Category: Eastern Europe

  • Geopolitical Diary: How Far Will the Caucasus Conflict Go?

    Geopolitical Diary: How Far Will the Caucasus Conflict Go?

    Stratfor.com
    August 28, 2008

    Russian President Dmitri Medvedev flew to
    Tajikistan on Wednesday for a summit with China
    and four Central Asian countries. The countries
    are members of the Shanghai Cooperation
    Organization, which meets regularly. This meeting
    had been on the schedule for while and has no
    significance, save that it brings the Russians
    into contact with four former members of the
    Soviet Union and ­ as important ­ China.

    Each of the Central Asian countries is obviously
    trying to measure Russia’s long-term intentions.
    The issue will not be Georgia, but what Georgia
    means to them. In other words, how far does
    Russia intend to go in reasserting its sphere of
    influence? Medvedev will give suitable
    reassurances, but the Russian empire and Soviet
    Union both conquered this area in the past.
    Retaking it is possible. That means that the four
    Central Asian countries will be trying very hard
    to retain their independence without irritating
    the Russians. For them, this will be a careful meeting.

    Of greater interest to the world is China’s view
    of the situation. Again, China has no interest in
    Georgia. It does have to have quiet delight over
    a confrontation between the United States and the
    Russians. The more these two countries are
    worried about each other, the less either ­ and
    particularly the United States ­ can worry about
    the Chinese. For China, a U.S.-Islamic
    confrontation coupled with a U.S.-Russian
    confrontation is just what the doctor ordered.
    Certainly the least problem Washington will have
    is whether the yuan floats ­ and, hoping for
    cooperation with China, the United States will
    pull its punches on other issues. That means that
    the Chinese will express sympathy to all parties
    and take part in nothing. There is no current
    threat to Central Asia, so they have no problems
    with the Russians. If one emerges, they can talk.

    In the meantime, in the main crisis, Russian
    Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called attention to
    the Black Sea as a potential flash point in the
    confrontation between Russia and the West. He
    warned that there could be direct confrontations
    between Russian and NATO ships should NATO or its
    member nations increase their presence there.
    According to NATO there are currently four NATO
    ships in the Black Sea for a previously scheduled
    exercise called Active Endeavor. Putin explicitly
    warned, however, that there could be additional
    vessels belonging to NATO countries in the Black
    Sea that are not under NATO command.

    It is hard to get ships into the Black Sea
    unnoticed. The ships have to pass through the
    Bosporus, a fairly narrow strait in Turkey, and
    it is possible to sit in cafes watching the ships
    sail by. Putting a task force into the Black Sea,
    even at night, would be noticed, and the Russians
    would certainly know the ships are there.

    As a complicating factor, there is the Montreaux
    Convention, a treaty that limits access to the
    Black Sea by warships. The deputy chief of the
    Russian general staff very carefully invoked the
    Montreaux Convention, pointing out that Turkey,
    the controlling country, must be notified 15 days
    in advance of any transit of the Bosporus, that
    warships can’t remain in the Black Sea for more
    than 21 days and that only a limited number of
    warships were permitted there at any one time.
    The Russians have been reaching out in multiple
    diplomatic channels to the Turks to make sure
    that they are prepared to play their role in
    upholding the convention. The Turkish position on
    the current crisis is not clear, but becoming
    crucial; both the United States and Russia are
    working on Turkey, which is not a position Turkey
    cares to be in at the moment. Turkey wants this crisis to go away.

    It is not going away. With the Russians holding
    position in Georgia, it is now clear that the
    West will not easily back down. The Russians
    certainly aren’t going to back down. The next
    move is NATO’s, but the alliance is incapable of
    moving, since there is no consensus. Therefore,
    the next move is for Washington to lead another
    coalition of the willing. It is coming down to a
    simple question. Does the United States have the
    appetite for another military confrontation
    (short of war, we would think) in which case it
    will use its remaining asset, the U.S. Navy, to
    sail into the Black Sea? If it does this, will it
    stay awhile and then leave or establish a
    permanent presence (ignoring the Montreaux
    Convention) in support of Ukraine and Georgia,
    with its only real military option being
    blockade? If this happens, will the Russians live
    with it, will they increase their own naval, air
    and land based anti-ship missile capabilities in
    the region, or will they increase pr essure
    elsewhere, in Ukraine or the Baltics?

