Category: Russian Federation

  • Iran drops Russia for Turkey

    Iran drops Russia for Turkey

    Tuesday, 17 November 2009

    Meir Javedanfar: As Ayatollah Khamenei sidles up to Recep Tayyip Erdogan, he could learn from Turkey’s leader about balancing his alliances

    Ayatollah Khamenei

    The famous Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu, wrote in his book, The Art of War: “If an enemy has alliances, the problem is grave and the enemy’s position strong; if he has no alliances, the problem is minor and the enemy’s position weak.”

    Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is currently witnessing how the US, which he sees as the enemy for his nuclear ambitions, is working hard on building alliances, including with Russia. Khamenei is not happy.

    So much so that Iran recently cancelled a deal with Russia to launch its communication satellite, and turned to Italy instead. This is in addition to recent complaints from Tehran regarding delays from Russia in the delivery of the S-300 anti-aircraft system. Until recently, Tehran kept its complaints away from the cameras and behind closed doors. But now that Khamenei sees the Russians as disloyal, his regime is not shy about airing its criticism publicly.

    The Iranian government has decided to take the initiative and to look for a new partner to replace the Russians. Judging by the recent flurry of visits between Tehran and Ankara, it seems that Khamenei has found a willing partner in Turkey.

    Unlike Russia, Turkey does not have a veto in the UN security council. However, its stock in the Middle East and the Islamic world is certainly rising. Its prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is being seen more and more as a credible defender of Islamic and Arab issues. Many people on the Arab street respect his leadership, as he was elected in a genuinely democratic elections. The same can not be said about Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak, or King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who received their posts undemocratically.

    Erdogan’s relations with the US and the EU also count in his favour. Although he has recently been getting closer to his Muslim and Arab regional neighbours, he has not severed his ties with the west, but is masterfully playing both sides. His relations with the US are also not based on Turkey’s weaknesses. On one occasion, he resisted US pressure and even walked away from a promise of $6bn in grants and $20bn loan guarantees, because he did not find the agreement suitable. And his verbal attacks on Israel after the recent Gaza war have certainly helped his image in the region.

    Now that Khamenei has turned down Barack Obama’s nuclear offer, he feels that the prospect of sanctions is greater. Therefore, he needs a change of strategy to deal with the expected difficult time ahead. One strategy is to turn his struggle against Obama into a new west v Islam confrontation. Judging by the recent international TV debate in Qatar, where Iran’s nuclear programme was discussed in front of a select audience from the Middle East, there certainly is sympathy for his position. As far as many people in the region are concerned, Iran’s nuclear programme is the only way to counter Israel’s superior balance of power. Therefore this is a viable strategy. And Erdogan’s rising popularity in the region, and Tehran’s improving relations with his administration, will be a feasible way for Khamenei to improve his own position during the difficult times ahead. The absence of progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace track will also help him.

    However, the Iranian supreme leader should be careful about how he approaches his relations with Turkey and the price he is willing to pay for it, both at home and abroad. According to the Iranian news website Khabar online, the Ahmadinejad government concluded a secret gas agreement with Turkey in late October, without informing parliament. After the news was recently leaked to the press, parliament launched a full investigation. There are now discussions about cancelling the whole deal if, as the members of parliament say, it is found to be against the country’s interests. Many people suspect that Khamenei offered the deal in unfavourably good conditions to Ankara, as a means of buying its loyalty. Judging by its results it seems to have worked. However, the domestic backlash could damage the legitimacy of his regime even further.

    There is also the issue of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Turkey can not complete it. Only Russia can. Khamenei turning his back on Moscow could be even more detrimental to this important and expensive project. Perhaps Khamenei could learn from the Turks, and instead of constantly changing one ally for another learn to balance his alliances.

    UTV

  • Turkey warm to storing Iranian uranium

    Turkey warm to storing Iranian uranium

    Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz said on Friday that if asked, his country would be willing to temporarily store Iran’s enriched uranium to help defuse a standoff over Western suspicions that Teheran is trying to build an atomic bomb.

