Category: Russian Federation

  • Medvedev Wants True Values Of Islam Explained In Media, Internet

    Medvedev Wants True Values Of Islam Explained In Media, Internet

    SOCHI, August 29 (Itar-Tass) — Russian President Dmitry Medvedev believes that far more active work must be conducted in the mass media and in the world web to explain the true, genuine values of Islam to promote religious education and to create a counterbalance to extremist information products.

    In his statement at a meeting in support of the religious Muslim organizations of the North Caucasus, the Russian head of state said that such work in the mass media and in the internet was a very complex and delicate matter, but at the same time a vital need.

    “So far it looks rather weak, if one compares the influence on people’s minds of the extremist sites and of normal sites that explain the nature of Islam and its dogmas that there exist in our country. Regrettably, the score will not be to the advantage of the sites that have been created here, including those at the universities concerned,” the president said.

    “This work must be stepped up. We shall never persuade anyone to stop using the Internet. Also we are aware that we shall fail to block this sort of extremist sites. There will emerge mirror sites and from there we shall have the same flow of absolutely extremist information and calls,” Medvedev said.

    “I do enter the Internet myself from time to time to see what they write there. The stuff is hair-raising. It has nothing to do with Islam or with any ideology at all,” Medvedev said. “I do hope that we shall be able to continue this work with the Islamic clergy in coordination with the presidential staff.”

  • Turkey’s Multivector Energy Hub: Ignore At Your Own Peril

    Turkey’s Multivector Energy Hub: Ignore At Your Own Peril

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    Chums: Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (right) meets with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, in Ankara on August 6.

    August 31, 2009
    By Alexandros Petersen

    According to Turkey’s popular “Zaman” newspaper, the country can now claim the title of “world’s largest energy hub.”

    While over a decade of government policy has sought to transform Turkey’s energy sector into first a European, then a regional, and now a global energy hub, a rash of recent international agreements, according to “Zaman,” have enabled Turkey to finally attain that status.

    Deals with European Union member states on the Nabucco natural-gas pipeline, with Russia on the competing South Stream project, with Qatar on liquefied natural gas and a possible pipeline, with Azerbaijan on gas supplies for its isolated Nakhchivan autonomous region, and with Syria on a gas-import deal have kept Turkey’s energy aspirations in the headlines.

    These developments should not come as a surprise.

    For those looking at the big picture, Anatolia’s tailor-made to be the geographic center of crisscrossing pipelines, inputs, and outlets for the flow of hydrocarbon resources. Turkey is surrounded by the world’s largest natural-gas reserves — Russia, the greater Caspian region, Iran, Iraq, the Gulf and Egypt — and one of the world’s greatest markets, the European Union.

    Decision makers in Ankara certainly see this big picture, and with projects like Nabucco are pushing to realize Turkey’s potential.

    Their counterparts in Brussels and other European capitals, however, often do not see the same picture.

    Turkey, for European decision makers, is the alternative energy corridor to the resources of the Caspian, a thoroughfare to connect EU consumers with producers such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, allowing for supply diversification and less dependence on problematic Russian reserves.

    This limited view often leads to incongruent policies between Ankara and Brussels, not to mention already Turkey-skeptical leaders such as France’s Nicholas Sarkozy and Germany’s Angela Merkel. The prolonged and difficult negotiations over Nabucco are just one example. 

    EU Myopia

    European energy policies, to the extent that there has been any unity of focus on reaching alternative reserves, have yet to take into account the enormous potential of genuinely partnering with Turkey as a global energy hub — as opposed to just hammering out a deal with Turkey because it controls the territory between the EU and the Caspian.

    It goes without saying that this myopia has led to complacency in Turkey’s EU accession process. One of the world’s largest markets for hydrocarbons has yet to open energy negotiations with the world’s largest energy hub, right on its doorstep.

    Most regrettably, this limited view of Turkey’s energy role among Western decision makers has contributed to an overall trans-Atlantic sense of “the loss of Turkey.” Ankara’s deals with Moscow on South Stream are seen as undermining the strategic Western-oriented Nabucco project. Turkish policymakers’ openness to including Russia and Iran in projects that are at least partly meant to strengthen the sovereignty of those powers’ smaller neighbors — and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s chummy relationship with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin — have more than just raised eyebrows in Washington and Brussels.

    But, again, that view ignores the bigger map on the tables of Ankara. Turkey’s energy ambitions have evolved into a fully fledged multivector policy. And, given Turkey’s overwhelming dependence on Russian natural gas for its own consumption, it is surprising that Ankara is still so open to Western-oriented projects.

    To deny Turkey’s multivector energy policies and potential would be to take Ankara for granted. It is a losing proposition for proponents of Western-oriented projects such as Nabucco to expect not to compete with counteroffers from the other major energy players in Turkey’s neighborhood.

    It behooves Western decision makers to fully appreciate Turkey’s energy big picture or risk upcoming surprises such as Armenian electricity exports to Turkey and a Russia-dominated Turkish nuclear sector. The “world’s largest energy hub” headline is not only aimed at puffing up chests in Turkey, but at turning heads in Europe and the United States.

    Alexandros Petersen is Dinu Patriciu fellow for trans-Atlantic energy security and associate director of the Eurasia Energy Center at the Atlantic Council. The views expressed in this commentary are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL.

    https://www.rferl.org/a/Turkeys_Multivector_Energy_Hub_Ignore_At_Your_Peril/1811254.html

  • A Georgian-Armenian Border Dispute?

    A Georgian-Armenian Border Dispute?

    By Ara Khachatourian on Aug 27th, 2009

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    Armenia-Georgia border

    The complicated situation plaguing the Georgian regions bordering Armenia, known as the Armenian-populated Samtskhe-Javakhk region, is being compounded as Georgian authorities are prohibiting farmers there to work, essentially claiming that the land on which they live is Georgian territory.

    The focal point of this recent flare up is the border city of Bavra, whose residents were issued deeds by the Armenian State Committee on Real Estate from 1992 to 2004. But, because the Soviet demarcation of borders left a legal uncertainty, Georgia has intermittently annexed portions of that land and claimed it as its own by planting trees and vegetation and expanding its “forests.” This move is beeing seen as effectively seizing Armenian territory.

    This has created confusion in the area, with Armenian border guards not allowing Armenian residents of Bavra to cross the border, in an effort to not enflame matters, while on the other hand, Georgian border guards are being granted permission to arrest the people who have been living and working there for decades.

    Bavra community head Koriun Sumbulyan said that Georgian authorities have prevented the farmers to enter a 300-hectar lot on the “legally uncertain” area. This move has affected the economic well-being of the residents, who have appealed to the Armenian Foreign Ministry for assistance but have not received clear-cut answers.

    It is estimated that if the current status quo is not challenged and Georgian authorities are allowed to continue this “restructuring of the border,” Georgia could advance within the current Armenian border to the tune of 400 meters, where the boundaries of the Bavra village end.

    This revelation further enflames an already volatile situation for the majority-Armenian-populated region of Javakhk as a direct result of Tbilisi’s treatment of ethnic groups in Georgia. Javakhk Armenian community organizations have appealed to the central authorities and to the international community, thus far, to no avail.

    The Armenian government has reassured that the proper procedures were in place to address the issue, yet Armenia, since its independence has not had a clear strategy or policy toward Javakhk.

    Aside from the fallout from last summer’s war, which continues to have adverse effects on Armenia, Azeri and Turikic nations are increasing the population in the areas immediately bordering Armenia. In fact, on Wednesday, the Meskheti Community of Azerbaijan announced that it would be disbanding at the beginning of next year, because it has fulfilled its mission of populating the “displaced” Meskheti Turks in Georgia, “per Georgian law.”

    The Saakashvili administration has not learned its lesson from last year’s war and continues to embroil its population in conflicts fraught with intimidation and violation of basic human rights. Unfortunately, this behavior is only encouraged-and Armenian lives further endangered-partially by the flawed policies of the US, which has allowed Georgian authorities to take liberties that are outside of democratic norms.