    In short, how far does this go?

  • All Quiet on the Southern Front

    All Quiet on the Southern Front

    Comment by Sergey Markedonov
    Special to Russia Profile

    Despite Having Been Affected by the Russo-Georgian Squabble, Both Armenia and Azerbaijan Cautiously Abstain From Taking Sides

    The events of the “five-day war” in South Ossetia demonstrated that countries of the Southern Caucasus largely act according to their own national interests, and not on the assurances of “eternal friendships.” Thus, both Armenia and Azerbaijan behave in a careful and calculated manner, realizing that getting involved in the Russian-Georgian conflict bears a lot of “hidden reefs” which could prove to be more dangerous than the status-quo that is so despised by Baku and so cherished by Yerevan.

    Georgia’s attempts to “restore the constitutional order” in South Ossetia and the harsh Russian response have altered the politico-legal and power configurations in the CIS, and not only in the two “hot spots.” They had a serious impact on the entire ethno-political situation in Eurasia. In this regard, it is crucial to consider the consequences of this “security deficit” in the South Caucasus, especially because in recent weeks, Armenia and Azerbaijan have remained in the shadows. What lessons were Baku and Yerevan able to draw, having been brought to a conflicted state by the events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the “hot August” of 2008?

    Let’s consider the horizontal links among the three former Caucasus republics, all of them now independent states in the South Caucasus region. Georgia considered Azerbaijan its natural ally. Baku was ready to reciprocate the sentiment. Let’s recall that the day before the new escalation in South Ossetia, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili called Azerbaijan no less than the “guarantor of independence” of his country. Typical theatrics of the Georgian leader aside, we should recognize a few important points. First, Georgia and Azerbaijan are members of an organization whose stated goal is to play a peculiar anti-CIS role—GUAM. After Georgia officially left the CIS, GUAM remains the sole structure in which Tbilisi can realize its integration projects (another question is how successfully) within Eurasia.

    Secondly, Azerbaijan has always supported the territorial integrity of Georgia. Unlike Ukraine, Azerbaijan itself lost some 13 percent of the land that is recognized as its integral part, and hence its support, along with political reasons, has emotional and psychological grounds (which in politics, especially in the Caucasus, is extremely important). Thirdly, there is the economic cooperation. In 2005, during the energy crisis, it was Azerbaijan that provided gas for Georgia. “The Georgian people will never forget this,” Saakashvili said in a statement during the groundbreaking opening ceremony for the Turkish section of the “Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars” railway on July 24 (only two weeks remained before the Tskhinvali tragedy). The two Caucasian states were also united by two pipelines (oil and gas). Baku also often served as a profitable and reliable sponsor for Tbilisi.
     
    Unlike Azerbaijan, Georgia never considered Armenia as a strategic partner and even less as a “guarantor of security.” There have been a lot of sensitive issues in their bilateral relations. These include the position of Armenians in Georgia (in the Armenian populated Samtskhe-Javakheti and in Tbilisi itself, considered to be an important cultural center for all Armenians), and the role of the Armenian community in the Abkhaz events. During the Georgian-Abkhazian war of 1992-1993, the Bagramyan battalion fought on the side of the “aggressive separatists” (as they call them in Tbilisi). There were far fewer Armenian participants on the Georgian side (largely from the aforementioned Tbilisi). In present-day Abkhazia, the Armenian community is represented both in the government and in business, and is generally loyal to the leadership of the de facto state. The irritating factors are compounded by the military partnership between Armenia and the Russian Federation (particularly the military base in Gyumri, to which, among others, Russian military units from Georgia were moved). Prior to the withdrawal of the Russian military base from Akhalkalaki, there were many local ethnic Armenian residents employed there. Also, Georgia (along with Iran) is Armenia’s window to the world (because of the land blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan). Hence, Yerevan does not want to move past certain milestones in its relations with Tbilisi. Armenia also realizes that its gateway to Russia is through Georgia, and that is why the dependence on the dynamics of Russian-Georgian relations is an extremely sore point for Armenia. In turn, given the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Tbilisi is more cautious in dealing with the “Armenian question.” The Georgian leadership cannot ignore that, unlike the Abkhazians or Ossetians, Armenians have strong support in the United States and the EU (similarly from France).

