Category: Russian Federation

  • Geopolitical Diary: Shades of a Second War

    Geopolitical Diary: Shades of a Second War

    August 6, 2009

    One year on from the outbreak of war between Georgia and Russia, events precipitating that conflict bear a striking resemblance to the situation today.
    First, it must be said that things are never quiet in the Caucasus. Russo-Georgian relations are cold in the best of times, and they certainly are not going to warm while the pro-Western government that took power Georgia in the 2003 Rose Revolution remains in place. Under this “Rose” government, Tbilisi has courted the West politically, economically and militarily in order to solidify its independence of Russia, with the goal of joining the NATO alliance – something that Russia has resisted at every turn.
    In 2008, the Russians shifted from resistance to invasion. The reasons are many, but one stands out: 2008 marked the final dissolution of Serbia, with Western institutions recognizing the independence of Kosovo. Serbia was Russia’s last ally in Europe, and the idea that Russia’s protests could not sway the West’s actions in the least was daunting for Moscow. Russia had to prove that not only was it still relevant, but that it could and would move militarily against an American and European ally. The target was Georgia, and the five-day war that followed was as decisive as it was swift.
    Events appear to be moving along a similar track in the early days of August 2009.
    Last month, following a trip to Georgia, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden gave an interview in which he called Russia out not only for being weak but, to put it bluntly, doomed to collapse. Needless to say, the Russians might be feeling the urge to prove Biden wrong in the court of global opinion. Russian officials are loudly and regularly warning that they stand ready for war, while Vladislav Surkov – a Kremlinite arguably second in power only to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin himself – has spent some personal time of late in South Ossetia, the tiny (Russian-allied) breakaway province of Georgia that was the proximate cause for the 2008 war.
    Biden’s comments are only one possible reason why the war drums are being beaten; there are others.
    The United States appears to be sliding toward conflict with Iran, and Russia has invested no small amount of political capital in bolstering the Iranians against the Americans. In Moscow’s mind, a United States fixated on the Persian Gulf is one that cannot fixate on Russia, and a United States that is at war with Iran is one that cannot stop Russia from adjusting borders in places like Georgia.
    And of course, there is Georgia itself. President Mikhail Saakashvili is no stranger to dramatic performances, and as the leader of a fractured country with next to no military capability (even before Georgia’s defeat in August 2008), he has few means of countering Russia at all. One option is to provoke a crisis with his northern neighbor in the hopes that the West will ride to the rescue. Considering what happened a year ago, this is perhaps not the wisest strategy, but it is not as though Saakashvili – personally or as Georgia’s president – has a wide array of options to peruse.
    War is not a process that Russia would choose carelessly, even if it would be a very, very easy war to win. What simply doesn’t fit in current circumstances is the boldness with which the Russians are acting. They have all but stated that war is imminent, they are backing the Iranians to the hilt, sending top Kremlin strategists to the region to coordinate with allies, and have even resumed nuclear submarine patrols off the east coast of the United States. The Russians have a well-earned reputation for being far more circumspect than this in the shell game that is international relations. It is almost as if all of this is simply noise designed to keep the Americans off balance while something else, something no one is watching, is quietly put into play.
    STRATFOR doesn’t have a good answer for this. All we can say is that the Russians are up to something – and if it is not a war, it is something big enough that a war would seem to make a good distraction. Now that bears some watching.

  • Turkish-Russian Grand Bargain in Energy Cooperation

    Turkish-Russian Grand Bargain in Energy Cooperation

    Turkish-Russian Grand Bargain in Energy Cooperation

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 152
    August 7, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s August 6 visit to Ankara marked a new era for “enhanced multi-dimensional partnership,” between Ankara and Moscow. Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed some twenty agreements covering energy, trade and other fields. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi also attended part of the talks between Erdogan and Putin, considering the involvement of Italian companies in some of these projects. The most remarkable dimension of the various joint projects concerns energy cooperation, most notably Turkey’s expression of support for Russia’s South Stream project (Anadolu Ajansi, www.cnnturk.com, www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 6).

    In oil transportation, Russia committed to participate in the planned Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline (SCP), connecting the Turkish Black Sea city of Samsun to the Mediterranean terminal Ceyhan. Turkey has solicited Russian participation in the SCP, which will bypass the congested Turkish Straits. Moscow has proven reluctant, and has instead promoted another bypass option through Burgas-Alexandroupolis between Bulgaria and Greece. Meanwhile, Turkey took further steps to make the SCP attractive for the Russian side, by linking this project with the Turkish-Israeli-Indian energy partnership (EDM, November 25, 2008).