    At the same time, the Armenian authorities’ unwillingness to engage in matters related to the threat facing the population of Javakhk, as well as Armenia’s border, exacerbates the situation further. It’s high time for a clear and concise policy toward Georgia, and more important a strategy on Javakhk.

  • Russia Gazprom unveils strategies for Turkey

    Russia Gazprom unveils strategies for Turkey

    Published: Friday 21 August 2009   

    Russian gas monopoly Gazprom has acquired a majority stake in the Turkish Bosphorus Gas Corporation, hoping to boost its investment and become a powerful player in the future strategic Eurasian gas hub to be established in Turkey, the Russian press announced on 19 August.

    Gazprom has expanded its share in Bosphorus Gas Corporation A.S. to 51 per cent, writes the daily Kommersant. The company, specialised in sales to final consumers, is expected to become a key player in the process of liberalization of the Turkish market, including the privatization of the gas supply network, the daily adds. 

    Gazprom had until now a 40% share in Bosphorus Gas, through its daughter company Gazprom Germania ZMB. The current share is 51% and the aim is to achieve soon a 71% share, officials said. But the Turkish press reportedly said that Gazprom already controls 71%, as it had acquired the shares of a Turkish key shareholder. 

    An unnamed high representative of Gazprom said that his company’s strategy is to make out of Bosphorus Gas “a powerbase of the Russian monopoly on the Turkish internal market”. 

    According to the source, Bosphorus Gas will boost its gas volume trade, participate in the privatization of pipelines and in building underground gas storages in Turkey. “In the perspective of Turkey becoming a huge world gas hub, Gazprom needs to have here its own companies,” the Gazprom representative told Kommersant. 

    On 6 August the prime ministers of Turkey and Russia signed a series of agreements on energy projects, including on Turkey’s acceptance that the “South Stream” gas pipeline would pass through Turkish territorial waters. As one of the aims of Russia with “South Steam” is to bypass Ukraine, the move would also help bypass Ukrainian territorial waters. 

    The source, quoted by Kommersant, however, dismissed the participation of Bosphorus Gas in “South Stream”, or in EU-favoured rival Nabucco pipeline. 

  • The Great Pipeline Opera

    The Great Pipeline Opera

    Inside the European pipeline fantasy that became a real-life gas war with Russia.

    www.foreignpolicy.com
    August 24, 2009

    BY DANIEL FREIFELD
    Daniel Freifeld is director of international programs at New York University’s Center on Law and Security.

    When Joschka Fischer’s lucrative new job as the “political communications advisor” to a consortium of European energy companies was leaked to a German business publication this summer, there was one comment that stood out. “Welcome to the club,” said Gerhard Schröder, an even more highly paid advocate for the other side in Europe’s increasingly politicized energy war.

    Schröder’s remark was short, snide — and very much to the point. For eight years, the two men had led Germany together, with Schröder ruling as its center-left chancellor and Fischer as his foreign minister. Their long-running partnership had survived a particularly complicated era in post-Cold War Europe, and publicly Fischer had always been supportive, even telling Der Spiegel that Schröder “will go down in the history books as a great chancellor.”

    But since their coalition government collapsed in 2005, Schröder’s controversial work has led to an ever-more-public breach between the former allies. Less than one month before leaving the chancellorship, Schröder used his office to guarantee a $1.4 billion loan (later turned down) for a Kremlin-backed natural gas pipeline that would connect Russia to Germany via the Baltic seabed. Then, just days after stepping down, Schröder accepted a senior post with the pipeline consortium run by Russia’s state gas monopoly Gazprom. The deal was a huge scandal inside Germany, where Schröder had already been known for years as Genosse der Bosse — “comrade of the bosses.”

    The chancellor’s move to the Kremlin energy payroll inspired a wave of alarm in Europe over its potentially dangerous dependence on Russia for natural gas. Moscow supplies about a third of the European Union’s gas — Europe’s preferred heating source — and some of its countries are 100 percent dependent on Russia. What’s more, Europe’s annual gas consumption is set to rise 40 percent by 2030, further stoking those fears about Russia. Several times in recent years, the Kremlin has abruptly cut off gas deliveries after disputes with key transit countries such as Ukraine, leaving millions of Europeans shivering in the winter cold.

    Schröder had been reliably pro-Russia while in office, even famously calling the KGB-spy-turned-president Vladimir Putin a “flawless democrat.” Although Fischer did not criticize his boss publicly at the time, more recently he has been openly dismissive. Schröder’s idea of Putin as a democrat, Fischer told the Wall Street Journal, “was never my position.” Asked later by Der Spiegel what he found “most objectionable” about Schröder’s tenure, Fischer replied succinctly: “His position on Russia.”

    This summer, Fischer made the breach with Schröder official: He signed up with a rival consortium — energy companies from Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria that have joined together to build the $11 billion Nabucco natural gas pipeline. Nabucco would bring gas from Middle Eastern and Caspian fields across Turkey’s Anatolian plateau, and north into Europe. The pipeline is backed and partly funded by the EU and is strongly supported by the United States. Perhaps most importantly, Nabucco would completely bypass Russia. Such an energy strategy, Fischer has argued, is urgently needed to stop Moscow’s “divide-and-conquer politics.”

    Moscow, not surprisingly, is pulling out all the stops to scuttle the project. It is seducing pliant politicians and resorting to old-fashioned bullying, especially in the states that Nabucco transits. It is acquiring stakes in European energy companies, often through questionable shell companies, that could complicate Nabucco’s completion. It is buying up natural gas in Central Asia and the Caspian, even paying up to four times more than in previous years, to deny supplies to Nabucco. And it has proposed a rival pipeline, called South Stream, which would flow from Russia across the Black Sea to Bulgaria and the Balkans and fork, with one spur running west to Italy and the other north to Austria.

    In many ways, Schröder and Fischer personify the intense struggle — some call it a war — over Europe’s energy future. On one side are those countries most worried about their dependence on Moscow, especially the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. On the other are countries such as Italy and Germany and leaders such as Schröder, who see closer ties with Russia as both a mercantilist opportunity and a strategic imperative. When I caught up with Schröder at a conference in Houston earlier this year, he was quick to brush aside concerns about Moscow. “There is no reason to doubt the reliability of Russia as a partner,” Schröder said. “We must be a partner of Russia if we want to share in the vast raw material reserves in Siberia. The alternative for Russia would be to share these reserves with China.”

    This gas war is especially hard-fought because of the physical nature of the prize itself. Unlike oil, which can be put onto tankers and shipped anywhere, gas is generally moved in pipelines that traverse, and are thus tethered to, geography. Because a pipeline cannot be rerouted, producers and consumers sign long-term agreements that bind one to the politics of the other, as well as to the transit states in between. In this way, today’s gas war is a zero-sum conflict similar to the scramble for resources that divided Eurasia in the 19th century. And now, as then, commerce is taking a back seat to politics.

    That is what I found when I set out this spring to travel the pipeline routes, encountering along the way a rogue’s gallery of cynical politicians, murky middlemen, insistent executives, and innumerable technocrats, each eager to shape the decision. But the real question that will determine Nabucco’s future — a question vividly on display in every country the pipeline will touch — is whether Europe has the stomach to fight as hard for its interests as Russia does for its own.

    One evening in 2002 in Vienna, a small group of Austrian energy executives took their colleagues from Turkish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Romanian firms to see a rarely performed Verdi opera. It recounted the plight of Jews expelled from Mesopotamia by King Nebuchadnezzar. The officials had spent the day sketching out a plan for a 2,050-mile pipeline that could transport up to 1.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas every year across their countries and into European markets. The sources of this gas would not be Russia, but Azerbaijan, maybe Iran one day, and with a U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein looking increasingly likely, possibly the gas fields of northern Iraq. The opera they attended that night was called Nabucco, and that is the name they gave their pipeline.

