On November 1 2010 Turkish Airlines resumed flights from Sabiha Gokcen International Airport located in Asian part of Istanbul to Moscow Domodedovo Airport. The flights will be operated by the airline’s subsidiary – AnadoluJet.
Boeing 737-809 of Turkish Airlines will be flying between Istanbul and Moscow four times a week:
ТК 7374 Istanbul (Sabiha Gokcen) – Moscow (Domodedovo) 09:55 13:55
Turkish Airlines established in 1933 is a national air carrier of Turkey and a member of international aviation alliance Star Alliance. Fleet of the airline features modern Airbus and Boeing aircraft. Turkish airlines is glad to offer a worldwide route network to its passengers. Development of international passenger traffic market is considered by the airlines through partnership with Star Alliance members and attraction of transit passenger flows.
Moscow Domodedovo Airport is the largest airport of Russia. Its market share in total passenger traffic in Moscow Aviation Hub makes 46%. At the moment 76 partner airlines (48 foreign including 12 representing the CIS States and 28 Russian) connecting over 243 destinations operate flights all over the world. The unique route network covered by Domodedovo partner airlines provides for 101 exclusive destinations. In 2009 18,7 million passengers benefited from Domodedovo services. Domodedovo Airport has been chosen for operations to Moscow by member airlines of two world aviation alliances: Star Alliance and oneworld.
Sunday, November 14, 2010 at 7:32AM | Scott Lucas in EA Middle East and Turkey
Writing in Zaman, Professor Beril Dedeoglu of the University of Galatasaray in Istanbul intervenes in the discussion of whether Turkey has been aligning itself with non-Western powers under the rule of Justice and Development Party (AKP). Beyond questioning the existence of an ‘axis’, Dedeoglu asks if the real shift is occurring within the European Union, seeing a possible UK-French alliance v. a German-Russian front following a deep economic crisis:
The term “axis shift” is used for countries that are supposedly changing their overall political positions, meaning that they abandon their current system of security and values to replace them with a new system.
This term, which is used as a political tool, would have meaning if axes existed in the current global circumstances. Nevertheless, even if this political qualification is now used, it is not right to use it solely for Turkey; one must be able to test it elsewhere as well.
The EU’s values and policies are dictated by the West’s stable and developed structures, which are marked by principles and rules. However, its practice does not always match the principle. The EU became what it is today because it has managed to regulate the rivalry between its members. Particularly in the security domain, rivalry has been thoroughly organized with every treaty and mechanism imaginable put in place in order to prevent one member state from becoming a security threat for another.
However, the changing global conditions are pushing the member countries to progressively abandon the idea of mutual interdependence, which is at the basis of their partnership. Some serious problems have already started to appear, with the current economic and financial crisis stimulating debate over necessary reform in the security and defense architecture. Member states would like to reduce their defense spending without causing gaps in security, as they are afraid any such gap will be filled by the US.
In order to find a solution, France and the UK have decided to make an agreement reminiscent of the Treaty of Dunkirk of 1947. For now, we do not know whether this will open a path to reunite the armed forces of these two countries, but we can say that this agreement symbolizes the beginning of a serious strategic cooperation. It is different from strategic cooperation initiatives witnessed elsewhere, such as the one between Turkey and Russia. The UK-France cooperation is more intense, and the two have not required a long process of confidence-building. It does not look like the cooperation between Turkey and Syria, either, as cooperation between the UK and France extends to the whole military domain rather than just a common fight against terrorism.
Perhaps the first question to ask about the UK-France cooperation is which actors are expected to be disturbed by this rapprochement. History shows that we do not need to look far to get an answer. It seems that France has grown sufficiently away from de Gaulle’s approach to foreign policy and it is no longer filled with mistrust toward the UK. Maybe France hopes that an agreement with the UK will reduce Paris’ dependence on Germany. Such an effort risks replacing the German-French axis in Europe with another axis, one situated a little bit more to the north and with the US on one end. The UK’s new cabinet has already promised that they care about Europe more than their predecessors. Apparently they intend to keep that promise.
