Turkish Forum

Category: Eastern Europe

  • Russian military concerned by larger NATO presence in Black Sea

    Russian military concerned by larger NATO presence in Black Sea

     
    16:33 | 25/ 08/ 2008
     

    MOSCOW, August 25 (RIA Novosti) – Russia has to be concerned that NATO is continuing to get a stronger foothold in the Black Sea, the deputy chief of General Staff said Monday.

    “NATO’s naval deployments in the Black Sea, where nine foreign vessels have already been sent, cannot but provoke concern,” Col. Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn said.

    According to a Russian military intelligence source, the NATO warships that have entered the Black Sea carry over 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles between them.

    NATO has so far deployed the USS McFaul and the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Dallas, the Polish frigate General Pulaski, the German frigate FGS Lubeck, and the Spanish navy ship Admiral Juan de Borbon.

    “NATO is actually deploying a surface strike group in the Black Sea,” the unidentified source said Monday.

    The McFaul unloaded 55 tons of humanitarian aid in the Georgian port of Batumi on Sunday, with two more U.S. Navy ships due in port later this week. The Polish, Spanish and German ships also entered the Black Sea on Friday.

    Nogovitsyn said Russian peacekeepers, who continue to be deployed in Georgia after the country’s war with breakaway South Ossetia, would not carry out checks of foreign ships entering Georgian Black Sea ports.

    But he said peacekeepers at a checkpoint near the Poti port would conduct patrols in the area. “Patrols are a civilized form of control,” he said.

    The senior military official put it more colorfully on Saturday: “Poti is outside of the security zone, but that does not mean we will sit behind a fence watching them riding around in Hummers.”

    Nogovitsyn promised that Russia would not exceed the numbers defined by international agreements, including a 1992 pact, when sending peacekeepers to South Ossetia.

    But he warned that Georgia was planning to deploy troops in the towns of Gori and Senaki.

    “The Georgian Armed Forces command is continuing to conduct acts aimed at restoring the combat readiness of its army directed at South Ossetia,” he said. “Communication systems are being restored, units are planned for deployment in the military towns of Gori and Senaki.”

    Georgia is also planning acts of sabotage on infrastructure and transportation facilities, Nogovitsyn said.

    “Georgian reconnaissance and sabotage groups are reinvigorating their efforts… and are preparing military actions along the routes of Russian armored columns, as well as acts of sabotage on transportation infrastructure,” he said.

  • Geopolitical Diary: U.S. Aid to Georgia Raises a Question for Russia

    Geopolitical Diary: U.S. Aid to Georgia Raises a Question for Russia

    Stratfor.com
    August 25, 2008

    The Russians still have not completed withdrawal
    from Georgia. It is clear that, at least for the
    time being, the Russians intend to use the clause
    in the cease-fire agreement that allows them
    unspecified rights to protect their security to
    maintain troops in some parts of Georgia. Moscow
    obviously wants to demonstrate to the Georgians
    that Russia moves at its own discretion, not at
    the West’s. A train carrying fuel was blown up
    outside of Gori, with the Georgians claiming that
    the Russians have planted mines. Whether the
    claim is true or not, the Russians are trying to
    send a simple message: We are your best friends
    and worst enemies. The emphasis for the moment is on the latter.

    It is essential for the Russians to demonstrate
    that they are not intimidated by the West in any
    way. The audience for this is the other former
    Soviet republics, but also the Georgian public.
    It is becoming clear that the Russians are intent
    on seeing Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili
    removed from office. Moscow is betting that as
    the crisis dies down and Russian troops remain in
    Georgia, the Georgians will develop a feeling of
    isolation and turn on Saakashvili for leading
    them into a disaster. If that doesn’t work, and
    he remains president, then the Russians have
    forward positions in Georgia. Either way, full
    withdrawal does not make sense for them, when the
    only force against them is Western public
    opinion. That alone will make the Russians more intractable.

    It is interesting, therefore, that a U.S. warship
    delivered humanitarian supplies to the Georgians.
    The ship did not use the port of Poti, which the
    Russians have effectively blocked, but Batumi, to
    the south. That the ship was a destroyer is
    important. It demonstrates that the Americans
    have a force available that is inherently
    superior to anything the Russians have: the U.S.
    Navy. A Navy deployment in the Black Sea could
    well be an effective counter, threatening Russian sea lanes.

    While it was a warship, however, it was only a
    destroyer ­ so it is a gesture, but not a threat.
    But there are rumors of other warships readying
    to transit into the Black Sea. This raises an
    important issue: Turkey. Turkey borders Georgia
    but has very carefully stayed out of the
    conflict. Any ships that pass through Turkish
    straits do so under Turkish supervision guided by
    the Montreux Convention, an old agreement
    restricting the movement of warships through the
    straits ­ which the Russians in particular have
    ignored in moving ships into the Mediterranean.
    But the United States has a particular problem in
    moving through the Bosporus. Whatever the
    Convention says or precedent is, the United
    States can’t afford to alienate Turkey ­ not if
    there is a crisis in the Caucasus.

