Category: Russian Federation

  • Azeri Visit to Karabakh Sparks Row

    Azeri Visit to Karabakh Sparks Row

    War of words breaks out as public relations exercise by Baku representatives goes wrong.

    By Samira Ahmedbeili in Baku, Sara Khojoian in Yerevan and Anahit Danielian in Stepanakert (CRS No. 501, 10-July-09)

    A visit by Azerbaijani officials and cultural leaders to the self-declared state of Nagorno-Karabakh was intended to build ties with its ethnic Armenian rulers, but degenerated into the usual verbal sparring within days.

    However, analysts were wrong-footed by an unusually conciliatory statement from Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliev after the trip, in which he appeared sympathetic to some Armenian demands.

    Nagorny Karabakh, ruled by Armenians but internationally considered part of Azerbaijan, has been a block to good relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan since Soviet times.

    More than a million refugees fled out of both countries before and during the war, which started in 1991 and ended with a ceasefire three years later. Since then, there have been almost no ties between the two neighbouring nations, while Karabakh declared independence unilaterally.

    Armenian forces control some 14 per cent of what Azerbaijan considers to be its territory, and exchanges of fire are frequent over the line of control.

    The visit to Karabakh, which started on July 3 and was headed by the ambassadors to Moscow of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, was intended to help ease the tensions.

    “I want to stress that neither Armenians nor Azeris are going to fly off into space. We must live together, and therefore we need to create contacts, joint ties, create mutual respect between each other,” Polad Bulbuloglu, the Azerbaijan ambassador, told reporters in Karabakh.

    But, even before he left the region, he had succeeded in offending the locals by following the terminology used in Azerbaijan to describe Karabakh. He met Bako Sahakian, leader of the self-proclaimed state, but presented it as just a meeting with local civil society figures, outraging political commentator David Babian.

    “It is unacceptable that non-constructive statements should be made after a visit, as was done by this Polad Bulbuloglu and his delegates. President Bako Sahakian from the start of the visit held onto the principal of equality of the two sides, stressing that no other format was acceptable, including the so-called possibility of holding talks between two communities,” the commentator said.

    “Such meetings are ineffective, since they once more make people angry, instead of creating an atmosphere of trust, as the authors insist.”

    The misunderstandings pursued the delegates, who also visited Yerevan and Baku, throughout their journey. On returning to the Azerbaijani capital, one delegate told a local news agency that the Armenian president had told them he understood that Aghdam – a region of Azerbaijan outside Nagorny Karabakh itself which is almost entirely controlled by Armenian forces – was not Armenian land, and that he respected Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.

    The comments were disowned by a spokesman for the president, and provoked outrage in Yerevan.

    “This is an arrogant lie,” President Serzh Sargsian’s spokesman said. “But we are no longer surprised that the Azerbaijani delegates distorted the facts when they returned to Baku, since they always do. The lack of tolerance from Azerbaijani society is clear.”

    Similar distrust was sparked in Baku, where the supposed peacemakers found themselves suspected of selling out the interests of their country. Any suggestion that Karabakh is not actually part of Azerbaijan meets fury in Baku, and Akif Nagi, head of the Organisation for the Liberation of Karabakh, suggested that by meeting Sahakian, the delegates were effectively recognising his rule.

    “As a result of such meetings the fact of the Armenian seizure of Azerbaijan’s territory retreats into the background. By making a statement… about visiting Karabakh through Azerbaijan’s territory, they present this as if it’s heroism. But if you meet the head of a separatist, puppet regime, and basically recognise his legitimacy, then it is unimportant how you got there,” Nagi said.

    He also expressed disquiet that the delegation had included Mikhail Shvidkoy, the head of the Russian Cultural Agency, and appeared to have been initiated in Moscow. “The visit of the so-called Azerbaijan intelligentsia to Karabakh contradicts the interests of Azerbaijan. This visit was conducted at the orders of Russia. Russia is just demonstrating that the Karabakh conflict is completely under its control and that it can make the two sides play by its rules any time it wants,” he said.

    Under the circumstances, therefore, it was not surprising that few observers expected positive results from the trip. However, comments from President Aliev to Russian television after the visit suggested a change of heart in Baku, which has previously been uncompromising in its opposition to any recognition of Armenian rights to Azerbaijan’s territory.