    The original impetus for the project was just business: The Turks and Austrians saw it as a way to get new supplies of gas from the Caspian and Middle East — not to mention lucrative transit fees for moving it across their territories into Europe. But politics soon entered into it, as Nabucco won early moral support from Russia skeptics in Central and Eastern Europe. They saw the pipeline as a historic opportunity to build a new lifeline to the West while weakening Russia’s grip on them. Many worried, as former Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar wrote, that “Russian leaders regard their energy assets as tools of foreign-policy leverage and envisage a future in which resource competition may be resolved by military means.” The main energy firms in Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary — all countries that would host Nabucco — signed on to help build the pipeline.

    The big powers of Western Europe, however, were less dependent on Russian gas and far less willing to antagonize Moscow by bringing non-Russian gas into Europe through former Soviet satellites. Italy, under Silvio Berlusconi, and Germany, under both Schröder and his successor Angela Merkel, dragged their feet on Nabucco. France, with its nicely diversified supply of energy, had little appetite for changing the status quo. Together, these countries blocked any effort within the European Union to allocate funding for Nabucco or even make support for the pipeline a common policy. This resistance infuriated the European Union’s newest members, and it still rankles. “The EU role has been weak,” Mihaly Bayer, Hungary’s special representative for Nabucco, told me. “The EU coordinator for Nabucco, Jozias van Aartsen, simultaneously serves as the mayor of The Hague!” Bayer thundered when we talked in his Budapest office. “When I assumed my post, I sent him multiple letters offering my assistance. I even spent two days in The Hague trying to meet with him. He ignored me.”

    This east-west deadlock held until 2006, when events started to push in Nabucco’s favor. The reason had everything to do with Ukraine, which has clashed repeatedly with Russia in recent years.

    Eighty percent of natural gas from Russia travels to Europe through Ukraine, across an energy infrastructure built by the Soviet Union after the 1956 Hungarian uprising. The main pipelines converge in Ukraine before fanning out into Eastern Europe, and were key to the Kremlin’s strategy of controlling its Warsaw Pact satellites. The route went through Ukraine because Soviet planners never imagined a day when Ukraine would not be ruled by Moscow. But when that day did arrive, on Aug. 24, 1991, Russia’s hold on Ukraine did not end. It just grew more complex, and gas remained a central means of control.

    How this unfolded was explained to me in Kiev by Bohden Sokolovsky, an energy advisor to Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, over a breakfast of vodka, blintzes, and cigarettes. It all came down to two things, Sokolovsky said, “Otkat and deriban” — roughly translated, kickbacks and theft. As Soviet assets and state-run energy companies were privatized in Ukraine in the 1990s, apparatchiks and businessmen on both sides of the border concocted elaborate schemes to get in on the action. They manipulated prices and parceled out kickbacks. The deals were “obviously corrupt,” recalled a senior advisor to former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. “But it was a great deal for Ukraine.”

    Many Europeans disliked their dependence on Ukraine. “The very basis of the gas business in Ukraine is graft,” Vaclav Bartuska, the Czech Republic’s ambassador at large for energy security, told me. But the desire to do something about it only really materialized with the gas disputes that broke out between Ukraine and Russia after the 2004 Orange Revolution. Ukrainian protesters had just successfully contested an election marred by fraud and voter intimidation, ultimately preventing the Kremlin-favored candidate from taking power. Soon after, the new president, Yushchenko, sought to steer Ukraine into a Euro-Atlantic orbit. This was a direct threat to Russia’s influence over its main point of entry into European gas markets. So Putin countered that if Ukraine wanted to be a Western country, it would have to pay the far higher Western price for gas. When Kiev refused to pay those higher prices in the winter of 2006, Moscow shut off gas shipments to its neighbor for four days, denying fuel to millions of other Europeans as well.

    “It wasn’t until the 2006 gas crisis that the rest of Europe actually started to care about what was going on in Ukraine,” recalled Bartuska, who mediated yet another dispute between Russia and Ukraine this January. Many more Europeans began to view Russia not as a reliable supplier of gas but as an aggressive petrostate that privileged its political organizations over its commercial obligations.

    Almost overnight, support for Nabucco grew dramatically throughout Europe. But the gas shut-offs also added new impetus to Nabucco’s Russian-backed rival, South Stream. Whereas Nabucco’s supporters saw warning signs in Ukraine about Russian aggression, others saw a corrupt, untrustworthy transit state disrupting Russia’s reliable supply of gas. As Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s ambassador to NATO, put it: “It’s clear that if Europe wants to have guaranteed natural gas supplies, as well as oil in its pipelines, then it cannot fully rely on its wonderful ally, Mr. Yushchenko.” The Italian energy company Eni led the way, signing on to South Stream in 2007.

    And then, of course, there is Germany, where Gerhard Schröder is hardly Russia’s only friend. At the same Houston conference where I saw Schröder, I attended a small breakfast for energy company officials and experts. At the first mention of transit security, Reinier Zwitserloot, a spry German of about 60, shot up and shouted, “The most reliable transit state is the Baltic!” He went on: “As far as I am concerned, Nabucco is nothing but an opera!” I later learned that Zwitserloot had recently been awarded the Order of Friendship of the Russian Federation, Moscow’s highest honor for non-Russian citizens.

    In this opera, Turkey has been cast in one of the leading roles. With its indispensable geographic position between the oil and gas reserves of Iraq, Iran, and the Caspian, it is an absolute certainty that Turkey will host major pipelines sooner or later. If Nabucco succeeds, Turkey could be the biggest winner, both economically and geopolitically — a fact not lost on Russia or Europe. Or Turkey.

    Until the gas wars began, Turkey had a weak hand: It had been rebuffed for EU membership and depended on Russia for a majority of its natural gas. But now, with the country’s gas demand skyrocketing and Turkish supply contracts with Russia set to expire, Turkey has not been shy in reminding Europe that it has options. “What is important is to gain natural gas,” said Taner Yildiz, Turkey’s minister of energy. But doing it through Nabucco, he added, “is not obligatory.” Turkey’s ambassador to the United States has pointedly called the EU “the biggest impediment to progress on Nabucco’s development.”

    When I sat down in late April with Cuneyd Zapsu, a founding member of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party and a longtime counselor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, he was openly frustrated with Europe’s wavering about the pipeline. “Turkey has been ready to sign the deal,” he told me. “But every time the consortium agrees, [our Nabucco partners] throw a new term in.”

    Zapsu understands Turkey’s delicate but fortuitous position. “Everyone is trying to make Turkey the enemy,” he said. But shifting his gaze out the window and down onto the Bosporus where Europe and Asia meet, Zapsu just smiled. “Everyone loves us.”

    The mood is less one of love than of fear in several other countries where Nabucco would run, as Russia has aggressively stepped up its efforts to block the pipeline. Next door to Turkey in Bulgaria — the poorest member of the EU and a transit state for both the Nabucco and South Stream pipelines — Ognyan Minchev, head of the Institute for Regional and International Studies, told me how Moscow threatened the Bulgarians in 2006. Scrap an agreement with Gazprom and sign a new contract with higher prices for Russia and lower transit fees for Bulgaria, they were told, or else the gas would be cut off. “The Bulgarian government is obedient to Russia,” Minchev said. “Bulgaria has put the entire energy system in Russian hands.”

    Further along the Nabucco route, in Hungary, Laszlo Varro has similar fears. At dawn one day in April, the tall Hungarian led his small dog around a hilltop park overlooking Budapest, recounting how the Russian energy giant Surgutneftegaz had recently acquired a decisive stake in the Hungarian energy firm MOL, where Varro is head of strategy. “It is one of the least transparent energy companies — in Russia,” he said. Varro’s concern, he explained, is that no one really knows who is behind Surgutneftegaz — or rather, he quickly added, that “everyone knows who is behind the company since no one knows.” Others in Hungary suspect the same, and one major newspaper spelled it out in a recent headline: “Mr. Putin, Declare Yourself.”

