Turkish Forum

Category: Eastern Europe

  • Armenia Hit By Fuel Shortages

    Armenia Hit By Fuel Shortages

     

     

     

     

     

    By Shakeh Avoyan

    Armenia was grappling with its worst fuel shortages since the early 1990s on Monday despite the reported reopening of Georgia’s east-west railway that serves as the main supply line of the two South Caucasus states.

    A section of that railway close to the central Georgian town of Gori was damaged by a weekend fuel train explosion which Georgian officials said was caused by a landmine. It occurred just over a week after another, powerful explosion downed a nearby rail bridge. Russia denied Georgian accusations that it was behind the attack.

    The August 16 blast left the Armenian government scrambling to restore supplies of wheat, fuel and other basic commodities from the Georgian Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi which process more than 90 percent of Armenia’s external cargo turnover. The government sent a convoy of about 40 fuel trucks to collect gasoline stranded in the ports.

    Officials said on Monday that the convoy returned to Armenia at the weekend with more than 500 tons of petrol. The government does not plan to send more heavy vehicles to Georgia in view of the renewed rail communication, they said.

    Meanwhile, the situation with fuel supplies only deteriorated, with the vast majority of filling stations in Yerevan resorting to severe fuel rationing on Sunday. They stopped selling petrol altogether the next morning. Only holders of prepaid corporate vouchers issued by the country’s largest station chains could buy a limited amount of petrol on Monday.

    “We have run out of gas and are selling it only to company cars. This is all the information I have at this point,” said a worker at one filling station besieged by angry motorists.

    “The war is in Georgia, but it’s Armenia that is in crisis,” one of them complained. “They keep saying that petrol is coming and there are no problems. But there is a problem.”

    “Even in the most remote Georgian village there is no petrol shortage,” said another driver. “Why? Because there are many petrol importers in Georgia but only three of them in this country.”

    The cargo company Apaven, which was assigned by the government to organize the emergency fuel imports, downplayed the crisis. “The [Georgian] railway has begun functioning at a fraction of its capacity,” Apaven’s executive director, Gagik Aghajanian, told RFE/RL. “But even that is enough. If there is any deficit, I think it will be eliminated shortly.”

    Aghajanian referred to the start of rail traffic through a smaller, disused rail bridge which Georgia, helped by Armenia and Azerbaijan, has prepared for use until the damaged bridge is repaired.

    According to the Armenian Ministry of Transport and Communications, the August 16 blast left a total of 178 rail cars, 108 of them loaded with wheat, stranded on Georgian railway sections west of Gori. “In all likelihood, 35 cars loaded with wheat will head to Armenia today,” a ministry spokeswoman, Susanna Tonoyan, told RFE/RL.

    “Besides, we have a lot of freight in the ports of Poti and Batumi awaiting shipment,” she said. “In particular, in Poti there are two ships carrying 6,700 tons of wheat and 93 rails cars of other goods. In Batumi, we have 2,500 tons of wheat, ten cars of petrol and another one thousand tons of petrol.”

    Tonoyan added that the government has also organized “intensive” fuel and wheat supplies from neighboring Iran. More than 400 tons of flour have already bee imported to Armenia through Iranian territory, she said.

     

  • Should Russia recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia?

    Should Russia recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia?

     
    19:00 | 25/ 08/ 2008
     

    MOSCOW. (Fyodor Lukyanov for RIA Novosti) – The Georgian-Russian conflict has dramatically changed the position of the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The idea of recognizing their independence has been put to the vote in Moscow.

    By trying to use military force to restore the country’s territorial integrity, Tbilisi has killed the last hope of a political settlement to the conflict. The return of the breakaway republics to Georgian sovereignty, unlikely before Mikheil Saakashvili’s ill-advised adventure, is now completely impossible.

    But this does not mean the future is predetermined. There are two precedents that developments may follow: that of Kosovo or that of Cyprus. Russia must be very careful when choosing between them.

    The Kosovo scenario seems to promise more lasting results. Judging by the sixth paragraph on the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan, or at least its Moscow version, which provides for international discussion of the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Kremlin would prefer the Kosovo scenario.

    But it can only be implemented if the UN Security Council approves a relevant resolution, similar to Resolution 1244 adopted in June 1999 after the end of NATO’s air raids on Yugoslavia.

    The international community already knew then that Kosovo, which had refused to bow to the central authorities long before the Yugoslav army pulled out, would never accept the sovereignty of Belgrade. However, it was impossible to announce this publicly, as this could have provoked unpredictable developments in Serbia and would amount to the crude dismemberment of a sovereign state.