    “As for the status of Nagorny Karabakh, that is a question of the future. A resolution of its status is not one of the proposals accepted by us and under discussion at the moment,” Aliev told Russia’s RTR television.

    “Of course, Azerbaijan will never agree to the independence of Nagorny Karabakh. I think Armenia understands this. Today we must resolve the results of the conflict and secure an end of the occupation. The security of all nationalities in Karabakh must be secured, after which communication must be restored. We understand that Nagorny Karabakh must have a special status, and we see it as being within Azerbaijan.”

    Despite Aliev’s uncompromising refusal to countenance independence for the region, those were still remarkably conciliatory remarks by the standards Baku has set since 1991.

    “Over the last month there has been a flurry of activity in the Karabakh negotiations: an intense round of diplomacy, the visit of the intellectuals to Karabakh and the first visit by Armenians to Baku in a long time, [and] a more positive tone from many of the political leaders,” said Tom de Waal, an analyst from the NGO Conciliation Resources and an expert in Karabakh’s history.

    “President Aliev adopted a more moderate tone than I can remember in an interview on the Karabakh issue. I was struck by the way he said that ‘we understand the concerns of the people of Karabakh’ and that he said that the status of Karabakh is a ‘matter for the future’. Now of course this was an interview to Russian television. I think things will really change only when the presidents say this kind of thing to a domestic audience, but it is a very positive signal.”

    Samira Ahmedbeili, Sara Khojoian and Anahit Danielian are IWPR contributors.

  • Equal Partners or Equal Rivals?

    Equal Partners or Equal Rivals?

    By Aaron Mulvihill
    Special to Russia Profile

    July 6, 2009

    As Europe and Russia Manoeuvre for Control of Energy Routes Across the Caucasus and the Black Sea, Turkey Has Emerged as a Key Broker

    As the jet carrying Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Energy Minister Taner Yildiz took off from Moscow after a meeting with their Russian counterparts, reports were already circulating about the conclusion of a deal on the Nabucco gas pipeline, which is to pump gas from the Caspian Sea into Europe, bypassing Russia. A coincidence? Or a sign, perhaps, that the meetings could have gone a little better for the Kremlin?

    The dossiers on energy and foreign relations are never far apart when Russian and Turkish delegations meet. The foreign minister was officially visiting to discuss relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the energy minister was to negotiate the building of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant – but the Nabucco pipeline is central to both issues, and it is unlikely to have been left off the agenda.
    The planned 3,300km Nabucco pipeline, which is to pump natural gas from the Caspian Sea into Europe as far as Austria, is designed to reduce European dependence on Russian energy. The final agreement on the construction of the $7.9 billion conduit is to be signed on 13 July in Ankara, it was revealed last Friday.

    Determined to maintain what the media has termed its “energy weapon,” Russia put forward a rival project: South Stream, which would pump Russian gas through the Black Sea to Bulgaria and beyond, also as far as Austria. Turkish representatives earlier in the year hinted that the country would put its full support behind Nabucco only if given guarantees on EU accession. The plausible alternative of South Stream, then, allowed both Russia and Turkey to exert leverage on Europe: Turkey could hold out for an EU quid-pro-quo, while Russia had time to put obstacles in Nabucco’s path, such as buying up its intended sources of gas. Turkey was last week formally invited to take part in the South Stream project, but it was not announced what form this might take, as the pipeline does not pass through Turkish land in its current draft form.

    It is unclear whether, by dragging its heels, Turkey has secured any EU promises (11 of 35 negotiation “chapters” are now open, but the one on energy, significantly, remains blocked), but it certainly has not damaged relations with the Kremlin.

