Category: Eastern Europe

  • Brzezinski reviews US policy towards Russia

    Brzezinski reviews US policy towards Russia

    Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US National Security Adviser under Jimmy Carter, claims that bringing the Ukraine closer to the West is the key to assuring the democratization of Russia.

    In an interview for the French paper Le Figaro said that the West must work to reopen relations with Russia and that Georgia and the Ukraine must be part of that dialogue.

    Western nations, including Poland and the United States, must rework their relations with Russia in order to `slowly limit Russia’s nostalgia for imperialism and renew disarmament negotiations.`

    Brzezinski told the paper that initiating a new dialogue with Russia cannot happen at the cost of limiting the aspirations of those countries seeking NATO membership – such as the Ukraine and Georgia – especially because the Ukraine, as a NATO member opens up a transformative path to democratize Russia.

    Source:  The Georgian Times, 02.19.2009



  • Turkey and Russia Developing a New Economic and Strategic Partnership

    Turkey and Russia Developing a New Economic and Strategic Partnership

    Turkey and Russia Developing a New Economic and Strategic Partnership

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 31
    February 17, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkish president Abdullah Gul paid a four-day visit to the Russian Federation from February 12 to 15, marking the flourishing multidimensional relations between the two countries. Gul met with Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and other officials and also traveled to Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, where he discussed joint investments. Gul was accompanied by Kursad Tuzmen, the state minister responsible for foreign trade, and Minister of Energy Hilmi Guler, as well as a large delegation of Turkish businessmen. Foreign Minister Ali Babacan joined the delegation for part of the trip.

    The Russian side elevated Gul’s trip from the previously announced status of an “official visit” to a “state visit,” the highest level of state protocol, indicating the value Moscow attaches to Turkey. Gul and Medvedev signed a joint declaration announcing their commitment to deepening mutual friendship and multi-dimensional cooperation. The declaration mirrors a previous “Joint Declaration on the Intensification of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership,” signed during a landmark visit by then-President Putin in 2004 (Today’s Zaman, February 14).

    Indeed, Turkish-Russian economic ties have flourished over the past decade, with trade volume reaching $32 billion in 2008, making Russia Turkey’s number one partner. Given this background, bilateral economic ties were quite naturally a major item on Gul’s agenda and both leaders expressed their satisfaction with the growing commerce between their countries.

    Cooperation in energy is the major area of mutual economic activity. Turkey’s gas and oil imports from Russia account for most of the trade volume. Russian press reports indicate that the two sides are interested in improving cooperation in energy transportation lines carrying Russian gas to European markets through Turkey (www.cnnturk.com, February 14).

    Moreover, Russia is playing a major part in Turkey’s attempts to diversify its energy sources. Cooperation in nuclear energy is particularly important in light of Turkey’s plans to introduce nuclear power. A Russian-led consortium won the tender for the construction of Turkey’s first nuclear plant; but since the price the consortium offered for electricity was above world prices, the future of the project, which is awaiting parliamentary approval, remains unclear (EDM, January 26). Prior to Gul’s visit to Moscow, the Russian consortium submitted a revised offer, reducing the price by 30 percent (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, February 14). If this revision is found legal under the tender rules, the positive mood during Gul’s trip may indicate the Turkish government is ready to finally give the go-ahead for the project.

    The Russian market also plays a major role for Turkish overseas investments and exports. Russia is one of the main customers for Turkish construction firms and a major destination for Turkish exports. Similarly, millions of Russian tourists bring significant revenues to Turkey every year.

    Nonetheless, a huge trade imbalance in Russia’s favor due to Turkey’s heavy dependence on Russian gas and oil continues to be a major concern for the Turkish side. Despite commitments to fix the trade imbalance made during Putin’s 2004 visit, the gap is still there. It remains to be seen whether this trip will produce concrete results on that count, but so far the only news is that the two sides may start to use the Turkish lira and the Russian ruble in foreign trade, which might increase Turkish exports to Russia (Hurriyet, February 15).