    Erdogan expressed his pleasure with the Russian decision to commit its crude. Ankara can consider this development as its greatest success in this grand bargain, given that Turkey has worked to convert Ceyhan, where the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline also terminates, into a global energy hub. However, Putin did not rule out interest in Burgas-Alexandroupolis, and instead emphasized that the two pipelines might be complementary in meeting the growing demand for export routes. This statement raises questions about how committed Russia will be to the SCP, given that Russian companies own the majority of shares in the other Burgas-Alexandroupolis option.

    In terms of gas cooperation, Turkey will allow Russia to conduct explorations and feasibility studies in the Turkish exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, as part of Russian plans to construct South Stream. Since this move comes against the background of Turkey’s decision to sign the rival Nabucco pipeline agreement last month, it raises many questions, as to how it will affect Nabucco, which Turkey considers a “strategic priority,” as well as European energy security issues. Despite the questions surrounding its feasibility and high costs, as well as its negative implications for Nabucco, Erdogan maintained that both projects contribute to diversification efforts.

    It appears that the “grand bargain” was between the SCP and Blue Stream. Ahead of the meeting, Yuri Ushakov, the Deputy Head of the Russian Government Staff said that “Turkey made concessions in South Stream and we made concessions in SCP,” but added that he had doubts over the SCP’s feasibility (Anadolu Ajansi, August 5). A statement from Berlusconi’s office also claimed that he had helped broker a rapprochement between both countries on these two issues (Hurriyet Daily News, August 6). However, domestically, there are concerns that in this “exchange” of concessions, Turkey did not gain much. The SCP’s importance was inflated, because it was developed by business interests close to the government (www.turksam.org.tr, August 7). Another gas deal concerned Ankara’s request to renew the contract under which it purchases Russian gas through the Western pipeline via the Balkans. Erdogan announced that the contract (which expires in 2011) will be renewed for 20 years. Turkey had complained about the high prices and the leave-or-pay conditions in its gas deals with Russia. Putin said it was renewed on favorable terms to Turkey, but the contract’s details are unclear.

    Erdogan also said that they discussed the extension of Blue Stream II to transport Russian gas to Israel, Lebanon and even Cyprus. Blue Stream, running underneath the Black Sea, is the second route carrying Russian gas to Turkey. Moscow previously raised the possibility that it could use Blue Stream II in order to transport gas to Europe, but this option was rejected, since it contradicted Nabucco and Russia sought to use Turkey only as a transportation route. Now, Ankara wants to revive it as part of a North-South corridor. Based on the leaders’ statements, it appears that the existing capacity of Blue Stream might be improved and gas could be transferred to the Mediterranean through this pipeline.

    However, although Erdogan praised this development as another major success, there is no guarantee that Russia will grant “re-export rights,” which indicates that if Blue Stream II is implemented, Moscow will continue to view Turkish territory as a mere conduit for its gas, which raises the question: how will Turkey benefit from the agreement? Russian priorities also involve Turkey’s first nuclear power plant tender, which was awarded to a Russian-Turkish consortium. As the original price was too high, the tender has long awaited cabinet approval (EDM, January 26). Meanwhile, the Russian side lowered the price, and offered a compromise. Prior to Putin’s visit, it was expected that with further “bargaining,” a final deal might be reached, but apparently it failed. Nevertheless, Ankara and Moscow signed protocols regarding energy cooperation, including the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, early notification of accidents, exchange of information on facilities, and to continue talks on the nuclear tender.

    The most controversial development is perhaps Ankara’s support for South Stream. Erdogan reiterated his belief that Nabucco and South Stream are complementary, yet turned a blind eye to several Russian officials’ (including Putin) statements to the contrary. It is assumed in Ankara that growing European energy demand will accommodate both projects; but this ignores the competition between both projects over the same downstream markets. Moreover, the Turkish side fails to appreciate the challenges Russia is facing in investing in its domestic gas industry, and acts on the assumption that “Russia has enormous reserves,” while failing to realize that Russia is also planning to tap into the same upstream producers, namely Central Asian and Caspian gas, just as the Nabucco project envisages (www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 6).