    Since then-President Vladimir Putin’s landmark visit to Ankara in 2004 – the first by a Russian head of state – trade turnover has multiplied, reaching a total volume of $38 billion dollars in 2008, and with increasing frequency observers began referring to a “special relationship” between the two countries. Turkish President Abdullah Gul paid a state visit to Moscow as recently as February 2009.
    Is the Turkey-Russia “equal partnership” more equal than others, as officia1 announcements from both sides would have observers believe? Or do Russia and Turkey regard each other as equally-matched rivals in a shared exclusion from Europe, as did the Russian and Ottoman Empires? 
    Sinan Ogan, the chairman of the Turkish Centre for International Relations and Strategic Analysis, argues that Russo-Turkish relations exhibit a special character. “Our economic structures complement each other and few countries in the world economy have such a feature. The other interesting thing in this relation is that both cooperation and competition exist at the same time within these relations, especially in the field of energy,” said Ogan.

    Energy

    The construction of Nabucco will not only mean that Europe becomes less reliant on Russian imports – the same applies to Turkey itself. Russia currently supplies Turkey with the bulk of its gas imports. In 2007, Russia overtook Iran to become Turkey’s top oil supplier as well. Turkey has few hydrocarbon resources of its own, yet its domestic demand for energy has risen sharply in recent years. Ankara’s latest answer to energy security is a balanced one: it has demanded that a percentage of the Nabucco capacity be made available for domestic distribution, and even possible re-sale, while at the same time is enlisting Russian help in constructing the republic’s first nuclear plant. Neither plan has yet been officially confirmed.

    Turkey’s role as an energy hub makes it politically perilous to accept overtures from one neighbour over another. Ankara’s balancing act is complicated by its simultaneous membership of several, sometimes conflicting, groups.

    Turkey’s NATO allies frown upon its purchase of Russian military hardware, while conscious that the secular Muslim democracy and leading member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference is a vital partner in Afghanistan and in the fight against Islamic extremism. Russia and Turkey found themselves on the same side in vocal opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and Turkey reversed years of close cooperation with the United States by refusing to cooperate in the offensive. But in August 2008, Turkey aggravated the Kremlin by allowing U.S. warships to pass through the Bosporus en route to Georgia, which was then struggling to regain control over the Russian-backed breakaway province of South Ossetia.

    NATO and Russia cut off ties as a result of the Georgia crisis, and formal co-operation resumed only in late June 2009. The continuing thaw, and possible resumption of military cooperation, is heavily dependent on internal lobbying from Turkey, though it has not prevented Russia from expressing its irritation by erecting barriers to trade.

    Trade

    In an almost immediate retaliation for the Georgian incident, in September 2008 Russia turned away convoys of Turkish trucks at its border, claiming the Turkish produce was of poor quality. According to Sinan Ogan, Turkish exporters are still facing problems with customs officials, despite the fact that “measurements made by Turkish official institutions have proved that there is nothing harmful in these products.” Turkish convoys, he added, are singled out for lengthier checks, and “Turkish trucks have to wait for days and sometimes for weeks [before clearing customs].” 

    In trade, as well as energy, Russia holds the trump cards. Turkey’s trade deficit against Russia reached a colossal $18 billion in 2008, giving its northern neighbour significant economic leverage. The three million Russians who holiday in Turkey annually are perhaps the most visible indicator of this booming trade. Turkish companies are key players in the Russian construction market – Terminal 3 of Moscow’s Sheremetyevo airport, due to open shortly, is only the most prominent example of Turkish firms’ appetite for major Russian government tenders.

    But Moscow’s continuing dominance in trade is not assured. Its main exports to Turkey are in the volatile sectors of energy and tourism, while it imports durable goods and foodstuffs from Turkey, the demand for which is more stable in the long term even if it has recently fallen. Analysts and rating agencies such as Fitch and Barclays Capital have tipped Turkey as the first country in the “emerging Europe” region, which includes Russia, to buck the economic downturn with strong growth in 2010. They point to its large domestic consumer base and robust banking system.

    Security

    The need for close cooperation between Ankara and Moscow, if not a “special relationship,” is vividly apparent in the sphere of national security. Chechen terrorist cells are thought to be still active in Turkey, and the armed wing of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) is known to use Russian territory as a safe haven. It has almost become a ritual to accompany each official state visit with a raid on the respective terrorist group’s hideout and a joint declaration of cooperation in the fight against terror. But Moscow has so far declined to add the PKK to its official list of terrorist organisations, despite token pledges of support.