    Surgutneftegaz is run by Vladimir Bogdanov, an oligarch who managed Putin’s 2000 presidential campaign in western Siberia. The secretive Surgutneftegaz has offered almost twice the market value for its shares in MOL. Varro and others see a sinister reason for this seemingly illogical behavior: MOL is a Nabucco consortium member, and by buying this stake, Surgutneftegaz can cut off funding for the pipeline and cripple it in Hungary.

    Russian firms are making similar acquisitions in Austria, which is the proposed end of the road for both Nabucco and South Stream. Centrex Europe Energy & Gas, an opaque gas trading firm with ties to Gazprom, makes its money buying cheap gas from Russia and reselling it for profit in Austria. The German magazine Stern recently traced Centrex’s profits back to a company registered to a phony address at a drab Soviet-style housing block in Russia. And yet, Centrex recently entered into a partnership with Gazprom Germania to take a 20 percent stake in Austria’s Baumgarten trading platform and storage facilities, where the two rival pipelines will literally terminate. Considering that Gazprom already holds a 30 percent share in Baumgarten, this means that Russia’s state-run energy company now controls half of the most important gas storage and distribution system in central Europe — and the future terminus of Eurasia’s competing southern pipelines.

    Not every country in Europe is so concerned about Russia, however. In Serbia, I was installed at the far end of a conference table opposite Mrakic Dusan, the state secretary for energy and mines. After an initial back and forth, Dusan interrupted me. “Where are the hard questions?” he demanded. So I asked him if Serbia is inviting unacceptable risks by signing a partnership with Gazprom. “We have a great contract with Russia,” Dusan insisted. I asked him if he worries that Gazprom has an unsound financial and strategic position. “After 2030, only Russia, Qatar, Iran, and Turkmenistan will still have gas. With Russia in control, this ‘gas-OPEC’ will control world supplies.” Dusan rubbed his chin as he spoke, revealing a large fancy watch. I asked where he got it. Smirking, he responded before the translator could finish.

    “Putin.”

    For the last few years, veteran U.S. diplomat Steven Mann, the State Department’s coordinator for Eurasian energy diplomacy, watched as Americans and Europeans struggled to turn Nabucco from grandiose idea to gas-delivering reality. But when he finally left the job earlier this year, he told author Steve LeVine to beware “Nabucco hucksterism” — a condition he defined as occurring when political enthusiasm for an energy deal gets out too far ahead of its commerical viability. “There have been quite a number of officials who know very little about energy who have been charging into the pipeline debate,” Mann told LeVine. “Nabucco is a highly desirable project, don’t get me wrong. But there are other highly desirable projects besides Nabucco,” he added. “And the overriding question for all these projects is, Where’s the gas?”

    For Nabucco to be initially viable, most energy experts agree, the gas will need to come from the former Soviet state of Azerbaijan — 283 billion cubic feet of gas per year, to be precise, roughly 25 percent of the pipeline’s capacity. Indeed, without Azerbaijan and its major natural gas supplies, Nabucco is a non-starter.

    Russia knows this too, so it has been doing everything in its power to deny Nabucco gas from Azerbaijan, buying it to replenish Russia’s declining production. In April, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev hosted Azeri President Ilham Aliyev in Moscow to discuss Russian purchases of Azerbaijan’s gas. And then in June, they inked an agreement in which Azerbaijan promised to sell Russia up to 500 million cubic feet of gas — at well over market rate — from its offshore gas field, Shah Deniz.

    If there were still any doubt about how far Russia would go to fight for its interests in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan need only look at Georgia, which is still reeling from Russia’s invasion last summer. It is the key transit state between Azerbaijan and Turkey, hosting two pipelines that bring oil and gas from the Caspian to Turkey. By attacking its small neighbor, Russia effectively warned not only Georgia but the whole neighborhood.

    But in recent months, Nabucco’s European supporters have started to get their acts together, and Azerbaijan has begun to take notice of that, too. In May, the EU signed a deal of its own with Azerbaijan, which committed to building energy and trade links directly with Europe. This was arguably a more valuable agreement than the one Azerbaijan later signed with Gazprom, which offered not money but only vague pledges that may or may not be met.

    Then, on July 13, beneath the crystal chandeliers of an Ankara hotel ballroom, the prime ministers of Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria signed a Nabucco treaty describing exactly how the pipeline would operate and how tariffs would be calculated. Several days after the announcement that Nabucco had hired Joschka Fischer, who is beloved by many in Turkey for his passionate support for its EU membership, Turkey had dropped a major demand that it had insisted on for months, and the path to the deal was cleared. This was a major breakthrough, and it led Natig Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s energy minister, to remark: “I am sure that the project will be realized successfully.” When that day comes, Azerbaijan will enjoy both higher prices for its gas and a lifeline to the West.

    Also in attendance in Ankara was Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, whose country looks increasingly likely to play a large role in supplying Nabucco — possibly larger than that of Azerbaijan. By some estimates, Iraq could provide more than 500 billion cubic feet of natural gas per year by 2014, when Nabucco is expected to be up and running. All of the major players — Arab Iraqis, Kurdish Iraqis, and the Turks next door — want to see Iraqi gas heading north through Turkey and into Europe. Recently, a Hungarian and an Austrian energy firm, both Nabucco consortium members, made deals to take 10 percent apiece in the $8 billion Pearl Petroleum gas project in Iraqi Kurdistan. It now seems distinctly possible that a pipeline named after Nebuchadnezzar, the ancient ruler of Babylon, might ultimately owe its success to Iraq.

    When Gerhard Schröder signed on with Gazprom in 2005, the smart money in the gas war was on Moscow. Now that picture is changing, if slightly. There is a sense that the Kremlin overplayed its hand both in the gas shut-offs to Ukraine and in the Georgia war last summer. Indeed, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden recently echoed this view of Russia’s energy power play. “[Russia’s] actions relative to essentially blackmailing a country and a continent on natural gas, what did it produce?” he pointed out. “You’ve now got an agreement [Nabucco] that no one thought they could have.” At the same time, the global recession has hit Russia particularly hard, and Gazprom’s profits fell 84 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008, making it Russia’s biggest debtor, rather than the world’s biggest company, as it once bragged it would become.

    And Nabucco’s European supporters finally seem to be taking their own side in this fight. They now have a heavyweight rainmaker in Fischer, who is going toe to toe with his old boss Schröder in the struggle for influence in the path of the pipelines. The recent EU agreement with Azerbaijan and the fanfare-laden treaty signing in Turkey are contributing to the sense that Europe is leveling the playing field with Russia. “We have started to confound the skeptics, the unbelievers,” European Commission President José Manuel Barroso said in July. “Now that we have an agreement, I believe that this pipeline is inevitable rather than just probable.”

    And yet, if recent experience teaches anything, it is not to count Russia out, especially when so much is at stake. When I raised this issue with Russian Energy Minster Sergei Shmatko at a meeting in Bulgaria in April, he shot me a threatening glare and cautioned against planning for an energy future without Russia, unless the Europeans were fully prepared to deliver it. “We have an expression in Russia,” Shmatko told me. “Don’t sell the skin off a bear before you kill it.”

  • The War That Was, The World War That Might Have Been

    The War That Was, The World War That Might Have Been

    Politicizing Ethnicity: US Plan to Repeat Yugoslav Scenario in Caucasus

    by Rick Rozoff

    Global Research, August 15, 2009

     

     

    caucususethnic
    CLICK HERE TO ENLARGE
    Copyright. John O’Laughlin, University of Colorado, Boulder

    Matthew Bryza has been one of the U.S.’s main point men in the South Caucasus, the Caspian Sea Basin and Central Asia for the past twelve years.

