Category: Eastern Europe

  • Aslamova claims that RF and U.S. are preparing to face off again in the Caucasus – this time in Azerbaijan

    Aslamova claims that RF and U.S. are preparing to face off again in the Caucasus – this time in Azerbaijan

    Komsomolskaya Pravda
    December 17, 2008
    “USA and Russia Playing a New ‘Caucasus” Gambit in Azerbaijan,” by Artem Aniskin and Darya Aslamova. The authors visit Baku to gage the political scene there: the Azerbaijani are seeking to balance relations with Moscow and Washington.

    Following the war in South Ossetia in the Caucasus a new confrontation involving world powers is under consideration. Caspian natural gas and a Karabakh beachhead are at stake.

    On the Moscow-Baku aircraft two drunken young Azerbaijanis , in outlandishly unfashionable attire, addressed me: “Girl, hey, girl,” one of them urged me, “let’s get acquainted.” “Boy! What kind of girl am I to you?,” I sternly said and hid behind my newspaper. This scarcely diminished the young people’s ardor, who managed to grab at the stewardess’s skirt as she passed by and express their love for the pudgy young woman, as she stood in line for the toilet. The last time I flew to Baku was 20 years ago, and it was just as tedious then when I heard similar words, which caused me to grit my teeth as the youngsters reached toward me. Apparently, the traditions of getting to know women are passed from generation to generation. But one detail stood out from the usual picture. These “new Azerbaijanis” not only accosted every attractive woman under 50, but they were also pouring whiskey into their co-passenger, a German businessman, all the while explaining themselves in an English language that could have been learned only in a good British college.

    The surprises of this “new Azerbaijan” did not end here. The banknotes that I received at the Baku “money exchange” were so suspiciously like the Euro, that I offered a compliment: “Your manats look just like a Euro!” “They are better,” I was informed with pride. “We invited European specialists to Baku to make our money look like European currency. The rate of exchange for our manat is stronger than the dollar.

    An Era of Extravagance

    “The European Charm of the East!” is how the American television channels describe Azerbaijan. A small eastern state has raised up on oil just like leavened dough, which in spite of geography wishes to become part of Europe. The capital Baku is growing rapidly. Everywhere there is a passion for illumination, marble, crystal chandeliers, and expensive rugs. Five-star hotels, luxurious restaurants, and stores shimmer in luxury among the scaffoldings, cement mixers, and torn-up roads. At an average wage of $200 US, the narrow streets are crammed with brand new Jeeps and enormous, ancient ” Mercedes ” automobiles. (The residents of Baku believe that a car of any price must be big.)

    They merely shrug their shoulders over the crisis: “Well, what can happen in a small, oil and gas producing monarchist state? There is a family succession of authority and no upheavals. Is oil getting cheaper? Well, so what, in a couple of years the price will go up again, where it go out of sight. Then, too, we have not been playing the stock market like you Russians. We have a passion for roulette. All of these stocks and bonds. When the world market collapsed, it took the Russian market along with it. We don’t mess around with such foolishness.” A local banker said it more to the point than anyone else: “For the first time in my life I am glad that I live in the stone age.”

    However, the local stone age is awash with all the trappings of the 21st century. The city is reaping the fruits of its oil prosperity and is entering an era of extravagance and boastfulness. Once there was a slogan that said: “If you have money, hide it,” but now the slogan is, “If you have money, spread it around and show off.” “Initially we bought lights for our streets from Russia for $60 each,” said Ilkhan Shaban, a Baku petroleum expert. “Two years later we grew weary of the lights. We ordered new ones from Turkey at $120 each. But income and appetite grow. Now we have purchased lighting in Belgium. Within a span of five years we changed our street lighting three times! We are changing store fronts and making borders out of marble and granite. A German business is building asphalt roads. We have spent $10 billion US on outward appearances. We have foolishly provided the opposition with a pile of money, and it just sits there quietly without blinking. Even though Azerbaijan is seated at the European Council and is participating in NATO projects, we are a typical small Asian country with an Asian way of thinking.”