    Yildiz stated that storing low-level enriched uranium in Turkey would not pose a problem, adding that although such a request had not been made, the issue was still being discussed.

    If asked, he concluded, “we would not say no.”

    The idea that Turkey could play a role in the crisis was raised in an American television interview by IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei, who noted that Turkey, a Muslim country and a NATO member, has good relations with both neighboring Iran and the US.

     

    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after a press conference in Istanbul, Monday.
    Photo: AP

    Iranian Chief of Staff Hassan Firouzabadi spoke later on Friday in support of the proposals to ship most of Teheran’s low-enriched uranium stockpile abroad for further processing, AFP reported, quoting the Mehr news agency.

    The initiative will prove that the country’s “peaceful nuclear activities” are “bona fide,” Firouzabadi was quoted as saying.

    Iran’s chief of staff also urged Russia to ship the S-300 surface-air missile system to Teheran in accordance with a contract signed between the two countries months ago, PressTV reported.

    According to the report, Firouzabadi expressed confusion over Moscow’s six-month delay. “Don’t Russian strategists realize Iran’s geopolitical importance to their security?” the general was quoted as saying.

    The system would significantly boost Iran’s defense capabilities, especially against aircraft.

  • STREAMS TAKING DOWN OBSTACLES

    STREAMS TAKING DOWN OBSTACLES

    Tribuna
    October 29, 2009

    Fortunately, Russia has powerful allies in Europe nowadays
    Author: Giulietto Chiesa
    SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE THE PRESENCE OF MIND TO DISREGARD WASHINGTON’S ORDERS IN THE MATTER OF ENERGY COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

         As soon as Nord Stream negotiated all bureaucratic and
    technological obstacles, Europe and the United States initiated
    debates or, rather, mounted a campaign aiming to circumvent the
    whole project. It was then that Premier Vladimir Putin organized
    informal meetings with his Italian counterpart Silvio Berlusconi
    and Gerhard Schroeder of Germany.
         Nord Stream is the largest project Moscow designed in years.
    It is a gas pipeline across the Baltic Sea to Germany that will
    spare Russia inconveniences of transit via Ukraine. Victor
    Yuschenko’s reign made the situation absolutely intolerable. The
    so called Orange Revolution put Kiev under Brussels’ and
    Washington’s protective wing and set it on a course into NATO via
    the European Union. In other words, it fomented a deliberate
    confrontation with Moscow. Why would Russia continue to try and
    appease Kiev? Past friendship is kaput. Besides, not even all of
    Europe is prepared to put up with the Ukrainian blackmailers. That
    their methods lack finesse is putting it mildly. Whenever gas
    bound for Europe disappears somewhere in Ukraine, Moscow turns the
    valve. As a result, both Kiev and Europe remain without gas. Sure,
    it costs Russia too but what really counts is that Europe is
    swindled out of one fourth of the gas it needs.
         Moscow’s pragmatic policy secured it another prospective
    buyer, one who desperately needs all energy it can lay its hands
    on. This new customer can well reroute the channels still going to
    the West in its own direction. The matter concerns China, of
    course. Gas pipelines to China are already built.
         In other words, Putin has found someone interested and
    prepared to pay. Nord Stream in the meantime costs more than 10
    billion euros. Germany was the first country where the Kremlin’s
    voice was finally heard. Ex-Chancellor Schroeder became the head
    of the project. Frau Merkel backed him. Sarkozy in France wants
    his slice of the pie too. There is South Stream as well, an
    alternative to Nabucco. South Stream will send Russian gas via the
    Black Sea to Bulgaria, Balkans, Greece, Italy. Putin’s plans found
    enthusiastic supporters in official Rome – Berlusconi and Eni. So,
    there is a new situation to be taken into account. It is in
    Moscow’s power now to deliver gas, Russian and Central Asian, to
    Europe without fearing that Ukraine will pull something off.
         Needless to say, official Washington does not take to all
    these developments. Pretty well forgotten, Jimmy Carter’s National
    Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski raised his voice again.
    Washington plainly announced that Moscow was out to divide West
    and East Europe. Its satellites joined the critical chorus.
    Estonia began complaining that the Baltic states had been
    “ignored”. A bunch of exes (former heads of states and
    governments) condemned Moscow for the intention “to restore its
    sphere of influence”. All projects promoted by Moscow seek to
    undermine economic stability of East Europe – that’s the most
    popular tune in East European capitals, these days. The Kremlin is
    condemned for what is called “energy blackmail”.
         But why wouldn’t Brussels itself rearrange gas in accordance
    with market realities? Russia will keep exporting gas in any
    event. East Europeans claim that Moscow has planned some foul play
    and that demands will be put forth soon enough. Sikorski in Warsaw
    went so far as to equate Nord Stream with the Molotov-Ribbentrop
    Pact. (To listen to these guys, construction of gas pipelines must
    be thwarted no matter what.) European allies sing hosannah to
    Nabucco, a project lobbied by the United States. Nabucco is about
    giving Russia the mitten and having the Central Asian work for the
    West. Besides, Nabucco is to be built across Turkey and Georgia.
    By and large, that’s a great plan, but… but Putin and Medvedev
    have already struck back. They have powerful (not to say decisive)
    allies in Europe now.
         Some events of considerable magnitude and importance are
    bound to follow. Since Putin, Berlusconi, and Schroeder decided to
    meet informally in St.Petersburg, it can only mean that a
    counteroffensive is about to be mounted.
         