    From 1997-1998 he was an advisor to Ambassador Richard Morningstar, coordinating U.S. efforts in the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as in Southeastern Europe, particularly Greece and Turkey. Morningstar was appointed by the Clinton administration as the first Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Assistance to the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union in 1995, then Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy in 1998 and was one of the chief architects of U.S. trans-Caspian strategic energy plans running from the Caspian Sea through the South Caucasus to Europe. Among the projects he helped engineer in that capacity was the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan [BTC] oil pipeline – “the world’s most political pipeline” – running from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey and the Mediterranean Sea.

    Trans-Caspian, Trans-Eurasian Energy Strategy Crafted In The 1990s

    In 1998 Bryza was Morningstar’s chief lieutenant in managing U.S. Caspian Sea energy interests as Deputy to the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, where he remained until March of 2001, and he worked on developing what are now U.S. and Western plans to circumvent Russia and Iran and achieve dominance over the delivery of energy supplies to Europe.

    Morningstar later became United States Ambassador to the European Union from 1999-2001 and this April was appointed the Special Envoy of the United States Secretary of State for Eurasian Energy, a position comparable to that he had occupied eleven years earlier.

    In 2005 the George W. Bush administration appointed Bryza Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs under Condoleezza Rice, a post he holds to this day although he will soon be stepping down, presumably to become the U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan, the nation that most vitally connects American geostrategic interests in an arc that begins in the Balkans, runs through the Caucasus to the Caspian Sea and then to Central and South Asia.

    Last June Bryza delivered a speech called Invigorating the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership in Washington, DC and reflected on his then more than a  decade of work in advancing American energy, political and military objectives along the southern flank of the former Soviet Union. His address included the following revelations, the first in reference to events in the 1990s:

    “Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev welcomed international investors to help develop the Caspian Basin’s mammoth oil and gas reserves. Then-Turkish President Suleyman Demirel worked with these leaders, and with Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, to develop a revitalized concept of the Great Silk Road in the version of an East-West Corridor of oil and natural gas pipelines.

    “Our goal was to help the young independent states of these regions [the Caucasus and Central Asia] secure their sovereignty and liberty by linking them to Europe, world markets, and Euro-Atlantic institutions via the corridor being established by the BTC and SCP [South Caucasus Pipeline natural gas]pipelines….The Caucasus and Central Asia were grouped with Turkey, which the Administration viewed as these countries’ crucial partner in connecting with European and global markets, and with Euro-Atlantic security institutions.

    “[C]ooperation on energy in the late 1990’s formed a cornerstone of the U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership, resulting in a successful ‘first phase’ of Caspian development anchored by BTC for oil and SCP for gas.

    Iraq War Part Of Previous Geopolitical Plans

    “Today, we are focusing on the next phase of Caspian development, looking to the Caspian Basin and Iraq to help reduce Europe’s dependence on a single Russian company, Gazprom, which provides 25 percent of all gas consumed in Europe.

    “Our goal is to develop a ‘Southern Corridor’ of energy infrastructure to transport Caspian and Iraqi oil and gas to Turkey and Europe. The Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) and Nabucco natural gas pipelines are key elements of the Southern Corridor.

    “Potential gas supplies in Turkmenistan and Iraq can provide the crucial additional volumes beyond those in Azerbaijan to realize the Southern Corridor. Washington and Ankara are working together with Baghdad to help Iraq develop its own large natural gas reserves for both domestic consumption and for export to Turkey and the EU.” [1]

    Bryza took no little personal credit for accomplishing the above objectives, which as he indicated weren’t limited to a comprehensive project of controlling if not monopolizing oil and natural gas flows to Europe but also in the opposite direction to three of the world’s four major energy consumers: China, India and Japan. Since the delivery of the presentation from which the above is quoted the U.S. and its Western European NATO allies have also launched the Nabucco natural gas pipeline which intends to bring gas from, as Bryza mentioned, Iraq and also eventually Egypt and possibly Algeria to Turkey where Caspian oil and gas will arrive via Azerbaijan and Georgia.

    Energy Transit Routes Used For Military Penetration Of Caucasus, Central And South Asia

    Previous articles in this series [2] have examined the joint energy-geopolitical-military strategies the West is pursuing from and through the sites of its three major wars over the past decade: The Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan.

    Bryza himself made the connection in the above-cited speech of last year:

    “The East-West Corridor we had been building from Turkey and the Black Sea through Georgia and Azerbaijan and across the Caspian became the strategic air corridor, and the lifeline, into Afghanistan allowing the United States and our coalition partners to conduct Operation Enduring Freedom.” [3]   

    His work and his political trajectory – paralleling closely that of his fellow American Robert Simmons [4], former Senior Advisor to the United States Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs on NATO and current NATO Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia and Deputy Assistant Secretary General of NATO for Security Cooperation and Partnership – has continued through four successive U.S. administrations, those of George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and now Barack Obama, and has taken him from the American embassy in Poland in 1989-1991 to that in Moscow in 1995-1997 to positions in the National Security Council, the White House and the State Department.

    While in his current State Department role Bryza has not only overseen trans-Eurasian, tri-continental energy projects but has also been the main liaison for building political and military ties with the South Caucasus nations of Georgia and Azerbaijan and he remains the U.S. co-chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group monitoring the uneasy peace around Nagorno Karabakh, one of four so-called frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union.

    Although Azerbaijan is one of the interested parties in the conflict and the nation’s president, Ilham Aliyev, routinely threatens war to conquer Karabakh, often in the presence of top American military commanders, aside from being a supposed impartial mediator with the Minsk Group Bryza in his State Department role secured the use of an Azerbaijani air base for the war in Afghanistan. In 2007 he stated, “There are plenty of planes flying above Georgia and Azerbaijan towards Afghanistan. Under such circumstances we want to have the possibility of using the Azeri airfield.” [5]

    Bryza also recently announced that U.S. Marines were heading to Georgia to train its troops for deployment to Afghanistan where in the words of a Georgian official “First of all, our servicemen will gain combat experience because they will be in the middle of combat action, and that is a really invaluable experience.

    “Secondly, it will be a heavy argument to support Georgia’s NATO aspirations.” [6]

    Oil For War: US, NATO Caucasus Clients Register World’s Largest Arms Build-Ups

    During his four-year stint as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs he has focused on the South Caucasus, and during that period Georgia’s war budget has ballooned from $30 million a year when U.S.-educated Mikheil Saakashvili took power after the nation’s “Rose Revolution” in 2004 to $1 billion last year, a more than thirty fold increase.

    In the same year, 2008, Azerbaijan’s military spending had grown from $163 million the preceding year to $1,850,000,000, more than a 1000% increase. In the words of the nation’s president last year, “And it will increase in the years to come. The amount envisaged in the 2009 state budget will be even greater.” [7]

    Much of the money expended for both unprecedented build-ups came from revenues derived from oil sales and transit fees connected with the BTC pipeline Bryza was instrumental in setting up.

    Pentagon’s Role In Last August’s Caucasus War

    Regarding neighboring Georgia, a German press report on the second day of last August’s war between that nation and Russia stated that “US Special Forces troops, and later US Marines replacing them, have for the last half decade been systematically training selected Georgian units to NATO standards” and “First-line Georgian soldiers wear NATO uniforms, kevlar helmets and body armour matching US issue, and carry the US-manufactured M-16 automatic rifle….” [8]

    On the first day of the war the Chairman of the Russia’s State Duma Security Committee, Vladimir Vasilyev, denounced the fact that the Georgian President Saakashvili “undertook consistent steps to increase [Georgia’s] military budget from $US 30 million to $US 1 billion –  Georgia was preparing for a military action.” [9]

    An Armenian news source the same day detailed that “Most of Georgia’s officers were trained in the U.S. or Turkey. The country’s military expenses increased by 30 times during past four years, making up 9-10 per cent of the GDP. The defense budget has reached $1 billion.

