The first is to note that Gazprom was particularly interested in signing such an agreement with Azerbaijan. This serves several reasons. The first reason is that in the past few years, production of natural gas in Russia has been decreased. Preferring not to invest large amounts of capital in the development of natural gas, Gazprom to date has preferred to operate with the Soviet Union deposits, although these deposits have begun to dry up over time. However, a treaty signed with European suppliers obliges Russia to search for additional volumes of gas. Therefore, first of all Russia has guaranteed the supply of gas from Central Asia, significantly increasing the price for it. Russia also extended the proposal to Azerbaijan, which opened the large Shahdeniz gas field in the late 90s.

Russia’s second reason lies in the problems of gas supplies to southern Russia. Thus, one could guarantee the stable supply in the North Caucasus republics. But the main reason is the desire of Russia to concentrate the supply of natural gas from former Soviet republics on its territory. Actually, Azerbaijan is the only state that could supply gas to the planned Nabucco pipeline. Proposed by the EU, this pipeline would transport natural gas from Azerbaijan and the Central Asia states through Turkey to south-eastern Europe. In reality, gas may come only from Azerbaijan.

Russia has proposed an alternative to Nabucco project, South Stream, which is also in need of Azerbaijani gas. In this case, Russia tries to prevent the realization of Nabucco.

With regard to Azerbaijan, it is the first time, after gaining its independence, that it shifted its energy exports from west to the north. There were several reasons for this.

The primary reason was the passive attitude of Western partners in the implementation of the project. Lack of coordination and understanding in the sphere of energy between the members countries of the EU led to the fact that this organization could not determine the strategy for the implementation of Nabucco. Paradoxically, the EU and its members are waiting for more concrete steps from potential exporters, hoping thereby to strengthen the project. However, Azerbaijan does not have a desire to pursue their own policies without the support of the West, and thereby worsen relations with Russia. This fact was especially true after the 5-day war in Georgia. Despite the fact that the political regime in Georgia came to power with broad support from the West, these countries did not provide the support it expected to receive. Azerbaijan also has the problem of separatism. In this case, in the interest of Azerbaijan is not to commit acts that could provoke Russia.

Another reason for signing the memorandum with Russia lies in the position of Turkey. Turkey is trying to address not only the transit of Azerbaijani gas through Nabucco, but also wants to become the seller. In particular, Turkey wants to purchase natural gas at the border with Azerbaijan and resell it to Western consumers at a several-fold price increase. This situation would not benefit Azerbaijan. In addition to that, Russia’s proposal to buy Azerbaijani gas is commercially much more attractive. Azerbaijan profits more from selling gas in Russia than Turkey.

In addition, between Turkey and Azerbaijan, disagreements arose about the intentions of Turkey to open its border with Armenia. This border has been closed since 1993, after Armenian troops occupied the Azeri region of Kelbedzhar. Recently, however, the government of Turkey has decided to develop relations with Armenia, and the first step was the visit of President Gul to Armenia’s capital Yerevan to watch a soccer qualifying match between the two national teams. The next step in the development of relations is to be the opening of borders between the two countries in mid-April. It should be noted that the prior condition for the opening of the border was the unconditional release of Armenian-occupied Azerbaijani territories.

This decision has received a sharp reaction in Azerbaijan. Public opinion in the country reacted negatively to the intentions of Turkey, which severely condemned the possible turn of events. Another reaction to the Turkish intention can be described with the signing of a contract between SOCAR and Gazprom. The President of SOCAR, Rovnaq Abdullayev, is also the president of the Football Federation of Azerbaijan. He arrived in Moscow on the eve of the qualifying soccer match between Azerbaijan and Russia. The signed contract has become a kind of symbolic response to Gul’s «football diplomacy» in Yerevan.

It should be noted that the signed memorandum negotiates gas exports to Russia for 2010. In this case, there is a certain amount of time to solve the problems of the realization of Nabucco, as the second phase of gas production at Shahdeniz has not yet begun. However, if there will be no concrete steps to implement Nabucco, gas for this pipeline could go in a northerly direction.