    Putin also added that a consensus was reached on Russia building gas storage facilities in the Salt Lake. Taken together with the announced joint investments between Turkish and Russian firms, including Gazprom, it is unclear whether the Turkish government recognizes the consequences of these decisions. Russia has effectively used the practice of co-opting the gas infrastructure of transport and consumer countries, as part of its efforts to monopolize downstream markets. It is unclear how this penetration into the Turkish grid might affect Ankara’s future energy policies.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-russian-grand-bargain-in-energy-cooperation/
  • Turkey and Russia Conclude Energy Deals

    Turkey and Russia Conclude Energy Deals

    a1Published: August 6, 2009

    ISTANBUL — Russia and Turkey concluded energy agreements on Thursday that will support Turkey’s drive to become a regional hub for fuel transshipments while helping Moscow maintain its monopoly on natural gas shipments from Asia to Europe.

    Turkey granted the Russian natural gas giant Gazprom use of its territorial waters in the Black Sea, under which the company wants to route its so-called South Stream pipeline to gas markets in Eastern and Southern Europe.

    In return, a Russian oil pipeline operator agreed to join a consortium to build a pipeline across the Anatolian Peninsula, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and Gazprom affirmed a commitment to expand an existing Black Sea gas pipeline for possible transshipment across Turkey to Cyprus or Israel.

    Energy companies in both countries agreed to a joint venture to build conventional electric power plants, and the Interfax news agency in Russia reported that Prime MinisterVladimir V. Putin offered to reopen talks on Russian assistance to Turkey in building nuclear power reactors.

    The agreements were signed in Ankara, the Turkish capital, in meetings between Mr. Putin and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Italy’s prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, who has joined Mr. Putin on several energy projects, attended the ceremony. The Italian company Eni broke ground on the trans-Anatolian oil pipeline this year.

    While the offer of specific pipeline deals and nuclear cooperation represented a new tactic by Mr. Putin, the wider struggle for dominance of the Eurasian pipelines is a long-running chess match in which he has often excelled.

    As he has in the past, Mr. Putin traveled to Turkey with his basket of tempting strategic and economic benefits immediately after a similar mission by his opponents. A month ago, European governments signed an agreement in Turkey to support the Western-backed Nabucco pipeline, which would compete directly with the South Stream project.

    By skirting Russian territory, the Nabucco pipeline would undercut Moscow’s monopoly on European natural gas shipments and the pricing power and political clout that come with it. That may explain why Nabucco, which cannot go forward without Turkey’s support, has encountered a variety of obstacles thrown up by the Russian government, including efforts to deny it vital gas supplies in the East and a customer base in the West.

    Turkey and other countries in the path of Nabucco have been eager players in this geopolitical drama, entertaining offers from both sides. Turkish authorities have even tried, without much success, to leverage the pipeline negotiations to further Turkey’s bid to join the European Union, while keeping options with Russia open, too.

    “These countries are more than happy to sign agreements with both parties,” Ana Jelenkovic, an analyst at Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy, said in a telephone interview from London. “There’s no political benefit to shutting out or ceasing energy relations with Russia.”

    Under the deal Mr. Putin obtained Thursday, Gazprom will be allowed to proceed with seismic and environmental tests in Turkey’s exclusive economic zone, necessary preliminary steps for laying the South Stream pipe, Prime Minister Erdogan said at a news conference.

    After the meeting, Mr. Putin said, “We agreed on every issue.”

    The trans-Anatolian oil pipeline also marginally improves Russia’s position in the region. The pipeline is one of two so-called Bosporus bypass systems circumventing the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, which are operating at capacity in tanker traffic.

    The preferred Western route is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which allows companies to ship Caspian Basin crude oil to the West without crossing Russian territory; the pipeline instead crosses the former Soviet republic of Georgia and avoids the crowded straits by cutting across Turkey to the Mediterranean.

    Russia prefers northbound pipelines out of the Caspian region that terminate at tanker terminals on the Black Sea. The success of this plan depends, in turn, on creating additional capacity in the Bosporus bypass routes. Russia is backing two such pipelines.

    Mr. Putin’s offer to move ahead with a Russian-built nuclear power plant in Turkey suggests a sweetening of the overall Russian offer on energy deals with Turkey, while both Western and Russian proposals are on the table.

    The nuclear aspect of the deal drew protests. About a dozen Greenpeace protesters were surrounded by at least 200 armored police officers in central Ankara on Thursday.

    Andrew E. Kramer contributed reporting from Moscow.

    The New York Times
  • Moscow Market Crackdown Strains Turkish-Russian Trade Relations

    Moscow Market Crackdown Strains Turkish-Russian Trade Relations

    Moscow Market Crackdown Strains Turkish-Russian Trade Relations

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 144
    July 28, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    As Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin prepares to visit Turkey in early August, new items are being added to his agenda. In addition to energy projects, bilateral trade issues, caused by recent problems encountered by Turkish exporters, will occupy a large part of his itinerary. The Russian government’s crackdown on the Cherkizovsky market in Moscow in early June added a new dimension to Turkish-Russian trade issues.