    Each potential American move has a complication
    attached. However, at this moment, the decision
    as to what to do is in the hands of the United
    States. The strategic question is whether it has
    the appetite for a naval deployment in the Black
    Sea at this historical moment. After that is
    answered, Washington needs to address the Turkish
    position. And after a U.S. squadron deploys in
    the Black Sea, the question will be what Russia,
    a land power, will do in response. The Europeans
    are irrelevant to the equation, even if they do
    hold a summit as the French want. They can do
    nothing unless the United States decides to act,
    and they can’t stop the United States if it does decide to go.

    The focus now is on the Americans. They can let
    the Russo-Georgian war slide into history and
    deal with Russia later on, or they can act. What
    Washington will decide to do is the question the
    arrival of the U.S.S. McFaul in Georgia posed for the Russians.

  • ANKARA AND YEREVAN – Waiting and watching

    ANKARA AND YEREVAN – Waiting and watching

    Turkey and the Caucasus

    Waiting and watching

    Aug 21st 2008 | ANKARA AND YEREVAN
    From The Economist print edition

    A large NATO country ponders a bigger role in the Caucasus

     

    APErdogan plays the Georgian flag

    AT THE Hrazdan stadium in Yerevan, workers are furiously preparing for a special visitor: Turkey’s president, Abdullah Gul. Armenia’s president, Serzh Sarkisian, has invited Mr Gul to a football World Cup qualifier between Turkey and its traditional foe, Armenia, on September 6th.
    If he comes, Mr Gul may pave the way for a new era in the Caucasus. Turkey is the only NATO member in the area, and after the war in Georgia it would like a bigger role. It is the main outlet for westbound Azeri oil and gas and it controls the Bosporus and Dardanelles, through which Russia and other Black Sea countries ship most of their trade. And it has vocal if small minorities from all over the region, including Abkhaz and Ossetians.
    Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has just been to Moscow and Tbilisi to promote a ‘Caucasus Stability and Co-operation Platform’, a scheme that calls for new methods of crisis management and conflict resolution. The Russians and Georgians made a show of embracing the idea, as have Armenia and Azerbaijan, but few believe that it will go anywhere. That is chiefly because Turkey does not have formal ties with Armenia. In 1993 Turkey sealed its border (though not its air links) with its tiny neighbour after Armenia occupied a chunk of Azerbaijan in a war over Nagorno-Karabakh. But the war in Georgia raises new questions over the wisdom of maintaining a frozen border. 
    Landlocked and poor, Armenia looks highly vulnerable. Most of its fuel and much of its grain comes through Georgia’s Black Sea ports, which have been paralysed by the war. Russia blew up a key rail bridge this week, wrecking Georgia’s main rail network that also runs to Armenia and Azerbaijan. This disrupted Azerbaijan’s oil exports, already hit by an explosion earlier this month in the Turkish part of the pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan, in Turkey.
    ‘All of this should point in one direction,’ says a Western diplomat in Yerevan: ‘peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.’ Reconciliation with Armenia would give Azerbaijan an alternative export route for its oil and Armenia the promise of a new lifeline via Turkey. Some Armenians gloat that Russia’s invasion of Georgia kyboshes the chances of Azerbaijan ever retaking Nagorno-Karabakh by force, though others say the two cases are quite different. Russia is not contiguous with Nagorno-Karabakh, nor does it have ‘peacekeepers’ or nationals there.
    Even before the Georgian war, Turkey seemed to understand that isolating Armenia is not making it give up the parts of Azerbaijan that it occupies outside Nagorno-Karabakh. But talking to it might. Indeed, that is what Turkish and Armenian diplomats have secretly done for some months, until news of the talks leaked (probably from an angry Azerbaijan).
    Turkey’s ethnic and religious ties with its Azeri cousins have long weighed heavily in its Caucasus policy. But there is a new worry that a resolution calling the mass slaughter of Armenians by the Ottoman Turks in the 1915 genocide may be passed by America’s Congress after this November’s American elections. This would wreck Turkey’s relations with the United States. If Turkey and Armenia could only become friendlier beforehand, the resolution might then be struck down for good.
    In exchange for better relations, Turkey wants Armenia to stop backing a campaign by its diaspora for genocide recognition and allow a commission of historians to establish ‘the truth’. Mr Sarkisian has hinted that he is open to this idea, triggering howls of treason from the opposition. The biggest obstacle remains Azerbaijan and its allies in the Turkish army. Mr Erdogan was expected to try to square Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliev, in a visit to Baku this week. Should he fail, Mr Gul may not attend the football match—and a chance for reconciliation may be lost.

  • The Eurasian Corridor: Pipeline Geopolitics and the New Cold War

    The Eurasian Corridor: Pipeline Geopolitics and the New Cold War

    By Michel Chossudovsky
    Global Research, August 22, 2008 

    The ongoing crisis in the Caucasus is intimately related to the strategic control over energy pipeline and transportation corridors.

    There is evidence that the Georgian attack on South Ossetia on August 7 was carefully planned. High level consultations were held with US and NATO officials in the months preceding the attacks. 

    The attacks on South Ossetia were carried out one week after the completion of extensive US – Georgia war games (July 15-31st, 2008). They were also preceded by high level Summit meetings held under the auspices of GUAM, a US-NATO sponsored regional military alliance. 