Rovshan İbrahimov

International Research Club – www.interesclub.org

April 13, 2009
Kazan Tatars, Muslims and Shamans Present Three New Challenges to Moscow

Paul Goble

Vienna, April 10 – Three very different actions by the Kazan Tatars, a major Muslim Spiritual Directorate, and the shamans of the Russian Federation both reflect the unintended consequences of Moscow’s approach to ethnic and religious issues and present new challenges to the Russian government that it may find difficult to dismiss out of hand.
First of all, having secured Moscow’s agreement to declare Kazan “the third capital” of Russia, some Kazan Tatars are now seeking to have the central government declare their language “the second state language of Russia” because the Tatars are the second largest language community there and serve as Russia’s bridge to other Turkic-speaking peoples.
The World Forum of Tatar Youth, which has organized this effort and put up a special website (uzebez.org/) to press its case, seeks more than just recognition. It hopes to use this campaign to reverse recent cutbacks in Tatar language use outside of Tatarstan because unlike other nations in Russia, most Kazan Tatars live beyond their republic’s current borders.
And to that end, the group plans an online petition campaign, something that will both raise national awareness among young Tatars (another goal of the group) and challenge Moscow’s policy under Putin and Medvedev of cutting back the national component of education in many areas (mariuver.wordpress.com/2009/04/09/tatar-2-gosjazyk/#more-7442).
Second, the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of the European Part of Russia has pub two books by Said Nursi on its list of “approved Islamic literature,” even though these and other works of the Islamic writer have been declared “extremist” by Russian courts and are included in the Federal List of Extremist Materials (www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=29686).
On the one hand, this action by the MSD reflects a widespread view among many Muslim leaders that Russian courts lack the expertise to decide who is “extremist” among Muslims. And on the other, the timing of this action appears to be a protest against the composition of the new justice ministry group that is supposed to provide such testimony.
However that may be, at least some Muslims close to the Russian government, including Mufti Mukhammedgali Khuzin, who is himself a member of that new justice ministry group, say that the MSD’s actions represents “a challenge to the leadership of the country” (www.interfax-religion.ru/print.php?act=news&id=29689).
Such “a demonstrative approval of materials which form the ideological foundation of the Nurjilar organization, which the Supreme Court recognized last year as extremist, is an unconcealed challenge and may be considered as spitting in the face of the Russian powers that be,” Khuzin told Interfax.
At the very least, this decision of the MSD for the European Part of Russia, especially given the prominence of that group within the Union of Muftis of Russia and its authority among many Muslims as a traditional rather than radical forum, will spark new tensions between the government and Muslim leaders, at a time when Moscow would like to avoid them.
And third, there is another emerging challenge, although it may seem extraordinarily distant from Russia’s corridors of power. The shamans of Russia have announced plans to hold the “first popular elections of the Supreme Shaman of Russia,” thus creating a leader who could speak for them in Moscow (www.shamanstvo.ru/choice.htm).
In recent months, shamans in Siberia and the Far East have been among the leaders of protests against the destruction of the environment by Russian officials and Russian firms, and with a popularly elected leader, they are likely to demand that they should be represented in Russia’s Inter-Religious Council as one of the country’s “traditional” religions.
Patriarch Kirill, who in his earlier incarnation as the head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s External Affairs Department took the lead in organizing that group and using the term “traditional” to embrace only Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism, will thus face a new test, especially since many in Russia see shamanism as part of their heritage.
But Moscow is unlikely to make a concession on this point because many would see the addition of yet another “traditional” religion as opening the way for the inclusion of other groups, including Catholics and Protestants, and that could destroy precisely the exclusionary, religious “power vertical” in which both Kirill and the Kremlin have invested so much.

http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2009/04/window-on-eurasia-kazan-tatars-muslims.html

April 11, 2009
Are Turkey And Armenia About To Normalize Relations?

In September, Turkish President Abdullah Gul (left) accepted Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian’s invitation to attend a soccer match between their countries.

April 02, 2009

There are increasing hints that Turkey and Armenia could soon announce a deal reopening their border — which has been closed since 1993 — and restoring diplomatic relations.