If cooperation between France and the UK compels Germany to reinforce ties with Russia, then we will witness a real axis shift within the EU. If that happens, the debates on Turkey will also change as the “non à la Turquie” front collapses. The EU member countries may start competing with each other through Turkey, and some countries may stop refusing Turkey’s accession and while others increase their level of opposition.
via EA WorldView – Home – Turkey in the Axis of Radicalism? An Alternative View of Europe (Dedeoglu).
(Reuters) – Russia’s state nuclear unit Rosatom is planning to expand into wind power and will look for foreign partners to help build farms in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Ukraine, its equipment head said on Friday.
“We are looking for a technology partner. The desire of all world leaders (in wind technology) to take part in the Russian wind power market is there,” Vladimir Kashenko, Chief Executive of Rosatom’s equipment unit Atomenergomash, told Reuters.
Resources-rich Russia currently has almost no wind energy turbines due to its vast reserves of oil and gas, but the government has said it now wants 4.5 percent of power to come from renewable resources by 2020.
That compares with just 1 percent of total electricity being generated from renewable resources in Russia today, and a European Union 2020 target of 20 percent.
Kashenko declined to name potential partners for the project, saying Indian, Chinese or European companies could enter the Russian market.
“I am far from having illusions that we will produce all 100 percent of wind power generators at our enterprises. The market is capacious and other players, of course, will be here,” said Kashenko.
One of the world’s biggest manufacturers of wind turbines is Germany’s Siemens — which signed a 1 billion euro ($1.36 billion) co-operation agreement with Russian wind power companies earlier this year.
Kashenko said early wind power projects may include the construction of wind farms around seven Russian nuclear power stations from 2012, but the group would then target overseas markets.
“Ukraine is very interesting in terms of alternative energy. In addition we plan to engage with Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Turkey and with other countries traditionally friendly to Russia,” he said.
He said he hoped ‘green tariffs’ would be introduced in Russia next year to ease financial concerns around the project.
Russia President Dmitry Medvedev asked Energy Minister Igor Sechin to look into the issues of alternative energy and tariffs earlier this year.
(Writing by John Bowker; Editing by Andrey Ostroukh)
via Russia plans to build wind farms in Europe, Turkey | Reuters.
President Abdullah Gül has said he hoped Turkey’s economic progress would take it into the ranks of emerging BRIC countries — Brazil, Russia, India and China — although he made it clear Turkey remains committed to joining the European Union.
Gül, in an interview with the Financial Times, said the international order was shifting towards the East. “It wouldn’t be surprising if we start talking about BRIC plus T,” he said. The BRIC countries are considered to be at a similar stage of newly advanced economic development, and their growing influence in the global scene is seen as an indication of the shift in economic power from the developed West towards the developing world.
Turkey, which has built closer ties with its Middle East neighbors under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, has been accused in the West of turning away from the Western club and cozying up to countries such as Iran.
Gül, who was on a visit to Britain to receive the prestigious Chatham House Prize, said in the interview that Turkey still saw membership in the EU as a “strategic vision” and wanted to be part of the principles that Europe defends, promising that Ankara would make sure it met all standards required for membership even though large parts of its entry negotiations are frozen.
But Gül, speaking a day before the European Commission criticized Turkey for restrictions on freedom of expression and over Cyprus in an annual progress report released on Tuesday, also complained of political obstacles raised by some EU member countries. “We see certain political issues being included in the process, which have the effect of slowing down and, to a certain extent, hijacking these negotiations. We are not happy about this,” Gül told the Financial Times on Monday.
Speaking in Oxford also on Monday, Gül said some EU member states were creating “artificial problems” in Turkey’s EU membership negotiations but said Turkey would stick to the task. “The injection of some political issues of certain member countries in the negotiating process leads to certain artificial problems that in our point of view are not fair and not acceptable,” he said at an event hosted by the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies. “But Turkey is determined to move forward in the direction of working on the negotiations,” he said.