    Russian anti-smuggling teams raided the Cherkizovsky market, confiscating thousands of containers for further examination, and shut it down. The charges against the traders included violations of consumer safety and sanitation codes as well as immigration rules. The incident cost countless jobs, many of whom are foreigners including Chinese, Vietnamese and Turkish traders, and created tension between Russia and China where most of the goods originated (www.russiatoday.ru, June 29; Anadolu Ajansi, July 1).

    Why the Russian government decided to close the Cherkizovsky market, after allowing it to flourish for twenty years, remains unclear. Prior to the crackdown on the market, Putin complained about the failure of the anti-smuggling mechanism, and signaled his readiness to strengthen the fight against smuggling (Cihan, June 29).

    The Turkish press speculated that Putin used these allegations as a pretext to punish the owner of the market, the business mogul Telman Ismailov, for his recent investments in Turkey. In May, Ismailov opened a luxurious hotel in the Turkish city of Antalya, a frequent destination for Russian tourists, which is estimated to yield $1.4 billion annually for the local economy. Putin was reportedly angered by the lavish opening party in the context of the global financial crisis. Moreover, the Turkish press suggested that Ismailov’s decision to invest in Antalya was in defiance of Russian authorities’ advice to open the hotel in Sochi, which had further upset Putin (Radikal, June 10; Yeni Safak, July 13).

    In an interview to the Turkish press, Ismailov even expressed his desire to obtain Turkish citizenship (Yeni Safak, May 25), which also negatively affected his reputation in Russia. He did not officially file an application, but changes to the Turkish citizenship code around the same time eased the conditions for citizenship on exceptional grounds, such as for foreigners investing in Turkey (Hurriyet, June 11).

    However, the Turkish press initially preferred to present the market crackdown as a measure against Ismailov, downplaying the broader context of the developments in Russia. Last week, its coverage of the crisis took a new turn. Several reports highlighted the “plight” of Turkish businessmen who were affected in the midst of this crisis caused by Russia’s internal competition. Hundreds of Turkish firms are believed to sell textile, leather and other goods, by registering them and paying the necessary fees at this market first, before they are further distributed within Russia. Turkish businessmen claimed that, due to the ongoing Russian anti-smuggling investigation, they cannot retrieve their goods from storage facilities. Many criticized Russia’s treatment of the Turkish businessmen as unfair, and compared it to the “customs crisis” between Ankara and Moscow, which has continued for more than one year (Cihan, July 25). Some Turkish businessmen, however, support these Russian actions and maintain that this was long overdue. In their view, the smugglers in the market were creating unfair competition for the traders who were operating legally (www.turkrus.com, July 27).

    The growing protests from the Turkish business community exerted pressure on the Turkish government to protest officially to Russia. Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz, who is also the co-chair of the Russian-Turkish joint economic council, described this development as an internal Russian affair, and stressed that this issue was not raised in bilateral contacts with Russia (Cihan, July 27). His Russian counterpart, Igor Sechin visited Turkey last week to hold talks with Yildiz and the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan ahead of Putin’s visit to Turkey in early August.

    Nonetheless, the State Minister responsible for Foreign Trade Zafer Caglayan issued a written statement, which described Russia as a major trading partner and noted that the under-secretariat for foreign trade had formed a commission to investigate the claims of Turkish businessmen and explore new marketplaces in Moscow. Although Caglayan recognized that the decision of the Russian authorities did not directly target Turkey, given the volume of Turkish goods in the market, he stressed that this did indirectly affect the country. However, the figures released by Caglayan contradicted those which appeared in earlier press reports. Whereas the Turkish press maintained that as many as 5,000 businesses were affected by the market crackdown, Caglayan said that only 200 were owned by Turks. Moreover, Caglayan noted that only 10 percent of the total goods sold in the market were of Turkish origin (www.ihlassondakika.com, July 27).

    Caglayan also signaled that he might raise this issue with Russian officials in order to protect the rights of the Turkish businessmen in accordance with the Russian and international rules. Moreover, he added that these problems and the “customs issue” will be on the agenda when Putin visits Turkey next month.