    Other economic issues causing problems in Turkish-Russian commercial relations were also addressed. Ankara is particularly disturbed by difficulties encountered by Turkish goods at the Russian border. In response to Gul’s request for help on that issue, Medvedev reiterated the Russian position that strict inspection rules on trucks were being applied to all countries and Turkey was not specifically discriminated against. Nonetheless, he suggested the establishment of a joint technical delegation to examine the issue (Anadolu Ajansi, February 13). The parties had already agreed in September to simplify customs procedures and the new delegation might contribute to those efforts.

    A large part of Gul’s visit concerned the development of political ties between the two countries. Both leaders repeated the position that, as the two major powers in the area, cooperation between Russia and Turkey was essential to regional peace and stability. Noting he had held fruitful and sincere contacts with his Russian counterparts, Gul said “Russia and Turkey are neighboring countries that are developing their relations on the basis of mutual confidence. I hope this visit will in turn give a new character to our relations” (Hurriyet Daily News, February 13).

    For their part, the Russians praised Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives in the region. Medvedev particularly emphasized his satisfaction with Turkey’s actions during the Russian-Georgian war last summer and Turkey’s subsequent proposal for the establishment of a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP). Medvedev said the August crisis had demonstrated not only the need for coordination among regional countries to address local challenges, but also their ability to deal with such problems on their own without the involvement of outside powers (www.cnnturk.com, February 13).

    Medvedev was clearly referring to the exclusion of the United States from attempts to solve regional problems. Indeed, the ease with which Turkey went ahead with the CSCP, bypassing Washington and not seeking transatlantic consensus on Russia, prompted international and Turkish observers to question Turkey’s place in the West (EDM, September 2). Since then, attention has been focused on Turkey’s determination to follow an independent foreign policy.

    Economic dependence on Russia, however, reduces Ankara’s autonomy and options with regard to Russia in diplomatic affairs. During the Russia-Georgia war, this asymmetric dependence forced Turkey to follow an acquiescent policy toward Moscow. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan acknowledged that dependence on Russia had tied Turkey’s hands (EDM, August 27; Milliyet, September 2).

    This dependence apparently did not bother Turkey very much. Following Gul’s visit, some have even described Turkish-Russian relations as a “strategic partnership,” a label traditionally used for Turkish-American relations. It remains to be seen how long Ankara can maintain a balancing act between the two major powers when controversial issues such as Russian plans for building a missile shield come onto the agenda.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-and-russia-developing-a-new-economic-and-strategic-partnership/

  • Presidents of Russia, Turkey adopt strategic declaration

    Presidents of Russia, Turkey adopt strategic declaration

       
     
       

    MOSCOW, February 13 (RIA Novosti) – The presidents of Russia and Turkey adopted a joint declaration following talks in Moscow on Friday to promote ties and enhance bilateral friendship and partnership.

    Turkish President Abdullah Gul arrived for his first four-day visit to Russia on Thursday. Following his stay in Moscow, he travels to Kazan, the capital of Russia’s predominantly Muslim republic of Tatarstan.

    “This is a strategic document laying out the achievements of bilateral cooperation and setting tasks for enhancing it further,” a source in the Kremlin said earlier.

    In the declaration, the two presidents urged action to take effective measures to settle frozen conflicts that could destabilize the situation in the South Caucasus.

    They also vowed to move quicker in settling issues related to defense cooperation.

    “Reaching agreements on burning issues in defense cooperation between the two countries will open up more opportunities for broader cooperation in the sphere,” the two presidents said in the declaration.

    The two countries, which as the Russian and Ottoman empires established diplomatic relations over five centuries ago, also agreed on mutual aid to restore and build monuments.

    Taking into account the leading role of private businesses in bilateral trade, Russia and Turkey agreed “to facilitate and speed up business contacts… and visa procedures for businessmen.”