    Where There Is Oil and Gas, There Is Truth and Power

    My new friends, young journalists Gamid and Vadim, with great pride show me Baku nightlife, lit up with those expensive lights: “What does a European capital have that we don’t?” We are eating our evening meal in the private office of a restaurant owner (the Baku Sheik), nibbling on a shashlyk of contraband fried sturgeon. I ask: “Well, lads, what sort of Europe are you? Just look at the map to see where they are and where we are. Why do you need the European Union? You are proud that you are the East. For ten years Turkey has been on its knees begging to join the European Union. Why do you need this humiliation?” Gamid softly responds: “And they will accept us, because where there is oil and gas, there is truth and power!”

    “Azerbaijan is a state focused on western pragmatism, but with eastern roots,” such was the elegant definition given to me by the department chief of political analysis under the administration’s president, Ehlnur Aslanov. “In Copenhagen at a NATO conference I once argued that the Azerbaijanis are Europeans with an analyst. He did not agree with me. A year later we met again. This same analyst announces from the dais that Azerbaijan is part of Europe. I could not contain myself: ‘How can this have changed in just one year later? Is it geography?’ He thought for a bit and then answered honestly. ‘No, the geography is just as it was. The geopolitics have changed.”

    A City of Spies

    The well-known writer Chingiz Abdullayev says: “Baku is the last city of spies on the earth. “All of the secret services of the world are operating here at the same time – Russia, Israel, Iran, Turkey, England, and America.

    “The petroleum interests of all these states are in Azerbaijan. We are hemmed in between enormous Russia and powerful Iran and we do not want to make any sudden movements. We cannot behave rashly like Georgia has done. Our balancing act is between the East and the West – a forced, intelligent policy. We will never forget that the Russian language brought us into the world at large. We have retained more than 200 Russian language schools. We have a Slavic university and 14 Russian language institutes; in our stores 90% of the books are Russian literature. We are fated to a friendship with Russia. What is more we have excellent relations with the USA, which Iran does not like, half of the population of which, by the way, are Azerbaijanis In addition, Azerbaijan is the only secular Muslim country. You will tell me, but what about Turkey? In Turkey a religious party won in the elections, but here such parties do not even register a half percentage point. Besides, aircraft from Baku fly to Tel-Aviv every day.” “Does this mean that you are flirting with everyone?” “We are just like a discerning bride. Azerbaijan is the key not only to the Caspian area, but to the entire South Caucasus, as well as to the East and on to Iran.”

    The Armenians Are to Blame for Everything

    “Do you know who poisoned Andropov and Chernenko?”, a mustachioed taxi driver throws out to me while we are sitting in a Baku traffic jam. “Probably the Armenians,” I absentmindedly reply. (Within five days in Baku I have concluded that if there is an earthquake in China, it was probably caused by the Armenians.) “That’s right!”, the taxi driver excitedly throws out in defeat, “How did you know?” “Well, someone must have been responsible, why not the Armenians? Were the Soviet leaders really poisoned?”, I ask in turn. “Of course!,” the taxi driver is convinced. “The Armenians slipped them some poison to kill off the USSR and get their hands on Nagornyy Karabakh. Remember how the collapse of the Soviet Union began? With Karabakh. If it hadn’t been for Karabakh, the Dnestr river area, Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Kosovo would not have happened. When there are doubts as to who is responsible, just look to see what the Armenians have been up to at that time. Apparently, that is their tricks.” “And I thought we ought to keep an eye on the Jews!”, I say coming to life. “Nonsense! Wherever an Armenian has trod, a Jew has nothing to do.”

    For 15 years the wounded pride of the Azerbaijanis has found no balm from its border war with Armenia. Karabakh and the seven enclaves adjacent to Azerbaijan (totaling 20% of Azerbaijan territory) that were lost remain a non-healing wound, in which nearly everyone suffered. Some 15,000 people were killed and there were a half million refugees. But feelings of defeatism are quickly being replaced with a thirst for revenge. A new generation has come of age that has not known war, and it is eager to go into battle. “Just give us the weapons and we will regain our land!,” exclaims my colleague Gamid. “All of us will go as one.” “Gamid, you were not in that war and I was. Believe me, it’s not all that simple. Why do you think that all of you can regain what was lost 15 years ago?” “You don’t know anything. There was a great deal of betrayal then. The Russians were helping the Armenians with weapons. We were confused and surrounded by destruction. Everything is different now.”

    A Hook in the Rib of South Ossetia

    “Everything is different now.” This magical phrase is often repeated by young and old. “My son was born in 1989,” says parliament deputy Aydyn Mirzazade, “and he is a bigger patriot than I am.”