    War in Georgia Time Line

    July 1-2, 2008 GUAM Summit in Batumi, Georgia.  

    July 1,  “US-GUAM Summit” on the sideline of the official GUAM venue. 

    July 5 -12,  Russian Defense Ministry hold  War Games in the North Caucasus region under the codename “Caucasus Frontier 2008”. 

    July 9, 2008 China and Kazakhstan announce the commencement of construction of the Kazakhstan-China natural gas pipeline (KCP)

    July 15-31,  The US and Georgia  hold War Games under the codename Operation “Immediate Response”. One thousand US servicemen participate in the military exercise. 

    August 7,  Georgian Ground Forces and Air Force Attack South Ossetia

    August 8,  Russian Forces Intervene in South Ossetia.  

    August 14, 2008 Signing of US-Polish Agreement on the stationing of “US Interceptor Missiles” on Polish Territory

    Introduction: The GUAM Summit Venue

    In early July 2008, a regional summit was held in the Georgian city of Batumi under the auspices of GUAM  

    GUAM is a military agreement between Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, first established in 1997. Since 2006, following the withdrawal of Uzbekistan, GUAM was renamed: The Organization for Democracy and Economic Development – GUAM.  

    GUAM has little to do with “Democracy and Economic Development”. It is a de facto appendage of NATO. It  has been used by the US and the Atlantic Alliance to extend their zone of influence into the heartland of the former Soviet Union. 

    The main thrust of GUAM as a military alliance is to “protect” the energy and transportation corridors, on behalf of the Anglo-American oil giants. GUAM countries are also the recipients of US-NATO military aid and training. 

    The militarization of these corridors is a central feature of US-NATO planning. Georgia and Ukraine membership in NATO is part of the agenda of controlling the energy and transport corridors from the Caspian Sea basin to Western Europe.  

    The July 1-2, 2008 GUAM Summit Batumi meetings, under the chairmanship of President Saakashvili, focused on the central issue of pipeline and transportation corridors. The theme of the Summit was a “GUAM – Integrating Europe’s East”, from an economic and strategic-military standpoint, essentially with a view to isolating Russia. 

    The presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Ukraine (respectively  Ilham Aliyev, Mikheil Saakashvili and Viktor Yushchenko) were in attendance together with the presidents of Poland, Lech Kaczynski, and Lithuania, Valdas Adamkus. Moldova’s head of State flatly refused to attend this summit. 

    Map No 1: Georgia

    Undermining Russia 

    The GUAM Summit agenda focused on undermining Moscow’s influence in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe. The Polish President was in attendance. 

    US-NATO installations in Eastern Europe including the Missile Defense Shield are directly related to the evolving geopolitical situation in the Caucasus. Barely a week after the bombing of South Ossetia by Georgian forces, the US and Poland signed an agreement (August 14) which would allow the US Air Force to deploy US “interceptor missiles” on Polish soil: 

    “… As military strategists have pointed out, the US missiles in Poland pose a total existential threat to the future existence of the Russian nation. The Russian Government has repeatedly warned of this since US plans were first unveiled in early 2007. Now, despite repeated diplomatic attempts by Russia to come to an agreement with Washington, the Bush Administration, in the wake of a humiliating US defeat in Georgia, has pressured the Government of Poland to finally sign the pact. The consequences could be unthinkable for Europe and the planet. ” (William Engdahl, Missile Defense: Washington and Poland just moved the World closer to War, Global Research, August 15, 2008)

    The “US-GUAM Summit” 

    Barely acknowledged by the media, a so-called “US-GUAM Summit” meeting was also held on July 1st on the sidelines of the official GUAM summit venue. 

    US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Merkel met both GUAM and non-GUAM delegations behind closed doors. Several bilateral meetings were held including a Poland GUAM meeting (during which the issue of the US missile defense shield on Polish territory was most probably addressed). Private meetings were also held on July 1st and 2nd at the residence of the Georgian President. 

     

     

    US-Georgia War Games

    Barely two weeks following the GUAM Summit of July 1-2, 2008, US-Georgian military exercises were launched at the Vaziani military base, outside Tbilisi, 

    One thousand U.S and six hundred Georgian troops began a military training exercise under Operation “Immediate Response”. US troops included the participation of the US Air Force, Army, Marines and National Guard. While an Iraq war scenario had been envisaged, the military exercises were a dress rehearsal for an upcoming military operation. The  war games were completed on July 31st, a week before the onset of the August 7th Georgian attacks on South Ossetia. 

    Troops from Ukraine and Azerbaijan, which are members of GUAM also participated in Operation “Immediate Response” Unexpectedly, Armenia which is an ally of Russia and a staunch opponent of Azerbaijan also took part in these games, which also served to create and “train and work together” environment between Azeri and Armenian forces (ultimately directed against Russia). 

    Brig. Gen. William B. Garrett, commander of the U.S. military’s Southern European Task Force, was responsible for the coordination of the US-Georgia war games.