    A highly busy schedule awaits Putin in Turkey, most importantly over future cooperation in energy projects. Despite Ankara’s signing of the Nabucco treaty, Turkey is still pursuing joint investments with Russia in nuclear power, and other gas transportation projects. Turkish exports to Russia were damaged by the new customs regulations imposed by Russia prior to the Georgian war in August 2008. Russia and Turkey reached a deal in September 2008 to simplify customs procedures for Turkish goods, but Ankara claimed that Moscow has not complied with the agreement. The problem was not resolved during President Abdullah Gul’s and Yildiz’s visits to Moscow earlier this year. Although Russia was confirmed as Turkey’s main trading partner, its reluctance to resolve such issues remains a constant source of tension between both countries. More importantly, the timing of those “commercial” crises provides justification over the speculation that Russia is exploiting Turkey’s economic and energy dependence to punish Ankara for its political decisions.

    https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-market-crackdown-strains-turkish-russian-trade-relations/
  • Aliyev and Sarksyan Meet in Moscow

    Aliyev and Sarksyan Meet in Moscow

    Aliyev and Sarksyan Meet in Moscow

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 139
    July 21, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev met his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sarksyan in Moscow on July 17 in their latest round of reconciliation talks. Turkey has closely followed the talks between the two presidents, facilitated by the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, hoping that the resolution of the Karabakh issue might also facilitate Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.

    The meeting was the sixth between Aliyev and Sarksyan since their first meeting in June 2008. As one of the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk group, Russia accelerated its peacemaking efforts toward finding a solution to the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Medvedev hosted the two presidents in Moscow for a second time in November 2008, and since then the two leaders have met in Zurich, Prague and St. Petersburg (Trend News, July 17).

    The meeting came in the context of growing international interest. Other major actors had also expressed their support for this mechanism, hoping that it might facilitate a solution. The presidents of Russia, France and the United States issued a statement during the G8 summit in Italy the previous week, and urged all sides to step up their work toward the resolution of the remaining differences on Karabakh, on the basis of the principles outlined in the 2007 Madrid agreement (www.osce.org, July 10).

    Representatives from the other two co-chairs of the Minsk group and the OSCE representatives were also in Moscow. On July 17, the Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and his Armenian counterpart Edward Nalbandyan met with the Minsk group co-chairmen Yuri Merzlyakov (Russia), Bernard Fassier (France) and Matthew Bryza (United States), as well as the OSCE Chairman’s Special Envoy Andzey Kasprzyk. The Azeri and Armenian presidents also held bilateral talks, and later the ministers as well as the co-chairs joined them. The following day, the leaders held trilateral talks with the participation of Medvedev.

    No documents were signed at the meeting and no official statement was issued. Medvedev’s spokesperson told reporters that the parties had a chance to discuss in detail the remaining issues. He added that he is optimistic that “it will be possible to settle the Karabakh conflict in the foreseeable future.” According to Armenian diplomatic sources, the presidents instructed their foreign ministers to work in close cooperation with the Minsk group co-chairs to organize a high-level meeting on Karabakh in the fall. The co-chairs of the Minsk group reiterated their support for the ongoing talks. They added that they would continue their contacts in the region. The two presidents might meet again in September, they added (Trend News, ITAR-TASS, www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 18).

    On July 20, Mammadyarov said that some progress was achieved in Moscow. He added that the parties agreed on some principles of a possible solution, but that further work was required on the precise details. He maintained that both sides were working toward a schedule for withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the occupied Azeri territories. Once this is achieved, it will be possible to discuss other issues such as the repatriation of refugees, the rebuilding of the region and determining the status of Karabakh. However, he ruled out independence for Karabakh by saying “whatever its status, Karabakh will remain part of Azerbaijan” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 20).

    Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, the head of the E.U. troika delegation visiting the region, said in Yerevan that the E.U. supported the Minsk group’s activities and was ready to assist in the implementation of an agreement. However, in implicit defiance of Mammadyarov’s statements, Nalbandyan said that the “return of any territories to Azerbaijan was not discussed in Moscow.” He also added that Armenia did not officially endorse the Madrid principles (ANKA, July 20; Trend News, July 21).

    Despite the contradictory accounts from Yerevan and Baku, it appears that the removal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azeri territories has been on the agenda for some time. Prior to the meeting in Moscow, Aliyev had explained the details of the plan to a Russian TV station (www.cnnturk.com, July 8). According to the Turkish press, the two presidents in fact discussed the specifics of Armenian withdrawal from the occupied Azeri territories, even including the deployment of international forces. Whereas, the Armenian side insisted on Russian forces, the Azeris requested Turkish troops. Turkey reportedly expressed its readiness to send troops, if the parties agreed on such a solution (Zaman, July 19). However, no official Turkish diplomatic source has corroborated this proposal.