    The former Azerbaijan ambassador in Russia, Khikmet Gadzhizade says: “We are increasing our military budget to $3 billion US a year. (This is more than the annual budgets of Armenia and Georgia combined.) Karabakh is the focus of the entire nation. One day this abscess must break open.”

    “Our president is openly saying that we will fight.” “But, after all, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan just signed a declaration of peace in Moscow!”

    “Whoever Wishes to Fight Will Fight”

    “The Karabakh conflict is a hook beneath the rib of Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is a plaited noose and we are dangling from the Kremlin wall,” says political scientist Zardusht Alizade. “Russia does not want to relinquish Karabakh to either Armenia or Azerbaijan. Give it to Armenia and Azerbaijan will leave, give it to Azerbaijan and Armenia will steal away to the West. It is best if we all remain on the hook.”

    “And would Russia long remain interested were it not for the events that broke out in Georgia and the smell of a great gas deal?”

    “Let Me Gloat Just a Bit from the Bottom of My Soul”

    There are battles in which the victor fares no better than the defeated. The shadow of the August events hangs over the Southern Caucasus.

    Political scientist Oktay Sadykhzade believes: “Throughout those five days in August Azerbaijan was in a difficult and nerve-racking situation. Russia is our powerful neighbor and three million Azerbaijanis reside there. And Georgia is our energy partner. On whose side shall we stand?”

    Political expert and writer Zardusht Alizade says: “The lesson of Georgia was clearly understood by Armenia and Azerbaijan. In crushing the Georgian army, which had been so lovingly trained by American instructors and Turkish advisors, Russia demonstrated that it will act like America. But take note of the fact that Russia did not bomb the Azerbaijan gas pipeline that passes through Georgia to Turkey. It accurately placed its bombs near the pipeline, on both sides. It simply designated that it has such a capability. Today gas and oil are more important than territory.”

    “In Moscow many classified the August events as a victory for Russia,” says political scientist Rasim Musabekov. “They say we demonstrated to everyone who is most important. What came of this? Armenia – your ally – was isolated from Russia. Nothing was passing through Azerbaijan, and earlier through Armenia, since we have a front line rather than a border. The only dry-land link passed through Georgia, but now of course, the Georgian conflict has cut Armenia off from any Russian assistance.

    The Azerbaijanis speak with deep contentment about the hopeless situation in which Armenia now finds itself. An influential politician told me: “Listen, we did not create this situation. You Russians created it. And so, permit us to gloat just a bit from the bottom of our souls. Let an impoverished Armenia, which has nothing except its cognac and Karabakh, sit and drink its cognac out of grief. We shall wait.”

    Petroleum expert Ilkhan Shaban says quietly, “Sure, we will wait. The situation is just like on a chess board. We have taken many pieces, and we can easily declare mate, but for now we are not announcing checkmate.”

    The Gas Game

    When in the fall of last year Moscow unexpectedly renewed negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on Karabakh, it seemed that this was only an opportunity for Russia to perform an aria of peace and kindness. However, in the opinion of experts, the entire Karabakh story is only a smokescreen for a more momentous game of intrigue – the gas game.

    The intrigue is that the USA is anxious to start up the ” Nabukko ” pipeline and pump Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan natural gas through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Europe. “The ‘Nabukko philosophy’ is gas from wherever you wish, just not from Russia,” explains Ilkhan Shaban.

    “In Soviet times we had to get permission from Moscow and the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) to build a toilet in the train station in Yevlakha, and now Washington is playing the Gosplan role,” laughs political scientist Zardusht Alizade. “Now, having sensed a danger, emissaries from Moscow are showing up in Baku and saying: “Do you want to sell gas to Europe? Sell it to us at wholesale prices. You are selling natural gas to the Georgians for $150 US and we will pay you $400 US.”

    Ilkhan Shaban says: “As soon as Gazprom set a price of $400 US for a thousand cubic meters of gas, everyone rushed here. The deputy petroleum minister from Iran came and set the same price. And then there were similar offers from Italy, Bulgaria, Israel, and Turkey. Everyone suddenly wanted Azerbaijan gas. And Azerbaijan had room for maneuvering.”

