Category: Eastern Europe

  • The International Economic Crisis and Stratfor’s Methodology

    The International Economic Crisis and Stratfor’s Methodology

    The International Economic Crisis and
    Stratfor’s Methodology

    By George Friedman
    Stratfor’s focus is on geopolitics. That means that it focuses on the behavior of human societies organized into complex, geographically defined systems. In our time, that means that we study nation-states. In order to understand the behavior of nation-states, it is necessary to focus on three major dimensions: economics, war and politics. The nation has to be studied in terms of producing wealth, defending (and stealing) wealth, and the internal and external relations by which humans shape their lives.

    Economics, war and politics are not separate spheres. They are a single entity together constituting the reality of the nation-state. There are those who argue that economic life should be left alone, not interfered with by political or military power. We won’t engage in that argument. What we know, empirically, is that political and military power constantly impinge on economic life, and vice versa. It is impossible to imagine war without taking into account politics and economics. It is impossible to think of domestic or foreign policy without considering economic and military issues. By the same token, it is also impossible to think about economics without thinking about military and political matters. If it can be made otherwise, then someone will do so and then we will change our opinion. Until then, we cannot think of the free market as a meaningful independent reality. It is always shaped by other factors. Perhaps it should be otherwise. It isn’t.

    An integrated approach to social reality requires that these distinctions, so important in the organization of a university or a newspaper, be overcome. They were created in order to organize human activities into manageable pieces. Our argument is that in so doing, reality is only apparently made more manageable, and in fact is falsified. The standard approach to these issues creates distinctions that don’t exist and complexities that conceal rather than reveal the nature of the problem at hand. A general who tries to wage war without consideration of political ends and economic means is going to fail. An economist who tries to understand and predict the behavior of the economy without a comprehensive understanding of the political and military realities which shape the economy will not do particularly well.

    Geopolitics is in one sense also an abstraction, but it has the virtue of not creating artificial distinctions. The price that the geopolitician pays for a comprehensive view of reality is a forced simplification: there is just too much happening to state it comprehensively. Geopolitics is the search for the center of gravity of reality, those overwhelming forces that drive the system in the direction it is going to take. These forces are never solely political, military or economic in nature. Usually, they are in plain sight and are overlooked because, being simple, they appear insufficient. Indeed, they may be insufficient, but others can add the details. Our goal is to lay bare the essentials and identify the general direction in which things are moving.

    Take, for example, our recent analysis of the Russo-Georgian war. It derived from this central reality: Russia by the 19th century had achieved the borders essentially held by the Soviet Union. In 1992 it had collapsed to a position in which it had not been since perhaps the 17th century. That condition was untenable. Either Russia would implode or it would reassert itself fairly quickly. By early 2000s, it was our view that it would choose to assert itself. When the United States tried to make an ally of Ukraine, which Russia sees as crucial for its economic, military and political well-being, we became certain that Russia would push back. As the Americans got bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, a window of opportunity opened up and the Russians began the process of reassertion.

    There are, obviously, endless things left out of this analysis. People of every discipline could rip it apart as being insufficiently sophisticated. In one sense they would be right. By avoiding the complexity of sophistication, we could see the fundamental shape of things — which was that the Russian collapse, if halted, would have to reverse itself for economic, military and political reasons. There were obviously many details we could not predict and some we didn’t know. But we captured the essential geopolitical condition of Russia in order to understand what it had to do. We left it to others to do the important work of mapping the complexity. Our task was to capture the simplicity.

    In our analysis of the current financial crisis in the United States — and the world as a whole — we have sought the center of gravity of the problem. We approached that simply by asking one question: is what is going on simply another inflection point in the business cycles that have occurred since World War II, or does it represent a systemic failure such as that which happened during the Great Depression? This struck us as the urgent issue.

