Category: Eastern Europe

  • No Karabakh Deal Announced After Moscow Summit

    No Karabakh Deal Announced After Moscow Summit

     

     

     

     

     

    By Aza Babayan in Moscow and Tigran Avetisian

    The presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan pledged to step up the prolonged search for a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict but did not announce any concrete agreements after weekend talks hosted by their Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev.

    Serzh Sarkisian and Ilham Aliev met in a tête-à-tête format and were later joined by Medvedev at the Meiendorf Castle outside Moscow on Sunday amid fresh international hopes for a breakthrough in Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks mediated by Russia, the United States and France

    “The presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed to continue work, including during further contacts on the highest level, on agreeing a political resolution of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and ordered their foreign ministers to intensify further steps in the negotiating process in coordination with the co-chairs of the OSCE’s Minsk Group,” the three leaders said in a joint declaration read out by Medvedev.

    The declaration stressed the importance of continued efforts by the group’s American, French and Russian co-chairs to work out the basic principles of a Karabakh settlement acceptable to the conflicting parties. But it only vaguely alluded to a framework peace accord that was formally put forward by the co-chairs in November 2007.

    Armenia and Azerbaijani are understood to have agreed to most of the key points of the proposed settlement. The mediators hoped before the Moscow talks that the two sides will overcome their remaining differences before the end of this year.

    The mediating troika, including U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza, held separate talks with Aliev and Sarkisian at Meiendorf later on Sunday. No details of those talks were made public and the mediators issued no joint statements afterwards.

    Speaking to RFE/RL just before those talks, Yuri Merzlyakov, the Minsk Group’s Russian co-chair, described the trilateral declaration as a “historic” document that will speed up the peace process. He noted that Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders have jointly put pen to paper for the first time since the signing in May 1994 of a Russian-mediated truce that stopped the war in Karabakh.

    The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry appeared to downplay the document’s significance, though. “One should not look for anything new in the signing of the document,” a ministry spokesman, Khazar Ibrahim, told journalists in Baku on Monday, according to the Trend news agency. “Negotiations are still going on and their significance is reflected by the declaration. The groundwork needs to be laid for the transition to the next phase of the negotiations.”

    A senior official in Yerevan seemed in a more buoyant mood. Eduard Sharmazanov, a spokesman for the governing Republican Party of Armenia, pointed to the declaration’s emphasis on a “political settlement” of the Karabakh conflict. “This runs counter to bellicose statements that were made by Azerbaijani officials,” he told RFE/RL.

    Sharmazanov also pointed out that the declaration makes clear that the Minsk Group will remain the main mediating body in Karabakh talks. He said this disproved opposition allegations that Sarkisian is ready to let Armenia’s arch-rival Turkey take on a mediating role in the peace process.

    Armenia’s main opposition alliance, meanwhile, declined to comment on the Moscow talks on Monday. Levon Zurabian, a senior member of the Armenian National Congress, told RFE/RL that the top leader of the alliance, Levon Ter-Petrosian, will issue a special statement on Tuesday.

  • Moscow Declaration – A Victory For Armenia

    Moscow Declaration – A Victory For Armenia

    Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (right) with his counterparts from Armenia, Serzh Sarkisian (center), and Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev.

    November 03, 2008
    By Liz Fuller

     

    The Declaration On Regulating the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict signed by the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia following their talks in Moscow on November 2 can be regarded as a victory for Armenia in three key respects.

    First, the three presidents reaffirmed their shared commitment to seeking a political solution to the conflict “on the basis of the norms and principles of international law and of the decisions and documents adopted within that framework,” and with the stated objective of “creating a more healthy situation in the South Caucasus.”

    In other words, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, who has previously warned on numerous occasions that if mediation by the Minsk Group, created by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE), fails to yield a solution to the conflict, Azerbaijan will have no option but to resort to the use of military force to bring Nagorno-Karabakh under the control of the central government, has formally pledged not to begin a new war.

    Second, the declaration stresses the importance of the ongoing mediation effort by the OSCE Minsk Group, and specifically of the so-called Madrid Principles, the basic blueprint for resolving the conflict.

    In other words, the declaration effectively precludes any effort by Turkey to promote an alternative peace proposal that might be more in line with Azerbaijan’s vision of the optimal solution than are the Madrid Principles. Visiting Yerevan two months ago, Turkish President Abdullah Gul affirmed Turkey’s readiness to “assist” in resolving the Karabakh conflict.