    The issue was put on hold, and at Moscow’s insistence a clause was added to the resolution affirming the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.

    This did not save Belgrade, but Russia and Serbia doggedly quoted that clause when contesting Kosovo’s unilateral proclamation of independence and its recognition by several Western countries.

    The Russian leaders only state the facts when they say that Saakashvili has dealt a deadly blow to Georgia’s territorial integrity. Yet the Security Council cannot approve a document that does not affirm it. Not only the West, bent on supporting Tbilisi, but also most other countries, would oppose it.

    It is one thing when some states act illegally, as when Kosovo’s independence was legalized. But it is quite another matter when the international community approves a resolution sanctioning the dissolution of a sovereign state. No country, including those that will never experience such problems, could approve it.

    On the other hand, Moscow will find it extremely difficult for domestic reasons to tolerate any mention of Georgia’s territorial integrity in a UN resolution. It has made quite a few public statements and pledged to pay for the restoration of South Ossetia. Besides, it will be impossible to explain to the public why a military victory has not translated into a political win.

    It will take refined diplomatic skills to formulate ideas in such a way that all sides can interpret them as victory. Otherwise, the danger is that developments in Georgia will follow the Cyprus scenario. Russia would unilaterally recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia according to the formula that has linked Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which only Turkey has recognized, since 1974.

    This would create new problems without solving old ones.

    If Russia opts for that scenario, the position of the breakaway republics will not change in terms of international law, even though many countries have lately been violating it. It should be said, for justice’s sake, that Moscow is not among the leaders in this ignoble race.

    The practical situation will not improve either. The United States encouraged a score of influential countries to recognize Kosovo’s independence, but Russia is unlikely to convince even one country to follow its example. International support for Russia’s actions, or rather lack thereof, became apparent during its clash with Georgia.

    Unilateral recognition of their independence will not help Abkhazia or South Ossetia to break out of international isolation, but will put powerful pressure on Russia. Moscow could not be blamed for its stance on Kosovo because it acted strictly according to international law, while Western countries appealed to expediency. The situation can be reversed this time, with Russia’s actions losing consistency and integrity.

    It would be extremely difficult to follow the Kosovo scenario even if the Security Council approved a resolution on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Their new status can be formalized only if the process becomes international, whereas Moscow and the two breakaway republics would like to decide the matter without international involvement. Unfortunately, they cannot do so, because Russia lacks the political resource.

    The issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s status will take some time to decide. It took nine years for Kosovo to gain independence, and even then only part of the international community recognized it. Northern Cyprus has been demanding independence for nearly 34 years.

    Hasty moves motivated by a desire to score political points at home or demonstrate Russia’s ability to disregard the opinions of others would seriously damage the Kremlin’s prestige. But hard daily political and diplomatic efforts will eventually bring about the desired effect.

    Fyodor Lukyanov is editor-in-chief of the Moscow-based magazine Russia in Global Affairs.

  • Russian military concerned by larger NATO presence in Black Sea

    Russian military concerned by larger NATO presence in Black Sea

     
    16:33 | 25/ 08/ 2008
     

    MOSCOW, August 25 (RIA Novosti) – Russia has to be concerned that NATO is continuing to get a stronger foothold in the Black Sea, the deputy chief of General Staff said Monday.

    “NATO’s naval deployments in the Black Sea, where nine foreign vessels have already been sent, cannot but provoke concern,” Col. Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn said.

    According to a Russian military intelligence source, the NATO warships that have entered the Black Sea carry over 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles between them.

    NATO has so far deployed the USS McFaul and the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Dallas, the Polish frigate General Pulaski, the German frigate FGS Lubeck, and the Spanish navy ship Admiral Juan de Borbon.

    “NATO is actually deploying a surface strike group in the Black Sea,” the unidentified source said Monday.

    The McFaul unloaded 55 tons of humanitarian aid in the Georgian port of Batumi on Sunday, with two more U.S. Navy ships due in port later this week. The Polish, Spanish and German ships also entered the Black Sea on Friday.

    Nogovitsyn said Russian peacekeepers, who continue to be deployed in Georgia after the country’s war with breakaway South Ossetia, would not carry out checks of foreign ships entering Georgian Black Sea ports.

    But he said peacekeepers at a checkpoint near the Poti port would conduct patrols in the area. “Patrols are a civilized form of control,” he said.

    The senior military official put it more colorfully on Saturday: “Poti is outside of the security zone, but that does not mean we will sit behind a fence watching them riding around in Hummers.”

    Nogovitsyn promised that Russia would not exceed the numbers defined by international agreements, including a 1992 pact, when sending peacekeepers to South Ossetia.

