Category: Russian Federation

  • Group Says Power Vertical Threatens Republics

    Group Says Power Vertical Threatens Republics

    06 August 2009

    By Paul Goble / Special to The Moscow Times

    A draft of Russia’s future nationality policy prepared by the Moscow Institute of Ethnology calls for “the systematic destruction of the federal and democratic foundations” of the Russian Federation and contains elements from Soviet practice that could lead to “the disintegration of the country,” Middle Volga activists say.

    The World Kurultay of Bashkirs and the World Congress of Tatars released a joint appeal this week attacking the Moscow proposal in the name of “preserving the constitutional bases of the ethno-cultural diversity of the peoples of the Russian Federation.” Mordvin activists yesterday announced that they support the provisions of this declaration as well.

    And while all three groups have been denounced as radical in the past, the decision of the Turkic Tatars and Bashkirs to issue this statement and the readiness of the Finno-Ugric Mordvins to join them suggest that the issues that the appeal raises reflect the views of many people in that region and perhaps those of others as well.

    The Tatar-Bashkir declaration begins by asserting that “the situation that now exists in the country threatens the existence of the multi-national Russian Federation” because “authoritarian tendencies are increasing … and have begun to penetrate all spheres of sociopolitical and socioeconomic life.”

    “Construction of the so-called ‘power vertical’ has resulted in the systematic destruction of federal and democratic foundations of the new Russian statehood that arose after the destruction of the totalitarian regime of the CPSU,” the appeal continues. The document then focuses on what its authors see as the primary threat.

    “As is well-known, at one time in the USSR, the authorities persistently attempted to create ‘a single Soviet people’ without ethno-national characteristics,” they write. “[Such efforts] generated strong tension in society, especially in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations and, in the final analysis, led to the collapse of the country.”

    Unfortunately, the document continues, not having learned from the past, “certain political forces of Russia today are repeating the very same mistakes by attempting to construct a so-called ‘all-civic Russian nation,’” an effort likely to entail equally “destructive” consequences for the country in the future.

    The latest manifestation of such efforts, the appeal says, is the draft conception of a federal law titled “On the Foundations of Government Nationality Policy in the Russian Federation” and the explanatory supplements that were prepared by the Institute of Ethnology and that have been released with the draft concept paper.

    The Tatar-Bashkir declaration with which the Mordvin group has associated itself points to five problems with the draft legislation. First, the declaration says, the concept “completely ignores the existence of national republics and their priority rights in the conduct of nationality policy in their own republics.”

    As such, the Middle Volga appeal continues, the draft, in calling for “’new approaches to the development of legislation in the sphere of government nationality policy,’ is based on the leveling of all subjects of the Russian Federation, which in practice would mean the gradual liquidation of republics” within the country.

    Second, the appeal notes, in the draft, “the role of the national republics in the resolution of nationality problems is subordinated to federal, regional and local national-cultural autonomies,” another violation of the historic rights of the people involved and a threat to their future existence.

    Third, it continues, the draft conception ignores “the ethnic rights of the peoples of the Russian Federation” by declaring in what the Tatar and Bashkir appeal says are “abstract” and “meaningless” terms that the proposed legislation will promote “the unity of ethno-cultural and linguistic diversity.”

    Fourth, the appeal says, the proposed legislation, while invoking the Declaration of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, in fact promotes precisely the “unification” and “centralization” of public sphere “in the sphere of nationality policy” that the Declaration is intended to counter.

    And fifth, the appeal argues, the draft lays heavy stress “on the problems of national and ethnic minorities but at the same time minimizes issues concerning the ethnic development of republic-forming peoples,” yet another indication of the way in which the legislation would work to the detriment of the republics.

    In its concluding section, the Tatar-Bashkir appeal says that in its current form, the draft prepared by the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology is directed at the covert revision of the Russian Constitution, “the destruction of the language, culture and history of the indigenous peoples” of the country, and their “assimilation” into “a Russian civic nation.”