    Gen. William B. Garrett and Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili

    Russia’s War Games in the North Caucasus

    Russia began large-scale military exercises involving some 8,000 military personnel, some 700 armored units and over 30 aircraft ( in the North Caucasus republics of the Russian Federation on July 5th. (Georgian Times, July 28, 2008) 

    The Russian war games were explicitly carried out in response to the evolving security situation in Abhkazia and South Ossetia. The exercise, dubbed  “Caucasus Frontier 2008”, involved units of the 58th Army and the 4th Air Force Army, stationed in the North Caucasus Military District.

    A Russian Defense Ministry spokesman acknowledged that the military exercises conducted in the Southern Federal District were being carried out in response to “an escalation in tension in the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflict zones,…[and] that Russia’s North Caucasian Military District was ready to provide assistance to Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia if needed.” (Georgian Times, July 28, 2008, RIA-Novosti, July 5, 2008)  

    These units of the North Caucasian Military District (Army and Air Force) were subsequently used to lead the Russian counterattack directed against Georgian Forces in South Ossetia on August 8th.

    Pipeline Geopolitics

    A central issue on the GUAM-NATO drawing board at the July GUAM Summit in Batumi, was the Odessa-Brody-Plotsk (Plock on the Vistula) pipeline route (OBP) (see Maps 3 and 4), which brings Central Asian oil via Odessa, to Northern Europe, bypassing Russian territory. An extension of OBP to Poland’s port of Gdansk on the Baltic sea is also envisaged. 

    It should be noted that the OBP also links up with Russia’s Friendship Pipeline (Druzhba pipeline) in an agreement with Russia. 

    Washington’s objective is ultimately to weaken and destabilize Russia’s pipeline network –including the Friendship Pipeline and the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS)— and its various corridor links into the Western Europe energy market. 

    It should be noted that Russia has established as part of the Druzhba pipeline network, a pipeline corridor which transits through Belarus, thereby bypassing the Ukraine. (See Maps 2 and 3 below)

    The Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) also operated by Russia’s Transneft links Samara to Russia’s oil tanker terminal at Primorsk in the Gulf of Finland. (See map below) It carries crude oil from Russia’s Western Siberian region to both North and Western European markets. 

    Another strategic pipeline system, largely controlled by Russia, is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). The CPC  is a joint venture arrangement between Russia and Kazakhstan, with shareholder participation from a number of Middle East oil companies. 

    The Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) is tied into the Atyrau-Samara (AS) pipeline, which is a joint venture between Russia’s Transneft and Kazakhstan’s national pipeline operator, KazTransOil. The AS pipeline in turn links up with the Russia-Kazakhstan Caspian Petroleum Consortium (CPC), which pumps Tengiz crude oil from Atyrau (Western Kazakhstan) to the CPC’s Russian tanker terminal near Novorossiysk on the Black Sea.

    On July 10, 2008, barely a week following the GUAM Summit, Transneft and KazTransOil  announced that they were in talks to expand the capacity of the Atyrau-Samara pipeline from 16 to 26 million tons of oil per year. (RBC Daily, July 10, 2008).

    The GUAM Transportation Corridor 

    The GUAM governments represented at the Batumi GUAM Summit also approved the further development of  The GUAM Transportation Corridor (GTC),  which complements the controversial Baku Tblisi Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. The latter links the Caspian Sea basin to the Eastern Mediterranean, via Georgia and Turkey, totally bypassing Russian territory. The BTC pipeline is controlled by a oil consortium led by British Petroleum.   

    Both the GTC and the BTC corridors are protected militarily by GUAM and NATO. 

    The GTC corridor would connect the Azeri capital of Baku on the Caspian sea to the Georgian ports of Poti/ Batumi on the Black Sea, which would then link up with the Ukrainian Black sea port of Odessa. (And From Odessa, through maritime and land routes to Western and Northern Europe).

     

    Map No 2: Strategic Pipeline Routes. BTC, Friendship Pipeline, Baltic Pipeline System (BPS), CPC, AS

    Map No. 3. Russia’s Druzhba pipeline system

     

    Map No 4  Eastern Europe. Plock on the Vistula

    The Baku Tblisi Ceyan (BTC) Pipeline

    The BTC pipeline dominated by British Petroleum and inaugurated in 2006 at the height of the war on Lebanon, has dramatically changed the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean, which is now linked, through an energy corridor, to the Caspian sea basin:

     “[The BTC pipeline] considerably changes the status of the region’s countries and cements a new pro-West alliance. Having taken the pipeline to the Mediterranean, Washington has practically set up a new bloc with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Israel, ” (Komerzant, Moscow, 14 July 2006)


    Map No 5. The Baku, Tblisi Ceyan pipeline (BTC)


    Pipeline Geopolitics and the Role of Israel

    Israel is now part of the Anglo-American military axis, which serves the interests of the Western oil giants in the Middle East and Central Asia. Not surprisingly, Israel has military cooperation agreements with Georgia and Azerbaijan. 

    While the official reports state that the BTC pipeline will “channel oil to Western markets”, what is rarely acknowledged is that part of the oil from the Caspian sea would be directly channeled towards Israel. In this regard, an underwater Israeli-Turkish pipeline project has been envisaged which would link Ceyhan to the Israeli port of Ashkelon and from there through Israel’s main pipeline system, to the Red Sea.