Gül declined to name any country when he complained that certain, unnamed, “short-sighted” EU countries had hidden behind the Greek Cypriots to pursue their own objective of delaying Turkey’s membership bid in interviews with the British media. But Turkish officials say some EU countries, such as France, are using the impasse over Cyprus to stall Turkey’s accession bid.
He also said one cannot say for sure that Turkey will eventually join the EU because there will be public votes in several EU countries on Turkish membership after conclusion of accession talks with Turkey. “When the time comes, those countries will decide whether or not Turkey would be a burden on them. Maybe Turkish people would say, ‘although we concluded the negotiation process successfully, let us not be a member’,” Gül told the BBC’s “HARDtalk.”
Responding to a question on Turkey’s position regarding a planned NATO-wide missile defense system, Gül was hopeful that the alliance’s upcoming summit in Lisbon will produce a consensus on the issue. “The NATO Summit will convene in Lisbon next week. I think everybody will reach a consensus in the end,” he said.
Turkey insists that no country should be named as a potential threat in relevant NATO documents, a reference to Turkey’s neighbor, Iran.
When it was pointed out that US President Barack Obama addressed Muslim countries and relayed messages about peace and dialogue when he first came to power and he was asked whether Obama has caused disappointment since then, Gül said: “No, I think he is kindhearted. He does good things sincerely. However, maybe he could not succeed. Not only Muslims but others should listen to Obama. He should also persuade others, not just one party, to achieve peace in the region.”
via Today’s Zaman, your gateway to Turkish daily news.
Russia is no longer seen as a threat to Turkey – but debate rages over whether this is a triumph for Moscow’s diplomacy or a humiliating comedown for the nation’s armed forces.
Ankara has removed Russia from its so-called “Red Book” of potentially hostile states, along with neighbours Greece and Armenia and the Middle East trio of Syria, Iran and Iraq. Meanwhile Israel is added to the hit list after the storm over the summer “Freedom Flotilla” which set sail from Turkey but was blocked from landing in Palestine by Israeli forces.
But it’s Russia’s exclusion which has prompted most conversation.
All friends together
The official view is that Russia’s active role in trying to mediate the on-going conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan makes Moscow a valuable ally in promoting stability in the volatile trans-Caucasus.
The document highlights warmer relations under the guidance of Turkish PM Tayyip Erdogan, which involves closer economic ties as well as concluding the Nagorno-Karabakh war.
And strategists in Ankara conclude that “the threat of communism has finally lifted”, according to gzt.ru.
A bear without claws
But a more pragmatic stance offers less cause for Russia to celebrate, according to military analyst Andrei Areshev, deputy director of the Strategic Cultural Foundation.
He suggests Turkey is simply no longer all that concerned about the muscle of its giant historic rival on the other side of the Black Sea.
“Among the expert community it has been assumed that Turkey will remove Russia from the list of potential threats after a comparative analysis of the capabilities of the Russian and Turkish armies,” Areshev told gzt.ru.
“Turkey has a strong military, while the combat capability of the Russian army is in a permanent state of reform, which raises questions.”
Future prospects
Whether the latest signals from Turkey represent growing enthusiasm for Moscow’s interests or dwindling respect for Russia’s military could be less significant than what happens next.
Both countries have a shared interest in gas and oil transit to Europe, with Turkey currently signed up to the Nabucco pipeline scheme which enables the EU to access central Asian resources while bypassing Russia.
If Russia can use improved relationships with Ankara to slow that scheme it will boost the prospects of Gazprom’s treasured South Stream project becoming the market leader in gas transit to the Balkans and beyond.
Meanwhile Russian strategists may hope that they can use a less hostile Turkey as a means of easing tensions with NATO in south-eastern Europe.
The western alliance’s efforts to expand in that region have regularly alarmed Russia, which fears “encirclement” by US and European forces on its western borders, particularly if the likes of Ukraine and Georgia join the NATO club.