    Tangible security cooperation on a larger scale in the Caucasus region is fraught with complexity. Turkey and Russia de facto support opposite sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which flared up between Armenia and Azerbaijan when they achieved independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Armenia is Russia’s lone ally in the region, and the republic enjoys generous military support from Moscow. Azerbaijan, whose citizens consider themselves Turkish, rather than Turkic, is the source of much of the crude oil flowing through Turkey, carried by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
    After a long and bloody stalemate, both Russia and Turkey have begun to promote the OSCE Minsk Group peace process. Pipeline politics certainly have their part to play. The Georgian crisis demonstrated how violence in the Caucasus can play havoc with energy distribution, and consequently Turkey is anxious to normalise its strained relations with Armenia. In its turn, Russia’s state-owned gas giant Gazprom signed a deal with its Azeri counterpart in June 2009 to import 500 million cubic metres of gas in 2010 for eventual resale in Europe.

    Caucasus battleground

    Backers of the Nabucco pipeline are anxious that, with Russia snapping up large chunks of Caspian gas production, they will struggle to fill the pipeline when it opens in 2014. As far as energy competition is concerned, the Caucasus and Black Sea region has become as significant a battleground as it ever was during the rivalry of the Russian and Ottoman Empires.

    Accordingly, the historical logic of Turkey and Russia as “equals apart from Europe” is perhaps as useful now as it was during the 16th century.

  • Tatar Public Center Appeals To U.S. President For Help

    Tatar Public Center Appeals To U.S. President For Help

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    U.S. President Barack Obama visited Russia on July 6-7.

    July 08, 2009

    KAZAN, Russia — The Tatar Public Center in Kazan has sent an open letter to U.S. President Barrack Obama asking him to persuade Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to revise recently adopted laws on education in Russia’s ethnic republics, RFE/RL’s Tatar-Bashkir Service reports.

    Russia’s State Duma adopted the new law earlier this year eliminating classes on history, geography, and languages of the ethnic republics.

    Activists in Tatarstan say the law could lead to the complete loss of the ethnic and linguistic identity of indigenous peoples in Russia’s republics.

    The open letter says: “New educational standards exclude the learning of native language, history, and national culture. We hope the United States can help us to protect our rights.”

    https://www.rferl.org/a/Tatar_Public_Center_Appeals_To_US_President_For_Help/1772574.html

  • Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 128
    July 6, 2009 12:48 PM Age: 4 hrs
    Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Turkey, Energy, Foreign Policy, Economics, Featured
    By: Saban Kardas
    Ankara has reportedly finally given the green light to the Nabucco project, and the intergovernmental agreement might be signed on July 13. When the news broke on the Russian deal with Azerbaijan (EDM, July 2), the Turkish media initially suggested it represented a lethal blow to Nabucco. Partly as a result of the Russian media’s manipulation, it was interpreted as a negative development to undermine the viability of Nabucco (www.nethaber.com, June 30).

    On July 1-2, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Moscow to meet his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. Before his departure, Davutoglu said that Turkey was unconcerned about the gas deal between Moscow and Baku, and supported enhanced cooperation between its neighbors. Davutoglu maintained that growing regional cooperation, especially in energy, will benefit everyone in the region, (Anadolu Ajansi, July 1).

    Energy Minister Taner Yildiz made a similar point, arguing that the different projects are not alternatives and choosing one does not necessarily mean foregoing another. Yildiz added that the Russian-Azeri agreement would not affect Turkish-Azeri talks on the re-negotiation of the price for Turkey’s gas imports from Shah Deniz-I, and the country’s future imports from Shah Deniz-II (www.iha.com.tr, July 1).

    In Moscow, Davutoglu held talks on bilateral relations as well as regional security issues. During their joint press briefing, Davutoglu emphasized that Turkey and Russia have developed close economic, commercial, cultural and political ties, while both countries could solve their differences through dialogue. Davutoglu told reporters that, though the date was not set, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin would visit Turkey in the near future. Lavrov also underlined that the approaches of the two countries toward regional and global problems overlap.

    Asked about the possibility of Turkey’s cooperation with Russia in the South Stream project, Davutoglu said: “There are no limitations and barriers on Russian-Turkish cooperation. We decided to consider all projects, including alternative energy projects. Therefore, I want to express our readiness to collaborate with Russia on South Stream or other projects in a transparent manner.” Responding to the same question, Lavrov said that if Turkey decided to join the project, the Russian side would prepare the necessary groundwork. He added that the Turkish energy minister will discuss the details with the Russian officials (Anadolu Ajansi, July 2).

    Indeed, Yildiz also visited Moscow at the same time, at the invitation of the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin. As the co-chairs of the joint Turkish-Russian economic council, Yildiz and Sechin discussed bilateral economic relations. Yildiz raised issues relating to Turkish investors operating in Russia, particularly the “customs crisis.” Cooperation in energy issues occupied a large part of Yildiz’s itinerary. Energy related topics included the Russian offer to build Blue Stream II beneath the Black Sea, the current status of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant tender which was awarded to a Russian consortium, preliminary negotiations for additional gas purchases from Russia, and the South Stream project (Milliyet, July 1).

    Sechin told Yildiz that Moscow has studied the feasibility of various possible projects to diversify energy supplies to Europe. He claimed that South Stream outperforms Nabucco in terms of its efficiency and economic feasibility, and invited Turkey to join the project. In particular, he claimed that Russia has enough proven gas reserves to feed South Stream. Nonetheless, the Russian delegation did not elaborate any specific role envisaged for Turkey in South Stream, which in its current form would not cross Turkish territory.

    Yildiz repeated Ankara’s frequent argument that Nabucco and South Stream are not necessarily competitors: “This is a strategic package. It includes important projects that concern the two countries, our regions and our neighbors.” The Turkish government will evaluate all offers on the table, and choose the project that satisfies both countries’ interests, Yildiz added (Cihan, July 2).

    These developments led to speculation that Nabucco was in crisis (www.cnnturk.com, July 2). On his return to Turkey, Yildiz dismissed Russian media reports that Moscow asked Ankara to withdraw from Nabucco. Moreover, Yildiz said that the negotiations on Nabucco were well advanced and the parties were close to signing a deal, though avoiding specifying a date. He added that the talks were being carried out by the foreign ministry and prime minister’s office (Hurriyet, July 3).

    On the same day, European Commission officials announced that Turkey extended an invitation to its Nabucco partners to attend a ceremony in Ankara to sign the long-delayed intergovernmental agreement on July 13 (Anadolu Ajansi, July 3). The commission spokesman and Nabucco officials provided no further details as to whether Turkish demands were met to ensure its supply security, especially the controversial 15 percent clause, which had been stalling the negotiations (www.euobserver.com, July 3).

    Davutoglu flew from Moscow to Bucharest at the invitation of his Romanian counterpart Cristian Diaconescu, where he met the Romanian president and other officials. He discussed bilateral partnerships and regional cooperation in the Black Sea. After emphasizing the flourishing ties between the two countries, Davutoglu praised their cooperation in the context of the Nabucco project. Though he noted that Nabucco and South Stream were not mutually exclusive, Davutoglu maintained “Nabucco is a strategic project for us. This will continue to remain our main priority” (Cihan, July 3).

    Both Davutoglu and Yildiz declined to set a date but affirmed that the intergovernmental agreement will be signed soon. Sources close to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s office, however, reportedly confirmed that the government plans to hold a ceremony on July 13. If the schedule of the heads of state from the other Nabucco partners, Bulgaria, Romania, Austria and Hungary permits, then the agreement will be signed in Ankara (Hurriyet, July 4).

    What led to this turnaround in Turkey’s position and whether it secured concessions from its partners will be clarified if Ankara hosts the intergovernmental agreement next week. However, last week’s heavy diplomatic traffic, combined with Erdogan’s earlier contacts in Brussels, shows the extent to which Turkey wants to maximize its political and commercial gains by pitting the rival pipeline projects against each other.

    https://jamestown.org/program/ankara-approves-nabucco-following-high-level-visit-to-moscow/
  • Patriach Kirill calls Russian church inauguration historic

    Patriach Kirill calls Russian church inauguration historic

    16:35 06/07/2009

    ISTANBUL, July 6 (RIA Novosti) – The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, currently on a visit to Istanbul, said on Monday the inauguration of a Russian church on the grounds of the Russian Consulate General was a historic event.

    Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia and Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople consecrated the restored St. Constantine and Helen Church and held the first liturgy in the building on Monday.

    The two church leaders held prayers at St. George Cathedral in both Russian and Greek on Sunday.

    “This is a historic event. And it was pleasing to God that the opening of this church coincided with our brotherly meeting – so that the two patriarchs could hold a divine service together,” the Russian patriarch said.

    Kirill, who arrived in the country on Saturday, thanked the Greek patriarch for his “blessing to resume services in this church.”

    The St. Constantine and Helen church was built in 1832, on the territory of the summer residence of the Russian embassy located on the shore of the Bosporus. After the 1917 revolution, it was closed. Three years ago it housed boiler plants, but following large-scale restoration work the church was reopened.

    Patriarch Bartholomew thanked Patriarch Kirill for his first visit as head of the Russian Church to the senior patriarchate of the Greek Orthodox Church.

    “During this visit we renewed our relations, discussed issues of common interest and made a pledge to each other that our churches will contribute to the further development of inter-Orthodox relations just as God himself wishes,” he said.

  • Uyghur problem for Obama and Medvedev

    Uyghur problem for Obama and Medvedev

    17:35 06/07/2009

    MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Dmitry Kosyrev) – The ongoing ethnic riots in Urumqi, China, can threaten other countries, in particular the United States and Russia.

    The growth of Uyghur terrorism can complicate Barack Obama’s anti-terrorism policy focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan and affect Russia’s policy in Central Asia.

    Since life itself is forcing Russia and the U.S. to cooperate in Central Asia and Afghanistan, we can presume that President Dmitry Medvedev and President Barack Obama wish the Chinese authorities success in restoring order in Urumqi.

    Riots broke out in Urumqi, capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur province in northwest China, on July 5. They were organized by Uyghurs and were foreseen to claim lives.

    First, the reason for the riots was the killing of two Uyghurs, most likely by the police, in Shaoguan in southern China, on June 25 during demonstrations provoked by government handling of a conflict between Han Chinese and Uyghur factory workers.

    Ten days later, several hundred Uyghurs, most of them peaceful people, held a demonstration in Urumqi. At the same time, their much less peaceful compatriots started burning and smashing vehicles and confronting security forces.

    Second, I cannot imagine anyone setting fire to a shop with a lighter. You need at least a canister of gasoline to do that. It reminded me about the anti-Chinese riots in Lhasa, Tibet, in March 2008. In both cases, there were trained provocateurs inciting the public.

    Another factor proving my point is the reported number of the dead, over 140 as of Monday. There are never so many dead during ordinary, spontaneous street unrest.

    Like Tibetans, Uyghurs are an ethnic minority with a powerful foreign diaspora. The Uyghur diaspora is known for its terrorist groups, which have staged more than one terrorist attack in China’s main cities other than in Xinjiang.

    The Chinese authorities may have pointed to the rioters’ links with these groups too soon, but they could logically presume such connection as all previous riots were proved to be connected to the diaspora.

    There are many possible links apart from the U.S.-based World Uyghur Congress (WUC).

    Until recently, one of such links could lead to Kyrgyzstan, which has a large Uyghur population. It is for that reason that in the 1990s China focused on a project that has since become known as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

    People from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and other neighboring countries routinely go to Urumqi for their purchases, medical assistance, and recreation. Urumqi is a trade and business center of a booming economic zone, which incorporates all Central Asian people and their West Chinese colleagues.

    For this reason, we need not worry that the terrorist groups made up of Chinese minorities will receive assistance from Central Asia. However, it transpired in the 1980s that Uyghur terrorists were connected with subversives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. So, theoretically, Uyghurs, who are Muslims, are one of the problems facing Obama and Medvedev.

    Like many other similar organizations operating in the United States or any other country, Uyghurs are financed by American NGOs. This is an element of the U.S. policy that has failed, even though the new administration has not yet officially disavowed it.

    Besides, leaving such organizations to their own devices could be dangerous, as proved by the example of Al Qaeda.

    The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.