    The objective of Israel is not only to acquire Caspian sea oil for its own consumption needs but also to play a key role in re-exporting Caspian sea oil back to the Asian markets through the Red Sea port of Eilat. The strategic implications of this re-routing of Caspian sea oil are farreaching.

    What is envisaged is to link the BTC pipeline to the Trans-Israel Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline, also known as Israel’s Tipline, from Ceyhan to the Israeli port of Ashkelon. (For further details, see Michel Chossudovsky, The War on Lebanon and the Battle for Oil, Global Research, 26 July 2006)

    Map No 6. Trans-Israel Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline

    America’s Silk Road Strategy: The Trans-Eurasian Security System

    The Silk Road Strategy (SRS) constitutes an essential building block of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

    The SRS was formulated as a bill presented to the US Congress in 1999. It called for the creation of an energy and transport corridor network linking Western Europe to Central Asia and eventually to the Far East. 

    The Silk Road Strategy is defined as a “trans-Eurasian security system”. The SRS calls for the  “militarization of the Eurasian corridor” as an integral part of the “Great Game”. The stated objective, as formulated under the proposed March 1999 Silk Road Strategy Act, is to develop America’s business empire along an extensive geographical corridor.  

    While the 1999 SRS legislation (HR 3196) was adopted by the House of Representatives, it never became law. Despite this legislative setback, the Silk Road Strategy became, under the Bush Administration, the de facto basis of US-NATO  interventionism, largely with a view to integrating the former Soviet republics of the South Caucasus and Central Asia into the US sphere of influence.  

    The successful implementation of the SRS required the concurrent “militarization” of the entire Eurasian corridor from the Eastern Mediterranean to China’s Western frontier bordering onto Afghanistan, as a means to securing control over extensive oil and gas reserves, as well as “protecting” pipeline routes and trading corridors. The invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 has served to support American strategic objectives in Central Asia including the control of pipeline corridors. Afghanistan border onto Chinese Western frontier. It is also a strategic landbridge linking the extensive oil wealth of the Caspian Sea basin to the Arabian Sea.

    The militarization process under the SRS is largely directed against China, Russia and Iran. The SRS, called for:   

    “The development of strong political, economic, and security ties among countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia and the West [which] will foster stability in this region, which is vulnerable to political and economic pressures from the south, north, and east. [meaning Russia to the North, Iraq, Iran and the Middle East to the South and China to the East] (106th Congress, Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999)

    The adoption of a neoliberal policy agenda under advice from the IMF and the World Bank is an integral part of the SRS, which seeks to foster “open market economies… [which] will provide positive incentives for international private investment, increased trade, and other forms of commercial interactions”. (Ibid). 

    Strategic access to South Caucasus and Central Asian oil and gas is a central feature of the Silk Road Strategy: 

    “The region of the South Caucasus and Central Asia could produce oil and gas in sufficient quantities to reduce the dependence of the United States on energy from the volatile Persian Gulf region.” (Ibid)

    The SRS is also intent upon preventing the former Soviet republics from developing their own economic, political and military cooperation ties as well as establishing broad ties up with China, Russia and Iran. (See Michel Chossudovsky, America’s “War on Terrorism”, Global Research, Montreal, 2005). 

    In this regard, the formation of GUAM, which was launched in 1997, was intended to integrate the former Soviet republics into military cooperation arrangements with the US and NATO, which would prevent them from reestablishing their ties with the Russian Federation. 

    Under the 1999 SRS Act, the term “countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia” means Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. (106th Congress, Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999).

    The US strategy has, in this regard, not met its stated objective: Whereas Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia have become de facto US protectorates, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Armenia and Belarus are, from a geopolitical standpoint, aligned with Moscow. 

    This extensive Eurasian network of transport and energy corridors has been defined by Washington as part of an American sphere of influence:   

    “In the Caspian-Black Sea Region, the European Union and the United States have concentrated on setting up a reliable logistics chain to connect Central Asia with the European Union via the Central Caucasus and Turkey/Ukraine. The routes form the centerpiece of INOGATE (an integrated communication system along the routes taking hydrocarbon resources to Europe) and TRACECA (the multi-channel Europe-Caucasus-Asia corridor) projects.

    The TRACECA transportation and communication routes grew out of the idea of the Great Silk Road (the traditional Eurasian communication channel of antiquity). It included Georgian and Turkish Black Sea ports (Poti, Batumi, and Ceyhan), railways of Georgia and Azerbaijan, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, ferry lines that connect Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan with Azerbaijan across the Caspian Sea/Lake (Turkmenbashi-Baku; Aktau-Baku), railways and highways now being built in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and China, as well as Chinese Pacific terminals as strategically and systemically important parts of the mega-corridor.” (See GUAM and the Trans-Caspian Gas Transportation Corridor: Is it about Politics or Economics?),

    The Kazakhstan-China Natural Gas Pipeline (KCP)Barely a few days following the GUAM Summit in Batumi, China and Kazakhstan announced (July 9, 2008) the commencement of construction work of a 1,300-kilometer natural gas pipeline. The inaugural ceremony was held  near Kazakhstan’s capital Almaty. 