    “Moscow’s wishes are commendable,” says Zardusht Alizade, “but it has to be paid for. And is Karabakh the price for this? Of course! If we draw up a gas contract with Russia, our relations with Europe will worsen. This means that Russia must come up with something else. If Russia surrenders Karabakh, the American ” Nabukko ” project will become unthinkable. Hundreds of billions of dollars and an enormous zone of influence are at stake.”

    While Azerbaijan is offering delightfully evasive responses to everyone – the Russians, the Americans, and the Europeans, the eastern proverb comes to mind: “The longer the meat cures the more tender it becomes.

    “To be honest, we are not excited about this ” Nabukko ” project, and we are in no hurry,” says political scientist Rasim Musabekov. “We can take as long as we wish. Azerbaijan is not something to be handed over for ” Nabukko,” and it has time to get it.”

    Will Russia Deploy Troops in Karabakh?

    Why has tiny, impoverished Karabakh become so important not only for Azerbaijan and Armenia, but for the world powers? From Karabakh to Iran is but the wave of a hand. Azerbaijan does not wish for the USA to start a war with Iran from its territory, and that is why it is rejecting offers to join NATO.

    Karabakh is a different matter. The USA can dig in there on the border with Iran under the pretext of deploying peacekeepers.

    “Russia wants to take control of the Karabakh negotiations and leave the USA out of them,” says political scientist Oktay Sadykhzade. “This has to do with deploying Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh. But the Russians cannot share the region with the Americans. They want to take a stand in the south and they need a beachhead for Iran, and they are offering the north to the Russians. But in general Russia does not want to give the USA access there.”

    “Everyone that wants to deploy troops in Karabakh is only thinking about how to increase its influence,” the writer Chingiz Abdullayev bitterly acknowledges. ” Karabakh is for us like Kosovo is for the Serbs. And the big countries think that they can put their foot down here and not go away.”

    Journalist and political scientist Zardusht Alizade says: “Any conflict is a wonderful opportunity to settle in somewhere and to take advantage of the situation.” “Is this called the ability to control chaos?” I ask. “Right on the mark! The west has already taken our oil. Now it wants our gas. It wants Armenia to tear itself away from Russia. Now the Russians have a chance to solve their problems, but I fear you have neither the intellectual depth nor the political fortitude to make a choice. Either Russia returns Karabakh to Azerbaijan and gets the gas and strategic positions, or America will step by step come into the region. When they tell me that ‘Armenia will not permit this,’ I ask, what sort of resources does it have? How many divisions does it have?” “Do you seriously believe that Russia will surrender Armenia?” I ask.

    “The question is not about surrendering Armenia,” firmly says Alizade. “The question is not to surrender ourselves.”

    Commentary of Experts

    Aleksey Vlasov, General Director of the Center for the Study of Social and Political Processes in the Post-Soviet Space:

    “Moscow Will Seek a Balance”

    “Azerbaijan has started playing a more independent role in politics. Great opportunities are opening up for it to find a balance between Russia and the West. I am not certain that the people of Azerbaijan are prepared to make Nagornyy Karabakh into small change for the USA or for Russia. Neither Washington nor Moscow can now guarantee that, shall we say, in 2010 the seven Azerbaijani regions now controlled by Karabakh will be returned to Baku. Without such assurances and time periods how can one influence the Azerbaijan leadership? In no way at all. For 14 years they have been promising to solve this issue. Senselessly!

    Moreover, it seems to me that Karabach’s role as a tool in a Big Game is still exaggerated…

    As regards Armenia, one cannot forget that there is a Russian military base there. And Moscow, as a regular geopolitical player, will still seek a balance between Yerevan and Baku, and distortions are dangerous. It is important to note the Armenian lobby in Moscow, which has evolved historically, since Soviet times, and is more influential and more cohesive that that of Azerbaijan.

    Finally, it is wrong to argue that Russia, to put it bluntly, will abandon Armenia for the sake of Azerbaijan natural gas. Just imagine what our Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) allies will think about us, such as Kazakhstan or Belarus, if they see how easily we can rid ourselves of our partners. This will be an enormous loss of image. It is not yet known if we gain more than we lose.

  • On the issue of a common language and alphabet of the Turkic-speaking people, the intelligency of Azerbaijan is the only hope – Turkish Ambassador to Russia

    On the issue of a common language and alphabet of the Turkic-speaking people, the intelligency of Azerbaijan is the only hope – Turkish Ambassador to Russia

    Russia, Moscow, January 1 / TrendNews R. Mashadigasanli / The only question that remained unsolved between the Turkic-speaking people, is the question of a single alphabet – Turkey’s Ambassador to Russia Halil Akinci told Trend News on thursday.

    According to him, even in the XIX century, the Turks around the world accepted the Istanbul dialect as a common language, accessible to all Turkic-speaking people.

    But as the time went on, each people gave preference to its own language, which is quite natural. (more…)

  • Cyprus Dimension of Turkish Foreign Policy

    Cyprus Dimension of Turkish Foreign Policy

    Cyprus that is located in Eastern Mediterranean has a great strategic importance for European countries as much as other North Africa and Middle East have. Sovereign states made big wars especially to keep the artery of commerce under control and the island was occupied by so many forces throughout the history. (more…)

  • CITIZENS OF UKRAINE, CZECH REPUBLIC, TURKEY, AND THE USA WERE FIGHTING ON GEORGIA’S SIDE

    CITIZENS OF UKRAINE, CZECH REPUBLIC, TURKEY, AND THE USA WERE FIGHTING ON GEORGIA’S SIDE

    Investigation Committee working on a Nuremberg Trial for Saakashvili
    Author: Dmitri Steshin
    Source: Komsomolskaya Pravda, No. 193, December 24, 2008, p. 4
    [The interim results of an investigation into the Georgian Army’s
    crimes in South Ossetia have been released by the Investigation
    Committee at the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian
    Federation. The question of establishing a special judicial body
    for the events in South Ossetia will be considered.]
    Russian investigators report on the Georgian Army’s crimes in South Ossetia

         The interim results of an investigation into the Georgian
    Army’s crimes in South Ossetia were released on December 23 by the
    Investigation Committee at the Prosecutor General’s Office of the
    Russian Federation.
         A team of investigators and experts from the Russian
    Prosecutor General’s Office spent about a week touring Tskhinvali
    and its outskirts. They questioned local residents and prisoners
    of war, and participated in exhuming the bodies of Ossetians who
    were killed and buried in their own yards. They recorded
    outrageous cases such as an incident where soldiers opened fire on
    a car carrying women and children. The investigators then spent
    almost four months processing the materials they had gathered.
         The results of this investiation were released to the public
    on December 23 in the form of a White Book. But many materials
    still remain “off screen” – destined for the court-room. This was
    confirmed at a press conference by Investigation Committee
    Director Alexander Bastrykin: “After the investigation is
    complete, the question of establishing a special judicial body for
    the events in South Ossetia will be considered. After the
    investigation, all materials will be handed over to the Foreign
    Ministry of the Russian Federation. The Ministry will present them
    to the international community. Documents have already been found
    proving that Georgia started preparations for its act of
    aggression as far back as 2005.”
         The investigation revealed some sensational news. There has
    been a great deal of speculation about foreigners participating in
    the attack on South Ossetia. Now these rumors have been confirmed:
    in the village of Achebeli, investigators found photographs, note-
    pads, uniforms, and insignia from a Ukrainian nationalist
    organization, UNA-UNSO.
         They also established that an “international” diversionary
    group participated in the storming of Tskhinvali. It included
    citizens of Turkey, the United States, and the Czech Republic.
         The White Book will soon be translated into English.
         Translated by InterContact

  • Laying Claim to Asia

    Laying Claim to Asia

    by Dmitry Shlapentokh
    22 December 2008

    On the Dnieper and in Crimea, the notion is taking root that Eurasia’s true heart was never in Russia after all.

    For centuries, nationalistic Ukrainian intellectuals have seen Ukraine as a part of Europe and hostile to Asians. And it was Russians who were dubbed Asiatics, descendants of the Mongols, who had nothing to do with civilized European Ukraine. The popularity among some Russian intellectuals of “Eurasianism,” with its emphasis and praise of Russia’s Asiatic-Mongol roots, handed post-Soviet Ukrainian intellectuals an additional reason for locating Russia in Asia, with Asiatics as the Russians’ major allies.

    Nationalist-minded Ukrainian historians and politicians also began to witness a countermovement as, by the end of the Putin presidency, rising Russian nationalism increasingly disowned the notion, put forth by scores of Eurasianists from Lev Gumilev to Aleksandr Dugin, of the Mongols as engaged in a healthy “symbiosis” with Russians. In recent years Ukrainians also noted that in Crimea, which most Russians still regard as part of Russia, it was ethnic Tatars who were most loyal to Ukraine. This led to a dramatic reinterpretation of history. In the new version of Ukrainian idiosyncratic “Eurasianism,” Tatars, and indeed other Muslim peoples as well, became Ukraine’s “historical” friends who had fought alongside freedom-loving Ukrainians against their common primordial enemy, the Russian empire. The image of Tatars was recast in the Ukrainian mind from other perspectives as well. Tatar Asianness, essentially tainted by despotism and brutality, was displaced as a cultural and political phenomenon and became instead an integral part of civilized Europe.

    Detail of a painting depicting the Battle of Konotop. Source:
    Mузейний простір України.

    EURO-EURASIANISM

    The changing fortunes of the Crimean Tatars became a major driver of the growth of Ukrainian “Eurasianism.” Deported by Stalin during World War II and replaced by ethnic Russians and Russified Ukrainians, the Crimean Tatars were “rehabilitated” by Khrushchev and started to return to their ancestral lands by the late Soviet and, of course, post-Soviet era. Similar to the Chechens, the Crimean Tatars have never forgotten their misfortune and blame Russians – not just the regime but ethnic Russians – for this. This resentment is reinforced by the feeling that it was the Russians who took their property and land.

    For their part, the Russian-speakers who make up the large majority of the Crimean population regarded Crimea, with Sevastopol – still the home port for Russia’s Black Sea fleet – as an essentially Russian place. They demanded either broad autonomy or outright unification with Russia. Kyiv, alarmed that the Russian-speaking Crimeans might come to play a role not unlike that of the Sudeten Germans in interwar Czechoslovakia, began to appreciate the Crimean Tatars, who although much smaller in numbers had emerged as a natural counterbalance to the Russian speakers of the peninsula and, by the logic of events, even to Russified eastern Ukrainians, who are seen by westerners as less committed to independence. These elements – their gravitating, at least by political logic, toward western Ukrainian nationalists and their coming to appear more pro-European than eastern Ukrainians – lend the Eurasianism of the Ukrainian Tatars a specific flavor quite different from the Russian variety. Russian Eurasianism, while emphasizing peaceful coexistence and nurturing a “symbiosis” between Russians and Asians, sees in this the foundation of a grand empire. Asiatic elements in Russian culture are also seen as a way to juxtapose Russia-Eurasia against, if not the entire West, at least America, and what are regarded as her East European stooges. Nothing of this sort can be found in Ukrainian Eurasianism. It is true that both Ukrainians and Crimean Tatar nationalists boast of their respective peoples’ military prowess in dealing with enemies, Russia first of all. Yet this history of military valor serves to underscore the defense of liberty and has no imperialist implications.

    There are other differences. If for Russian Eurasianists the attachment to “Tatars” (not merely in the Crimea but the historical Muslim groups going back to the Mongol conquest) served to bind Russia closer to Asia, for the Ukrainians the same bond came to represent a European multiculturalism, the very fact that Europe, European civilization, includes not just white Christians but people of a variety of ethnic and cultural backgrounds.

    Representatives of both branches of Eurasianism have actively appealed to historical analogies to substantiate their essentially dissimilar claims.

    OUR FRIENDS, THE TATARS

    This new vision of Ukrainians’ relationship with the Tatars, as well as with other Asian peoples, took form soon after the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of Ukraine as an independent state – visibly, in the changing displays at the Kyiv State Historical Museum, the goal of which was to propagandize the new official version of the Ukrainian past. Drastic rearrangement of the Soviet-era expositions led to the disappearance of the Mongol invasion of the Kyivan state, the pivotal event in that state’s history and that of many peoples of Eurasia. The future Russian state’s struggle with the Mongols, and, later, what most historians regarded as the liberation from the Mongol yoke, had been marginalized. The centuries-long conflicts of Ukrainians, Poles, and Russians with the Crimean Tatar vassals of the Ottoman Empire had also vanished. And at the end of the exposition hall dedicated to the “Orange Revolution” of 2004, regarded by Ukraine’s present-day rulers as the true watershed in recent Ukrainian history, you could read that Ukraine was a place of various minorities. Russians were not mentioned. At the same time, there was now a place for Jews and Tatars.