WASHINGTON – On August 20 Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev signed amendments to a 1995 bilateral treaty extending Russia’s use of its 102nd military base near Armenia’s border with Turkey through 2044.
The signature launched long and controversial debates over possible causes and implications of the agreement.
On one hand, some are confident that the main purpose of such a move is directly linked to the Armenian-Azerbaijani contention over Nagorno-Karabagh and is clear evidence of Russia’s strategic-military support to Armenia in the event of military force used by Azerbaijan.
On the other, this view is contradicted by those who believe that “Russia’s reported plans to sell two of its S-300 Favorit air-defense systems to Azerbaijan” is a balancing enterprise to maintain a strategic parity between Armenia and Azerbaijan and thus, keep the status quo of “no war, no peace” situation.
Are these two mutually excluding moves part of Russia’s South Caucasian policies or are they part of a more far-going agenda?
Russia's Dmitry Medvedev (center) flanked by French and American presidents during G20 meeting last June. Photolur
All about East vs. West?
Affected by a historical inferiority complex vis-à-vis the West, Russia has initiated a reaction to Western superiority.
Development of Russia’s ambitions of modernization can be traced through a tripartite evolution of the Russian far-reaching strategy.
The first attempt was undertaken by Peter the Great in 17th century who sought to launch radical reforms of “westernization” of Russia. Some of his successor Tsars followed this path until 1917.
The second phase of the project was based on the promotion of Marxist and then Leninist ideas and resulted in the creation of a de-facto Soviet Empire that incorporated, mostly by force, nations of the Russian empire.
Consequently, the Cold War not only became the driving force in the antagonism between the West and Russia after WW2, but a source of new ideological tensions. End of the Soviet Union marked another failure of the Russian project.
In the 1990s, Russia found itself as the successor of the two previous (Tsarist and Soviet) attempts and it was consequential to set up the third platform that Russia would use as a tool to (re)gain the control it lost over former-Soviet countries. New ideas were needed and Russia’s old ambitions took on new forms.
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created and many of those countries including the South Caucasian states joined it. Since then, any Western ambitions and interplay of CIS countries with Euro-Atlantic structures were seen by Russia as “treachery” by these newly independent states.
Russia has since also established the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) in effect to “tame” any NATO or other Euro-Atlantic inspirations deemed a direct threat to Russia’s national security.
First, it created regional military alliances. Second, Russia strongly enforced its economic presence in the former Soviet area. Third, it sought to undermine initiatives by non Russia-oriented states toward the West.
The Russia-Georgia armed confrontation and the ascendance of Russia-favored Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych to power are central elements of this strategy.
Russia is also taking revenge against the West’s unilateral actions in former Yugoslavia and NATO’s enlargements into Eastern Europe.
Russia seems ready to make more moves towards Iran and Turkey to make sure its presence in the region and its influence over the greater Caucasus is not undermined by the US and the EU-led projects such as NABUCCO, Georgia’s (and Ukraine’s) accession to NATO, pumping Central Asian hydrocarbon resources to Europe by bypassing Russia etc.
Although Russia is trying to present itself as open to engaging the West on matters such us Iran’s nuclear program, its real priority is enhanced control over the South Caucasus, on one hand, while increasing contradictions between the West, China and Middle East players.
Thus, the extension of the lease of the Russian military base in Armenia for another 34 years and Moscow’s possible delivery of anti-aircraft missile launchers S-300 to Azerbaijan underscore the third attempt of Russia in its far-reaching strategy.
Russia has strong ambitions both for the West and the Rest. By the same logic, Russia has recently canceled its plans to supply Iran with S-300. Russia doesn’t need now to put a spoke in US’s wheel and to have a stronger Iran. Over time Russia-Iran-US triangle is likely to reveal new dynamics.
We can therefore presume that Russia’s endeavors in the South Caucasus and beyond are not partner- or friendship-oriented.
Rather, these policies are based on a strategy and pursue the objective to see Russia as a rising instead of falling power.
Boeing 737-809 of Turkish Airlines will be flying between Istanbul and Moscow four times a week:
