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Category: Russian Federation

Russian plant for Turkey’s Akkuyu

Turkey’s first nuclear power plant will be built, owned and operated by Russia after the two countries signed an agreement during a visit by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev to Ankara.

The deal, signed in front of Medvedev and Turkish prime minister Recep Erdogan, covers the construction of four 1200 MWe VVER units at the Akkuyu site on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. Unlike Russia’s previous overseas reactor construction projects, however, the plant will be built, operated and middlefinanced through a Russian project company. Russian state nuclear company Rosatom has been given until mid-August to create the subsidiary, which will initially be 100% Russian-owned. In the longer term, Russia may sell up to 49% of the company to other investors from Turkey and elsewhere, but will retain the 51% controlling stake. Turkish firm Park Teknik and state generation company Elektrik Uretim AS (EUAS) have been tipped as likely candidates eventually to take up significant shares in the $20 billion project.

Rosatom head Sergei Kiriyenko described the establishment of a Russian-owned reactor overseas as a long-sought after development, saying it was “much more interesting” to be a co-investor rather than simply the constructor of such projects.

The site for the reactors will be provided by EUAS. The Turkish Electricity Trade and Contract Corporation (TETAS) has guaranteed to purchase a fixed amount of the plant’s output (70% of the electricity generated by the first two units and 30% of that from the third and fourth reactors) over the first 15 years of commercial operation at a reported price of 12.35 US cents per kWh, with the rest of the electricity to be sold on the open market by the project company. The reactors are expected to enter service in the period 2016-2019, with the first one due to start up within seven years of receipt of a construction licence and the others following at yearly intervals.

The agreement also provides for Russia and Turkey to cooperate in other areas of the nuclear fuel cycle including the treatment of used nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, decommissioning and the possible construction of a Turkish nuclear fuel fabrication plant. However, such cooperation would be carried out under separate terms.

Both the Turkish and Russian parliaments must now ratify the agreement before it can come into force.

World Nuclear Watch

May 13, 2010
Russia says plans full visa-free travel with Turkey in long-term

Medvedev said that they targeted to apply a whole visa-free regulation with Turkey in long-term.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said on Wednesday that they targeted to apply a whole visa-free regulation with Turkey in long-term.

Earlier in the day, Turkish and Russian officials signed an agreement putting an end to visa procedures between the two countries. The agreement was signed between Turkish and Russian governments in capital Ankara, removing visa requirements for Turkish and Russian citizens to travel to each other’s countries.

Speaking at Turkey-Russia Business Forum in Ankara, Medvedev said that there was a high-level economic cooperation between Turkey and Russia.

Medvedev said that Turkey and Russia signed many agreements today, and the amount of investments was expected to exceed 25 million USD thanks to these agreements.

We can reach the figures of pre-economic crisis period, he added.

We target to reach 100 billion USD of trade volume between Turkey and Russia within the next few years, said Medvedev.

He noted that it was important to make investments in textile, food industries, chemical industry and agriculture too.

Medvedev said that visa requirement for tourists and businessmen was ended between Turkey and Russia today, adding that this was just a beginning. Medvedev said that they targeted to apply a whole visa-free regulation in long-term.

Noting that construction sector was on very good level in Russia, Medvedev said that many Turkish companies were operating in Russia in this sector. He added that the business volume of Turkish construction companies in Russia was nearly 30 billion USD.

Medvedev said that the investments were mutual, adding that the amount of Russian businessmen’s investments in Turkey reached billions of USD, and they were on technology and metal industry areas.

AA

May 13, 2010
Russia, Turkey call for Hamas inclusion

Russia and Turkey have called for the inclusion of the democratically elected Palestinian government of Hamas in Middle East peace talks.

“Unfortunately Palestinians have been split into two… In order to reunite them, you have to speak to both sides. Hamas won elections in Gaza and cannot be ignored,” Turkish President Abdullah Gul said during a joint press conference with his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev in Ankara on Wednesday.

“Undoubtedly, all parties to this problem should be included more actively (in the process) in order to reach a solution. The process should not exclude anyone,” he added.

Medvedev agreed with the idea that no group should be excluded from the peace process.

The Russian president urged the United States to work actively with other nations in the efforts to establish peace in the Middle East.

He also stated that a divided Palestinian administration could not help resolve the conflict.

Medvedev said the division “causes the Palestinians to regress.” He also warned that Gaza was “facing a human tragedy.”

Earlier on Tuesday, Medvedev was in Syria, where he met with Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Medvedev’s meeting with Meshaal and his later comments in Turkey received an angry response from the Israeli foreign ministry.

“The foreign ministry vehemently rejects the call from the presidents of Russia and Turkey to include Hamas in the peace process and expresses deep disappointment over the meeting between the president of Russia and Khaled Meshaal in Damascus,” it said in a statement issued on Wednesday.

However, that was not the only thing about Medvedev’s visits that upset Tel Aviv. In a phone conversation before Medvedev left for Syria, Israeli President Shimon Peres had asked him to convey a message to Assad.

But according to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Medvedev did not agree because it contradicted Moscow’s stance.

“We did not have a special need to implement this message because this is our position — to live in peace and solve issues on the basis of the international legal framework adopted by everyone and which should now be implemented by everyone,” Lavrov told AFP.

Press TV

May 13, 2010
Ankara-Yerevan Accords Point toward Armenia’s Withdrawal from the Occupied Territories

foto -geography.about.com

Gulnara Inandzh
Director
International Online Information Analytic Center Ethnoglobus
The emotions, whipped up by commentaries which followed the signing on October 10 of the protocols between Turkey and Armenia, have prevented a logical analysis of the situation. In order to begin such an analysis, we need to recognize that at the roots of the signing of these accords lie a multi-sided game of significance far beyond the South Caucasus region.

If at the outset, the opening of the borders with Armenia was one of the conditions on Turkey’s path toward joining the European Union, then at the present time, the rapprochement of the two countries depends on the geopolitical situation and Ankara’s participation in these processes. Immediately after the signing of the Turkish-Armenian accords, as one should have expected, the EU put forward some new demands for Turkey, about which the latter could not have but known about in advance. This means that Turkey signed the agreements with Armenia not as part of its effort to join the EU, something that provides one of the points of departure for understanding why Turkey decided to reach an agreement with Armenia.

At the same time, we must not ignore the pressures on Turkey both direct and behind the scenes. And those came from more places than just the capitals of the countries which were represented at the signing ceremony. (Here, we intentionally are not touching on the role of Israel in all these complicated political games, the situation around Iran, the transportation routes for Iraqi oil and the Kurdish element in Iraq, as each of these represent a distinctive subject for discussion).

Turkey, who bear the genetic code of the Ottoman Empire as far as great power games are concerned, will not agree to play the role of a defeated country even under the pressure of world powers. Ankara is not in such a weak geopolitical situation that it has to act in ways that harm its national interests. Not long ago, we should remember, Turkey felt itself strong enough to refuse the United States the right to use the military base at Incirlik for the supply of the anti-Saddam operations of the coalition forces in Iraq.

When pointing to the harm the protocols between Ankara and Yerevan create for Azerbaijan in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, one must not forget that the Armenian diaspora has terrorized Turkey with the issue of the so-called “Armenian genocide.” In its turn, Turkish diplomacy, which connects this question with the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict until recently took a position absolutely the same as Azerbaijan both because of their common Turkishness and because of Turkey’s own national interests. These two issues also served as a factor which united the Azerbaijani and Turkish diaspora, which resisted recognition of “the Armenian genocide” by pointing to the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani lands.

Viewed from that perspective, it would seem that Turkey, which has little to gain economically and politically by reaching an accord with Armenia, signed the protocols in a way that both undercut its own interests and angered its fraternal and strategic relationship with Azerbaijan.

Of course, in contrast to the 1990s, Azerbaijan today is not the weak “younger brother” who needs support but an equal state that is confident in its own forces and demands respect on that basis. This cannot entirely please the current Turkish powers that be, but it is not the occasion for a break with a reliable partner. Differences in the question of the transportation of Azerbaijani gas to Turkey also cannot be the subject for speculation on such a strategic question as the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border.

During the entire period of talks with Armenia, official representatives of Turkey at various levels repeated that the relationship Ankara sought would not harm the interests of Azerbaijan and that the Turkish-Armenian borders will not be opened until the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Among those who have constantly said this are Turkish President Abdulla Gul, Prime Minister Erdogan, Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoglu, members of the parliament, opposition figures and others both before and after the signing of the protocols.

At the same time, every step of Armenian-Turkish negotiations was discussed with Baku, and talks about the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue continued in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group.

And in this context, the declaration of Turkish President Gul concerning the impact in “a short time” of the Armenian-Turkish accords on “the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” merits attention and should calm many of the concerns in Azerbaijan.

At the present time, when Azerbaijan has acquired major geopolitical importance, ignoring its interests on such an important issue is impossible. Consequently, the interests of Baku were taken into consideration. Note that immediately after the signing in Switzerland of the Armenian-Turkish agreement Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev arrived in Zurich where the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was discussed. Further, a short time after the signing of the agreement with the very same mission, Tina Kaidanow, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia arrived in Baku, and in the framework of the meetings of the foreign ministers of the Black Sea countries, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met with President Ilham Aliyev and his foreign minister, Elmar Mammadyarov. And the visit to Baku of General Ishyk Koshaner, commander of Turkish ground forces, to meet with Azerbaijani Defense Minister Col. Gen. Safar Abiyev is yet another confirmation of this.

Taken together, it is clear that this cycle of visits was not a matter of chance.

And if there were any doubt about this, the reaction both within Armenian society and also in the diaspora to the accord which should allow Armenia to escape from the blockade has been negative. Evidently, Armenian society and politicians recognize that they will have to free the occupied territories, because otherwise no one intends to save Armenia. It is not accidental that after the signing of the Zurich agreement, all sides represented at the ceremony except for Armenian Foreign Minister Edvard Nalbandyan did not hide their satisfaction with what had taken place.

In other words, everything shows that the Zurich agreement will have a positive consequence on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Judging by the presence at the signing ceremony of the representatives of the OSCE Minsk Group, it is possible to assert that all interested sides are informed about this process and about its impact on the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

If under the pressure of the diaspora Armenia will not ratify the agreement, Azerbaijan and Turkey will return to where they were before. If the Turkish and Armenian parliaments all the same give legal force to the agreement, then Armenia will have to free Azerbaijani territories in order to secure the opening of the Turkish borders. Otherwise, Ankara, responding to public pressure in Azerbaijan and in Turkey will not be able to open the borders with Armenia. In that case, Azerbaijani and Turkish public opinion will be in a position to increase international pressure on Yerevan and the Armenian diaspora regarding the liberation of the occupied territories.

If Armenia does not follow through, then Turkey will always be in a position to find reasons to close the borders. In such a case, Azerbaijan will be left with only one choice – the liberation of the occupied territories by military means; and the countries involved in the division of spheres of influence in the region will have to agree with this. Otherwise Azerbaijan, using its status as “the most reliable country for the transportation of gas,” will have every reason for refusing to allow the Nabucco project to pass through its territory.

Every country has its own interests and priorities, and in this case, that means that there is no chance that Turkey will sacrifice its relations with Azerbaijan for new ties with Armenia.

May 6, 2010
Russian Patriarch Honors Armenia ‘Genocide’ Victims

Catholicos Garegin II (right) and Russian Patriarch Kirill lay a wreath at a monument to Russian soldiers killed in the Russo-Persian war in Yerevan.

March 17, 2010

YEREVAN — Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has honored the victims of what Armenians consider the first genocide of the 20th century.

During a visit to Yerevan, Kirill laid wreaths at Yerevan’s Armenian Genocide Monument, dedicated to the hundreds of thousands of Armenians who died in World War I-era mass killings by Turkish forces.

Russia is among the countries that recognize the killings as genocide, a term Turkey rejects.

Earlier, Kirill pledged to strengthen relations between the Russian and Armenian churches at the beginning of his three-day official visit.

Kirill and Catholicos Garegin II, the supreme leader of the Armenian Apostolic Church, were greeted by hundreds of believers and led a joint prayer service at the Armenian church’s main cathedral in Echmiadzin, near Yerevan, shortly after Kirill’s arrival in the Armenian capital on March 16.

“Every visitor to Armenia receives unforgettable impressions, looking at its main symbol, the holy Mount Ararat,” Kirill said in a speech.

He added that Russian-Armenian relations have been “warm and friendly” ever since modern-day Armenia was incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1828 as a result of a Russo-Persian war. He underlined the significance of that victory later in the day by visiting a memorial to Russian soldiers killed in that war.

Garegin, for his part, spoke of the Armenian people’s “total love of and warm feelings of gratitude toward the Russian [Orthodox] Church, the great Russian people, and the Russian state.”

A spokesman for Garegin, Vahram Melikian, told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service that the visit will “further strengthen” ties between the two churches, which both enjoy strong government support.

Russian analysts say that unlike his predecessor, Aleksy II, who died in 2008, Kirill is active in the political arena and keen to reach out to other
churches. Aleksei Makarkin, director of the Moscow-based Center for Political Technologies, likened him to experienced politicians who can “very quickly achieve their goals.”

Makarkin told RFE/RL that the 63-year-old patriarch has a cordial rapport with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

“Patriarch Kirill is undoubtedly an influential political figure in Russia, someone whose views the Kremlin takes into account,” he said.

The Armenian Apostolic Church is the oldest state church in the world.

https://www.rferl.org/a/Russian_Patriarch_Honors_Armenia_Genocide_Victims/1986689.html

March 17, 2010
Killing Two Birds With One Stone?

Gulnara Inandzh
Director
International Online Information Analytic Center Ethnoglobus

mete62@inbox.ru

RELATED INFO

https://www.turkishnews.com/ru/content/

Russia’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia complicated the ethnic situation in the entire Caucasus by creating favorable conditions for the exacerbation of ethnic self-consciousness among many groups and for the manipulation of some of these groups by various countries both in the region and beyond.

The activities of the Circassians who hope to unite the members of their ethnos into a single republic have attracted a great deal of attention, but developments in Samtskhe-Javakhetia, a Georgian region populated largely by ethnic Armenians have not, although for many reasons, what is going on there may have even greater immediate consequences.