Regional analyst Richard Giragosian, director of the Yerevan-based Armenian Center for National and International Studies, discusses the possibilities of such a deal with RFE/RL correspondent Charles Recknagel.

RFE/RL: You are one of an increasing number of regional analysts who see a forthcoming accord between Ankara and Yerevan. Why is that?

Richard Giragosian: We see broader developments that have moved both parties, Armenia and Turkey, much closer to forging a historic agreement. These broader trends include not only Russian support for such an initiative but we also see [that] the upcoming visit of U.S. President [Barack] Obama to Turkey [on April 6-7], the recent visit of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Turkey, and several months of secret negotiations and diplomatic negotiations between the Armenians and Turks in Switzerland have paved the way for a historic breakthrough agreement.

RFE/RL: There are some additional variables to consider that might increase pressure to reach agreement, including Obama’s campaign promise to support a Congressional resolution that would recognize as genocide the killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in the period of World War I, and the upcoming Armenian Remembrance Day on April 24, which the White House traditionally marks with a statement. How soon do you think a Turkish-Armenian accord might be announced?

Giragosian: We see leaks of such a deal in the Turkish media and it seems both sides are now preparing their respective societies to brace for an announcement that possibly could come as early as April 16, when the Turkish foreign minister arrives in Armenia in the form of a meeting of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization.

However, I do not expect a breakthrough agreement to be unveiled during the April 16 meeting. It seems more likely that Turkey will decide to wait until after April 24 in order to exert maximum leverage over the Obama administration to refrain from recognizing the “Armenian Genocide” in his April 24 statement.

Thawing Relations

RFE/RL: If there is an announcement of an accord, what points might it include?

Giragosian: Several elements will be announced, starting with an agreement to open the long-closed border between Armenia and Turkey, followed by an agreement to move toward diplomatic relations, with the Turkish ambassador in Georgia most likely assuming the portfolio of representing Turkey in Armenia.

Third, we see an agreement as well to form a large, all-encompassing governmental commission to resolve several issues, most importantly including the “Armenian Genocide” issue. And fourthly, we do see signs of a possible Turkish unveiling of a new document or road map on Nagorno-Karabakh committing all sides to work within the OSCE Minsk Group mediation process and committing all sides to working hard to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which is the last frozen conflict in the region.

RFE/RL: How much opposition is there in Turkey and Armenia to an accord?

Giragosian: Once the agreement is announced publicly, this will invite confrontation with powerful vested interests. On the Turkish side, the vested interests which will oppose this will perhaps be a nationalist reaction against normalization. From the Armenian side, the Armenian government will have to deal with the Armenian diaspora, which has taken the lead role in terms of Armenian nationalism on this issue and the lead role in genocide-recognition efforts.

All Sides In Favor

RFE/RL: You are in Yerevan. What is motivating the Armenian government to pursue an accord at this time?

Giragosian: The timing is both ironic and inductive to normalization and an agreement, mainly because it is this Armenian government that is much less popular and much less legitimate than any previous Armenian government, making its desire for a foreign-policy success even more profound.

The Armenian government, embattled by a political internal stalemate, needs a foreign-policy success to distract international attention and divert it away from domestic shortcomings and also to endow it with a degree of legitimacy, which it lacks.

RFE/RL: And what about the Turkish side?

Giragosian: We also see, for the first time, that it is in Turkey’s national security interest to open the border, to stabilize the restive Kurdish regions of eastern Turkey, which, after the war in Iraq, is even a larger concern for Turkey.

RFE/RL: Finally, what is Russia’s position on a Turkish-Armenian accord? In the past, Moscow — which has strong ties with Yerevan — has been seen as against it. Has that changed?

Giragosian: The key difference here is that after the war in August [in South Ossetia between Russia and Georgia], the Russians are now supporting the process, unlike in the past, and in fact they are also looking to use open borders between Armenia and Turkey to their own economic benefit by virtue of their control over energy and telecommunications in Armenia, but also to further isolate and marginalize Georgia, which is in their strategic interest.