     

    The pipeline which is to be constructed in several stages is expected to start pumping gas in 2010. (See silkroadintelligencer.com, July 9, 2008)

    “The new transit route is part of a larger project to build two parallel pipelines connecting China with Central Asia’s vast natural gas reserves. The pipes will stretch more than 7,000 kilometers from Turkmenistan, cross Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and enter China’s northwestern Xinjiang region. Uzbekistan started construction of its part this month while Turkmenistan launched its segment last year.” (Ibid)

    Map No 7. Kazakhstan-China natural gas pipeline (KCP)

    China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) which is  the leading operator of the consortium, “has signed deals with state oil and gas firms of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan giving them 50 percent stakes in their respective parts of the pipeline.”

    The KPC pipeline project encroaches upon US strategic interests in Eurasia. It undermines the logic of America’s Silk Road Strategy. The KPC is part of a competing Eurasian based transportation and energy strategy, largely dominated by Russia, Iran and China. 

    Competing Eurasian Strategy protected by the SCO-CSTO Military Alliance

    The competing Eurasian based corridors are protected (against US-NATO encroachment) by two regional military alliances: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)  and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

    The SCO is a military alliance between Russia and China and several Central Asian former Soviet republics including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Iran has observer status in the SCO. 

    The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which plays a key geopolitical role in relation to transport and energy corridors, operates in close liaison with the SCO. The CSTO regroups the following member states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

    Of significance, since 2006, the SCO and the CSTO member countries have conducted joint war games and are actively collaborating with Iran.  

    In October 2007, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) signed a Memorandum of Understanding, laying the foundations for military cooperation between the two organizations. This SCO-CSTO agreement, barely mentioned by the Western media, involves the creation of a full-fledged military alliance between China, Russia and the member states of SCO/CSTO. It is worth noting that the SCTO and the SCO held joint military exercises in 2006, which coincided with those conducted by Iran. (For further details see Michel Chossudovsky, Russia and Central Asian Allies Conduct War Games in Response to US Threats, Global Research, August 2006)

    While remaining distinct from an organizational standpoint, in practice, these two regional military alliances (SCO and SSTO) constitute a single military block, which confronts US-NATO expansionism in Central Asia and the Caucasus. 

    Full Circle 

    The US-NATO protected SRS Eurasian transport and energy corridors, are slated to link Central Asia to the Far East, as outlined in the Silk Road Strategy. At present, the Eastward corridors linking Central Asia to China are protected militarily by the SCO-CSTO.

    In terms of Washington’s global military and strategic agenda, the Eurasian corridors contemplated under the SRS would inevitably encroach upon China’s territorial sovereignty.The proposed US-NATO-GUAM pipeline and transportation corridors are intended to connect, at some future date, with the proposed transport and energy corridors in the Western hemisphere, including those envisaged under the North American Security Prosperity Partnership (SPP).   

    The Security Prosperity Partnership (SPP) is to North America what the Silk Road Strategy (SRS) is to the Caucasus and Central Asia. They are strategic regional constructs of America’s business empire. They are the building blocks of the New World Order. 

    The SPP is the result of a similar process of strategic planning, militarization and free market economic integration, largely based on the control of strategic resources including energy and water, as well as the ” protection” of energy and transportation corridors (land and maritime routes ) from Alaska and Canada’s Arctic to Central America and the Caribbean basin. 

    Author’s Note: This article has focused selectively on key pipeline corridors with a view to analyzing broad geopolitical and strategic issues. 
    An examination of the overall network of Eurasian pipeline corridors would require a far more detailed and comprehensive presentation    .

  • Syria: we’ll host Russian missile system

    Syria: we’ll host Russian missile system


    AFP Photo / Vladimir Rodionov

     

    <I class=annotation>Syria says it’s ready to put a Russian missile system on its soil as a counterweight to U.S. plans to deploy a missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. The offer was made during a meeting between Syrian leader Bashar Al-Assad and President Dmitry Medvedev in the Black Sea resort of Sochi. Meanwhile, Moscow is considering a request from Syria for more Russian-made weapons.

    It was the first meeting between the two leaders, and President Al-Assad was keen to show Syria’s support for Russia.

    “We understand what is behind Russia’s position … We believe this is a response to Georgian provocation. We support Moscow in this and are against any attempts to blacken Russia,” Al-Assad said.
     
    Many expected a tit-for-tat response after the U.S. sealed a deal to deploy interceptors in Poland as a part of their missile defence system.

    Ahead of the visit, there were reports that Russia might deploy a missile system in Syria, in particular, the Iskander system. It’s something Syria has been requesting for a long time. After Friday’s meeting, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Russia is ready “to consider the offers of the Syrian government in connection to the delivery of new weapons, only for defence purposes”.

    Moscow has temporarily suspended cooperation with NATO. It follows NATO’s criticism of Russia’s actions in South Ossetia and threats to shut down the NATO-Russia Council. Lavrov was clear on Russia’s course: “We are not going to slam the door on NATO. NATO could slam this door, though. Everything depends on NATO’s priorities: if the priorities are absolutely supportive of Saakashvili’s bankrupt regime to the detriment of partnership with Russia, then it is not our fault,” he said.
     