    But he warned that Georgia was planning to deploy troops in the towns of Gori and Senaki.

    “The Georgian Armed Forces command is continuing to conduct acts aimed at restoring the combat readiness of its army directed at South Ossetia,” he said. “Communication systems are being restored, units are planned for deployment in the military towns of Gori and Senaki.”

    Georgia is also planning acts of sabotage on infrastructure and transportation facilities, Nogovitsyn said.

    “Georgian reconnaissance and sabotage groups are reinvigorating their efforts… and are preparing military actions along the routes of Russian armored columns, as well as acts of sabotage on transportation infrastructure,” he said.

  • Geopolitical Diary: U.S. Aid to Georgia Raises a Question for Russia

    Geopolitical Diary: U.S. Aid to Georgia Raises a Question for Russia

    Stratfor.com
    August 25, 2008

    The Russians still have not completed withdrawal
    from Georgia. It is clear that, at least for the
    time being, the Russians intend to use the clause
    in the cease-fire agreement that allows them
    unspecified rights to protect their security to
    maintain troops in some parts of Georgia. Moscow
    obviously wants to demonstrate to the Georgians
    that Russia moves at its own discretion, not at
    the West’s. A train carrying fuel was blown up
    outside of Gori, with the Georgians claiming that
    the Russians have planted mines. Whether the
    claim is true or not, the Russians are trying to
    send a simple message: We are your best friends
    and worst enemies. The emphasis for the moment is on the latter.

    It is essential for the Russians to demonstrate
    that they are not intimidated by the West in any
    way. The audience for this is the other former
    Soviet republics, but also the Georgian public.
    It is becoming clear that the Russians are intent
    on seeing Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili
    removed from office. Moscow is betting that as
    the crisis dies down and Russian troops remain in
    Georgia, the Georgians will develop a feeling of
    isolation and turn on Saakashvili for leading
    them into a disaster. If that doesn’t work, and
    he remains president, then the Russians have
    forward positions in Georgia. Either way, full
    withdrawal does not make sense for them, when the
    only force against them is Western public
    opinion. That alone will make the Russians more intractable.

    It is interesting, therefore, that a U.S. warship
    delivered humanitarian supplies to the Georgians.
    The ship did not use the port of Poti, which the
    Russians have effectively blocked, but Batumi, to
    the south. That the ship was a destroyer is
    important. It demonstrates that the Americans
    have a force available that is inherently
    superior to anything the Russians have: the U.S.
    Navy. A Navy deployment in the Black Sea could
    well be an effective counter, threatening Russian sea lanes.

    While it was a warship, however, it was only a
    destroyer ­ so it is a gesture, but not a threat.
    But there are rumors of other warships readying
    to transit into the Black Sea. This raises an
    important issue: Turkey. Turkey borders Georgia
    but has very carefully stayed out of the
    conflict. Any ships that pass through Turkish
    straits do so under Turkish supervision guided by
    the Montreux Convention, an old agreement
    restricting the movement of warships through the
    straits ­ which the Russians in particular have
    ignored in moving ships into the Mediterranean.
    But the United States has a particular problem in
    moving through the Bosporus. Whatever the
    Convention says or precedent is, the United
    States can’t afford to alienate Turkey ­ not if
    there is a crisis in the Caucasus.

    Each potential American move has a complication
    attached. However, at this moment, the decision
    as to what to do is in the hands of the United
    States. The strategic question is whether it has
    the appetite for a naval deployment in the Black
    Sea at this historical moment. After that is
    answered, Washington needs to address the Turkish
    position. And after a U.S. squadron deploys in
    the Black Sea, the question will be what Russia,
    a land power, will do in response. The Europeans
    are irrelevant to the equation, even if they do
    hold a summit as the French want. They can do
    nothing unless the United States decides to act,
    and they can’t stop the United States if it does decide to go.

    The focus now is on the Americans. They can let
    the Russo-Georgian war slide into history and
    deal with Russia later on, or they can act. What
    Washington will decide to do is the question the
    arrival of the U.S.S. McFaul in Georgia posed for the Russians.

  • ANKARA AND YEREVAN – Waiting and watching

    ANKARA AND YEREVAN – Waiting and watching

    Turkey and the Caucasus

    Waiting and watching

    Aug 21st 2008 | ANKARA AND YEREVAN
    From The Economist print edition

    A large NATO country ponders a bigger role in the Caucasus

     

    APErdogan plays the Georgian flag

    AT THE Hrazdan stadium in Yerevan, workers are furiously preparing for a special visitor: Turkey’s president, Abdullah Gul. Armenia’s president, Serzh Sarkisian, has invited Mr Gul to a football World Cup qualifier between Turkey and its traditional foe, Armenia, on September 6th.
    If he comes, Mr Gul may pave the way for a new era in the Caucasus. Turkey is the only NATO member in the area, and after the war in Georgia it would like a bigger role. It is the main outlet for westbound Azeri oil and gas and it controls the Bosporus and Dardanelles, through which Russia and other Black Sea countries ship most of their trade. And it has vocal if small minorities from all over the region, including Abkhaz and Ossetians.
    Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has just been to Moscow and Tbilisi to promote a ‘Caucasus Stability and Co-operation Platform’, a scheme that calls for new methods of crisis management and conflict resolution. The Russians and Georgians made a show of embracing the idea, as have Armenia and Azerbaijan, but few believe that it will go anywhere. That is chiefly because Turkey does not have formal ties with Armenia. In 1993 Turkey sealed its border (though not its air links) with its tiny neighbour after Armenia occupied a chunk of Azerbaijan in a war over Nagorno-Karabakh. But the war in Georgia raises new questions over the wisdom of maintaining a frozen border. 
    Landlocked and poor, Armenia looks highly vulnerable. Most of its fuel and much of its grain comes through Georgia’s Black Sea ports, which have been paralysed by the war. Russia blew up a key rail bridge this week, wrecking Georgia’s main rail network that also runs to Armenia and Azerbaijan. This disrupted Azerbaijan’s oil exports, already hit by an explosion earlier this month in the Turkish part of the pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan, in Turkey.
    ‘All of this should point in one direction,’ says a Western diplomat in Yerevan: ‘peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.’ Reconciliation with Armenia would give Azerbaijan an alternative export route for its oil and Armenia the promise of a new lifeline via Turkey. Some Armenians gloat that Russia’s invasion of Georgia kyboshes the chances of Azerbaijan ever retaking Nagorno-Karabakh by force, though others say the two cases are quite different. Russia is not contiguous with Nagorno-Karabakh, nor does it have ‘peacekeepers’ or nationals there.
    Even before the Georgian war, Turkey seemed to understand that isolating Armenia is not making it give up the parts of Azerbaijan that it occupies outside Nagorno-Karabakh. But talking to it might. Indeed, that is what Turkish and Armenian diplomats have secretly done for some months, until news of the talks leaked (probably from an angry Azerbaijan).
    Turkey’s ethnic and religious ties with its Azeri cousins have long weighed heavily in its Caucasus policy. But there is a new worry that a resolution calling the mass slaughter of Armenians by the Ottoman Turks in the 1915 genocide may be passed by America’s Congress after this November’s American elections. This would wreck Turkey’s relations with the United States. If Turkey and Armenia could only become friendlier beforehand, the resolution might then be struck down for good.
    In exchange for better relations, Turkey wants Armenia to stop backing a campaign by its diaspora for genocide recognition and allow a commission of historians to establish ‘the truth’. Mr Sarkisian has hinted that he is open to this idea, triggering howls of treason from the opposition. The biggest obstacle remains Azerbaijan and its allies in the Turkish army. Mr Erdogan was expected to try to square Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliev, in a visit to Baku this week. Should he fail, Mr Gul may not attend the football match—and a chance for reconciliation may be lost.

  • The Eurasian Corridor: Pipeline Geopolitics and the New Cold War

    The Eurasian Corridor: Pipeline Geopolitics and the New Cold War

    By Michel Chossudovsky
    Global Research, August 22, 2008 

    The ongoing crisis in the Caucasus is intimately related to the strategic control over energy pipeline and transportation corridors.

    There is evidence that the Georgian attack on South Ossetia on August 7 was carefully planned. High level consultations were held with US and NATO officials in the months preceding the attacks. 

    The attacks on South Ossetia were carried out one week after the completion of extensive US – Georgia war games (July 15-31st, 2008). They were also preceded by high level Summit meetings held under the auspices of GUAM, a US-NATO sponsored regional military alliance. 

    War in Georgia Time Line

    July 1-2, 2008 GUAM Summit in Batumi, Georgia.  

    July 1,  “US-GUAM Summit” on the sideline of the official GUAM venue. 

    July 5 -12,  Russian Defense Ministry hold  War Games in the North Caucasus region under the codename “Caucasus Frontier 2008”. 

    July 9, 2008 China and Kazakhstan announce the commencement of construction of the Kazakhstan-China natural gas pipeline (KCP)

    July 15-31,  The US and Georgia  hold War Games under the codename Operation “Immediate Response”. One thousand US servicemen participate in the military exercise. 

    August 7,  Georgian Ground Forces and Air Force Attack South Ossetia

    August 8,  Russian Forces Intervene in South Ossetia.  

    August 14, 2008 Signing of US-Polish Agreement on the stationing of “US Interceptor Missiles” on Polish Territory

    Introduction: The GUAM Summit Venue

    In early July 2008, a regional summit was held in the Georgian city of Batumi under the auspices of GUAM  

    GUAM is a military agreement between Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, first established in 1997. Since 2006, following the withdrawal of Uzbekistan, GUAM was renamed: The Organization for Democracy and Economic Development – GUAM.  

    GUAM has little to do with “Democracy and Economic Development”. It is a de facto appendage of NATO. It  has been used by the US and the Atlantic Alliance to extend their zone of influence into the heartland of the former Soviet Union. 

    The main thrust of GUAM as a military alliance is to “protect” the energy and transportation corridors, on behalf of the Anglo-American oil giants. GUAM countries are also the recipients of US-NATO military aid and training. 

    The militarization of these corridors is a central feature of US-NATO planning. Georgia and Ukraine membership in NATO is part of the agenda of controlling the energy and transport corridors from the Caspian Sea basin to Western Europe.  

    The July 1-2, 2008 GUAM Summit Batumi meetings, under the chairmanship of President Saakashvili, focused on the central issue of pipeline and transportation corridors. The theme of the Summit was a “GUAM – Integrating Europe’s East”, from an economic and strategic-military standpoint, essentially with a view to isolating Russia. 

    The presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Ukraine (respectively  Ilham Aliyev, Mikheil Saakashvili and Viktor Yushchenko) were in attendance together with the presidents of Poland, Lech Kaczynski, and Lithuania, Valdas Adamkus. Moldova’s head of State flatly refused to attend this summit. 

    Map No 1: Georgia

    Undermining Russia 

    The GUAM Summit agenda focused on undermining Moscow’s influence in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe. The Polish President was in attendance. 

    US-NATO installations in Eastern Europe including the Missile Defense Shield are directly related to the evolving geopolitical situation in the Caucasus. Barely a week after the bombing of South Ossetia by Georgian forces, the US and Poland signed an agreement (August 14) which would allow the US Air Force to deploy US “interceptor missiles” on Polish soil: 

    “… As military strategists have pointed out, the US missiles in Poland pose a total existential threat to the future existence of the Russian nation. The Russian Government has repeatedly warned of this since US plans were first unveiled in early 2007. Now, despite repeated diplomatic attempts by Russia to come to an agreement with Washington, the Bush Administration, in the wake of a humiliating US defeat in Georgia, has pressured the Government of Poland to finally sign the pact. The consequences could be unthinkable for Europe and the planet. ” (William Engdahl, Missile Defense: Washington and Poland just moved the World closer to War, Global Research, August 15, 2008)

    The “US-GUAM Summit” 

    Barely acknowledged by the media, a so-called “US-GUAM Summit” meeting was also held on July 1st on the sidelines of the official GUAM summit venue. 

    US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Merkel met both GUAM and non-GUAM delegations behind closed doors. Several bilateral meetings were held including a Poland GUAM meeting (during which the issue of the US missile defense shield on Polish territory was most probably addressed). Private meetings were also held on July 1st and 2nd at the residence of the Georgian President. 

     

     

    US-Georgia War Games

    Barely two weeks following the GUAM Summit of July 1-2, 2008, US-Georgian military exercises were launched at the Vaziani military base, outside Tbilisi, 

    One thousand U.S and six hundred Georgian troops began a military training exercise under Operation “Immediate Response”. US troops included the participation of the US Air Force, Army, Marines and National Guard. While an Iraq war scenario had been envisaged, the military exercises were a dress rehearsal for an upcoming military operation. The  war games were completed on July 31st, a week before the onset of the August 7th Georgian attacks on South Ossetia. 

    Troops from Ukraine and Azerbaijan, which are members of GUAM also participated in Operation “Immediate Response” Unexpectedly, Armenia which is an ally of Russia and a staunch opponent of Azerbaijan also took part in these games, which also served to create and “train and work together” environment between Azeri and Armenian forces (ultimately directed against Russia). 

    Brig. Gen. William B. Garrett, commander of the U.S. military’s Southern European Task Force, was responsible for the coordination of the US-Georgia war games.

    Gen. William B. Garrett and Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili

    Russia’s War Games in the North Caucasus

    Russia began large-scale military exercises involving some 8,000 military personnel, some 700 armored units and over 30 aircraft ( in the North Caucasus republics of the Russian Federation on July 5th. (Georgian Times, July 28, 2008) 

    The Russian war games were explicitly carried out in response to the evolving security situation in Abhkazia and South Ossetia. The exercise, dubbed  “Caucasus Frontier 2008”, involved units of the 58th Army and the 4th Air Force Army, stationed in the North Caucasus Military District.

    A Russian Defense Ministry spokesman acknowledged that the military exercises conducted in the Southern Federal District were being carried out in response to “an escalation in tension in the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflict zones,…[and] that Russia’s North Caucasian Military District was ready to provide assistance to Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia if needed.” (Georgian Times, July 28, 2008, RIA-Novosti, July 5, 2008)  

    These units of the North Caucasian Military District (Army and Air Force) were subsequently used to lead the Russian counterattack directed against Georgian Forces in South Ossetia on August 8th.

    Pipeline Geopolitics

    A central issue on the GUAM-NATO drawing board at the July GUAM Summit in Batumi, was the Odessa-Brody-Plotsk (Plock on the Vistula) pipeline route (OBP) (see Maps 3 and 4), which brings Central Asian oil via Odessa, to Northern Europe, bypassing Russian territory. An extension of OBP to Poland’s port of Gdansk on the Baltic sea is also envisaged. 

    It should be noted that the OBP also links up with Russia’s Friendship Pipeline (Druzhba pipeline) in an agreement with Russia. 

    Washington’s objective is ultimately to weaken and destabilize Russia’s pipeline network –including the Friendship Pipeline and the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS)— and its various corridor links into the Western Europe energy market. 

    It should be noted that Russia has established as part of the Druzhba pipeline network, a pipeline corridor which transits through Belarus, thereby bypassing the Ukraine. (See Maps 2 and 3 below)

    The Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) also operated by Russia’s Transneft links Samara to Russia’s oil tanker terminal at Primorsk in the Gulf of Finland. (See map below) It carries crude oil from Russia’s Western Siberian region to both North and Western European markets. 

    Another strategic pipeline system, largely controlled by Russia, is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). The CPC  is a joint venture arrangement between Russia and Kazakhstan, with shareholder participation from a number of Middle East oil companies. 

    The Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) is tied into the Atyrau-Samara (AS) pipeline, which is a joint venture between Russia’s Transneft and Kazakhstan’s national pipeline operator, KazTransOil. The AS pipeline in turn links up with the Russia-Kazakhstan Caspian Petroleum Consortium (CPC), which pumps Tengiz crude oil from Atyrau (Western Kazakhstan) to the CPC’s Russian tanker terminal near Novorossiysk on the Black Sea.

    On July 10, 2008, barely a week following the GUAM Summit, Transneft and KazTransOil  announced that they were in talks to expand the capacity of the Atyrau-Samara pipeline from 16 to 26 million tons of oil per year. (RBC Daily, July 10, 2008).

    The GUAM Transportation Corridor 

    The GUAM governments represented at the Batumi GUAM Summit also approved the further development of  The GUAM Transportation Corridor (GTC),  which complements the controversial Baku Tblisi Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. The latter links the Caspian Sea basin to the Eastern Mediterranean, via Georgia and Turkey, totally bypassing Russian territory. The BTC pipeline is controlled by a oil consortium led by British Petroleum.   

    Both the GTC and the BTC corridors are protected militarily by GUAM and NATO. 

    The GTC corridor would connect the Azeri capital of Baku on the Caspian sea to the Georgian ports of Poti/ Batumi on the Black Sea, which would then link up with the Ukrainian Black sea port of Odessa. (And From Odessa, through maritime and land routes to Western and Northern Europe).

     

    Map No 2: Strategic Pipeline Routes. BTC, Friendship Pipeline, Baltic Pipeline System (BPS), CPC, AS

    Map No. 3. Russia’s Druzhba pipeline system

     

    Map No 4  Eastern Europe. Plock on the Vistula

    The Baku Tblisi Ceyan (BTC) Pipeline

    The BTC pipeline dominated by British Petroleum and inaugurated in 2006 at the height of the war on Lebanon, has dramatically changed the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean, which is now linked, through an energy corridor, to the Caspian sea basin:

     “[The BTC pipeline] considerably changes the status of the region’s countries and cements a new pro-West alliance. Having taken the pipeline to the Mediterranean, Washington has practically set up a new bloc with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Israel, ” (Komerzant, Moscow, 14 July 2006)


    Map No 5. The Baku, Tblisi Ceyan pipeline (BTC)


    Pipeline Geopolitics and the Role of Israel

    Israel is now part of the Anglo-American military axis, which serves the interests of the Western oil giants in the Middle East and Central Asia. Not surprisingly, Israel has military cooperation agreements with Georgia and Azerbaijan. 

    While the official reports state that the BTC pipeline will “channel oil to Western markets”, what is rarely acknowledged is that part of the oil from the Caspian sea would be directly channeled towards Israel. In this regard, an underwater Israeli-Turkish pipeline project has been envisaged which would link Ceyhan to the Israeli port of Ashkelon and from there through Israel’s main pipeline system, to the Red Sea.

    The objective of Israel is not only to acquire Caspian sea oil for its own consumption needs but also to play a key role in re-exporting Caspian sea oil back to the Asian markets through the Red Sea port of Eilat. The strategic implications of this re-routing of Caspian sea oil are farreaching.

    What is envisaged is to link the BTC pipeline to the Trans-Israel Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline, also known as Israel’s Tipline, from Ceyhan to the Israeli port of Ashkelon. (For further details, see Michel Chossudovsky, The War on Lebanon and the Battle for Oil, Global Research, 26 July 2006)

    Map No 6. Trans-Israel Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline

    America’s Silk Road Strategy: The Trans-Eurasian Security System

    The Silk Road Strategy (SRS) constitutes an essential building block of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

    The SRS was formulated as a bill presented to the US Congress in 1999. It called for the creation of an energy and transport corridor network linking Western Europe to Central Asia and eventually to the Far East. 

    The Silk Road Strategy is defined as a “trans-Eurasian security system”. The SRS calls for the  “militarization of the Eurasian corridor” as an integral part of the “Great Game”. The stated objective, as formulated under the proposed March 1999 Silk Road Strategy Act, is to develop America’s business empire along an extensive geographical corridor.  

    While the 1999 SRS legislation (HR 3196) was adopted by the House of Representatives, it never became law. Despite this legislative setback, the Silk Road Strategy became, under the Bush Administration, the de facto basis of US-NATO  interventionism, largely with a view to integrating the former Soviet republics of the South Caucasus and Central Asia into the US sphere of influence.  

    The successful implementation of the SRS required the concurrent “militarization” of the entire Eurasian corridor from the Eastern Mediterranean to China’s Western frontier bordering onto Afghanistan, as a means to securing control over extensive oil and gas reserves, as well as “protecting” pipeline routes and trading corridors. The invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 has served to support American strategic objectives in Central Asia including the control of pipeline corridors. Afghanistan border onto Chinese Western frontier. It is also a strategic landbridge linking the extensive oil wealth of the Caspian Sea basin to the Arabian Sea.

    The militarization process under the SRS is largely directed against China, Russia and Iran. The SRS, called for:   

    “The development of strong political, economic, and security ties among countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia and the West [which] will foster stability in this region, which is vulnerable to political and economic pressures from the south, north, and east. [meaning Russia to the North, Iraq, Iran and the Middle East to the South and China to the East] (106th Congress, Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999)

    The adoption of a neoliberal policy agenda under advice from the IMF and the World Bank is an integral part of the SRS, which seeks to foster “open market economies… [which] will provide positive incentives for international private investment, increased trade, and other forms of commercial interactions”. (Ibid). 

    Strategic access to South Caucasus and Central Asian oil and gas is a central feature of the Silk Road Strategy: 

    “The region of the South Caucasus and Central Asia could produce oil and gas in sufficient quantities to reduce the dependence of the United States on energy from the volatile Persian Gulf region.” (Ibid)

    The SRS is also intent upon preventing the former Soviet republics from developing their own economic, political and military cooperation ties as well as establishing broad ties up with China, Russia and Iran. (See Michel Chossudovsky, America’s “War on Terrorism”, Global Research, Montreal, 2005). 

    In this regard, the formation of GUAM, which was launched in 1997, was intended to integrate the former Soviet republics into military cooperation arrangements with the US and NATO, which would prevent them from reestablishing their ties with the Russian Federation. 

    Under the 1999 SRS Act, the term “countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia” means Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. (106th Congress, Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999).

    The US strategy has, in this regard, not met its stated objective: Whereas Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia have become de facto US protectorates, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Armenia and Belarus are, from a geopolitical standpoint, aligned with Moscow. 

    This extensive Eurasian network of transport and energy corridors has been defined by Washington as part of an American sphere of influence:   

    “In the Caspian-Black Sea Region, the European Union and the United States have concentrated on setting up a reliable logistics chain to connect Central Asia with the European Union via the Central Caucasus and Turkey/Ukraine. The routes form the centerpiece of INOGATE (an integrated communication system along the routes taking hydrocarbon resources to Europe) and TRACECA (the multi-channel Europe-Caucasus-Asia corridor) projects.

    The TRACECA transportation and communication routes grew out of the idea of the Great Silk Road (the traditional Eurasian communication channel of antiquity). It included Georgian and Turkish Black Sea ports (Poti, Batumi, and Ceyhan), railways of Georgia and Azerbaijan, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, ferry lines that connect Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan with Azerbaijan across the Caspian Sea/Lake (Turkmenbashi-Baku; Aktau-Baku), railways and highways now being built in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and China, as well as Chinese Pacific terminals as strategically and systemically important parts of the mega-corridor.” (See GUAM and the Trans-Caspian Gas Transportation Corridor: Is it about Politics or Economics?),

    The Kazakhstan-China Natural Gas Pipeline (KCP)Barely a few days following the GUAM Summit in Batumi, China and Kazakhstan announced (July 9, 2008) the commencement of construction work of a 1,300-kilometer natural gas pipeline. The inaugural ceremony was held  near Kazakhstan’s capital Almaty. 

     

    The pipeline which is to be constructed in several stages is expected to start pumping gas in 2010. (See silkroadintelligencer.com, July 9, 2008)

    “The new transit route is part of a larger project to build two parallel pipelines connecting China with Central Asia’s vast natural gas reserves. The pipes will stretch more than 7,000 kilometers from Turkmenistan, cross Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and enter China’s northwestern Xinjiang region. Uzbekistan started construction of its part this month while Turkmenistan launched its segment last year.” (Ibid)

    Map No 7. Kazakhstan-China natural gas pipeline (KCP)

    China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) which is  the leading operator of the consortium, “has signed deals with state oil and gas firms of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan giving them 50 percent stakes in their respective parts of the pipeline.”

    The KPC pipeline project encroaches upon US strategic interests in Eurasia. It undermines the logic of America’s Silk Road Strategy. The KPC is part of a competing Eurasian based transportation and energy strategy, largely dominated by Russia, Iran and China. 

    Competing Eurasian Strategy protected by the SCO-CSTO Military Alliance

    The competing Eurasian based corridors are protected (against US-NATO encroachment) by two regional military alliances: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)  and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

    The SCO is a military alliance between Russia and China and several Central Asian former Soviet republics including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Iran has observer status in the SCO. 

    The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which plays a key geopolitical role in relation to transport and energy corridors, operates in close liaison with the SCO. The CSTO regroups the following member states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

    Of significance, since 2006, the SCO and the CSTO member countries have conducted joint war games and are actively collaborating with Iran.  

    In October 2007, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) signed a Memorandum of Understanding, laying the foundations for military cooperation between the two organizations. This SCO-CSTO agreement, barely mentioned by the Western media, involves the creation of a full-fledged military alliance between China, Russia and the member states of SCO/CSTO. It is worth noting that the SCTO and the SCO held joint military exercises in 2006, which coincided with those conducted by Iran. (For further details see Michel Chossudovsky, Russia and Central Asian Allies Conduct War Games in Response to US Threats, Global Research, August 2006)

    While remaining distinct from an organizational standpoint, in practice, these two regional military alliances (SCO and SSTO) constitute a single military block, which confronts US-NATO expansionism in Central Asia and the Caucasus. 

    Full Circle 

    The US-NATO protected SRS Eurasian transport and energy corridors, are slated to link Central Asia to the Far East, as outlined in the Silk Road Strategy. At present, the Eastward corridors linking Central Asia to China are protected militarily by the SCO-CSTO.

    In terms of Washington’s global military and strategic agenda, the Eurasian corridors contemplated under the SRS would inevitably encroach upon China’s territorial sovereignty.The proposed US-NATO-GUAM pipeline and transportation corridors are intended to connect, at some future date, with the proposed transport and energy corridors in the Western hemisphere, including those envisaged under the North American Security Prosperity Partnership (SPP).   

    The Security Prosperity Partnership (SPP) is to North America what the Silk Road Strategy (SRS) is to the Caucasus and Central Asia. They are strategic regional constructs of America’s business empire. They are the building blocks of the New World Order. 

    The SPP is the result of a similar process of strategic planning, militarization and free market economic integration, largely based on the control of strategic resources including energy and water, as well as the ” protection” of energy and transportation corridors (land and maritime routes ) from Alaska and Canada’s Arctic to Central America and the Caribbean basin. 

    Author’s Note: This article has focused selectively on key pipeline corridors with a view to analyzing broad geopolitical and strategic issues. 
    An examination of the overall network of Eurasian pipeline corridors would require a far more detailed and comprehensive presentation    .