But despite the negative agenda I do think that, regardless of the motivations, that the end result is a net benefit for all sides.

https://www.rferl.org/a/Are_Turkey_And_Armenia_About_To_Normalize_Relations/1600894.html

April 2, 2009
TRADE WITH ARMENIAN DIASPORA

business mans view of ……..

As Turks and Armenians wait for 24th April to see whether U.S. President Barack Obama will utter “genocide”, a new period takes start for Turkish-Armenian relations. Business worlds of two countries launch different projects one after another.

President of Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC) Kaan Soyak said that there are many projects are waiting to be launched. Soyak stated that “qualified industrial zone” with Armenia and customs free exportation to Russia might form good chances for Turkish businessmen. Soyak said that the biggest trade initiative between two countries will be exportation of Turkey to Armenian diaspora of 7 million population in the World. Soyak said that Turkey will be able to reach Brazil, Argentina and Canada markets through Armenian diaspora in those countries, by establishment of good relations with Armenian diaspora. Soyak underscored that Armenia is the most active country in Caucasus in which Turkey can boost its volume of trade and said, “Now the amount of exportation to Armenia is about $100 million. This amount could be increased to $500 million in short term.

Establishment of relations with Armenian diaspora and with usage of qualified industrial zone this amount would be even much higher.”

Kaan Soyak believes that Turkey and Armenia will make a new start if American President Barack Obama does not use the word “genocide” during his speech on 24 April. Turkish and Armenian businessmen are on the alert for possible opening of Turkey-Armenia state border and they have projects ready to be launched in case. Soyak said that the process that is started by Yerevan visit of President Abdullah Gul last year, made Turkish and Armenian businessmen to take action. Soyak said, “There were many projects on our agenda. Their infrastructures are completed, now the project that we deal with is reaching Armenian diaspora.”

Soyak said that Armenian diaspora is the richest diaspora in the World after Jewish diaspora. He said, “There are 1.2 million Armenian in U.S. and 2 million in Russia. Besides we are interested in the diaspora of Canada, Argentina and Brazil. These people speaks Turkish language with Anatolian dialect and their economical status are very well. More than any other thing, they are ready to cooperate with Turkey.”

Soyak said that Turkey can reach to the markets that it cannot find place for itself with the help of Armenian diaspora. He said that this new markets can form a new hope against recession.

March 31, 2009
RUSSIA: MOSCOW HOSTS CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN

RIA Novosti

Russia is ready to actively contribute to normalization of the situation in Afghanistan, President Dmitry Medvedev said Friday in a welcome message to the participants of an international conference, RIA Novosti reports.

The Moscow conference on Afghanistan was held under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – a regional security organization comprising Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The conference participants – SCO ministers and representatives of G8 members, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Iran, the UN, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the OSCE, the EU and NATO – gathered to discuss the situation in Afghanistan and in the Middle East and work out a strategy of fight against terrorism and drug production.

The CSTO comprises Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

“I am convinced that the conference results will become a weighty contribution to the efforts by member countries and observers of the SCO, other states and international organizations to assist Afghanistan,” said the president’s message, which was read by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

“For its part, Russia is ready for active joint steps aimed at normalizing the situation in the country and ensuring its peaceful and creative development,” it said.

Medvedev said the conference was a very important event and noted that its participants would have to discuss a number of serious problems touching upon the interests of Afghanistan and other countries.

The president said Russia is interested in wide cooperation with the international community to resolve Afghanistan’s problems.

Lavrov, heading the Russian delegation, said the SCO and CSTO proposed forming belts of drug, terrorist and financial security in Afghanistan.

The Foreign Ministry said Lavrov would attend an international conference on Afghanistan in The Hague on March 31, which will bring together foreign ministers of states involved in Afghanistan, as well as representatives of international organizations.

“The minister will outline the main results of the conference on Afghanistan in Moscow,” the ministry said.

At Friday’s conference in Moscow, a Chinese deputy foreign minister said China had provided $180 million assistance to Afghanistan and written off all its outstanding debts.

The Turkish foreign minister said Turkey intended to contribute to SCO efforts on an Afghan settlement and an Iranian deputy foreign minister said it was time to switch over from declarations to actions in the Afghan settlement.

March 30, 2009