    Among the comments left on the Mariuver site after it posted the Tatar-Bashkir declaration were two that are especially intriguing. According to one, the draft legislation shows that “people in the Kremlin are living absolutely in another dimension” and are trying to unite “whole peoples” with “the poor Russians whom the entire world dislikes.”

    And according to the other, “the last sentence of the population of Yugoslavia showed that very people identified as Yugoslavs. After several years, out of this country arose five new states. No one in our century is running to fulfill the inventions of those in power” as the authors of the draft seem to think.

    Instead, the author of the post says, “even the Roma respect their own nation and hardly are likely to identify as [non-ethnic] Russians. That is all the more the case for [ethnic] Russians and Tatars. Besides, it seems that in recent times, [Moscow] has begun to respect the Tatars and Bashkirs — apparently as a result of [their] resistance to Russification.”

  • The call of the pipes: Putin in Turkey

    The call of the pipes: Putin in Turkey

    15:48 07/08/2009

    MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Fedyashin) – Things are now so mixed up in the pipe and gas business that it is difficult to see where pipes begin and politics ends.

    Vladimir Putin’s one-day visit to Ankara was balanced on precisely such pipe and politics considerations. Plus the peaceful atom: Russia will now be building for Turkey its first nuclear power plant near Akkuyu on the Mediterranean coast.

    To judge from the scale and trend of the documents signed, Ankara will soon turn into a huge energy-handling hub between Russia and the European Union in the southern sector. Now in the north we have Germany and Nord Stream, and in the south, Turkey and South Stream. Two friendships, Nordic and Ottoman.

    Turkey has long been a regional heavyweight, and Porte’s added “gas weight” will only strengthen it in this role. In recent years Ankara has been increasingly urging Russia to join in a regional forum it conceived for solving crucial Caucasian issues.

    The Caucasus war greatly puzzled Ankara, which has close economic ties both with Georgia and Russia. As a NATO country, Turkey “quietly” supported Georgia, to which it sent its military instructors and is now supplying equipment. But Turkey does not want to lose, let alone reduce or weaken, its ties with Russia either, especially in the current hard economic times. After all, Moscow satisfies 64% of Turkey’s requirements in gas, and can deliver even more.

    If that is not enough, let us bear in mind that more than one million Russians visit Mediterranean Turkish resorts every year, leaving more than $1.42 billion there. Moscow is Turkey’s top foreign economic partner – last year Turkey’s trade with Russia totaled $38 billion. In the next four years, Ankara hopes to bring the figure to $100 billion. One should not mess about with such things.

    By offering itself as a regional platform for settling Russia’s “Caucasian problems,” Ankara is perfectly aware that the Kremlin will not conduct parleys with Mikheil Saakashvili.

    But the Turks, offering their mediating services, very much hope to get Russia’s help in an area where such help cannot be dispensed with: That is a settlement in Nagorny Karabakh and normalization of relations with Armenia. In its turn, this means the involvement of Azerbaijan, which Turkey is also proposing to include, “on the kinship principle,” in the membership of the Caucasian regional forum. Unless the Nagorny Karabakh issue is settled, Turkey will be unable to normalize its relations with Armenia.

    Turkey is being prodded in the same direction by the European Union, or rather Turkey’s hope for admission to the EU (one of Brussels’ conditions is settlement of relations with Armenia), and its own regional economic interests. But the way to a Turkish-Armenian diplomatic thaw is blocked by Azerbaijan, which has long staked out its claim: It will not welcome Turkish diplomatic overtures to Armenia as long as the Nagorny Karabakh issue remains unsolved.

    Only Russia, and this is something everyone realizes, can push Armenia to a softer stance on Nagorny Karabakh. True, Russia will never nudge Armenia to surrender all its interests in Nagorny Karabakh, implying its return to Azerbaijan with broad autonomy rights. That is especially true in the wake of recognizing Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence. So, whether we like it or not, our friendship will only thrive on gas, oil and the peaceful atom.