    And third, the three presidents agreed that the search for a peaceful solution should be accompanied by “legally binding international guarantees of all its aspects and stages.”

    From Yerevan’s viewpoint, the primary weakness of the so-called Madrid Principles is that they require Armenia to relinquish its most important bargaining chip and withdraw from the seven districts of Azerbaijan bordering on Nagorno-Karabakh that it currently controls before any decision has been made on the future status of the unrecognized republic vis-a-vis the central Azerbaijani government in Baku. That issue is to be decided by means of a referendum that may not take place until years after the Armenian withdrawal.

    ‘Confidence-Building Measures’

    Many Armenians are therefore concerned that, having regained control of the seven districts, the Azerbaijani government might then block the holding of the planned referendum.

    The Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaktsutiun threatened on October 31 to quit the coalition government if President Serzh Sarkisian betrays “national interests” by agreeing to cede the occupied territories. One day earlier, on October 30, a group of prominent Armenian intellectuals and public figures announced the launch of a new movement, named Unification National Initiative, that will similarly actively oppose any territorial concessions to Azerbaijan.

    The proposed “legally binding international guarantees” are presumably intended to prevent any such perfidy on Baku’s part, and thus reduce domestic political pressure on Sarkisian. The final point of the declaration similarly stresses the importance of “confidence-building measures.”

    The international guarantees would presumably also encompass commitments by various states to provide international peacekeepers to be deployed in the seven liberated districts and the strategic Lachin corridor linking Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.

    Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, too, can be pleased with the outcome of the November 2 talks, insofar as the declaration affirms a commitment by Russia to a positive role, promoting peace and stability in the South Caucasus in the wake of the August war with Georgia.

  • Russian, Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers begin meeting in Moscow

    Russian, Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers begin meeting in Moscow

     

     
     

    [ 31 Oct 2008 19:53 ]
    Baku. Lachin Sultanova–APA. Foreign ministers of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia Sergei Lavrov, Elmar Mammadyarov and Edward Nalbandyan have started their meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia in Moscow.

    The ministers will make announcement for the journalists after the meeting, diplomatic sources told APA.
    On Saturday the ministers will hold consultations with OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs Yuriy Merzlyakov (Russia), Bernard Fassier (France) and Matthew Bryza (USA) and special representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office Andrzej Kasprzyk.
    The meetings have a character of preparation for the negotiations between the presidents of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia Dmitriy Medvedev, Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan on November 2 in Moscow on the settlement of Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

  • Georgia, Russia: Moscow’s Troop Checkmate

    Georgia, Russia: Moscow’s Troop Checkmate

    Stratfor.com

    Summary

    Russia has ratified treaties with the Georgian breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that will see 3,800 Russian troops stationed in the two territories. The decision puts the Georgian military in checkmate, and it sends a clear message to the West as Russia consolidates control of its periphery.

    Analysis

    The Russian Duma ratified treaties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia on Oct. 29 that provide for the stationing of 3,800 troops in both Georgian breakaway provinces. The deployment places Russian troops in key strategic positions, giving Moscow decisive control over the two regions and the ability to put Georgia at permanent risk.

    The troops will be stationed at Russian bases. In South Ossetia, they will be located in Tskhinvali and Java, and in Abkhazia they will be stationed in Gudauta (a former Russian base) and Ochamchira. These bases are situated on strategic supply lines that run from Russia to the heart of Georgian territory.

    From its position in South Ossetia, which juts halfway into the heart of Georgia, Russia will have rapid access to Georgia’s main transportation corridors and the strategic city of Gori. Russian proximity means Moscow can shut down the main road and rail routes through the country at will. The occupation of Gori and the transit corridor would isolate the Georgian capital of Tbilisi from ports on the Black Sea as well as from any meaningful transportation route to Turkey and Armenia, as Russia demonstrated briefly during the Russian-Georgian war. Gori also straddles Georgia’s three major pipelines, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa oil pipeline and the Shah Deniz natural gas pipeline. All three ship Azerbaijani energy resources to world markets via Georgia.

    Russian logistical links in South Ossetia are entirely reliant on the vulnerable two-lane Roki Tunnel, but from Abkhazia, the Russians have a direct line of transport on the railway along the Black Sea. From here, Russian troops are poised to again sever Georgian connections to the outside world, this time from its Black Sea ports and from Western-oriented Turkey.