    “U.S. military grants to Georgia total $40.6 million. NATO member states, including Turkey and Bulgaria, supplied Georgia with 175 tanks, 126 armored carriers, 67 artillery pieces, 4 warplanes, 12 helicopters, 8 ships and boats. 100 armored carriers, 14 jets (including 4 Mirazh-2000) fighters, 15 Black Hawk helicopters and 10 various ships are expected to be conveyed soon.” [10]

    “The procurement in recent years of new military hardware and modern weapons systems was indeed in line with Georgia’s single-minded commitment to joining NATO.” [11]

    In addition to the country’s standing army the Saakashvili regime has introduced a 100,000-troop reserve force, also trained in part by NATO.

    In 2006 Saakashvili mandated a system of universal conscription in which “every man under 40 must pass military trainings” [12] and every citizen should “know to handle arms and if necessary should be ready to repel aggression.” [13]

    Ten months later the government announced “a doctrine on total and unconditional defense” and that “service in the reserve troops would be compulsory for every male between the ages of 27 to 50.” [14]

    Matthew Bryza and his colleagues in the State Department and the Pentagon have served American and NATO interests in the South Caucasus and adjoining areas well over the past decade.

    First US-Backed War In The South Caucasus: Adjaria

    On August 10 Bryza, “who, as he himself put it, was a more frequent guest to Georgia than any other U.S. official,” [15] was awarded the Order of the Golden Fleece by Georgia’s Saakashvili in Tbilisi.

    “Saakashvili thanked Bryza for assistance rendered in 2004 while solving problems in Adjaria.” [16]. The allusion is to events early in that year when Saakashvili, flanked by then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, was inaugurated president after the putsch that was called the Rose Revolution and introduced his party flag as that of the nation, which as British journalist John Laughlin remarked at the time had not been done since Hitler did the same with the swastika in 1933.

    Less than two months later Saakashvili threatened to invade the Autonomous Republic of Adjaria (Adjara), which had been de facto an independent country, and to “shoot down my plane” as Adjarian president Aslan Abashidze reported.

    An Agence France-Presse report in March of 2004 said, “The situation was made all the more explosive because Russia has a military base in Adjara….Saakashvili warned in televised comments that ‘not a single tank can leave the territory of the base. Any movement of Russia’s military equipment could provoke bloodshed.’” [17]
     
    An all-out war was only avoided because Russia capitulated and even flew Abashidze to Moscow, after which it withdrew from the Adjarian base.

    Bryza’s assistance to the Saakashvili government has also extended to backing it in its armed conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which in the second case escalated into all-out war a year ago.

    State Department Passes The Baton To Veteran Balkans Hand

    Now Bryza, the nominal mediator, is going to pass his role as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs to Tina Kaidanow.

    But he will continue until next month as the US co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group on Nagorno Karabakh, where as recently as August 12 he met with Azerbaijani President Aliyev and either arbitrarily expanding the format of discussions or combining his dual functions he also discussed “bilateral relationship between Azerbaijan and the United States, energy cooperation and regional and international issues.” [18]

    It was also Bryza who recently announced that U.S. Marines were headed to Georgia to train troops for the war in Afghanistan. “Matt Bryza, the outgoing US deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs, said the US would provide training and equipment for Georgian servicemen bound for Afghanistan.” [19]

    As seen earlier, a Georgian official said of the development that “First of all, our servicemen will gain combat experience because they will be in the middle of combat action, and that is a really invaluable experience,” [20] which training under fire could only be intended for future combat operations against Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia.

    Bryza has also played a role in attempting to insinuate European Union and American observers into the South Caucasus conflict zones.

    His successor in the State Department position, Kaidanow, possesses a political curriculum vitae which provides insight into what can be expected from her.

    This April, before getting the nod to replace Bryza, Kaidanow said “I worked in Serbia, in Belgrade and in Sarajevo, then in Washington, and I went back to Sarajevo and am now in Kosovo. I don’t know where my next challenge will be. It is under discussion.” [21]

    Ms. Kaidanow is a veteran Balkans hand. She “served extensively in the region, as Special Assistant to U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill in Skopje [Macedonia] 1998-1999, with specific responsibilities focused on the crisis in Kosovo….” [22] Before that she served in Bosnia from 1997-1998.

    Prior to that her first major post in the U.S. foreign policy apparatus began under President Bill Clinton, where she served as director for Southeast European Affairs at the National Security Council.

    Kaidanow: From Rambouillet To Ambassador To Kosovo

    After transitioning from advising the National Security Council on the Balkans to implementing the U.S. agenda there, Kaidanow attended the Rambouillet conference in February of 1999 where the American delegation headed by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright threw down the gauntlet to Yugoslavia with the infamous Appendix B ultimatum and set the stage for the 78-day war that began on March 24.

    From 2003-2006 she was back in Bosnia, this time as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy, from where she departed to become the Chief of Mission and Charge d’Affaires at the U.S. Office in Kosovo from July 2006 to July 2008; that is, while the Bush administration put the finishing touches to the secession of the Serbian province which resulted in the unilateral independence of Kosovo in February of 2008. Despite concerted pressure from Washington and its allies, a year and a half later 130 of 192 nations in the world refuse to recognize its independence and those who do include statelets like Palau, the Maldives, the Federated States of Micronesia, Samoa, San Marino, Monaco, Nauru, Liechtenstein and the Marshall Islands, presumably all paid handsomely for their cooperation.

    Last year the Bush administration appointed Kaidanow the first U.S. ambassador to Kosovo, a post she took up on July 18, 2008.

    Reproducing Kosovo In Russia’s Southern Republics

    On August 12 Russian political analyst Andrei Areshev spoke about her new appointment in reference to the lingering tensions over Nagorno Karabakh which pit Azerbaijan against Armenia and warned that “it is an attempt to sacrifice [Nagorno Karabakh’s] interests to Azerbaijan’s benefit and in regard to Moscow to give a second wind to the politicization of ethnicity in the North Caucasus with the possibility of repeating the ‘Kosovo scenario,’” [23] adding that the same threat would also target Iran.

    By the North Caucasus Areshev was referring to the Russian republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia and North Ossetia where extremist secessionist violence has cost scores of lives in recent months, including those of leading officials. The writer’s message was not that the U.S. would simply continue its double standard of recognizing Kosovo’s secession while arming Georgia and Azerbaijan to suppress the independence of Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh and South Ossetia – none of which “seceded” from anything other than new post-Soviet nations they has never belonged to – but that a veteran of the U.S. campaign to fragment and ultimately destroy Yugoslavia may be planning to do the same thing with Russia. As the author added, “the existing realities in the Caucasus, including the existence of three de facto states, two of which are officially recognized by Russia, still create plenty of opportunities to build different combinations, which would ultimately
    result in a long-term military and political consolidation of the United States in the region.” [24]

    With reference to Areshev including Iran along with Russia as an intended target of such an application of the Yugoslav model, the clear implication is that the West could attempt to instigate separatist uprisings among the nation’s Azeri, Arab and Baloch ethnic minorities in an effort to tear that nation apart also.

    It is the politicizing of ethnic, linguistic and confessional differences that was exploited by the West to bring about or at any rate contribute to the dissolution of Yugoslavia into its federal republics and then yet further on a sub-republic level with Kosovo and Macedonia (still in progress).

    Having worked under the likes of Christopher Hill and later Richard Armitage in the Rice State Department, Kaidanow surely knows how the strategy is put into effect. Much as does her former Balkans colleague Philip Goldberg, U.S. ambassador to Bolivia until that nation expelled him last September for fomenting subversion and fragmentation there based on the Balkans precedent.

    Only a week before the announcement of Kaidanow’s transfer from supervising the “world’s first NATO state” (as a former Serbian president called it) in Kosovo, where the U.S. has built its largest overseas military base since the Vietnam War, Camp Bondsteel, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov again warned of the precedent Kosovo presented and admonished nations considering legitimizing it through diplomatic recognition to “think very carefully before making this very dangerous decision that has an unforeseeable outcome and is not good for stability in Europe.” [25]

    The situation Kaidanow will enter into is one in which a year ago a war had just ended and currently others threaten.