    We noted that in the Great Depression, the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by nearly 50 percent over three years. It was an unprecedented calamity. Bearing this in mind, we compared the current situation to other events since World War II to see if there was a framework for measuring it. We found that framework in the Savings and Loan crisis of 1989, when an entire sector of the U.S. financial system collapsed and the federal government intervened — essentially guaranteeing or purchasing commercial real estate, whose price decline had triggered the crisis. We noted that the total amount allocated by the federal government in that crisis was about 6.5 percent of the GDP (and the amount actually spent, before recouping of costs via sales, was less than 3 percent). We noted also that in the current crisis another sector of the financial system — the investment banks — were devastated, and that the federal government intervened, this time at about 5 percent of GDP. Meanwhile, the equity markets had not declined as much as they did in 2000-2001, and as of the second quarter of this year the economy was still growing by more than 2 percent. From this we concluded that the U.S. economy was moving into a recession but that the recession would not break the framework of the postwar economy, although clearly the degree of government intervention will reshape the financial markets.

    From the point of view of many Russian experts in 2001, our analysis of the future of Russia was seen as simplistic and naïve. From the standpoint of professional economists and traders in the markets, the same is being said of our current analysis. But just as our critics among Russian experts failed to see the main thrust of Russian history, many economists fail to see the main thrust of what is now happening. The United States is a $14 trillion economy with a potential problem amounting to $1-2 trillion (and probably far less than that). If the government intervenes, it will create inequities and imbalances in the system. But between the size of the economy and the government printing press, the problem will be managed — particularly because there are underlying assets — houses — that can be monetized in the long run. The gridlock in the financial system will undoubtedly create a recession, but there hasn’t been one for seven years and it’s high time.

    One can like or dislike the outcome, and we certainly agree that this will cause long-term dislocations and imbalances. But we also know that America as a nation-state has the resources to manage its way through this crisis if the government intervenes. And that intervention is as hard-wired into the American political-economic-military system as the law of supply and demand.

    We do not speak the language of economics. There are numerous economists who can do that. And we certainly don’t speak the language of the financial markets. We speak our own language, designed to reveal the elegant essence of the problem rather than its enormous complexity. Certainly, if our analysis is wrong because we failed to identify a crucial problem, then we haven’t identified the center of gravity properly. And we will be wrong, which is far worse. But as in February 2000, when we published a piece called “Recession Time?” which forecast the market collapse that happened a few weeks later and the recession that followed it, we will be criticized for not understanding some essential point — in 2000 it was that we had no understanding of the impact of increased productivity on the business cycle. They were right. We didn’t understand it and we were right not to. The complexities of productivity did not trump the obvious, which was that the NASDAQ had reached unsupportable levels and there had been no recession in nine years and that was way too long.

    So, too, we are criticized for our failure to understand the spread between T-Bills and LIBOR or myriad other things. But we do understand this: The political reality is that the size of the American economy, deployed by the state, trumps the financial problems created by the fall of the housing markets. It will be ugly and painful for some and there will be a recession, but things are always ugly and painful when there is a recession.

    This series is about the economic problem, therefore, but is not written about the economy and certainly not by economists. Their work is valuable but it differs from ours. Rather this is about geopolitics and therefore about the different regions and nation-states of the world. It is a geopolitical analysis subsuming economics, politics and military affairs in a single system. And it is designed to extract the obvious rather than drill into the complexity.

    We hope this series has some value to our readers in clarifying the current moment. That is its intention: to highlight the main tendency, not to detail the complexity. Understanding the trees has value, but seeing the forest clearly has value as well.

    John F. Mauldin
    [email protected]

  • Cultural Influences on Politics in Caspian

    Cultural Influences on Politics in Caspian

    Brenda Shaffer who is an American thinker works to define cultural domination on foreign or domestic affairs of states in the “Is there a Muslim Foreign Policy?”article. Shaffer is explaining this event via some sharp examples. Firstly, Shaffer begin the article with Huntigton’s thesis: “The Clash of Civilizations”. Samuel Huntigton’s thesis follows an idea that culture has a main role in defining of policy. Also Brenda Shaffer agrees thesis of Huntington and creates new approaches about conducts of civilizations and state actions. Shaffer says that culture was a main mechanism to diplomatic relations. Also she interprets culture as specific subject of country’s within religion, history and civilization.

    Western scholars researched about strong Islamic effection in Muslim countries after 11 September terrorist act and looked at Muslim scholars, historians, diplomats and generals who have an extraordinary situation over the people. As a result they understood Islamic effection as strong as nuclear weapons against to the world. But this is not a physical danger, this is an ideological spread. Their speeches to newspapers and political journals which had a title as “Do Muslim countries have a different outlook against Non-Muslim States?”

    On the other hand Shaffer interests about this subject under the psychological perspective. Human beings are often driven by culture according to Shaffer. Also human behavior effects on to state affairs. But state acts partly different from human behaviors. We can give example from philosophical history: Some philosophers think that the state is a thing like human. But it is systematically human as a big organism. State actions have similarities with people actions. State is a big form of human and human is a small form of the state. As behavioral psychological meaning has different dimensions.[1]

    Shaffer gives an example about different state decision-making; some Muslim countries have an anti-American approach as behavioral. But these are making alliance with the USA like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt. Commonly we can see inharmonious dimensions between state policies and people behaviors. Caspian perspective of Shaffer has a common beliefs. According to Shaffer, all Caspian countries have been influenced by Islamic effection after from the Soviet Union. Shaffer judges all Caspian and Middle Asian people as Islamic effected nations but it is not totally true if we looked at historical and contemporary situations. Also today these countries are secular except Iran.

    Iran – Politics with Islamic Style

    The Islamic Republic of Iran is an important country in this area as ideological mechanism according to idea of western scholars. After the collapse of the USSR, Iran wanted to export their Islamic regime for other neighbor states via some absolute ways. In Central Asia and Caucasus territory Iran plays to export their Persian Islamic mind as a regime under the title as “Islamic Solidarity” with economic and security events. Western idea is true about activities of this country. But common outlook to Islamic countries of American or Western scholars is different. They agree Islam as a common political tool among all Muslims. Example, Iran works to create an Islamic governing system for all Muslim countries. But Islamic mind of Iran is very different from normal Islamic idea. Persian Islamic system bases on fundamentalist movement. If we look at Turkey, Egypt or Tunis, we could see normal or laic Islamic behavior. Also Shaffer says their false point in next sentence. “Poor Muslim countries have an effective circumstance about this issue but secular Muslim countries challenges to Iran like Turkmenistan.” But Tehran has faced three regional disputes :

    – The Nagorno-Karabagh conflict (Christian Armenia versus Muslim Azerbaijan)

    – The Chechen conflict (Chechen Muslims versus Moscow)

    – The Tajik civil war (The Islamic Renaissance Party versus Moscow)

    In these mix circumstances Iranian fundamentalist approach transformed to self-interest system. An interesting point about is that Iran supports Armenia instead of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.[2] With these events, Iran state security was challenged in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia since Iran was a multiethnic state. We give information about Iran’s population: Half of Iran’s population is comprised of non Persian ethnic minorities; Turkmens, Kurds and Azerbaijani groups. Largest minority Azerbaijanis live in northwestern provinces of Iran which bordered with Azerbaijan. Relations of Iran bogged down with Baku because of Iranian self interests.

    Shaffer shows her ideas that Iranian diversity of opinion is a good example to explain Iranian foreign policy. There are some different points as historical legacies and religious differences in policies.

    “On the other hand Turkey attempted to conduct a balanced policy toward both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Also Turkey helped for Karabagh conflict to Baku.”

    Turkey changed its policy when Karabagh became a conflict. It can be an example for cultural combines if western scholars wanted to define their issue. But it cannot be an absolute example about regional cultural alliences subject.

    According to many observers, religious differences have played a central role in the Caspian region. With these circumstances Azerbaijan supported Chechenya. Also some analysts have assumed that religious differences serve as a basis for conflict between Muslim Azerbaijan and Christian Armenia. Over these events, common culture serves as a basic role for alliances and coalitions and different cultures act as an obstacle to cooperation.

    Shaffer’s opinion is that there are cultural alliances are created follow by from collapsing of the USSR.

    Tehran’s main argument is Shiite background in their support system. Also Turkey and Azerbaijan shares ethnic Turkic and Muslim backgrounds. Also Russian and Armenian background is Orthodox Christian form. But Georgian-Russian conflict is different from this event. Shaffer and other western scholars can not define this reality.

    Final

    Culture may be a certain material of regime survivability. Islam can be an effective reason to influence state system and people behavior like speeches of western scholars. Some governments explain and justify their policies in cultural terms. We must analyze a country’s foreign policy on the basis of actions. We have anticipated the New Testament to Germany and Russia or Torah to Israel like Islamic system. Shaffer asks question : “What does the Koran has to say a foreign policy question?” If Islam influences them, they should act with Islamic interaction.

    The USA wants an enemy to rebuild their father emotion on the world. They forced as goodness of the world during the Cold War. They defended the world countries from dangerous communist system. Their interest was communism in that time. But they wanted a new enemy to regulate the world with themselves. After the Cold War, their White House scholars worked for a new enemy establishment. There was a “Red Dangerous” line. But today there should be “Green Dangerous” line. And its name is Islamic effection on politics.[3]

    Fans of the USA defense western style always. There shouldn’t be a religious system like Islam around the world according to them. But they don’t look at Israeli system or American Christiantic base. Main question should be about Western classification about cultural conflicts. There are too many problems about this thesis.

    Today there is a Muslim conflict. And the USA isa  patron of the world. So they are working for peace, democracy and other good things. But the world’s people will know works of the USA. All terror acts, all problems, all ethnic clashes…

     


    [1] Arnold Wolfers, Behavior of States, Dogu Bati Journal – 26, Istanbul 2003

    [2] Karabagh conflict borned in the late 1980. Armenia attacked to the legal boundaries of Azerbaijan.

    [3] Political Declaration Fikret Baskaya – Ideologies, Dogu Bati Journal 2003

    Mehmet Fatih ÖZTARSU

    Baku Qafqaz University

    International Research Club (INTERESCLUB)

  • Georgia’s conflict and Iran and Turkey

    Georgia’s conflict and Iran and Turkey

    Georgia’s conflict and Iran and Turkey
    By Rayyan al-Shawaf
    Commentary by
    Tuesday, September 09, 2008

    Although the Russo-Georgian military clash is over, its ramifications will be felt for a long time, especially as the political crisis between the two countries remains unresolved. In the Middle East, two major countries, Turkey and Iran, have been directly affected by the recent events. While Turkey stands to lose should Russia and Georgia fail to resolve their differences, Iran stands to win.

    An embattled Russia cornered by the West would never forgive NATO member Turkey; as a result, Russian-Turkish relations would plummet and Russia might even stop providing Turkey with natural gas. In casting about for allies, Russia would find a similarly isolated Iran to be amenable to giving the two countries’ ties a strategic dimension, but only in return for political and economic concessions. Thus, the Russo-Georgian crisis may ironically change the balance of power in the Middle East.

    Both Russia and Iran have become increasingly alarmed with the West’s attempts to bypass them in the quest for oil. Moscow wanted the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, the world’s second longest, to pass through Russia. That way, Russia would not only benefit financially, but also be able to exert some control over the supply of oil to the West, much as it does with the longest pipeline in the world, the Druzhba, which flows from southeast Russia to Europe. During its invasion of Georgia, Russia pointedly demonstrated that it can threaten the BTC pipeline, and that, as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev recently put it, “Russia is a nation to be reckoned with.”

    Meanwhile, Iran, most of whose oil flows to Asia, has long sought to lay oil pipelines to the West, a desire more often than not frustrated by Western sanctions. By supporting Russia in its current confrontation with the West, Tehran may have secured a future economic and political payoff. This would be especially true should Iran have extracted from Russia a commitment to devise a common oil strategy vis-a-vis the West.

    However, even without this possibility, there are several indicators of the benefits that may accrue to Iran as a result of its pro-Russian policy. For example, Iranian (and Syrian) requests for a sophisticated missile defense system are being taken seriously in Moscow, much to the chagrin of the United States and Israel. When one remembers that Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant – built with Russian support – is slated to begin operation in 2009, it becomes apparent that Iran may be on the verge of radically enhancing its regional and international position.

    Even as Iran makes a bid for regional power status, Turkey has almost by accident emerged as the country that could hold the key to solving the Russo-Georgian crisis. Indeed, Turkey is exceptionally well-positioned to be mediator, a role it is already playing with some success between Syria and Israel, and to a lesser extent between Iran and the West. Russia is Turkey’s biggest trading partner, and Turkey is dependant on Russian natural gas. At the same time, Turkey maintains strong economic and military ties with Georgia, which aspires to join NATO, of which Turkey is a strategic member. Turkey cannot afford to allow its relations with Russia to deteriorate – they have already been strained by the passage of American ships through the Bosphorus on their way to the Georgian port of Batumi – but neither can it shun the West’s call for supporting Georgia. As a result, mediating the current conflict is not only a role that could propel Turkey into the limelight as a major regional player, but also a necessity insofar as Turkish politico-economic imperatives are concerned.

    If Turkey meets the challenge, there may even be added benefits. Turkish-Armenian relations could thaw, which would be of great significance to the oil and natural gas industry. The most direct overland route for an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to Turkey would begin in Azerbaijan and pass through Armenia. Yet no such pipeline has ever been constructed due to political instability: Azerbaijan and Armenia fought a war over Nagorno-Karabakh and remain at loggerheads, while Turkey’s border with Armenia has been closed since 1993 in solidarity with Azerbaijan.

    With the Russo-Georgian clash illustrating the vulnerability of Georgia, through which the BTC pipeline passes, Armenia’s importance has increased. Turkish President Abdullah Gul, on a groundbreaking visit to Yerevan last week for a Turkish-Armenian soccer match, spoke about the need for the countries of the Caucasus to work together to enhance stability. To that end, Turkey has called for the creation of a regional cooperation group comprising Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

    The trajectory of the Russo-Georgian conflict during the next few months could be critical in determining what happens in the Middle East. If mediation succeeds in bringing the two sides together and defusing the crisis, Russia will not find it necessary to turn to Iran. If the successful mediation is Turkish, then Turkey will have demonstrated a unique ability to bring stability to the Caucasus, broker Syrian-Israeli peace talks, and mediate between Iran and the West.

    On the other hand, if the conflict drags on, Russia’s ties to the West and Turkey will inevitably deteriorate. Facing diplomatic isolation and possibly even sanctions, Russia may forge a strategic alliance with Iran, thereby drastically increasing Iranian influence in the Middle East.

     

    \\\ a freelance writer and reviewer based in Beirut. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.is

    #

  • Russia Says Karabakh Peace In Sight

    Russia Says Karabakh Peace In Sight

     

     

     

     

     

    By Emil Danielyan

    Russia expects the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to meet again shortly after next week’s Azerbaijani presidential election and reach a framework peace agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in a newspaper interview published on Tuesday.

    He stressed the importance of a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement and the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations for Armenia’s security and economic development.

    “There remain two or three unresolved issues which need to be agreed upon at the next meetings of the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan,” Lavrov told the “Rossiiskaya Gazeta” daily. “Our understanding is that such meetings will take place shortly after the forthcoming [October 15] presidential elections in Azerbaijan.”

    “As one of three mediators, we have a sense that a denouement is quite real,” he said, adding that the two other mediating powers, the United States and France, also see a “very real chance” of a resolution of the Karabakh conflict.

    The mediators have been trying to get the conflicting parties to accept the basic principles of Karabakh peace that were formally put forward by them in November 2007. Senior French, Russian and U.S. diplomats co-chairing the OSCE Minsk Group discussed the possibility of another Armenian-Azerbaijani summit during the most recent talks with the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers held in New York late last month.

    Lavrov said the future of the so-called Lachin corridor, which provides for the shortest overland link between Armenia and Karabakh, is now the main stumbling block in the peace talks. He did not elaborate.

    The Russian minister was interviewed by a “Rossiiskaya Gazeta” reporter late last week as he flew to Yerevan to meet with Armenia’s President Serzh Sarkisian and Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandian. After the talks with Nalbandian he sounded cautiously optimistic about prospects for a breakthrough in the Karabakh peace process.

    However, a top aide to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev, struck a cautious note as he commented on Lavrov’s upbeat statements in Yerevan. “Major issues have not been agreed upon,” Novruz Mammadov told the Azerbaijani Trend news agency.

    According to Lavrov, Armenia should be keenly interested in a Karabakh settlement in the wake of the crisis in neighboring Georgia which he said exposed “the vulnerability of its position” and highlighted the importance of having an open border with Turkey. “Armenia has huge difficulties communicating with the outside world,” he said. “It is in the fundamental interests of the Armenian people to unblock this situation as soon as possible.

    “It really has few geographic and political options. As soon as the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement becomes a fact, Turkey will be ready to help Armenia forge normal links with the outside world, naturally through the establishment of diplomatic relations between Ankara and Yerevan.”