    Indeed, the given dispositions have determined the attitude that Georgia’s neighbors have toward the “hot August” events. Despite its commitment to a strategic alliance with Russia, Armenia preferred to abstain from sudden moves and categorical statements. There are many reasons for this. There is a reluctance to either clearly align their actions with the Russians or to spoil their relations with the West. They are already uneasy in connection with the events of March 1 in Yerevan. It is understandable that Serzh Sargsyan is no Alexander Lukashenko, to whom the United States and the EU have long ago given their “blessing” of more freedom in his interpretation of events.

    Armenia, which has such a vulnerable place as the Karabakh, was also not overly interested in anchoring the Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR) and the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict to Russian-Georgian relations. Besides, even earlier, both Armenia and the NKR leadership distanced themselves from an openly pro-Ossetia and pro-Abkhazia position. This is why representatives of Armenia’s Ministry of Defense hastened to declare on August 10 that raids on the Georgian airbases were not being conducted from the Russian base located in Armenia: “The 102nd military base in the city of Gyumri has no military aircraft capable of committing acts such as these bombings,” they claimed.

    The position of Armenia in connection with the heated Russian-Turkish relations is another sensitive issue. Mild support by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan for the Russian Federation’s position is creating a feeling in Yerevan (as well as in the Armenian Diaspora in the West) that the two great powers can agree with each other to the detriment of Armenia (in particular, on the Karabakh issue). Recall that on August 13 Erdogan stated: “The situation in South Ossetia gives us cause to review the relationship between our countries, whose solidarity in this region is of great importance.” Here is what Karapet Kalenchyan, an expert at the Armenian Center for National and International Studies, wrote on this matter: “Seeing that Russia is once again entering the South Caucasus, Turkey gives it its full support in exchange for certain concessions on the part of Russia. What kind of concessions could these be? Armenians have often worried that such concessions might be made at the expense of our interests.”

    Prudence (only in the opposite direction) is also what set apart Azerbaijan’s position. Representatives of various political parties of the republic (including the ruling party) were more open in expressing their positions. According to Mubariz Gurbanly (the ruling “Yeni Azerbaijan” party), the “Georgian authorities’ actions to restore the country’s territorial integrity are fully merited. These actions were undertaken in accordance with the UN Charter.” Note that this idea (the legality of actions to punish separatists) had so far been far more popular in Azerbaijan than in Georgia. The chairman of the Supreme Majlis of the “Musavat” (opposition forces) party, Sulhaddin Akper, stated that Georgia “was forced to conduct the operation against the separatists in South Ossetia.” However, Baku was officially much more cautious than, for instance, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and the Foreign Ministry of his country (which, unlike Azerbaijan, does not have such serious interests in the region).

    The statement by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs from August 8 in support of Georgia’s territorial integrity (approved by the Georgian diplomats) contained general statements on the validity of the Georgian operation under “international law,” but was not further clarified.

    Five leaders of states that expressed their solidarity with Georgia were present at a rally in Tbilisi on August 12. There were leaders of the three Baltic countries, Poland, and Ukraine, but Ilham Aliyev, the head of the state which Saakashvili called the “guarantor of independence” less than a month earlier, was not there. Baku preferred caution, given their interest in maintaining stable relations with Russia. Unlike Georgia, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is not based on a rigid confrontational manner. In Baku, they consider Russia to be a counterweight to the West (which does not have such unambiguous relations with Azerbaijan as it does with Georgia). Azerbaijan is also afraid of being drawn into the “Iran game,” where it is destined to play a role as either a runway or the target of “Tehran’s retaliatory shot.” Hence the desire to appreciate the generally friendly, albeit difficult, relations with Russia.

    The opposition is trying to take advantage of this situation. Isa Gambar, the leader of the “Musavat” party (who received second place in the last presidential elections) believes that the official Baku reaction to the events in South Ossetia is inadequate. But what level of influence does Isa Gambar, or other opposition figures (Eldar Namazov or Ali Keremli), enjoy today that he can alter the position of the president’s team? That is a rhetorical question. Let’s consider a hypothetical situation. Tomorrow either Gambar or Namazov replace Ilham Aliyev. I think that they would also strictly separate rhetoric and realistic politics, guided by the national interests of Azerbaijan. Note that if such a scenario were to be repeated in Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku would receive a much tougher reaction from the West. There would even be talk of the consolidated opinion of the United States, Russia, and leading EU countries. And that is why the Azerbaijani police prohibit protests at the Russian embassy in Baku, and prevents anti-Russian hysteria from sweeping the country.

    Sergey Markedonov Ph.D., is the head of the Interethnic Relations Department at Moscow’s Institute of Political and Military Analysis.

  • Geopolitical Diary: Abkhaz and South Ossetian Independence, the Russian Motive

    Geopolitical Diary: Abkhaz and South Ossetian Independence, the Russian Motive

    Stratfor.com
    August 27, 2007

    Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on Tuesday
    recognized the independence of two regions in the
    territory of the former Soviet republic of
    Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia and
    Georgia fought a brief war over the territories
    earlier this month which Russia clearly won. Now
    Russia will undoubtedly enter into “formal”
    negotiations with the two “states” about either
    long-term military staging agreements or formal annexation.

    The West, which has consistently backed the idea
    of Georgia’s territorial integrity, broadly
    condemned the move, but has taken no action
    beyond rhetoric. Nor is it likely to in the short
    term. The West could deploy naval forces that can
    outmaneuver and box in Russia as a whole, but
    that requires time and political will. In the
    meantime, Russia has forces on the ground in the
    two territories and loads more nearby. The West
    doesn’t. The Russians clearly are the ones
    determining the reality on the ground, and that ­ for now ­ is that.

    But recognition is not something that seems to
    serve Russia’s interest. Unlike the drama
    surrounding the independence declaration of
    Kosovo earlier this year, there is no broad
    swathe of states standing by to recognize Abkhaz
    or South Ossetian independence. Only Belarus ­
    whose leadership is finding its leash
    ever-shorter ­ is likely to jump at the news, and
    even then not until the appropriate recognition
    speech is faxed to them from the Kremlin.
    Additionally, Russia is packed to the gills with
    its own separatist regions and Tuesday’s decision
    will only give all of these disparate and
    resentful groups food for thought. If Abkhazia
    can be independent, why not Chechnya? If South Ossetia, why not Tatarstan?

    So why open Pandora’s Box?

    First and foremost, the recognition decision is
    about Kosovo. In Kosovo, the West utterly ignored
    Russian concerns and imposed a legal regime that
    fit with Western interests. With Abkhazia and
    South Ossetia, Russia is returning the favor in its own backyard.

    Yet for that logic to hold, this must be only the
    beginning. For the Russians the war and this
    recognition is not really about Abkhazia and
    South Ossetia, or even about Georgia. It is about
    redefining the expectations of a broad swathe of
    actors all along the Russian periphery. Since
    1992 many entities have been eating away at the
    Russian borderlands ­ the West first and foremost
    among them. In Moscow’s view, Russia needs to
    roll that tide back not just in the Caucasus, but
    in Central Asia, the Baltics, Ukraine, and maybe even the Balkans.

    But that does not mean that tide will be rolled
    back in a day. Russia holds most of the cards,
    yet does not appear set to press its advantage,
    or at least not immediately or overtly. There are
    any number of things the Russians could do in
    Azerbaijan, Ukraine, the Baltic states ­ or even
    in Georgia ­ that they have chosen to put on hold
    for now. Tuesday’s recognition had a feel similar
    to that of the press statements of the Western
    powers: rhetoric that danced around the real issue.

    The reason for the (brief) break in the action is
    likely rooted in Russia’s mindset, which in turn
    is determined by Russia’s geography. Russia’s
    borderlands are for the most part indefensible
    and so the Russian psyche has been shaped by wave
    after wave of foreign invasion. A certain
    paranoia about outsiders is understandable.

    But there is another layer. Built into this fear
    of outsiders is a belief that Russia’s suffering
    has allowed others to escape Russia’s dark fate
    and thrive. For example, Russians feel that while
    Russia languished under Mongol subjugation, their
    resistance prevented the Mongols from conquering
    Europe. Another common belief is that the Soviet
    Union’s battles with Nazi Germany gave the United
    States and United Kingdom the time they needed to
    invade France. These national myths ­ which is
    not to say that they are fabrications, merely
    interpretations – blend Russia’s natural paranoia
    with the idea that the rest of the world owes
    them something. Therefore, it is just a matter of
    finding the right words to convince the world of that “fact.”

    In the aftermath of the Georgian war we suspect
    Russia is waiting for what they feel would
    constitute an “appropriate” response from the
    West. We suspect that the Russians expect to be
    informed that the West will recognize Moscow’s
    suzerainty in Russia’s sphere of influence and
    see no reason to push the matter so long as the
    balance of forces are so obviously in Moscow’s favor.

    For better or worse, this buys everyone a bit of
    time. Time to negotiate a West-Russia truce
    perhaps. Or perhaps time for the two sides to
    gear up for a much larger ­ and broader ­ conflict.

  • Ilgar Mamedov: “The decision of the Russian president to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia threatens the security system in the world”

    Ilgar Mamedov: “The decision of the Russian president to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia threatens the security system in the world”

    The decision of the Russian president to recognize independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia affects the security system in the world, said famous political scientist Ilqar Mamedov in his interview to Day.Az.

    “The security and cooperation in Europe were challenged even following the factual recognition of Kosovo’s independence. The first, deep concern for the future of OSCE appeared at that time. And now after Russia has recognized independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we are dealing with the second, destructive influence on the security system of the world. (more…)

  • Georgia and Kosovo: A Single Intertwined Crisis

    Georgia and Kosovo: A Single Intertwined Crisis

    By George Friedman

    The Russo-Georgian war was rooted in broad geopolitical processes. In large part it was simply the result of the cyclical reassertion of Russian power. The Russian empire — czarist and Soviet — expanded to its borders in the 17th and 19th centuries. It collapsed in 1992. The Western powers wanted to make the disintegration permanent. It was inevitable that Russia would, in due course, want to reassert its claims. That it happened in Georgia was simply the result of circumstance.

    There is, however, another context within which to view this, the context of Russian perceptions of U.S. and European intentions and of U.S. and European perceptions of Russian capabilities. This context shaped the policies that led to the Russo-Georgian war. And those attitudes can only be understood if we trace the question of Kosovo, because the Russo-Georgian war was forged over the last decade over the Kosovo question.

    Yugoslavia broke up into its component republics in the early 1990s. The borders of the republics did not cohere to the distribution of nationalities. Many — Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and so on — found themselves citizens of republics where the majorities were not of their ethnicities and disliked the minorities intensely for historical reasons. Wars were fought between Croatia and Serbia (still calling itself Yugoslavia because Montenegro was part of it), Bosnia and Serbia and Bosnia and Croatia. Other countries in the region became involved as well.

    One conflict became particularly brutal. Bosnia had a large area dominated by Serbs. This region wanted to secede from Bosnia and rejoin Serbia. The Bosnians objected and an internal war in Bosnia took place, with the Serbian government involved. This war involved the single greatest bloodletting of the bloody Balkan wars, the mass murder by Serbs of Bosnians.

    Here we must pause and define some terms that are very casually thrown around. Genocide is the crime of trying to annihilate an entire people. War crimes are actions that violate the rules of war. If a soldier shoots a prisoner, he has committed a war crime. Then there is a class called “crimes against humanity.” It is intended to denote those crimes that are too vast to be included in normal charges of murder or rape. They may not involve genocide, in that the annihilation of a race or nation is not at stake, but they may also go well beyond war crimes, which are much lesser offenses. The events in Bosnia were reasonably deemed crimes against humanity. They did not constitute genocide and they were more than war crimes.

    At the time, the Americans and Europeans did nothing about these crimes, which became an internal political issue as the magnitude of the Serbian crimes became clear. In this context, the Clinton administration helped negotiate the Dayton Accords, which were intended to end the Balkan wars and indeed managed to go quite far in achieving this. The Dayton Accords were built around the principle that there could be no adjustment in the borders of the former Yugoslav republics. Ethnic Serbs would live under Bosnian rule. The principle that existing borders were sacrosanct was embedded in the Dayton Accords.

    In the late 1990s, a crisis began to develop in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Over the years, Albanians had moved into the province in a broad migration. By 1997, the province was overwhelmingly Albanian, although it had not only been historically part of Serbia but also its historical foundation. Nevertheless, the Albanians showed significant intentions of moving toward either a separate state or unification with Albania. Serbia moved to resist this, increasing its military forces and indicating an intention to crush the Albanian resistance.

    There were many claims that the Serbians were repeating the crimes against humanity that were committed in Bosnia. The Americans and Europeans, burned by Bosnia, were eager to demonstrate their will. Arguing that something between crimes against humanity and genocide was under way — and citing reports that between 10,000 and 100,000 Kosovo Albanians were missing or had been killed — NATO launched a campaign designed to stop the killings. In fact, while some killings had taken place, the claims by NATO of the number already killed were false. NATO might have prevented mass murder in Kosovo. That is not provable. They did not, however, find that mass murder on the order of the numbers claimed had taken place. The war could be defended as a preventive measure, but the atmosphere under which the war was carried out overstated what had happened.

    The campaign was carried out without U.N. sanction because of Russian and Chinese opposition. The Russians were particularly opposed, arguing that major crimes were not being committed and that Serbia was an ally of Russia and that the air assault was not warranted by the evidence. The United States and other European powers disregarded the Russian position. Far more important, they established the precedent that U.N. sanction was not needed to launch a war (a precedent used by George W. Bush in Iraq). Rather — and this is the vital point — they argued that NATO support legitimized the war.

    This transformed NATO from a military alliance into a quasi-United Nations. What happened in Kosovo was that NATO took on the role of peacemaker, empowered to determine if intervention was necessary, allowed to make the military intervention, and empowered to determine the outcome. Conceptually, NATO was transformed from a military force into a regional multinational grouping with responsibility for maintenance of regional order, even within the borders of states that are not members. If the United Nations wouldn’t support the action, the NATO Council was sufficient.

    Since Russia was not a member of NATO, and since Russia denied the urgency of war, and since Russia was overruled, the bombing campaign against Kosovo created a crisis in relations with Russia. The Russians saw the attack as a unilateral attack by an anti-Russian alliance on a Russian ally, without sound justification. Then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin was not prepared to make this into a major confrontation, nor was he in a position to. The Russians did not so much acquiesce as concede they had no options.

    The war did not go as well as history records. The bombing campaign did not force capitulation and NATO was not prepared to invade Kosovo. The air campaign continued inconclusively as the West turned to the Russians to negotiate an end. The Russians sent an envoy who negotiated an agreement consisting of three parts. First, the West would halt the bombing campaign. Second, Serbian army forces would withdraw and be replaced by a multinational force including Russian troops. Third, implicit in the agreement, the Russian troops would be there to guarantee Serbian interests and sovereignty.

    As soon as the agreement was signed, the Russians rushed troops to the Pristina airport to take up their duties in the multinational force — as they had in the Bosnian peacekeeping force. In part because of deliberate maneuvers and in part because no one took the Russians seriously, the Russians never played the role they believed had been negotiated. They were never seen as part of the peacekeeping operation or as part of the decision-making system over Kosovo. The Russians felt doubly betrayed, first by the war itself, then by the peace arrangements.

    The Kosovo war directly effected the fall of Yeltsin and the rise of Vladimir Putin. The faction around Putin saw Yeltsin as an incompetent bungler who allowed Russia to be doubly betrayed. The Russian perception of the war directly led to the massive reversal in Russian policy we see today. The installation of Putin and Russian nationalists from the former KGB had a number of roots. But fundamentally it was rooted in the events in Kosovo. Most of all it was driven by the perception that NATO had now shifted from being a military alliance to seeing itself as a substitute for the United Nations, arbitrating regional politics. Russia had no vote or say in NATO decisions, so NATO’s new role was seen as a direct challenge to Russian interests.

    Thus, the ongoing expansion of NATO into the former Soviet Union and the promise to include Ukraine and Georgia into NATO were seen in terms of the Kosovo war. From the Russian point of view, NATO expansion meant a further exclusion of Russia from decision-making, and implied that NATO reserved the right to repeat Kosovo if it felt that human rights or political issues required it. The United Nations was no longer the prime multinational peacekeeping entity. NATO assumed that role in the region and now it was going to expand all around Russia.

    Then came Kosovo’s independence. Yugoslavia broke apart into its constituent entities, but the borders of its nations didn’t change. Then, for the first time since World War II, the decision was made to change Serbia’s borders, in opposition to Serbian and Russian wishes, with the authorizing body, in effect, being NATO. It was a decision avidly supported by the Americans.

    The initial attempt to resolve Kosovo’s status was the round of negotiations led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari that officially began in February 2006 but had been in the works since 2005. This round of negotiations was actually started under U.S. urging and closely supervised from Washington. In charge of keeping Ahtisaari’s negotiations running smoothly was Frank G. Wisner, a diplomat during the Clinton administration. Also very important to the U.S. effort was Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried, another leftover from the Clinton administration and a specialist in Soviet and Polish affairs.

    In the summer of 2007, when it was obvious that the negotiations were going nowhere, the Bush administration decided the talks were over and that it was time for independence. On June 10, 2007, Bush said that the end result of negotiations must be “certain independence.” In July 2007, Daniel Fried said that independence was “inevitable” even if the talks failed. Finally, in September 2007, Condoleezza Rice put it succinctly: “There’s going to be an independent Kosovo. We’re dedicated to that.” Europeans took cues from this line.

    How and when independence was brought about was really a European problem. The Americans set the debate and the Europeans implemented it. Among Europeans, the most enthusiastic about Kosovo independence were the British and the French. The British followed the American line while the French were led by their foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, who had also served as the U.N. Kosovo administrator. The Germans were more cautiously supportive.

    On Feb. 17, 2008, Kosovo declared independence and was recognized rapidly by a small number of European states and countries allied with the United States. Even before the declaration, the Europeans had created an administrative body to administer Kosovo. The Europeans, through the European Union, micromanaged the date of the declaration.

    On May 15, during a conference in Ekaterinburg, the foreign ministers of India, Russia and China made a joint statement regarding Kosovo. It was read by the Russian host minister, Sergei Lavrov, and it said: “In our statement, we recorded our fundamental position that the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo contradicts Resolution 1244. Russia, India and China encourage Belgrade and Pristina to resume talks within the framework of international law and hope they reach an agreement on all problems of that Serbian territory.”

    The Europeans and Americans rejected this request as they had rejected all Russian arguments on Kosovo. The argument here was that the Kosovo situation was one of a kind because of atrocities that had been committed. The Russians argued that the level of atrocity was unclear and that, in any case, the government that committed them was long gone from Belgrade. More to the point, the Russians let it be clearly known that they would not accept the idea that Kosovo independence was a one-of-a-kind situation and that they would regard it, instead, as a new precedent for all to follow.

    The problem was not that the Europeans and the Americans didn’t hear the Russians. The problem was that they simply didn’t believe them — they didn’t take the Russians seriously. They had heard the Russians say things for many years. They did not understand three things. First, that the Russians had reached the end of their rope. Second, that Russian military capability was not what it had been in 1999. Third, and most important, NATO, the Americans and the Europeans did not recognize that they were making political decisions that they could not support militarily.

    For the Russians, the transformation of NATO from a military alliance into a regional United Nations was the problem. The West argued that NATO was no longer just a military alliance but a political arbitrator for the region. If NATO does not like Serbian policies in Kosovo, it can — at its option and in opposition to U.N. rulings — intervene. It could intervene in Serbia and it intended to expand deep into the former Soviet Union. NATO thought that because it was now a political arbiter encouraging regimes to reform and not just a war-fighting system, Russian fears would actually be assuaged. To the contrary, it was Russia’s worst nightmare. Compensating for all this was the fact that NATO had neglected its own military power. Now, Russia could do something about it.

    At the beginning of this discourse, we explained that the underlying issues behind the Russo-Georgian war went deep into geopolitics and that it could not be understood without understanding Kosovo. It wasn’t everything, but it was the single most significant event behind all of this. The war of 1999 was the framework that created the war of 2008.

    The problem for NATO was that it was expanding its political reach and claims while contracting its military muscle. The Russians were expanding their military capability (after 1999 they had no place to go but up) and the West didn’t notice. In 1999, the Americans and Europeans made political decisions backed by military force. In 2008, in Kosovo, they made political decisions without sufficient military force to stop a Russian response. Either they underestimated their adversary or — even more amazingly — they did not see the Russians as adversaries despite absolutely clear statements the Russians had made. No matter what warning the Russians gave, or what the history of the situation was, the West couldn’t take the Russians seriously.

    It began in 1999 with war in Kosovo and it ended in 2008 with the independence of Kosovo. When we study the history of the coming period, the war in Kosovo will stand out as a turning point. Whatever the humanitarian justification and the apparent ease of victory, it set the stage for the rise of Putin and the current and future crises.

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  • Turkey: Ankara’s S-300 Curiosity

    Turkey: Ankara’s S-300 Curiosity

     
     

    A Russian S-400 air defense battery, which is based on the S-300 design
    Summary
    Turkey is reportedly in the process of acquiring late-model Russian air defense technology from Ukraine and Belarus, Turkish daily Today’s Zaman reported Aug. 25. Bought second-hand, these systems would be used for the Turkish air force to train against, rather than to upgrade Ankara’s aging air defense network. That training could prove an important tool for both Turkey specifically and NATO in general.
    Analysis
    Turkey is in the process of acquiring several variants of the Russian S-300 air defense system, Turkish daily Today’s Zaman reported Aug. 25. The systems — reportedly to be acquired second-hand from Belarus and Ukraine — are not meant to revitalize Ankara’s aging air defense network; they are intended to be a training tool for the Turkish air force. Turkey decided to make the purchase July 22 — before the Russo-Georgian conflict — but should the deal go through, the lessons Turkey hopes to learn will almost certainly proliferate to NATO as a whole.
    The S-300 encompasses a number of long-range strategic air defense systems (some variants also have a limited ballistic missile defense capability). Turkey has its sights set on both the S-300 and S-300V. The former, known to NATO as the SA-10B/C/D, encompasses several models of varying capability, but in short approaches the height of Soviet strategic air defense systems. Though neither Ukraine nor Belarus has the most modern S-300 variants — the PMU series — Turkey will likely attempt to acquire a PMU-series variant from them if it can, because Ankara knows Greece fields a PMU1 variant on Crete.
    The S-300V, meanwhile, shares the same design heritage as the S-300 (including some component parts). But while its spectrum of coverage and engagement envelope are quite similar, it is a distinct air defense system (known to NATO as the SA-12) characterized by the large tracked vehicles on which it is mounted. The S-300V was designed with a higher degree of mobility in mind. Russian troops deployed near the Turkish border in Armenia are protected by an S-300V battery.
    Both the United States and Israel reportedly were able to acquire some S-300 components during the 1990s (including, in the U.S. case, parts of the S-300V), but the Turkish effort could include a later model or a more complete system.
    Should Turkey succeed in this acquisition, Ankara’s subsequent work would take two important approaches. The first is reverse engineering, where key components are disassembled and their inner workings closely examined.. The second is training in electronic warfare against actual systems.
    Ukraine and Belarus have neither the newest nor the best-maintained air defense hardware. The condition of the equipment Ankara seeks to buy is unclear, and Russia may be in a position to block at least the Belarusian part of the sale. But perhaps the most significant aspect of this news is the intention to train against it — not just dissecting the missile, but actually flying against functional systems.
    A training range at Konya, less than 150 miles south of Ankara, is reportedly slated to host this Russian hardware, along with the shorter-range Russian Tor-M1. According to the report, the systems will be integrated with an electronic warfare training system with which Turkey’s F-16s will conduct exercises.
    If Turkey is able to acquire even one of the three S-300 variants it seeks, it will undoubtedly work at the training range to learn and test the technology’s performance parameters. This will allow Turkey (and any other NATO allies who happen to train with Turkish forces at the Konya facility) to test tactics and challenge the system over and over again. Whether it will succeed in acquiring a PMU1 remains to be seen, but even older variants could offer very real insight into some of the overall S-300 design’s ultimate limitations and weaknesses. And the result will be a Turkish air force more capable of addressing the two most advanced air defense systems positioned on its periphery: the Greek S-300PMU1 batteries (which were originally slated for Cyprus) to its southwest and the Russian S-300V battery in Armenia, on its eastern border.
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