    A Year Later: Resumption Of Caucasus War Threats

    A year after the beginning of the hostilities of 2008, August 8, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev warned:

    “Georgia’s actions in the Trans-Caucasian region continue to cause serious anxieties. Georgia does not stop threatening to restore its ‘territorial integrity’ by force.

    “Armed forces are concentrated at the borders near Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and provocations are committed.” [26]

    On August 1 the Russian Defense Ministry expressed alarm over renewed Georgian shelling of the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali and stated: “Events in August 2008 developed in line with a similar scenario, which led to Georgia unfolding military aggression against South Ossetia and attacking the Russian peacekeeping contingent.” [27]

    Two days later South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity announced that “Russian troops will hold drills in the republic. These will be preventive measures, everything will be done in order to ensure security and keep the situation under control.” [28]

    The following day Andrei Nesterenko, spokesman for Russia’s Foreign Ministry, said that “Provocations from the Georgian side ahead of the anniversary of the August events last year are not stopping. In connection with this, we have stepped up the combat readiness of Russian troops and border guards.” [29]

    On August 5 Russian Duma Deputy Sergei Markov wrote:

    “Western countries’ accountability for the war in South Ossetia is not recognized altogether. Politically, the West, primarily NATO, supports Saakashvili, and this support made him confident in the success of his military venture. Moreover, during the war preparations and onset of combat, high-ranking officials in Washington did not answer their telephone calls although they must have been in the office at 9 p.m. and 10 p.m. Moscow time….

    “The U.S. Congress did not make any inquiry into the conduct of Vice President Dick Cheney or presidential nominee John McCain during the start of the war. Georgian troops were equipped with NATO weapons, and trained in line with NATO standards.” [30]

    At the same time the above-mentioned Andrei Nesterenko also said that “Georgia continues to receive Western arms and help in modernizing its army….Lasting peace…is way, way off. Over the past 12 months, the Georgians were responsible for about 120 firing incidents. Over the past seven days alone, South Ossetian villages came under Georgian mortar attacks multiple times.” [31]

    As a reflection of how thoroughly Georgian leader Saakashvili is an American creature and how inextricably involved Washington has been and remains with all his actions, a commentary of early this month reminded readers that:

    “Under George Bush, Washington already committed itself to put all Georgian bureaucrats on its payroll, having paid a little more than $1 billion as a compensation for Saakashvili’s small war. The first tranche of $250 million has already been transferred….[A] considerable part of these funds will be allocated for compensation and salaries of government officials of all ministries…. In other words, all of Georgia’s government officials are already on the U.S. payroll, a fact which nobody even tried to conceal during the last few years of Bush’s term.” [32]

    Russia wasn’t alone in attending to the anniversary of the war. A U.S. armed forces publication reported a year to the day after its start that “U.S. European Command has its eyes firmly focused on the volatile Caucasus region, where tensions between Georgia and Russia continue to mount on the anniversary of last year’s five-day war….[C]ommanders are on guard for any sign of a repeat.

    “[W]ith Georgia prepared to commit troops to the effort in Afghanistan as early as 2010, pre-deployment counterinsurgency training will be taking place. EUCOM also will be working with the Georgians to develop the Krtsanisi National Training Center outside of Tbilisi into a modern pre-deployment combat training center….Following the war, EUCOM conducted an assessment of Georgian forces, which uncovered numerous shortcomings related to doctrine and decision-making.” [33]

    Last year’s war began immediately after the completion of the NATO Immediate Response 2008 military exercises which included over 1,000 American troops, the largest amount ever deployed to Georgia. The day after the drills ended Georgia shelled the South Ossetian capital and killed several people, including a Russian peacekeeper.

    The War That Was, The World War That Might Have Been

    What a resumption of fighting between Georgia and South Ossetia will entail is indicated by an examination of the scale of the catastrophe that was narrowly averted a year ago.

    A few days ago the government of Abkhazia shared information on what Georgia planned had its invasion of South Ossetia proven successful. The plan was to, having launched the war on the day of the Olympic Opening Ceremony in Beijing while world attention was diverted, have Georgian troops and armor rapidly advance to the Roki Tunnel which connects South Ossetia with the Russian Republic of North Ossetia and prevent Russia from bringing reinforcements into the war zone.

    Then a parallel assault on Abkhazia was to be launched. The government of Abkhazia documented Georgia’s battle plans earlier this week, stating “the attack could have been carried out from the sea and from the Kodori Gorge, where Georgian special forces were building their heavily fortified lines of defense.

    “Most people in Abkhazia were almost certain that if Georgia succeeded in
    conquering Tskhinvali, their republic would have been next….Military intelligence issued a warning that the Georgian army was planning to
    invade Abkhazia from the sea. Another possibility was that the enemy would come from the Kodori Gorge, an area that Georgian special forces entered in 2006, violating international peace agreements.

    “On August 9 last year, the Abkhazian army launched a preventive attack against Georgian troops in the Kodori Gorge.” [34]

    Last week Abkhazian Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba demonstrated that Georgia was not alone in the planned attack on and destruction of his nation when he said “[W]e have always emphasized that the U.S. bears considerable responsibility for the events that took place in August 2008 in South Ossetia.

    “Therefore, we do not trust the Americans. All these years the U.S. has been arming, equipping and training Georgian troops and continues to do so, again restoring military infrastructure, and again preparing the Georgian army for new acts of aggression.

    “What were the American instructors training the Georgian army for here, on Abkhazia’s territory, at the upper end of the Kodori Gorge? For an attack on Abkhazia.” [35]

    An August 7 report from an Armenian news source substantiated that the plans for last August’s war were on a far larger scale than merely Georgia’s brutal onslaught against South Ossetia in an attempt to conquer and subjugate it and later Abkhazia. Stating that neighboring Azerbaijan was simultaneously planning for a war against Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh, a political analyst was quoted as saying, “Armenia would be in a state of war should Georgia’s plan not have failed in 2008,” adding that “last year Azerbaijan thrice attempted attacks on the NKR [the Nagorno Karabakh Republic], yet the attempts were frustrated thanks to NKR forces.” [36]

    A coordinated attack by Georgia on South Ossetia and Abkhazia and by Azerbaijan on Nagorno Karabakh would have led to a regional conflagration and possibly a world war. As indicated above, Armenia would have been pulled into the fighting and the nation is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) along with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

    A week ago the secretary general of the CSTO, Nikolai Bordyuzha, was quoted as asserting:

    “How will the CSTO react if Azerbaijan wants to get back Nagorno Karabakh in a military way and war begins between Azerbaijan and Armenia?”

    “The 4th term of the Collective Security Treaty says that aggression against one member of Collective Security Treaty Organization will be regarded as aggression against all members.” [37]

    Even if the CSTO had not responded to an Azerbaijani assault on Karabakh which would have ineluctably dragged member state Armenia into the fighting as it was obligated to do, Turkey would have intervened at that point on behalf of Azerbaijan and being a NATO member could have asked the Alliance to invoke its Article 5 military assistance clause and enter the fray. Russia would not have stood by idly and a war could have ensued that would also have pulled in Ukraine to the north and Iran to the south. In fact the U.S. client regime in Ukraine had provided advanced arms to Georgia for last year’s conflict and threatened to block the return of Russian Black Sea fleet ships to Sevastopol in the Crimea during the fighting.

    Along with synchronized attacks on South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh, Ukraine may well have been ordered to move its military into the site of the fourth so-called frozen conflict, neighoring Transdniester, either in conjunction with Moldova or independently.

    A year ago Russian maintained (and still has) peacekeepers in Transdniester, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and, while not in Karabakh, also in Armenia. Over 200 Russian soldiers were killed and wounded in the fighting in South Ossetia and if those numbers had been matched or exceeded in three other battle zones Russian forbearance might have reached its limits quickly.