    South Stream will make Russia and its customers less dependent on transit countries, in particular, Ukraine, because Turkey will not be a transit country technically. In 2013, the pipe will transport 63 billion cubic meters of gas. Investments in the project are estimated at 25 billion euros. Contractors are Russia’s Gazprom and Italy’s ENI, acting on a parity basis. In fact, South Stream’s inauguration ceremony was an affair for three: Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi also arrived for the occasion.

    The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

  • Geopolitical Diary: Shades of a Second War

    Geopolitical Diary: Shades of a Second War

    August 6, 2009

    One year on from the outbreak of war between Georgia and Russia, events precipitating that conflict bear a striking resemblance to the situation today.
    First, it must be said that things are never quiet in the Caucasus. Russo-Georgian relations are cold in the best of times, and they certainly are not going to warm while the pro-Western government that took power Georgia in the 2003 Rose Revolution remains in place. Under this “Rose” government, Tbilisi has courted the West politically, economically and militarily in order to solidify its independence of Russia, with the goal of joining the NATO alliance – something that Russia has resisted at every turn.
    In 2008, the Russians shifted from resistance to invasion. The reasons are many, but one stands out: 2008 marked the final dissolution of Serbia, with Western institutions recognizing the independence of Kosovo. Serbia was Russia’s last ally in Europe, and the idea that Russia’s protests could not sway the West’s actions in the least was daunting for Moscow. Russia had to prove that not only was it still relevant, but that it could and would move militarily against an American and European ally. The target was Georgia, and the five-day war that followed was as decisive as it was swift.
    Events appear to be moving along a similar track in the early days of August 2009.
    Last month, following a trip to Georgia, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden gave an interview in which he called Russia out not only for being weak but, to put it bluntly, doomed to collapse. Needless to say, the Russians might be feeling the urge to prove Biden wrong in the court of global opinion. Russian officials are loudly and regularly warning that they stand ready for war, while Vladislav Surkov – a Kremlinite arguably second in power only to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin himself – has spent some personal time of late in South Ossetia, the tiny (Russian-allied) breakaway province of Georgia that was the proximate cause for the 2008 war.
    Biden’s comments are only one possible reason why the war drums are being beaten; there are others.
    The United States appears to be sliding toward conflict with Iran, and Russia has invested no small amount of political capital in bolstering the Iranians against the Americans. In Moscow’s mind, a United States fixated on the Persian Gulf is one that cannot fixate on Russia, and a United States that is at war with Iran is one that cannot stop Russia from adjusting borders in places like Georgia.
    And of course, there is Georgia itself. President Mikhail Saakashvili is no stranger to dramatic performances, and as the leader of a fractured country with next to no military capability (even before Georgia’s defeat in August 2008), he has few means of countering Russia at all. One option is to provoke a crisis with his northern neighbor in the hopes that the West will ride to the rescue. Considering what happened a year ago, this is perhaps not the wisest strategy, but it is not as though Saakashvili – personally or as Georgia’s president – has a wide array of options to peruse.
    War is not a process that Russia would choose carelessly, even if it would be a very, very easy war to win. What simply doesn’t fit in current circumstances is the boldness with which the Russians are acting. They have all but stated that war is imminent, they are backing the Iranians to the hilt, sending top Kremlin strategists to the region to coordinate with allies, and have even resumed nuclear submarine patrols off the east coast of the United States. The Russians have a well-earned reputation for being far more circumspect than this in the shell game that is international relations. It is almost as if all of this is simply noise designed to keep the Americans off balance while something else, something no one is watching, is quietly put into play.
    STRATFOR doesn’t have a good answer for this. All we can say is that the Russians are up to something – and if it is not a war, it is something big enough that a war would seem to make a good distraction. Now that bears some watching.