    Translated by Aleksei Ignatkin

  • Crimean Tatar Leader Claims FSB Behind Murder Plan

    Crimean Tatar Leader Claims FSB Behind Murder Plan

    F630A4F1 99CD 4E14 BDEA B370DEB67210 w393 sMustafa Dzhemilev (center) said he knows from diplomatic sources about FSB plans to have him killed.
    October 29, 2009
    KYIV — Crimean Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev says he believes Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) is behind a special operation to assassinate him, RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service reports.

    Two members of the Islamist group At-Takfir wal-Hidjra were arrested on October 26 during a special operation in several parts of the Ukrainian region.

    Leaders of the movement are alleged to have issued a fatwa to kill Dzhemilev and some of his associates for their criticism of radical Islam.

    Dzhemilev told RFE/RL that members of a radical Islamic movement who were recently arrested “could hardly” initiate such an assassination plan.

    Dzhemilev said the spiritual direction of the Crimean Muslims and radical Islamist organizations share a “mutual enmity.” He added that radical Islamists have nothing in common with Islam and should be called extremists.

    But Dzhemilev said he knows from diplomatic sources about FSB plans to have him killed. He said “some states who are not interested in allowing democratization in Ukraine” might be sponsoring the extremist Islamic organizations.

    Ukrainian Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko said the arrested members of the Islamist group are refusing to talk. He said they refuse to recognize Ukrainian laws and say they are subordinate only to their religion.

    Crimean police chief Gennady Moskal told RFE/RL that an estimated 100 members of extremist organizations are active in Crimea. He said security forces are searching for At-Takfir wal-Hidjra’s leader.

    Moskal added that some refugees from Uzbekistan join up with Ukrainian extremist organizations.

    He said he does not believe there is “a Russian trace” in any assassination plan for Dzhemilev.

    Dzhemilev, who is the chairman of the Crimean Tatar Assembly and spent many years in the gulag as a Soviet dissident, had previously called on the Ukrainian government to allow the 33 Crimean Tatar parliament members to carry arms due to threats from Islamic extremists.

    https://www.rferl.org/a/Crimean_Tatar_Leader_Claims_FSB_Behind_Murder_Plan/1864556.html
  • JOINING BATTLE FOR CRIMEA

    JOINING BATTLE FOR CRIMEA

    RUSSIA IS LOSING THE BATTLE OVER THE CRIMEA TO WASHINGTON AND BRUSSELS
    Author: Tatiana Ivzhenko
    [The European Union vies for clout with the Crimea.]