    After Yugoslavia, Afghanistan And Iraq: Pentagon Turns Attention To Former Soviet Space

    In June of 2008 the earlier quoted Russian analyst Andrei Areshev wrote in article titled “The West and Abkhazia: A New Game” that “The prevention of a military conflict is Russia’s priority, but it is not a priority for our ‘partners.’

    “This should not be forgotten….As for experiments undertaken by the United States that acted so ‘perfectly’ in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, they do not spell any good.” [38]

    Two months before he had written “The U.S., the ground having slipped from under its feet in Iraq and Afghanistan, is now preoccupied with
    gaining control over the most important geopolitical regions in the post-Soviet territory – Ukraine, Transcaucasia and Central Asia….

    “The regions of Transcaucasia, integrated in NATO, Georgia in the first place (especially in case of the successful annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia), will serve U.S. interests aimed at destabilization of the North Caucasus.” [39]

    Last week a group of opposition Georgian scholars held a round table discussion in the nation’s capital and among other matters asserted:

    “The whole August war itself…served the interests of the US. The Americans tested Russia’s readiness to react to military intervention, while at the same time ridding Georgia of its conflict-ridden territories so it could continue its pursuit of NATO membership.

    “[H]ad Russia refrained from engaging its forces in the conflict, the nations [republics] of the Northern Caucasus would have serious doubts about its ability to protect them. This would in turn lead to an array of separatist movements in the Northern Caucasus, which would have the potential to start not only a full-scale Caucasian war, but a new world war.” [40]

    What the West’s probing of Russia’s defenses in the Caucasus may be intended to achieve and what the full-scale application of the Yugoslav model to Russia’s North Caucasus republics could look like are not academic issues.

    Armed attacks in the republics of Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia have been almost daily occurrences over the last few months. In June the president of Ingushetia, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, was seriously wounded in a bomb attack and two days ago the republic’s Construction Minister was shot to death in his office.

    Similar armed attacks on and slayings of police, military and government officials are mounting in Dagestan and Chechnya.

    The shootings and bombings are perpetrated by separatists hiding behind the pretext of religious motivations – in the main Saudi-based Wahhabism. Until his death in 2002 the main military commander of various self-proclaimed entities like the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the Caucasus Emirate was one Khattab (reputedly born Samir Saleh Abdullah Al-Suwailem), an ethnic Arab and veteran of the CIA’s Afghan campaign of the 1980s, who also reportedly fought later in Tajikistan and Bosnia.

    Assorted self-designated presidents and defense ministers of the above fancied domains have been granted political refugee status by and are living comfortably in the United States and Britain.

    That plans for carving up Russia by employing Yugoslav-style armed secessionist campaigns are not limited to foreign-supported extremist troops was demonstrated as early as 1999 – the year of NATO’s war against Yugoslavia – when the conservative Freedom House think tank in the United States inaugurated what it called the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya. By the middle of this decade its board of directors was composed of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alexander Haig, Steven Solarz, and Max Kampelman.

    Members included the three main directors of the Project for the New American Century: Robert Kagan, William Kristol and Bruce P. Jackson. Jackson was the founder and president of the US Committee on NATO (founded in 1996) and the chairman of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq (launched months before the invasion of that nation in the autumn of 2002).

    Other members of the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya included past CIA directors, National Security Advisers, Secretaries of State and NATO Supreme Allied Commanders like the previously mentioned Zbigniew Brzezinski and Alexander Haig and James Woolsey, Richard V. Allen and a host of neoconservative ideologues and George W. Bush administration operatives with resumes ranging from the Committee on the Present Danger to the Project for the New American Century like Morton Abramowitz, Elliott Abrams, Kenneth Adelman, Michael Ledeen, Richard Perle, Richard Pipes and Norman Podhoretz.

    The American Committee for Peace in Chechnya has evidently broadened its scope and is now called the American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus. Its mission statement says:

    “The American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus (ACPC) at Freedom House is dedicated to monitoring the security and human rights situation in the North Caucasus by providing informational resources and expert analysis. ACPC focuses on Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Adygeya, as well as the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia.”

    Abkhazia and South Ossetia are of course in the South Caucasus and not in Georgia except in the minds of those anxious to expel Russia from the Caucasus, North and South, and transparently have been included as they are targets of designs by U.S. empire builders to further encircle, weaken and ultimately dismantle the Russian Federation.

    Russian political leadership has been reserved if not outright compliant over the past decade when the U.S. and NATO attacked Yugoslavia, invaded Afghanistan and set up military bases throughout Central and South Asia, invaded Iraq in 2003, assisted in deposing governments in Yugoslavia, Georgia, Adjaria, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan to Russia’s disadvantage and brazenly boasted of plans to drive Russia out of the European energy market.

    But intensifying the destabilization of its southern republics and turning them into new Kosovos is more than Moscow can allow.

    Notes

    1) U.S. Department of State, June 24, 2008
    2) Black Sea: Pentagon’s Gateway To Three Continents And The Middle East
       https://www.globalresearch.ca/black-sea-pentagon-s-gateway-to-three-continents-and-the-middle-east/12400
       Eurasian Crossroads: The Caucasus In US-NATO War Plans   
       https://www.globalresearch.ca/eurasian-crossroads-the-caucasus-in-us-nato-war-plans/13101
       Azerbaijan And The Caspian: NATO’s War For The World’s Heartland
       https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-conquest-of-eurasia-nato-s-war-for-the-world-s-heartland/13938
       West’s Afghan War And Drive Into Caspian Sea Basin
       https://www.globalresearch.ca/military-escalation-from-afghanistan-to-the-caspian-sea-and-central-asia/14316
    3) Ibid
    4) Mr. Simmons’ Mission: NATO Bases From Balkans To Chinese Border
       https://www.globalresearch.ca/nato-bases-from-the-balkans-to-the-chinese-border/12554
    5) PanArmenian.net, March 31, 2007
    6) Russian Information Agency Novosti, August 6, 2009
    7) AzerTag, January 1, 2008
    8) Deutsche Presse-Agentur, August 9, 2008
    9) Russia Today, August 8, 2008
    10) PanArmenian.net, August 8, 2008
    11) The Financial, June 27, 2008
    12) Prime News (Georgia), August 10, 2006
    13) Civil Georgia, April 2, 2007
    14) Civil Georgia, December 7, 2006
    15) Civil Georgia, August 11, 2009
    16) Trend News Agency, August 11, 2009
    17) Agence France-Presse, March 14, 2004
    18) AzerTag, August 12, 2009
    19) Rustavi 2, August 11, 2009
    20) Russian Information Agency Novosti, August 6, 2009
    21) World Investment News, April 22, 2009
    22) Azeri Press Agency, August 12, 2009
    23) PanArmenian.net, August 12, 2009
    24) Ibid
    25) Black Sea Press, August 6, 2009
    26) Itar-Tass, August 8, 2009
    27) Russian Information Agency Novosti, August 1, 2009
    28) Interfax, August 3, 2009
    29) Daily Times (Pakistan), August 5, 2009
    30) Russian Information Agency Novosti, August 5, 2009
    31) Voice of Russia. August 5, 2009
    32) Russian Information Agency Novosti, August 6, 2009
    33) Stars and Stripes, August 8, 2009
    34) Russia Today, August 9, 2009
    35) Russian Information Agency Novosti, August 4, 2009
    36) PanArmenian.net, August 7, 2009
    37) Azeri Press Agency, August 6, 2009
    38) Strategic Culture Foundation, June 12, 2008
    39) Strategic Culture Foundation, April 18, 2008
    40) Russia Today, August 7, 2009

     

     

    Rick Rozoff is a frequent contributor to Global Research.

    https://www.globalresearch.ca/caucasus-the-war-that-was-the-world-war-that-might-have-been/14779