  • Turkish-Russian Grand Bargain in Energy Cooperation

    Turkish-Russian Grand Bargain in Energy Cooperation

    Turkish-Russian Grand Bargain in Energy Cooperation

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 152
    August 7, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s August 6 visit to Ankara marked a new era for “enhanced multi-dimensional partnership,” between Ankara and Moscow. Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed some twenty agreements covering energy, trade and other fields. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi also attended part of the talks between Erdogan and Putin, considering the involvement of Italian companies in some of these projects. The most remarkable dimension of the various joint projects concerns energy cooperation, most notably Turkey’s expression of support for Russia’s South Stream project (Anadolu Ajansi, www.cnnturk.com, www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 6).

    In oil transportation, Russia committed to participate in the planned Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline (SCP), connecting the Turkish Black Sea city of Samsun to the Mediterranean terminal Ceyhan. Turkey has solicited Russian participation in the SCP, which will bypass the congested Turkish Straits. Moscow has proven reluctant, and has instead promoted another bypass option through Burgas-Alexandroupolis between Bulgaria and Greece. Meanwhile, Turkey took further steps to make the SCP attractive for the Russian side, by linking this project with the Turkish-Israeli-Indian energy partnership (EDM, November 25, 2008).

    Erdogan expressed his pleasure with the Russian decision to commit its crude. Ankara can consider this development as its greatest success in this grand bargain, given that Turkey has worked to convert Ceyhan, where the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline also terminates, into a global energy hub. However, Putin did not rule out interest in Burgas-Alexandroupolis, and instead emphasized that the two pipelines might be complementary in meeting the growing demand for export routes. This statement raises questions about how committed Russia will be to the SCP, given that Russian companies own the majority of shares in the other Burgas-Alexandroupolis option.

    In terms of gas cooperation, Turkey will allow Russia to conduct explorations and feasibility studies in the Turkish exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, as part of Russian plans to construct South Stream. Since this move comes against the background of Turkey’s decision to sign the rival Nabucco pipeline agreement last month, it raises many questions, as to how it will affect Nabucco, which Turkey considers a “strategic priority,” as well as European energy security issues. Despite the questions surrounding its feasibility and high costs, as well as its negative implications for Nabucco, Erdogan maintained that both projects contribute to diversification efforts.

    It appears that the “grand bargain” was between the SCP and Blue Stream. Ahead of the meeting, Yuri Ushakov, the Deputy Head of the Russian Government Staff said that “Turkey made concessions in South Stream and we made concessions in SCP,” but added that he had doubts over the SCP’s feasibility (Anadolu Ajansi, August 5). A statement from Berlusconi’s office also claimed that he had helped broker a rapprochement between both countries on these two issues (Hurriyet Daily News, August 6). However, domestically, there are concerns that in this “exchange” of concessions, Turkey did not gain much. The SCP’s importance was inflated, because it was developed by business interests close to the government (www.turksam.org.tr, August 7). Another gas deal concerned Ankara’s request to renew the contract under which it purchases Russian gas through the Western pipeline via the Balkans. Erdogan announced that the contract (which expires in 2011) will be renewed for 20 years. Turkey had complained about the high prices and the leave-or-pay conditions in its gas deals with Russia. Putin said it was renewed on favorable terms to Turkey, but the contract’s details are unclear.

    Erdogan also said that they discussed the extension of Blue Stream II to transport Russian gas to Israel, Lebanon and even Cyprus. Blue Stream, running underneath the Black Sea, is the second route carrying Russian gas to Turkey. Moscow previously raised the possibility that it could use Blue Stream II in order to transport gas to Europe, but this option was rejected, since it contradicted Nabucco and Russia sought to use Turkey only as a transportation route. Now, Ankara wants to revive it as part of a North-South corridor. Based on the leaders’ statements, it appears that the existing capacity of Blue Stream might be improved and gas could be transferred to the Mediterranean through this pipeline.

    However, although Erdogan praised this development as another major success, there is no guarantee that Russia will grant “re-export rights,” which indicates that if Blue Stream II is implemented, Moscow will continue to view Turkish territory as a mere conduit for its gas, which raises the question: how will Turkey benefit from the agreement? Russian priorities also involve Turkey’s first nuclear power plant tender, which was awarded to a Russian-Turkish consortium. As the original price was too high, the tender has long awaited cabinet approval (EDM, January 26). Meanwhile, the Russian side lowered the price, and offered a compromise. Prior to Putin’s visit, it was expected that with further “bargaining,” a final deal might be reached, but apparently it failed. Nevertheless, Ankara and Moscow signed protocols regarding energy cooperation, including the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, early notification of accidents, exchange of information on facilities, and to continue talks on the nuclear tender.

    The most controversial development is perhaps Ankara’s support for South Stream. Erdogan reiterated his belief that Nabucco and South Stream are complementary, yet turned a blind eye to several Russian officials’ (including Putin) statements to the contrary. It is assumed in Ankara that growing European energy demand will accommodate both projects; but this ignores the competition between both projects over the same downstream markets. Moreover, the Turkish side fails to appreciate the challenges Russia is facing in investing in its domestic gas industry, and acts on the assumption that “Russia has enormous reserves,” while failing to realize that Russia is also planning to tap into the same upstream producers, namely Central Asian and Caspian gas, just as the Nabucco project envisages (www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 6).

    Putin also added that a consensus was reached on Russia building gas storage facilities in the Salt Lake. Taken together with the announced joint investments between Turkish and Russian firms, including Gazprom, it is unclear whether the Turkish government recognizes the consequences of these decisions. Russia has effectively used the practice of co-opting the gas infrastructure of transport and consumer countries, as part of its efforts to monopolize downstream markets. It is unclear how this penetration into the Turkish grid might affect Ankara’s future energy policies.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-russian-grand-bargain-in-energy-cooperation/
  • Turkey and Russia Conclude Energy Deals

    Turkey and Russia Conclude Energy Deals

    a1Published: August 6, 2009

    ISTANBUL — Russia and Turkey concluded energy agreements on Thursday that will support Turkey’s drive to become a regional hub for fuel transshipments while helping Moscow maintain its monopoly on natural gas shipments from Asia to Europe.

    Turkey granted the Russian natural gas giant Gazprom use of its territorial waters in the Black Sea, under which the company wants to route its so-called South Stream pipeline to gas markets in Eastern and Southern Europe.

    In return, a Russian oil pipeline operator agreed to join a consortium to build a pipeline across the Anatolian Peninsula, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and Gazprom affirmed a commitment to expand an existing Black Sea gas pipeline for possible transshipment across Turkey to Cyprus or Israel.

    Energy companies in both countries agreed to a joint venture to build conventional electric power plants, and the Interfax news agency in Russia reported that Prime MinisterVladimir V. Putin offered to reopen talks on Russian assistance to Turkey in building nuclear power reactors.

    The agreements were signed in Ankara, the Turkish capital, in meetings between Mr. Putin and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Italy’s prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, who has joined Mr. Putin on several energy projects, attended the ceremony. The Italian company Eni broke ground on the trans-Anatolian oil pipeline this year.

    While the offer of specific pipeline deals and nuclear cooperation represented a new tactic by Mr. Putin, the wider struggle for dominance of the Eurasian pipelines is a long-running chess match in which he has often excelled.

    As he has in the past, Mr. Putin traveled to Turkey with his basket of tempting strategic and economic benefits immediately after a similar mission by his opponents. A month ago, European governments signed an agreement in Turkey to support the Western-backed Nabucco pipeline, which would compete directly with the South Stream project.

    By skirting Russian territory, the Nabucco pipeline would undercut Moscow’s monopoly on European natural gas shipments and the pricing power and political clout that come with it. That may explain why Nabucco, which cannot go forward without Turkey’s support, has encountered a variety of obstacles thrown up by the Russian government, including efforts to deny it vital gas supplies in the East and a customer base in the West.

    Turkey and other countries in the path of Nabucco have been eager players in this geopolitical drama, entertaining offers from both sides. Turkish authorities have even tried, without much success, to leverage the pipeline negotiations to further Turkey’s bid to join the European Union, while keeping options with Russia open, too.

    “These countries are more than happy to sign agreements with both parties,” Ana Jelenkovic, an analyst at Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy, said in a telephone interview from London. “There’s no political benefit to shutting out or ceasing energy relations with Russia.”

    Under the deal Mr. Putin obtained Thursday, Gazprom will be allowed to proceed with seismic and environmental tests in Turkey’s exclusive economic zone, necessary preliminary steps for laying the South Stream pipe, Prime Minister Erdogan said at a news conference.

    After the meeting, Mr. Putin said, “We agreed on every issue.”

    The trans-Anatolian oil pipeline also marginally improves Russia’s position in the region. The pipeline is one of two so-called Bosporus bypass systems circumventing the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, which are operating at capacity in tanker traffic.

    The preferred Western route is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which allows companies to ship Caspian Basin crude oil to the West without crossing Russian territory; the pipeline instead crosses the former Soviet republic of Georgia and avoids the crowded straits by cutting across Turkey to the Mediterranean.

    Russia prefers northbound pipelines out of the Caspian region that terminate at tanker terminals on the Black Sea. The success of this plan depends, in turn, on creating additional capacity in the Bosporus bypass routes. Russia is backing two such pipelines.

    Mr. Putin’s offer to move ahead with a Russian-built nuclear power plant in Turkey suggests a sweetening of the overall Russian offer on energy deals with Turkey, while both Western and Russian proposals are on the table.

    The nuclear aspect of the deal drew protests. About a dozen Greenpeace protesters were surrounded by at least 200 armored police officers in central Ankara on Thursday.

    Andrew E. Kramer contributed reporting from Moscow.

    The New York Times
  • Moscow Market Crackdown Strains Turkish-Russian Trade Relations

    Moscow Market Crackdown Strains Turkish-Russian Trade Relations

    Moscow Market Crackdown Strains Turkish-Russian Trade Relations

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 144
    July 28, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    As Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin prepares to visit Turkey in early August, new items are being added to his agenda. In addition to energy projects, bilateral trade issues, caused by recent problems encountered by Turkish exporters, will occupy a large part of his itinerary. The Russian government’s crackdown on the Cherkizovsky market in Moscow in early June added a new dimension to Turkish-Russian trade issues.

    Russian anti-smuggling teams raided the Cherkizovsky market, confiscating thousands of containers for further examination, and shut it down. The charges against the traders included violations of consumer safety and sanitation codes as well as immigration rules. The incident cost countless jobs, many of whom are foreigners including Chinese, Vietnamese and Turkish traders, and created tension between Russia and China where most of the goods originated (www.russiatoday.ru, June 29; Anadolu Ajansi, July 1).

    Why the Russian government decided to close the Cherkizovsky market, after allowing it to flourish for twenty years, remains unclear. Prior to the crackdown on the market, Putin complained about the failure of the anti-smuggling mechanism, and signaled his readiness to strengthen the fight against smuggling (Cihan, June 29).

    The Turkish press speculated that Putin used these allegations as a pretext to punish the owner of the market, the business mogul Telman Ismailov, for his recent investments in Turkey. In May, Ismailov opened a luxurious hotel in the Turkish city of Antalya, a frequent destination for Russian tourists, which is estimated to yield $1.4 billion annually for the local economy. Putin was reportedly angered by the lavish opening party in the context of the global financial crisis. Moreover, the Turkish press suggested that Ismailov’s decision to invest in Antalya was in defiance of Russian authorities’ advice to open the hotel in Sochi, which had further upset Putin (Radikal, June 10; Yeni Safak, July 13).

    In an interview to the Turkish press, Ismailov even expressed his desire to obtain Turkish citizenship (Yeni Safak, May 25), which also negatively affected his reputation in Russia. He did not officially file an application, but changes to the Turkish citizenship code around the same time eased the conditions for citizenship on exceptional grounds, such as for foreigners investing in Turkey (Hurriyet, June 11).

    However, the Turkish press initially preferred to present the market crackdown as a measure against Ismailov, downplaying the broader context of the developments in Russia. Last week, its coverage of the crisis took a new turn. Several reports highlighted the “plight” of Turkish businessmen who were affected in the midst of this crisis caused by Russia’s internal competition. Hundreds of Turkish firms are believed to sell textile, leather and other goods, by registering them and paying the necessary fees at this market first, before they are further distributed within Russia. Turkish businessmen claimed that, due to the ongoing Russian anti-smuggling investigation, they cannot retrieve their goods from storage facilities. Many criticized Russia’s treatment of the Turkish businessmen as unfair, and compared it to the “customs crisis” between Ankara and Moscow, which has continued for more than one year (Cihan, July 25). Some Turkish businessmen, however, support these Russian actions and maintain that this was long overdue. In their view, the smugglers in the market were creating unfair competition for the traders who were operating legally (www.turkrus.com, July 27).

    The growing protests from the Turkish business community exerted pressure on the Turkish government to protest officially to Russia. Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz, who is also the co-chair of the Russian-Turkish joint economic council, described this development as an internal Russian affair, and stressed that this issue was not raised in bilateral contacts with Russia (Cihan, July 27). His Russian counterpart, Igor Sechin visited Turkey last week to hold talks with Yildiz and the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan ahead of Putin’s visit to Turkey in early August.

    Nonetheless, the State Minister responsible for Foreign Trade Zafer Caglayan issued a written statement, which described Russia as a major trading partner and noted that the under-secretariat for foreign trade had formed a commission to investigate the claims of Turkish businessmen and explore new marketplaces in Moscow. Although Caglayan recognized that the decision of the Russian authorities did not directly target Turkey, given the volume of Turkish goods in the market, he stressed that this did indirectly affect the country. However, the figures released by Caglayan contradicted those which appeared in earlier press reports. Whereas the Turkish press maintained that as many as 5,000 businesses were affected by the market crackdown, Caglayan said that only 200 were owned by Turks. Moreover, Caglayan noted that only 10 percent of the total goods sold in the market were of Turkish origin (www.ihlassondakika.com, July 27).

    Caglayan also signaled that he might raise this issue with Russian officials in order to protect the rights of the Turkish businessmen in accordance with the Russian and international rules. Moreover, he added that these problems and the “customs issue” will be on the agenda when Putin visits Turkey next month.

    A highly busy schedule awaits Putin in Turkey, most importantly over future cooperation in energy projects. Despite Ankara’s signing of the Nabucco treaty, Turkey is still pursuing joint investments with Russia in nuclear power, and other gas transportation projects. Turkish exports to Russia were damaged by the new customs regulations imposed by Russia prior to the Georgian war in August 2008. Russia and Turkey reached a deal in September 2008 to simplify customs procedures for Turkish goods, but Ankara claimed that Moscow has not complied with the agreement. The problem was not resolved during President Abdullah Gul’s and Yildiz’s visits to Moscow earlier this year. Although Russia was confirmed as Turkey’s main trading partner, its reluctance to resolve such issues remains a constant source of tension between both countries. More importantly, the timing of those “commercial” crises provides justification over the speculation that Russia is exploiting Turkey’s economic and energy dependence to punish Ankara for its political decisions.

    https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-market-crackdown-strains-turkish-russian-trade-relations/