    Nezavisimaya Gazeta
    October 20, 2009

    The European Union joins the Russian-American backstage battle for
    the Crimea. Web site of the Ukrainian government posted a brief
    note to the effect that implementation of the EU’s Joint
    Initiative of the Commonwealth in the Crimea was going to begin
    right after election of the president. The program in question
    included investment projects in all economic and social spheres.
         Sources in the government claim that European countries’ plan
    of actions on the peninsula was already charted and that its
    endorsement was scheduled for spring 2010. Each EU participant
    will be put in charge of some particular sphere like economic
    development (Great Britain), environmental protection (Sweden),
    and civil society (the Netherlands). Finland, Germany, Hungary,
    Poland, Lithuania and, perhaps, Estonia are prepared to join the
    program too. Kiev counts on up to 12 million euros worth of
    investments in the Crimea in 2010 alone. Gunnar Wiegand who
    represents the European Commission in the project recently met
    with the government of Ukraine. He informed the Ukrainians that
    the European Union regarded the Crimea as an extremely important
    region, “one with a powerful potential for all of Europe”.
         As far as Senior Deputy Premier Alexander Turchinov was
    concerned, the new Crimean project meant rapid rapprochement with
    Europe and a wholly new level of relations with it.
         “The project is of paramount importance for the government of
    Ukraine and for Yulia Timoshenko… particularly at the onset of
    the presidential campaign,” Konstantin Bondarenko of the Gorshenin
    Institute of Management Issues confirmed. “It offers them an
    opportunity to show that the Crimea is part of Ukraine and, also
    importantly, that Ukraine is a country to invest in.” Bondarenko
    recalled that President Leonid Kuchma had approached the Russians
    with analogous ideas in 2002 – 2003 [with the idea of joint
    investments in development of the peninsula]. “Unfortunately, I
    cannot call the Russians particularly enthusiastic or energetic,”
    he said. “At the very least, I do not think much of the economic
    results of the Russians’ activeness. The impression is that they
    erroneously made an emphasis on politics but people cannot be
    expected to last long on slogans alone.”
         Vladimir Kazarin of the Sevastopol administration seconded
    this opinion. “It is clear now that Russia is losing the battle
    for influence with the Crimea. It was Russia and the United States
    vying for clout with the peninsula once, but no longer. The
    European Union is joining them too, these days, and Brussels makes
    an emphasis on investments rather than on politics.”
         Kazarin pointed out that the new player moved in just as
    Russia was losing ground. “We witness these days what would have
    been considered impossible barely a year ago,” he said. “We see
    pickets with anti-Russian slogans and posters in front of the
    Black Sea Fleet HQ. What counts is that these protest actions are
    organized by Black Sea Fleet’s ex-employees. I can only surmise
    that the Russian authorities are not informed, that they do not
    grasp long-term political consequences of the current underfunding
    of the Black Sea Fleet… when 8,000 employees including 1,000
    officers are to be laid off, when wage arrears mount along with
    debts to Sevastopol’s department of public works and to the
    pensions foundation. The situation is challenging indeed. Anyone
    capable of solving economic problems of Sevastopol and, broader,
    all of the Crimea will earn the locals’ gratitude,” Kazarin said.
         Neither did the United States withdraw from the battle for
    the peninsula. Establishment of a diplomatic mission or
    information bureau in Sevastopol was suggested this spring but
    protests from the population and the local authorities persuaded
    Washington to table the idea then. It is on the agenda again,
    these days. It is the US Consulate General that the Americans want
    to set up in the Crimea now. “The way I see it, problems were
    encountered because the Crimean authorities had deliberately gone
    too far in their efforts to make the whole matter political,”
    Vladimir Nalivaichenko of the Ukrainian Security Service said.
    “What can be so political about an American mission? We all see
    how the Russian Consulate General operates in the Crimea.
    Diplomats were the first to arrive, followed by Russian
    businesses, capitals, and so on.”
         Valery Chaly of the Razumkov Center did not think that the
    Americans could really count on unproblematic existence in the
    Crimea. The population was thoroughly suspicions of all and any
    Washington’s initiatives concerning the peninsula, he said. Not so
    the EU’s initiatives which the locals never associated with
    politics.
         Political scientists meanwhile comment that Russia does not
    even try to counter these Western moves. Crimean pro-Russian
    organizations complain of the lack of support. The Russian
    Community of the Crimea, Russian Bloc, Russian Crimea, Tavria
    Alliance, Faith, Crimean Civil Activists, and Crimean Russian
    Youth Center set up a coordinating council. This body will chart a
    common strategy and coordinate joint efforts aimed at “promotion
    of the Russians’ legitimate rights and interests.”
         One of the activists explained that interests of the Russians
    were vulnerable and needed promotion because “the Ukrainian
    authorities and their Western patrons are determined to drive the
    Black Sea Fleet out of the Crimea while everyone is distracted by
    the crisis.” The activist commented that the news of the EU’s
    initiatives was released in the midst of fresh scandals involving
    the Black Sea Fleet. Ukrainian media outlets reported movement of
    the fleet’s units and forces – allegedly to training grounds – the
    Ukrainian authorities had never been notified of in advance. Local
    nationalists appealed to the authorities to confiscate military
    hardware of the Black Sea Fleet for violation of the terms of
    presence specified by Ukrainian-Russian agreements.
         Ukrainian experts point out that Moscow deliberately refuses
    to acknowledge the latest scandals involving the fleet and the
    Ukrainian organizations that volunteer to promote interests of
    Russia. Political scientists agree that political actions are
    pointless when there is an economic crisis to grapple with.
    Economic projects, ones that offer jobs, salaries, and security
    are the only thing capable of swaying public opinion. Economic
    projects are precisely what the European Union might beat the
    United States and Russia with.