    The Turkish president said annual bilateral trade, which exceeded $30 billion last year, could soon grow to $50 billion.

    “We could push the [bilateral trade] index to the level of $40 billion-$50 billion in the near future in the interests of our nations,” Gul said.

    Moscow and Ankara agreed that energy was a strategic sphere in bilateral cooperation that had potential for growth.

    Turkey receives about 65% of its gas from Russia, which is pumped via Ukraine and the Blue Stream pipeline that passes directly from Russia to Turkey under the Black Sea.

    Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko told reporters on Friday that Russia could sign an energy contract worth more than $60 billion with Turkey on the construction of a nuclear power plant and power supplies to the country for the next 15 years.

    He said four reactors for a potential nuclear plant in Turkey could cost $18 billion-$20 billion.

    At the conclusion of the talks, the Turkish president invited his Russian counterpart to make a return trip to Turkey.

    “I believe my current visit will open up a new page in the history of Russian-Turkish ties,” Gul said.

  • Russia rattles sabres in Obama’s direction

    Russia rattles sabres in Obama’s direction

    By Quentin Peel

    Published: February 6 2009 17:20 | Last updated: February 6 2009 17:20

    Russia may face a grim economic downturn but one would scarcely think so to judge by the sound of sabre-rattling emerging from the Kremlin. Unless, of course, it is intended as a domestic distraction from the gathering gloom.

    The double-act of Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin has come up with a series of security initiatives that seem designed to provoke, or at least irritate, the new administration in Washington. Without even waiting to hear how President Barack Obama intends to conduct his relations with Moscow – something that Joe Biden, his vice-president, may well address on Saturday at the annual Munich Security Conference – the Russian leaders have thrown down the gauntlet.

    First, they leaked details of naval and air bases to be established on the shores of the Black Sea in the breakaway Georgian province of Abkhazia, whose independence is recognised by Moscow alone. Then they signed an air defence treaty with the former Soviet republic of Belarus, apparently paving the way for an anti-missile defence system to counter one planned by the previous US administration across the border in Poland. Moscow appears to have persuaded the Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan to oust the US from its air base at Manas, outside Bishkek, in exchange for $2bn (€1.6bn, £1.4bn) in loans, and $150m in financial aid.

    Russia and the former Soviet republics of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – the so-called Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) – have agreed to form a “rapid reaction force” which is intended to be just as good as the equivalent force operated by the Nato alliance, according to President Medvedev.

    Outside analysts are sceptical whether any of these moves amounts to a particularly effective military gesture but they are certainly intended to suggest that Russia is not rushing to embrace the new US administration.

    The air defence deal with Belarus is on a par with Mr Medvedev’s announcement, on the day Mr Obama was elected, that Russian Iskander missiles would be sited in the Kaliningrad enclave to counter the US missile defence system. It appears to negate a subsequent conciliatory gesture from Moscow, saying those missiles would not be deployed if the US also held back.

    As for the Abkhaz naval base, it may be intended as an insurance policy for the day when, or if, Russia is forced to vacate the existing base for its Black Sea fleet at Sevastopol in the Crimea, which is leased from Ukraine until 2017. Oksana Antonenko, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, believes all the actions are part of a pattern, intended to provoke a US reaction, and give Russia more bargaining chips in negotiating a new relationship with Washington. “In Russia there has never been any euphoria about Obama as there has been in the rest of Europe,” she says. “Russia is still very mistrustful of the US, and Putin profoundly so.

    “But there is an overwhelming view in Moscow now that the Americans are in decline and will be forced to negotiate with Russia from a position of weakness. They seem to expect all the concessions to come from Obama. It is very unrealistic.”

    The response from Washington has been muted. Russia is simply not a high priority for the new president. Western analysts believe Russia’s production of Iskander missiles is not enough to base any significant numbers in Belarus as well as on its southern borders. As for the rapid reaction force, it is regarded with wry amusement in Brussels. None of Russia’s would-be allies wants to be used as a pawn in some muscle-flexing contest with Washington. Even Abkhazia is unhappy about becoming a vast military base for its neighbour.