    The Tatars’ old negative image in Ukraine is showing signs of reversing among historians and in the public mind as well, as opinions catch on that in some ways resemble those of such Russian Eurasianists as the scholar Lev Gumilev (1912-1992), who saw the dramatic events of the 13th century not so much as an overwhelming onslaught – the traditional view of pre-revolutionary and Soviet historiography – but rather as a “raid” that inflicted rather limited damage. This is also the view of some Ukrainian historians who downplay the devastation and argue that soon after the Mongol conquest of Kyiv, the capital of Kyivan Rus, foreign travelers found a vibrant trading community in the city, a sign of the limited extent of the destruction. Moreover, recent archeological work is cited as support for a hypothesis that the conquering impulses of the new rulers were subsiding and their energies increasingly channeled into city-building, trade, crafts, and similar exploits. These views of the Golden Horde fit well into the design of some leading intellectuals in Russia’s Tatarstan Republic. While regarding modern Tatars as the descendants of the Golden Horde, or at least not denying the Golden Horde as contributing to the formation of Tatar nationhood, one of these intellectuals, R.S. Khakimov, focuses not on the Golden Horde’s military prowess and associated brutality but on what he sees as the positive implications of Mongol statehood. In his view, its rulers were preoccupied not with bloodshed or conquest but with the development of crafts, trade, and culture.

    This stress on the cultural achievements and broad religious tolerance of Tatars and Muslims in general not only enrolls them within European civilization but can be taken so far as seeing in them forerunners of true European values in an era when most other Europeans were behaving in a most “unEuropean” and “Asiatic” way. And while Tatar military prowess may now be downplayed when Ukrainian pundits comment on the Muslim conquests, it can also be re-emphasized when the Tatars are seen as the Ukrainians’ ally in fighting what is now regarded as Ukrainians’ historical enemies: the Russians.

    PAST AND PRESENT

    As friction between Ukraine and Russia has risen, history has become increasingly involved in providing justification for the present. This year, Ukrainian press accounts, bolstered by an article in the nationalist Russian newspaper Zavtra, laid claim to celebrate the Battle of Konotop as a great feat of Ukrainian military power.

    In that encounter in 1659, a force of Ukrainians and their Crimean Tatar and Polish allies defeated with much slaughter a Russian army at Konotop in the north of today’s Ukraine. The triumph of Ukrainian leader Ivan Vyhovsky, successor to Bogdan Khmelnitsky, was not to last long; Vyhovsky soon faced rebellion in his own ranks and fled to Poland.

    The Battle of Konotop is one of the manifestations of the complexity of Russia’s 17th-century war with Ukraine, one event in the bloody years of strife among Ukrainians, Poles, and Russians that ended in major territorial gains for Moscow. The clash has been transformed by present-day Ukrainian historians into an epic battle in which the foe numbered almost 100,000.

    In these scholars’ thinking the victory at Konotop identifies Russia as the major enemy of the Ukrainians. More, it shows clearly that not only was the Ukrainian state already in existence in the 17th century but that it was a strong power, a worthy rival of Russia. According to one tale, upon receiving news of the defeat, the Russian czar trembled. The implication is that Russia was trembling not in fear of a potential Polish march on Moscow – the memory of the Time of Troubles when Polish troops occupied Moscow still fresh – but in fear of victorious Ukraine.

    This interpretation, of course, leaves unexplained how this mighty rival of weak Russia was in the end incorporated into the Russian state. At any rate, what most concerns us is the role of the Tatars in these events. Here, the Tatars have emerged as a valiant ally who helped the Ukrainians defeat the common enemy. In an article published in June on a site for Russian Muslims, Islam.ru, pagan Russians are juxtaposed against monotheist Muslim Tatars or Ottoman Turks; it was no accident, according to this interpretation of events, that the victors presented some of the most important Russian prisoners taken at Konotop to the Ottoman sultan. It is a view of history in which Ukraine has not been the historical enemy of Asians, at least those who live in Europe, but actually their good friend. The same could be said for Ukraine’s historical relations with the Poles. The story is quite different for Russia. From a brotherly Orthodox country, it has been transformed into the primordial enemy of Ukrainians.

    There is also a direct link between past and present. In the past, Ukrainians, Poles, and Muslims of various origin – civilized and freedom-loving people all – defended their liberties against the Russian imperial monster, the same as they do now, for Russia’s nature has not changed through time. In the eyes of some Ukrainian politicians, Russia continues to occupy part of historic Ukrainian land and subjugates the Chechens. Russia was and continues to be an imperial predator.

    The unfolding of dramatic geopolitical changes – Russia’s increasing alienation not just from the West but from Eastern Europe, as well as from a good segment of her own Muslims, and the corresponding rapprochement between Ukrainians and the historic Muslim community in the Crimea – has driven this startling reversal. By dint of this growing Ukrainian “Eurasianism” Russia is cast into an “Asia” that is not so much a place as a cultural and political sign for despotism and brutality. At the same time the Tatars are pulled into Europe, a Europe not in the geographic sense but a symbol of the “civilized” West.

     

    Dmitry Shlapentokh is an associate professor of history at Indiana University in South Bend.

  • Russian Defense Ministry, Kazan Agree to Set Up Tatar Units in the Russian Army

    Russian Defense Ministry, Kazan Agree to Set Up Tatar Units in the Russian Army

    Paul Goble

    Vienna, December 22 – The Russian defense ministry and the Republic of Tatarstan have agreed on an experimental program to set up military units consisting only of draftees from Tatarstan, a measure Moscow officials say would help eliminate ethnic crime within the Russian army but a step some analysts suggest could lead to the fragmentation of that military force.
    The joint decision to create “national Tatar units” on a trial basis in Orenburg and Samara oblasts was taken after human rights activists and families of draftees visited the Tots Garrison where an ethnic Tatar recently fled from his unit because of the mistreatment he received from soldiers of other ethnic groups (www.rbcdaily.ru/2008/12/22/focus/395812).
    While the creation of such units could reduce the amount of “dedovshchina” as such mistreatment is commonly called, it creates “a very bad precedent,” according to retired general Leonid Ivashov of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, because now other groups will want the same treatment, a trend that would undermine military cohesion and the chain of command.
    That view is certain to be shared by many in the Russian political elite, but senior officials in the defense ministry appear likely to support the creation of such national units given the problems they have faced from the Soldiers’ Mothers Committee and even appeals to the European Court of Human Rights.
    In tsarist times, units complected on an ethnic basis were a commonplace, with the so-called “Savage Division” consisting of units made up of various Caucasian nationalities only the most famous because of the willingness of its commanders to defend the tsar and the tsarist system when almost no one else would
    But in the Soviet period, such units were permitted only during the complicated days of the Russian Civil War (1918-1922) and then again during World War II (1941-1945), when the regime was prepared to make compromises with the population in the name of saving the communist system.
    Since 1991, many non-Russian groups, led by the Tatars, have called for the establishment of ethnically based units, not only to end the mistreatment many of their soldiers currently experience in the army but also to generate a sense of national pride and to prevent the army from becoming a “russianizing” experience.
    Moscow has resisted such a step until now, and this “experiment” may prove stillborn, although having allowed the announce to be made and with the defense ministry having indicated that it supports the measure, the Russian government may well face resistance to any retreat on this line even as it is certain to face demands for such units from other ethnic groups.
    Perhaps the first of these additional demands will come from Chechnya, where the republic’s president Ramzan Kadyrov has already said that he favors the formation of Chechen units not only within the borders of his own republic but in the Russian army and fleet more generally.
    Meanwhile, in another development that highlights growing restiveness among the Tatars is a report in today’s “Kommersant” suggesting that that nationality has now found allies among the neighboring Bashkirs for its position on restoring the regional and ethnic component of school curricula (kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1097881).
    On Saturday, the paper said, a group of 150 Bashkir activists, some of whom are members of the Kuk Bure national movement and the Vatan Party, organized a demonstration in the square in front of the republic television center in Ufa and said they would “join forces with Tatar defenders of the national-regional component’ of the educational program.
    While it is unclear just how far this cooperation will proceed or whether it will extend to other republics in the Middle Volga as well, Moscow observers told the paper that even this level of inter-republic and inter-ethnic cooperation against the central authorities represented a serious warning that the latter needed to reconsider what they are doing.

     

    http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2008/12/window-on-eurasia-russian-defense.html