  • AZERBAIJAN-RUSSIA GAS AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

    AZERBAIJAN-RUSSIA GAS AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

    October 15, 2009—Volume 6, Issue 189


    by Vladimir Socor

    On October 14 in Baku, Azerbaijan’s State Oil Company president Rovnag Abdullayev and Gazprom CEO Aleksei Miller signed an agreement on Azerbaijani gas exports to Russia. The move is a logical follow-up to the June 29 agreement, signed by the same company chiefsin the presence of Presidents Ilham Alyiev and Dmitry Medvedev in Baku on that occasion–about the main principles of the gas trade between the two countries (see EDM, July 2, 17).

    This agreement turns Azerbaijan for the first time in history from an importer of Russian gas into an exporter of gas to Russiaalbeit with small initial volumesthanks to growing internal production in Azerbaijan. If understood and handled appropriately by the European Union and Turkey, this event can lend impetus to the E.U.and U.S.backed Nabucco pipeline project, notwithstanding European media speculation about Russia pre-empting Nabucco’s Azerbaijani gas supplies.

    The documents just signed involve a framework agreement for the years 2010 to 2014 and a sale-and-purchase contract for 2010. During this first year Azerbaijan shall export at least 500 million cubic meters (mcm) of gas to Russia through the Baku-Novo Filya pipeline, for use in Russia’s North Caucasus territories. Azerbaijan may increase that export volume during 2010, at its discretion. The gas may originate in any of Azerbaijan’s fields (Trend Capital, Day.Az, October 14).

    The Russian purchase price is not publicly specified. According to Abdullayev at the signing ceremony, the price-setting formula “suits the Azerbaijani side” – apparently a hint that the price is in line with the anticipated European netback prices for 2010. This had been Baku’s objective all along in the negotiations on its gas priceUnder this agreement, the price is said to be adjustable every quarter, pegged to the price of the basket of oil products (APA, Turan, October 14). Miller had proposed to buy Azerbaijani gas at $350 per one thousand cubic meters in the lead-up to the June 29 preliminary agreement.