    Meanwhile, the withdrawal of Russian troops from the conflict zone is well under way. There will be at least 500 peacekeepers deployed in the so-called security zone near the border. The rest of the peacekeepers will remain within the de facto borders of South Ossetia. The rest of the troops in the area will return to Russia.

    Russia says it’s fully committed to the six principles of the cease-fire, but, according to Lavrov, some countries are resorting to diplomatic tricks.

    Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia’s two separatist regions, have again asked Moscow to recognise their independence.

    Post this story to del.icio.us

  • Russian Mediterranean Naval Build-Up Challenges NATO Sixth Fleet Domination

    Russian Mediterranean Naval Build-Up Challenges NATO Sixth Fleet Domination

    By 20 August 2008 Moscow is flexing its muscles again in the eastern Mediterranean, and aims to reactivate old cold war naval installations with its ally, Syria. President Bashar Assad, on his way to the Kremlin to finalize what looks to become a high profile deal invited Russia to position surface/surface missiles on his land in response to US deployment of missile interceptors in Poland. The Russians have sent their only aircraft carrier “Admiral Kuznetsov” from its home base in Murmansk, towards the Mediterranean and the Syrian port of Tartus. The mission comes after Syrian President Bashar Assad said he is open to a Russian base in the area.  The Admiral Kuznetsov, part of the Northern Fleet and Russia’s only aircraft carrier, will head a Navy mission to the area. The mission will also include the Black Sea fleet flagship, the missile cruiser Moskva, and several submarines.

    On December 2007 Russia launched their frist north sea flotilla to the Mediterranean, to demonstrate its military strength. It was when Russian President Vladimir Putin alarmed Europe by finally declaring Russia’s official rejection of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), (the treaty entered into force on July 17, 1992 limiting the number of combat elements that Russia could deploy along its borders with Europe). Immediately following this declaration, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov announced sending a sortie of six Russian warships to the Mediterranean, led by the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier. Other vessels escorting the carrier as part of the task force are Admiral Levchenko and Admiral Chabanenko anti-submarine ships, and the Sergei Osipov and Nikolai Chiker support ships. The group is expected to be joined by the flagship Moskva a guided missile cruiser and four additional ships as it arrives in the Mediterranean.

    This will be the first prolonged stay of a Russian carrier to the eastern Mediterranean in waters dominated with regular patrolled by the US Sixth Fleet and in vicinity of Israel’s shores. On its decks Admiral Kuznetsov carries 47 warplanes (mostly Su-33) and 10 helicopters. The Russian Black Sea Fleet contingent, which has already set out for its new mission from Sevastopol, will rely on the naval facilities at Syria’s Tartous port. Its presence for several months will be a complication for the Israel navy’s operations opposite the Lebanese and Syrian coasts, especially if the Russians could be joined at Tartous by Iranian extended Kilo class submarines armed with the Russian-made “Sizzler” Klub-S (3M54) missile, as some unofficial Israeli sources reported. The Rusian Kuznetsov carrier group will conduct three tactical exercises, including real and simulated launch of missiles, said Serdyukov, adding 11 port visits are expected to be made.

    Update – January 20, 2008: Following last week’s joint exercises in the Mediterranean, the Russian naval strike group joined the Moskva missile cruiser, which left Sevastopol on January 12. The group is expected to conduct an exercise in the Atlantic Ocean, beginning January 20. The two months mission is expected to end early in February. “After this visit to the Mediterranean and France, the first in 15 years, we will establish a permanent presence in the region,” Vice-Admiral Nikolai Maksimov said.

    Last week, the group was split into two elements which performed joint naval exercises with the Italian and French Navies. The Russian and Italian navies practiced rescue and counter-terror operations. The two Italian vessels participating in the drill were the Frigate Espero and Bersagliere. Following the exercise part of the Russian flotilla sailed to the French naval port of Toulon, for a short rest. Their Mediterranean voyage will continue on January 17th as the elements from the Northern Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Nicholas Maximov, will be joined by the Black Sea Fleet flagship, missile cruiser Moskva, which left Sevastopol on the 13th. The Moskva is commanded by the Vice-Admiral Vasily Kondakov, Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet. As with their Italian counterparts, the French Navy is planning to hold naval exercises with the Russian visitors.

    Sending such powerful Russian warships onto the Mediterranean, for any amount of time, is no small matter. With the Mediterranean having been a “NATO lake” for the past 15 years, since the demise of the Soviet Union, the simple presence of a naval Russian force will require reviewed strategy and tactics of many of western and Israeli navies.

    But making matters even more complicated for NATO, the Kremlin has also decided to send a sortie of warships to the northeastern Atlantic. No less that eleven vessels from the Northern Fleet have set sail on a range of voyages that will cover much of the globe. Extending to more than 12,000 miles they are scheduled to enter ports of six countries in 71 days.

    In the latest twist to worsening East-West relations, NATO submarines and surface ships, which may include Royal Navy vessels, are already engaged in trying to gather information on the new Amur stealth class boat, being secretly tested by the Russian Navy in the Baltic. Adding to this greater-than-normal scrutiny effort is in part, a response to Russia’s recent decision to resume long-range bomber flights close, or even penetrating into NATO airspace, which has revived memories of Cold War confrontation between the two blocs. In fact, twice during last summer, Russian Tu-95 Bear nuclear bombers have been spotted heading towards British airspace off Scotland, prompting the RAF to send fast reaction interceptors to head them off.