    The Russian military is the undisputed power in the region. The Georgian military by contrast is small, weak and underprepared for substantial action. With a total of 7,600 Russian troops stationed on former Georgian territory (about 2,400 fewer than were used during the 2008 invasion), there is little the Georgian military can do to counter Russia. In short, Moscow is poised to permanently station a combined military force that is every bit as large as the active-duty Georgian ground forces, which number around 7,000 and are largely conscripted. Georgia’s small navy and air force (each numbering under 1,500) are supplemented by a comparably sized national guard and some 11,000 border guards and Interior Ministry troops. Although the U.S. military has actively trained the Georgian military over the past four years, Tbilisi is ill-trained and ill-equipped to stave off military aggression from even one of the 3,800-strong Russian contingents ­ much less move offe nsively against both of them.

    With this treaty, Russia effectively has finished positioning enough forces in key locations to crush the Georgian military should the need arise. These troops will suffice to deter or block Georgian maneuvers at a moment’s notice in the near term.

    But the decision to fully occupy South Ossetia is more than just a way to control Georgia. Russia has now made sure that no amount of Western financial aid or rhetorical support will be able to alter the military reality on the ground for Georgia. This is a well-crafted message, both to the West and to neighbors like Ukraine that are flirting with notions of aligning with the West, that Russia is not to be messed with ­ especially not on its periphery.

  • Western Mediators To Join Armenian-Azeri Summit In Moscow

    Western Mediators To Join Armenian-Azeri Summit In Moscow

     

     

     

     

     

    By Ruben Meloyan

    U.S. and French mediators will travel to Moscow ahead of Sunday’s meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents hosted by Russia, Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandian announced on Thursday.

    Nalbandian said he and his Azerbaijani counterpart Elmar Mammadyarov will meet the American, French as well as Russian diplomats co-chairing the OSCE Minsk Group in the Russian capital on Saturday. He said the co-chairs could also meet Presidents Ilham Aliev and Serzh Sarkisian after their trilateral meeting with Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev.

    Medvedev has initiated the Armenian-Azerbaijani summit amid renewed international hopes for a near-term solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Russian president and other officials have expressed hope that Aliev and Sarkisian will bridge their remaining differences on a framework peace accord proposed by the Minsk Group.

    The Russian initiative has fuelled talk of Moscow seeking to sideline the West in the Karabakh peace process as part of its efforts to boost its influence in the South Caucasus after the recent war with Georgia.

    However, the initiative was welcomed by the United States on Wednesday. “We are pleased by this initiative that Moscow is undertaking. We hope that the initiative succeeds. We are monitoring it very closely,” U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack told reporters.

    “We hope that the meeting of the presidents will give yet another serious impetus to the acceleration of the negotiations,” Nalbandian said for his part. He said the success of the Moscow talks depends on whether Azerbaijan will embrace mutual compromise. The Armenian side is ready to make its share of the concessions, he said.

    “We can find a settlement with Azerbaijan,” Nalbandian told a news conference. “That will be possible if Azerbaijan expresses political will and opts for an appropriate settlement, instead of taking disruptive steps in various international organizations and making parallel statements.”

    Sarkisian said at the weekend that the Karabakh dispute can be resolved only if Azerbaijan recognizes the Karabakh Armenians’ “right to self-determination.” But Aliev insisted on Friday that Baku will never accept Karabakh’s secession from Azerbaijan.

    Nalbandian also dismissed opposition claims that Sarkisian is re-orienting Armenia’s foreign policy towards the West in hopes of securing U.S. and European support for his rule. “If somebody notices some change in our relations with Russia, I can assure them that that change can only reinforce, expand and deepen our strategic and allied relations with Russia, “ he said.

  • RUSSIA TAKES INITIATIVE IN INTERNATIONAL PUSH FOR KARABAKH PEACE

    RUSSIA TAKES INITIATIVE IN INTERNATIONAL PUSH FOR KARABAKH PEACE

    By Emil Danielyan

     

     

    Russia has taken the center stage in international efforts to resolve the Karabakh conflict, which could yield a breakthrough before the end of this year. President Dmitry Medvedev is expected to host a potentially decisive meeting of his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts next month. Moscow may thus be trying to sideline the OSCE’s so-called Minsk Group on Karabakh, which it has long co-chaired with the United States and France.

    When he paid an official visit to Yerevan on October 21, Medvedev publicly urged Presidents Serzh Sarkisian of Armenia and Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan to meet in his presence in Russia. The Karabakh dispute was high on the agenda. “I hope that the three presidents will meet in the very near future to continue discussions on this theme,” he told a joint news conference with Sarkisian. “I hope that the meeting will take place in Russia” (Regnum, October 21). He noted that the Karabakh peace process now seemed to be “in an advanced stage.”

    Medvedev discussed what the Kremlin described as preparations for the Armenian-Azerbaijani summit in a phone call with Aliyev the next day (Interfax, October 22). Konstantin Zatulin, a Kremlin-linked Russian pundit, told Armenian journalists afterward that the crucial summit would likely take place in early November; but neither conflicting party has yet confirmed the meeting, let alone announced any dates for it. Aliyev’s chief foreign policy aide, Novruz Mammadov, has said only that it was “possible” (Trend news agency, October 22). Armenian officials have not commented on the matter at all.

    Medvedev announced his initiative following unusually optimistic statements on Karabakh peace prospects that were made by his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov. In an October 7 interview with Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Lavrov spoke of a “very real chance” to end the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in the coming weeks. “There remain two or three unresolved issues that need to be agreed upon at the next meetings of the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan,” he said. He added that the future of the so-called Lachin corridor, which is the shortest overland link between Armenia and Karabakh, is now the main stumbling block in the peace talks. Three days later, Lavrov held a trilateral meeting with his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts on the sidelines of a CIS summit in Bishkek.

    Many analysts in the South Caucasus and the West have long contended that Russia was uninterested in a Karabakh settlement, lest it lose leverage against Azerbaijan and, even more, Armenia, its main ally in the region. Peace with Azerbaijan, they have argued, would reduce the significance for Armenia of maintaining close military ties with Russia and make the Armenian economy less dependent on Russian energy supplies. Medvedev’s desire to host the crucial Aliyev-Sarkisian encounter is, however, a clear indication that Karabakh peace is not necessarily incompatible with Russian goals and interests in the region, especially if Moscow plays a key role in a multinational peace-keeping force that would have to be deployed in the conflict zone.

    Armenia is rife with speculation that Moscow is trying to cajole Azerbaijan into agreeing to a Russian troop presence and pursuing a more pro-Russian policy on other issues, notably the transportation of Caspian oil and gas to the West. “To that end [the Russians] need to force Armenia into making essentially unilateral and absolutely unacceptable concessions on the Karabakh issue,” Yerkir, a Yerevan weekly controlled by the governing Armenian Revolutionary Federation party, wrote on October 24, reflecting the growing opinion among local observers.

    Sarkisian appeared to rule out such concessions when he said after his talks with Medvedev that the peace process had to proceed on the basis of the framework peace agreement that was formally put forward by the Minsk Group’s U.S., Russian, and French co-chairs in November 2007. The document calls for a phased settlement of the conflict that would start with the liberation of at least six of the seven Azerbaijani districts around Karabakh that were fully or partly occupied by Armenian forces during the 1991-1994 war. In return, Karabakh’s predominantly Armenian population would be allowed to determine the disputed territory’s status in a future referendum.

    According to U.S. officials privy to the talks, Baku and Yerevan essentially agreed to this peace formula as of late last year and only needed to work out some of its details. Political turmoil in Armenia that followed the February 2008 presidential election and the ensuing toughening of Azerbaijani leaders’ Karabakh rhetoric, however, have dealt a serious blow to the mediators’ efforts to negotiate a peace deal. Those efforts gained new momentum after the Russian-Georgian war, with all three mediating powers stressing the danger posed by unresolved ethnic disputes in the region.

    However, the sharp deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations resulting from the Georgia crisis called into question Moscow’s and Washington’s ability to continue to work together on Karabakh. Medvedev’s seemingly unilateral initiative raised more such questions. Washington has yet to react officially to the move. Incidentally, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried flew to Yerevan ahead of the Russian’ president’s visit. Fried said after talks with Sarkisian on October 17 that the signing of a Karabakh peace accord before the end of the year was “possible” but “not inevitable” (RFE/RL Armenia Report, October 20).

    Meanwhile, Bernard Fassier, the Minsk Group’s French co-chair, told the Azerbaijani APA news agency on October 21 that he and his American and Russian opposite numbers planned to visit Baku and Yerevan jointly next week; but two days later he said that the trip had been postponed, ostensibly because of the co-chairs’ conflicting work schedules.