    The remarks ran counter to a widely held belief in the West that Moscow is disinterested in the normalization of Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey for fear of losing geopolitical leverage against Yerevan.

  • RUSSIAN-AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS: TIME FOR A GRAND BARGAIN?

    RUSSIAN-AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS: TIME FOR A GRAND BARGAIN?

    By Alman Mir – Ismail

    Thursday, October 2, 2008

     

    The Georgian-Russian conflict in early August brought negative economic and humanitarian consequences for the South Caucasus. Carefully built East-West transport and energy corridors have come under question. Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia presents another diplomatic difficulty for the countries of the region.

    Yet, in the aftermath of the conflict, Azerbaijan, Georgia’s neighbor and closest ally, finds itself in a unique position for an opportunity to advance relations with Russia. The ultimate prize would be the Kremlin’s support in the Karabakh conflict. There is no doubt in Baku, among both the public and politicians, that the key to the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict lies in Moscow, as Russia was and remains Armenia’s closest military, political, and economic ally. Despite Azerbaijan’s persistent efforts to please Moscow and secure the return of the occupied territories, no success has been achieved yet.

    The current situation, however, presents a rare moment of opportunity for Baku to make Russia an offer it cannot refuse. The ingredients for the grand bargain have been piling up steadily over the past year. Early in the summer, Russian President Medvedev, during a trip to Baku, offered to buy all of Azerbaijan’s gas at the world market price. The Kremlin is obviously not interested in having an alternative gas exporter in its borders. The purchase of Azerbaijani gas would not only enable Moscow to remain the main energy provider to EU but would also help Gazprom fulfill its contractual obligations.

    On the other hand, the negative image that Russia created during the Georgian war is prompting Kremlin strategists to seek more cordial and friendly relations with another South Caucasus country, Azerbaijan, in order to demonstrate to the rest of the world that Russia is not a threat and aggressor to the former Soviet republics and does not intend to restore the Soviet Empire. Thus, Azerbaijan, with its pro-Western integration plans, presents the only chance for Russia to do this. Armenia is already heavily dependant on Russia, and Moscow does not consider it necessary to “win over” Yerevan.

    Gentler and more pragmatic relations with Azerbaijan would not only help Russia repair its image abroad but would also derail Azerbaijan’s pro-NATO and pro-EU course. It is no coincidence that President Medvedev called his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev a few weeks ago to discuss bilateral relations. The latter also traveled to Moscow to meet both Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin to advance the interests of both countries in the region.

    Finally, speculation has arisen in Baku that Moscow is pushing Azerbaijan’s political leadership to open a transit corridor through its territory to Armenia. The Kremlin’s sole remaining partner in the South Caucasus is significantly suffering from the war in Georgia, as transport from Russia to Armenia remains clogged in the closed borders. Armenia also has closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, thus putting its economy under a real threat. Under the grand bargain, Azerbaijan could play a transit role, allowing Russia to ship cargo through its territory to Armenia.

    It seems that not only Russia understands the increased value of Azerbaijan. Geopolitical rivalry over this country has heated up in recent weeks, with U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney visiting Baku and making statements about the United States’ intention to remain an active player in the region. A look at the map of the South Caucasus shows that with Georgia falling out of the Russian orbit, Azerbaijan remains the last battlefield between the West and Russia.

    The situation for the grand bargain seems ripe, especially considering the new dialogue between Turkey and Armenia and the general willingness among Armenian leaders to normalize relations with its neighbors. The traditional belief that Russia should do its best to preserve the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in order to keep its influence over them is not working any more. Russia will always be able to exert pressure and influence over these countries, long after the conflict is resolved. The resolution of the conflict, however, will bring a number of dividends to Russia, including a safer periphery and effective prevention of Radical Islam emerging in the region.

    Compromises on the issue of Karabakh and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan would pave the way for a much firmer and more solid partnership between Moscow and Baku. Moscow can and should push Armenia for more compromises on this issue in order to achieve a long-lasting peace. Otherwise, Azerbaijan, losing its hope to gain support from Kremlin, will continue to drift away toward the West.

  • Caucasus: No Easy Courtship

    Caucasus: No Easy Courtship

    There are positive signs in the budding relationship between
    Armenia and Turkey. But don’t expect too much too soon.
    by Timothy Spence
    30 September 2008