    Azerbaijan used to import Russian gas until as recently as 2006 through the old Baku-Novo Filya pipeline, which runs for approximately 200 kilometers along the Caspian Sea coast from the Russian border to Baku. This line will now be used in the reverse mode to carry Azerbaijani gas to Russia. The volume envisaged for 2010 will use only a fraction of this pipeline’s Soviet-era capacity. In addition, Azerbaijan is preparing its own section of the old Mozdok (Russia)-Gazimahomed pipeline, for possible reverse-use as a gas export outlet to Russia (Trend Capital, October 1).

    Gas extraction in Azerbaijan is set to reach 27 bcm for 2009 (Day.Az, October 8). The rate of increase could have been faster, but has been affected by slowed-down development at the giant Shah Deniz offshore field. That slowdown in turn reflects delays on the Nabucco pipeline project and Turkish government obstructions to a gas agreement with Azerbaijan. These two factors have postponed the opening of Azerbaijan’s gas export route to the West. In this situation, Azerbaijan can only open an export route to Russia while awaiting progress on Nabucco and with Turkey.

    Meanwhile, Azerbaijan remains committed to the Nabucco project. The government and the State Oil Company are consistently reaffirming Baku’s readiness to supply 7 bcm per year for that pipeline’s first phase. Construction work on Nabucco is now expected to start in 2011, for the first gas to flow by 2015 from Azerbaijan to Europe.

    Consequently, Baku has set the time-frame of the agreement just signed with Gazprom to expire in 2014, so as to release Azerbaijan from obligations to Gazprom after that year. Miller, however, declared at the signing ceremony explicitly that Russia wants to prolong this agreement after 2015, and for larger volumes of Azerbaijani gas (Interfax, October 14). That would pose risks for Nabucco. The October 14 agreement does not.

    This agreement, however, reiterates and amplifies certain lessons for the E.U., Turkey, and U.S. that were already implicit in the June 29 preliminary agreement. Azerbaijan’s move can actually help concentrate minds all-around on the Nabucco project, bearing the following considerations in mind.

    First, the volumes committed to Gazprom are meager and the time-frame does not impinge on the Nabucco project, assuming that Azerbaijan retains the necessary Western support to pursue Azerbaijan’s own Western choice. Awaiting Nabucco’s commissioning, it makes sense for Azerbaijan to use the existing pipeline(s) to Russia for exporting Azerbaijan’s growing surplus of gas during the interim period until 2014.

    Second, this agreement does not allow Gazprom to compete against Nabucco for Azerbaijani gas. But the situation could change in Russia’s favor, if Turkey’s AKP government insists on its extortionate terms for the purchase of Azerbaijani gas and its transportation through Nabucco. By the same token, Washington and the reshuffled European Commission, now entering a new term of office in Brussels, are being reminded that they need to lift that logjam in Ankara.

    Third, Baku’s agreement with Gazprom is a reminder to Ankara that Azerbaijan does not totally depend on the Turkish gas market or the Turkish gas transmission route. From Azerbaijan’s standpoint, adding a Russian export outletalbeit a small one–is an export diversification move, away from Turkey’s perceived monopoly on transportation, which the AKP government seeks to abuse. Azerbaijan can also use the Baku-Astara pipeline to Iran, or swap arrangements with that neighbor country, during the interim period until 2014.

    Fourth, Baku is successfully resisting Gazprom’s wish to re-export Caspian gas to third countries, at a profit to Russia and at the expense of Caspian producers. Baku has stipulated that its gas shall be used in Russia’s North Caucasus. And if the Russian purchase price is consistent with European netback pricesas envisaged at the time of the June 29 preliminary agreement and, apparently, in the October 14 agreement-Baku will have achieved a strategic gain. Turkey’s AKP government would place itself in an embarrassing position by insisting on worse terms than Russia has now consented to Azerbaijan. Across the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan will have set a useful precedent for Turkmenistan to also demand European netback prices from Gazprom. If the cash-strapped Gazprom fails to meet that benchmark, then a part of Turkmen export volumes would become available for the proposed trans-Caspian link to the Nabucco project.

    –Vladimir Socor