At the start of this year, the Georgian authorities – as they have in the past sought to prevent the situation in Samtskhe-Javakhetia from getting out of hand – arrested several activists, who Armenians said are completely “innocent.” But almost at the same moment this exchange occurred, an unusual declaration by Dashgyn Gulmammadov, the president of the National Assembly of Azerbaijanis of Georgia, was released.

That declaration [1] called for Georgia to be transformed into a confederation of Georgians, Abkhazians and Ossetians. But despite its Azerbaijani origin, it did not call for ethnic Azerbaijanis to gain autonomy, limiting itself to the demand that in this new state, Azerbaijani should be one of the state languages. A similar idea surfaced during the Russian-Georgian war of last August. At that time, its authors were citizens of the Russian Federation and an ethnic Azerbaijani from Iran now living in Sweden.

And this declaration, by a strange coincidence appearing at the time of the Javakhetia events but one not strange at all if these groups are being manipulated by Moscow and Yerevan, also called for giving the ethnic minorities of Azerbaijan, in particular the Talysh, Avars and Lazgis, similar rights. By putting out such statements, those who issue them and even more the people who are orchestrating this hope to weaken and fragment Georgia and Azerbaijan and to limit the options of both Tbilisi and Baku.

Confirmation of this is provided by the following: During the most recent arrests in Samtskhe-Javakhetia, Armenian commentators hurried to accuse Azerbaijan of being behind events there. In this way, Yerevan sought to take steps to give it greater freedom of action in the future. First of all, since Javakhetia organizations, in the opinion of Georgian experts, are directed by the Armenian special services and Russia, then the shift in rhetoric toward Georgia regarding its citizens of Azerbaijani nationality beyond any doubt indicates who compiled the “Azerbaijani” declaration.

Moscow is interested in the further dismemberment of Georgia and consequently views the efforts of the Javakhetia Armenians as a completely logical next step. Azerbaijanis, on the other hand and as Georgians recognize, do not have separatist ambitions and remain loyal to the Georgian government. Changing that by a few declarations of the type cited above won’t shift them from that.

Consequently, it should be obvious that claims to the contrary are simply intended to provide cover for Armenian plans. Equally indicative of what is going on is that the exacerbating of the ethnic situation in Georgia has slowed the process of the return of Meskhetian Turks to their historical lands in Samtskhe-Javakhetia, a return that Armenians of that region oppose.

And the sponsors of this exploitation of ethnic minority aspirations have promoted their ideas via scholarly conferences about these communities, propaganda about the dangers of Pan-Turanism and the assimilation of peoples living in Azerbaijan, and the creation of websites which speak out in defense of the rights of ethnic communities living there, to name just a few. Lazgis, Udins, Tats, Jews, and Kurds who alongside Azerbaijanis and Turks at the beginning of the 20^th century were killed by the thousand by Dashnaks have suddenly been transformed into the brothers of the Armenians. Indeed, Armenian websites are ready to post materials about the interrelationships of the indigenous peoples of Azerbaijan with the power structure which exists in this republic and about the means of expanding relations between them and the Armenian people. [2]

The latest and especially gratuitous example of this involves the dissemination by the Armenian information agency Panarmenian.net of reports about “Jewish pogroms” in Sumgait this month, events which someone at the agency or somewhere else invented out of whole cloth. There were no such “pogroms.” But reports that they were, however false, may help the Armenian lobby in the United States to push through a Congressional resolution about the Armenian genocide. And it is possible that they were directed at complicating relations between Israel and Turkey.

Armenia, even as it remains in occupation of Azerbaijani territory, has always sought to convince the world that the rights of ethnic minorities are not protected in Azerbaijan and consequently that it would be unthinkable to return the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh to a position in which they would be threatened by discrimination and destruction. The ethnic minorities of Azerbaijan and “the defense of their rights” thus remain under the constant control of political operatives in Armenia.

Unfortunately, this effort is often supplemented by the dispatch of Islamic groups and even criminal elements into Azerbaijan where they pose as “defenders” of the interests of ethnic Daghestanis. Indeed, the appearance in Daghestan of the youth movement Anti-Turan, the goal of which is the struggle with the spread of Turkish throughout the Caucasus, is a measure of the lengths Armenia and its Russian backers are prepared to go to promote anti-Azerbaijani attitudes. [3]

Notes
[1] Regnum (2009), ‘Настало время добиваться своих национальных целей: президент Национальной ассамблеи азербайджанцев Грузии’, January 30, available at (accessed February 12, 2009).

[2] E.g. explore .

[3] Khabal.info (2009) ‘Заявление молодежного патриотического движения “Анти-Туран”’, January 18, available at (accessed February 12, 2009).

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March 15, 2010