    The prospect of Russia reactivating its cold war naval bases in Syria’s Tartus and Latakia ports, could have a most dramatic strategic impact. High-profile air defense missiles and surveillance systems deployment around any Russian-manned installations in Syrian ports, might also shift the military balance to Israel’s disadvantage, or even threaten a clash between Israel and Russian forces, as happened during the later stages of the so-called War of Attrition in 1970, along the Suez Canal.

    The Russian Black Sea fleet’s 720th Logistics Support Point at Tartus has been in disuse since 1991, when the Soviet Union imploded. Yet it remains the only Russian military base outside the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States territory. Last year Russia reportedly dredged Tartus and began building a new dock at Latakia.

    The Syrian ports are invaluable for the Russian navy as an alternative naval base, provided that their security could be assured, by a viable air defense barrier – The Moskva with 64 SN-A-6 missiles on board (navalized S-300) will be able to provide such capability

    Israeli analysts believe that the present and rather unprecedented Russian strategic decision – sending such an impressive naval sortie into the eastern Mediterranean – could have resulted from Israel’s still mysterious foray into Syrian air defense, during the air strike on an alleged nuclear development or weapon assembly site. According to Aviation Week – who interviewed the retired Brigadier General Pinchas Burchris, director general of Israel’s Ministry of Defense, before the Israeli fighter aircraft ingress, a main Syrian radar site was struck with a combination of electronic attack and precision weapons, causing complete black-out of the entire Syrian air defense system which relied exclusively on Russian produced and installed equipment. Aviation Week claims this event may have been one of the first examples of offensive and defensive network attacks that included higher-level, non-tactical network penetrations.

    No precise information, nor confirmation of the AW&ST report was released by Israeli official authorities, but the very fact that non-stealth jet fighters managed to enter unscathed into the highly sophisticated Russian supplied air defense barrier, built painstakingly during decades, since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, speaks for itself. It certainly must have caused Moscow considerable embarrassment, over the lack of performance of their latest sophisticated air defense systems sold for hard cash to Mid Eastern Muslim nations.

    But not embarrassment alone, painful as it was, could have triggered Moscow to such a rapid reaction. The Russian navy is under growing pressure from Ukraine to withdraw the Black Sea Fleet from its traditional deployment at Sevastopol by 2017. Some recent incidents has sharpened this into, sofar minor, clashes with local elements, but the warnings are out in clear: “get out – you are no longer wanted here”!

    The ‘Kiev Post’ noted that the Black Sea fleet’s lease on its Sevastopol base is “hostage” to Ukraine’s volatile relations with Moscow – which will expire in 2017, necessitating a renegotiation or withdrawal. The Russian Black Sea Fleet base already boosted security at its navigational facilities, amid a dispute with Ukraine authorities, over a lighthouse, linked to the fleet in the Crimean city of Yalta. The Russian move came after Ukraine threatened to take over all the navigational facilities of the Black Sea Fleet. The dispute emerged when the staff of a Ukrainian state company seized the lighthouse and denied Russian servicemen access to the lighthouse.

    All this would render the Syrian ports invaluable for an alternative naval base, provided that their security could be assured, by a viable air defense barrier, safeguarding them from any future Israeli, or US attack, or even surveillance activities. Bolstering such an air defense can be enhanced by the long-term presence in off-shore deployment of high-profile warships, mounting sophisticated airpower (Su-33 fighters) and air defense armament, such as the Admiral Kuznetsov’s 3K95 Kinzhal missile system, the navalized version of the TOR and the Slava class Moskva’s SA-N-6 Grumble navalized version of the S-300 (SA-10).

    Another aspect of the new Russian Med deployment is intelligence. Israeli electronic warfare experts warn that the presence of a strong Russian naval force, most likely based in the Syrian port of Tartus, would represent a significant strengthening of Russian intelligence gathering capabilities in the region. The Russian navy is considered to have high-quality electronic equipment capable of observing new weapons systems and intercepting communications, which could become high-value assets to Syria and Iran. Russian intelligence maintained constant presence for several decades in international waters, where listening ships, camouflaged as fishing boats were positioned continuously off the Israeli coast, gathering electronic and communications. This activity continued at least through the 1990s.

    Whatever the latest Russian foray might signal, one thing is clear, the Mediterranean will soon become a new ‘Cold War’ type contest between Western and Russian navies, which will heat up substantially once the new Russian fourth generation Project 955 Borey class submarines, armed with Bulava missiles also enter into the fray.

    For further reading we recommend:

    Assad’s Ticket to Putins Mid East Comeback (12/23/2006)
    An Eastern Mediterranean Oil War? (2/16/2007)
    Is America Losing its Strategic Hold on Central Asia? (2/22/2007)
    Putin’s Muscle Flexing: Bluff or Cold War Challenge? (8/27/2007)
    Is Washington Losing the Gulf to Moscow? (11/20/2007)

     

     

    David Eshel