    Turkey has been supportive of the process led by the Minsk group and Russian initiatives. Ankara reportedly plans to contribute to the initiatives of the Minsk group through a new round of contacts with Baku and Yerevan. Nonetheless, currently the earliest direct talks between Yerevan and Ankara to discuss Turkish-Armenian normalization are scheduled in September at the U.N. General Assembly (Sabah, July 20).

    After intensive diplomatic traffic between Turkey and Armenia, which resulted in the announcement of a roadmap for normalization in April, Ankara had to slow down the process to satisfy concerns in Baku. During his visit to Baku in May, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan underlined clearly that Ankara would not proceed with its Turkish-Armenian rapprochement before a solution over the Karabakh issue could be achieved. Although Ankara came under criticism for stalling its dialogue with Yerevan, diplomatic sources maintain that secret talks between the two countries are continuing (EDM, June 30).

    Commenting on these recent developments, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu denied that Turkish-Armenian normalization was stalled. He said that “[Turkish-Armenian and Azeri-Armenian] processes would affect each other positively.” Though declining to set a date on the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border, he expressed his hope that positive developments might take place before the end of the year (Hurriyet Daily News, July 20).

    Erdogan took a very clear position, saying that he will maintain his support for Azerbaijan over the Karabakh dispute. It would be difficult for him to step back from this, given the enormous costs of such a move to his popularity at home and in Baku. Therefore, before taking any steps to revitalize its relations with Yerevan, Ankara hopes that the recent initiatives could produce at least partial progress between Baku and Yerevan.

    https://jamestown.org/program/aliyev-and-sarksyan-meet-in-moscow/
  • Washington is Playing a Deeper Game with China

    Washington is Playing a Deeper Game with China

    by F. William Engdahl

    14327

    Global Research, July 11, 2009

    https://www.globalresearch.ca/washington-is-playing-a-deeper-game-with-china/14327

    After the tragic events of July 5 in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China, it would be useful to look more closely into the actual role of the US Government’s ”independent“ NGO, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). All indications are that the US Government, once more acting through its “private” Non-Governmental Organization, the NED, is massively intervening into the internal politics of China.

     

    The reasons for Washington’s intervention into Xinjiang affairs seems to have little to do with concerns over alleged human rights abuses by Beijing authorities against Uyghur people. It seems rather to have very much to do with the strategic geopolitical location of Xinjiang on the Eurasian landmass and its strategic importance for China’s future economic and energy cooperation with Russia, Kazakhastan and other Central Asia states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

     

    The major organization internationally calling for protests in front of Chinese embassies around the world is the Washington, D.C.-based World Uyghur Congress (WUC).

     

    The WUC manages to finance a staff, a very fancy website in English, and has a very close relation to the US Congress-funded NED. According to published reports by the NED itself, the World Uyghur Congress receives $215,000.00 annually from the National Endowment for Democracy for “human rights research and advocacy projects.” The president of the WUC is an exile Uyghur who describes herself as a “laundress turned millionaire,” Rebiya Kadeer, who also serves as president of the Washington D.C.-based Uyghur American Association, another Uyghur human rights organization which receives significant funding from the US Government via the National Endowment for Democracy.

     

    The NED was intimately involved in financial support to various organizations behind the Lhasa ”Crimson Revolution“ in March 2008, as well as the Saffron Revolution in Burma/Myanmar and virtually every regime change destabilization in eastern Europe over the past years from Serbia to Georgia to Ukraine to Kyrgystan to Teheran in the aftermath of the recent elections.

     

    Allen Weinstein, who helped draft the legislation establishing NED, was quite candid when he said in a published interview in 1991: “A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.”

     

    The NED is supposedly a private, non-government, non-profit foundation, but it receives a yearly appropriation for its international work from the US Congress. The NED money is channelled through four “core foundations”. These are the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, linked to Obama’s Democratic Party; the International Republican Institute tied to the Republican Party; the American Center for International Labor Solidarity linked to the AFL-CIO US labor federation as well as the US State Department; and the Center for International Private Enterprise linked to the US Chamber of Commerce.

     

    The salient question is what has the NED been actively doing that might have encouraged the unrest in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and what is the Obama Administration policy in terms of supporting or denouncing such NED-financed intervention into sovereign politics of states which Washington deems a target for pressure? The answers must be found soon, but one major step to help clarify Washington policy under the new Obama Administration would be for a full disclosure by the NED, the US State Department and NGO’s linked to the US Government, of their involvement, if at all, in encouraging Uyghur separatism or unrest. Is it mere coincidence that the Uyghur riots take place only days following the historic meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?

     

    Uyghur exile organizations, China and Geopolitics

     

    On May 18 this year, the US-government’s in-house “private” NGO, the NED, according to the official WUC website, hosted a seminal human rights conference entitled East Turkestan: 60 Years under Communist Chinese Rule, along with a curious NGO with the name, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO).

     

    The Honorary President and founder of the UNPO is one Erkin Alptekin, an exile Uyghur who founded UNPO while working for the US Information Agency’s official propaganda organization, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty as Director of their Uygur Division and Assistant Director of the Nationalities Services.

     

    Alptekin also founded the World Uyghur Congress at the same time, in 1991, while he was with the US Information Agency. The official mission of the USIA when Alptekin founded the World Uyghur Congress in 1991 was “to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics in promotion of the [USA] national interest…” Alptekin was the first president of WUC, and, according to the official WUC website, is a “close friend of the Dalai Lama.”

     

    Closer examination reveals that UNPO in turn to be an American geopolitical strategist’s dream organization. It was formed, as noted, in 1991 as the Soviet Union was collapsing and most of the land area of Eurasia was in political and economic chaos. Since 2002 its Director General has been Archduke Karl von Habsburg of Austria who lists his (unrecognized by Austria or Hungary) title as “Prince Imperial of Austria and Royal Prince of Hungary.”

     

    Among the UNPO principles is the right to ‘self-determination’ for the 57 diverse population groups who, by some opaque process not made public, have been admitted as official UNPO members with their own distinct flags, with a total population of some 150 million peoples and headquarters in the Hague, Netherlands.

     

    UNPO members range from Kosovo which “joined” when it was fully part of then Yugoslavia in 1991. It includes the “Aboriginals of Australia” who were listed as founding members along with Kosovo. It includes the Buffalo River Dene Nation indians of northern Canada.

     

    The select UNPO members also include Tibet which is listed as a founding member. It also includes other explosive geopolitical areas as the Crimean Tartars, the Greek Minority in Romania, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (in Russia), the Democratic Movement of Burma, and the gulf enclave adjacent to Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and which just happens to hold rights to some of the world’s largest offshore oil fields leased to Condi Rice’s old firm, Chevron Oil. Further geopolitical hotspots which have been granted elite recognition by the UNPO membership include the large section of northern Iran which designates itself as Southern Azerbaijan, as well as something that calls itself Iranian Kurdistan.

     

    In April 2008 according to the website of the UNPO, the US Congress’ NED sponsored a “leadership training” seminar for the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) together with the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. Over 50 Uyghurs from around the world together with prominent academics, government representatives and members of the civil society gathered in Berlin Germany to discuss “Self-Determination under International Law.” What they discussed privately is not known. Rebiya Kadeer gave the keynote address.

     

    The suspicious timing of the Xinjiang riots

     

    The current outbreak of riots and unrest in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang in the northwest part of China, exploded on July 5 local time.

     

    According to the website of the World Uyghur Congress, the “trigger” for the riots was an alleged violent attack on June 26 in China’s southern Guangdong Province at a toy factory where the WUC alleges that Han Chinese workers attacked and beat to death two Uyghur workers for allegedly raping or sexually molesting two Han Chinese women workers in the factory. On July 1, the Munich arm of the WUC issued a worldwide call for protest demonstrations against Chinese embassies and consulates for the alleged Guangdong attack, despite the fact they admitted the details of the incident were unsubstantiated and filled with allegations and dubious reports.

     

    According to a press release they issued, it was that June 26 alleged attack that gave the WUC the grounds to issue their worldwide call to action.

     

    On July 5, a Sunday in Xinjiang but still the USA Independence Day, July 4, in Washington, the WUC in Washington claimed that Han Chinese armed soldiers seized any Uyghur they found on the streets and according to official Chinese news reports, widespread riots and burning of cars along the streets of Urumqi broke out resulting over the following three days in over 140 deaths.

     

    China’s official Xinhua News Agency said that protesters from the Uighur Muslim ethnic minority group began attacking ethnic Han pedestrians, burning vehicles and attacking buses with batons and rocks. “They took to the street…carrying knives, wooden batons, bricks and stones,” they cited an eyewitness as saying. The French AFP news agency quoted Alim Seytoff, general secretary of the Uighur American Association in Washington, that according to his information, police had begun shooting “indiscriminately” at protesting crowds.

     

    Two different versions of the same events: The Chinese government and pictures of the riots indicate it was Uyghur riot and attacks on Han Chinese residents that resulted in deaths and destruction. French official reports put the blame on Chinese police “shooting indiscriminately.” Significantly, the French AFP report relies on the NED-funded Uyghur American Association of Rebiya Kadeer for its information. The reader should judge if the AFP account might be motivated by a US geopolitical agenda, a deeper game from the Obama Administration towards China’s economic future.

     

    Is it merely coincidence that the riots in Xinjiang by Uyghur organizations broke out only days after the meeting took place in Yakaterinburg, Russia of the member nations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as well as Iran as official observer guest, represented by President Ahmadinejad?

     

    Over the past few years, in the face of what is seen as an increasingly hostile and incalculable United States foreign policy, the major nations of Eurasia—China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan have increasingly sought ways of direct and more effective cooperation in economic as well as security areas. In addition, formal Observer status within SCO has been given to Iran, Pakistan, India and Mongolia. The SCO defense ministers are in regular and growing consultation on mutual defense needs, as NATO and the US military command continue provocatively to expand across the region wherever it can.

     

    The Strategic Importance of Xinjiang for Eurasian Energy Infrastructure

     

    There is another reason for the nations of the SCO, a vital national security element, to having peace and stability in China’s Xinjiang region. Some of China’s most important oil and gas pipeline routes pass directly through Xinjiang province. Energy relations between Kazkhstan and China are of enormous strategic importance for both countries, and allow China to become less dependent on oil supply sources that can be cut off by possible US interdiction should relations deteriorate to such a point.

     

    Kazak President Nursultan Nazarbayev paid a State visit in April 2009 to Beijing. The talks concerned deepening economic cooperation, above all in the energy area, where Kazkhastan holds huge reserves of oil and likely as well of natural gas. After the talks in Beijing, Chinese media carried articles with such titles as “”Kazakhstani oil to fill in the Great Chinese pipe.”

     

    The Atasu-Alashankou pipeline to be completed in 2009 will provide transportation of transit gas to China via Xinjiang. As well Chinese energy companies are involved in construction of a Zhanazholskiy gas processing plant, Pavlodar electrolyze plant and Moynakskaya hydro electric station in Kazakhstan.

     

    casp kaz china ppl

    According to the US Government’s Energy Information Administration, Kazakhstan’s Kashagan field is the largest oil field outside the Middle East and the fifth largest in the world in terms of reserves, located off the northern shore of the Caspian Sea, near the city of Atyrau. China has built a 613-mile-long pipeline from Atasu, in northwestern Kazakhstan, to Alashankou at the border of China’s Xinjiang region which is exporting Caspian oil to China. PetroChina’s ChinaOil is the exclusive buyer of the crude oil on the Chinese side. The pipeline is a joint venture of CNPC and Kaztransoil of Kazkhstan. Some 85,000 bbl/d of Kazakh crude oil flowed through the pipeline during 2007. China’s CNPC is also involved in other major energy projects with Kazkhstan. They all traverse China’s Xinjiang region.

     

    In 2007 CNPC signed an agreement to invest more than $2 billion to construct a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China. That pipeline would start at Gedaim on the border of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and extend 1,100 miles through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Khorgos in China’s Xinjiang region. Turkmenistan and China have signed a 30-year supply agreement for the gas that would fill the pipeline. CNPC has set up two entities to oversee the Turkmen upstream project and the development of a second pipeline that will cross China from the Xinjiang region to southeast China at a cost of some $7 billion.

     

    chinapipelines

    As well, Russia and China are discussing major natural gas pipelines from eastern Siberia through Xinjiang into China. Eastern Siberia contains around 135 Trillion cubic feet of proven plus probable natural gas reserves. The Kovykta natural gas field could give China with natural gas in the next decade via a proposed pipeline.

     

    During the current global economic crisis, Kazakhstan received a major credit from China of $10 billion, half of which is for oil and gas sector. The oil pipeline Atasu-Alashankou and the gas pipeline China-Central Asia, are an instrument of strategic ‘linkage’ of central Asian countries to the economy China. That Eurasian cohesion from Russia to China across Central Asian countries is the geopolitical cohesion Washington most fears. While they would never say so, growing instability in Xinjiang would be an ideal way for Washington to weaken that growing cohesion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization nations.

     

    William Engdahl is the author of Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy in the New World Order.