    So perhaps the entire operation is for domestic purposes. That way it might at least make sense.

    Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009

  • The credit crunch according to Soros

    The credit crunch according to Soros

    The credit crunch according to Soros

    By Chrystia Freeland

    Published: January 30 2009 11:38 | Last updated: January 30 2009 11:38

    On Friday, August 17 2007, 21 of Wall Street’s most influential investors met for lunch at George Soros’s Southampton estate on the eastern end of Long Island. The first tremors of what would become the global credit crunch had rippled out a week or so earlier, when the French bank BNP Paribas froze withdrawals from three of its funds, and in response, central bankers made a huge injection of liquidity into the money markets in an effort to keep the world’s banks lending to one another.

    Although it was a sultry summer Friday, as the group dined on striped bass, fruit salad and cookies, the tone was serious and rather formal. Soros’s guests included Julian Robertson, founder of the Tiger Management hedge fund; Donald Marron, the former chief executive of PaineWebber and now boss of Lightyear Capital; James Chanos, president of Kynikos Associates, a hedge fund that specialised in shorting stocks; and Byron Wien, chief investment strategist at Pequot Capital and the convener of the annual gathering – known to its participants as the Benchmark Lunch.

    The discussion focused on a single question: was a recession looming? We all know the answer today, but the consensus that overcast afternoon was different. In a memo written after the lunch, Wien, a longtime friend of Soros’s, wrote: “The conclusion was that we were probably in an economic slowdown and a correction in the market, but we were not about to begin a recession or a bear market.” Only two men dissented. One of those was Soros, who finished the meal convinced that the global financial crisis he had been predicting – prematurely – for years had finally begun.

    His conclusion had immediate consequences. Six years earlier, following the departure of Stan Druckenmiller from Quantum Funds, Soros’s hedge fund, Soros converted the operation into a “less aggressively managed vehicle” and renamed it an “endowment fund”, which farmed most of its money out to external managers. Now Soros realised he had to get back into the game. “I did not want to see my accumulated wealth be severely impaired,” he said, during a two-hour conversation this winter in the conference room of his midtown Manhattan offices. “So I came back and set up a macro-account within which I counterbalanced what I thought was the exposure of the firm.”

    Soros complained that his years of less active involvement at Quantum meant he didn’t have the kind of “detailed knowledge of particular companies I used to have, so I’m not in a position to pick stocks”. Moreover, “even many of the macro instruments that have been recently invented were unfamiliar to me”. Even so, Quantum achieved a 32 per cent return in 2007, making the then 77-year-old the second-highest paid hedge fund manager in the world, according to Institutional Investor’s Alpha magazine. He ended 2008, a year that saw global destruction of wealth on the most colossal scale since the second world war, with two out of three hedge funds losing money, up almost 10 per cent.

    Soros’s main goal was to preserve his fortune. But, as has been the case throughout his career, his timing and financial acumen enhanced his credibility as a thinker, and never more so than in 2008. In May and June, after more than two decades of writing, he hit bestseller lists in the US and in the UK with his ninth book, The New Paradigm for Financial Markets. In October, he received an invitation to testify before Congress about the financial crisis. In November, Barack Obama, whom he had long backed for the presidency, defeated John McCain.

    “In the twilight of his life, he’s achieved the recognition he has always wanted,” Wien said. “Everything is going for him. He’s healthy, his candidate won, his business is on a solid footing.”

    . . .

    Many comparisons have been drawn between 2008 and earlier periods of turmoil, but the historical moment with most personal resonance for Soros is not one of the conventional choices. The parallel he sees is with 1944, when, as a 13-year-old Jewish boy in Nazi-occupied Budapest, he eluded the Holocaust.

    Soros credits his beloved father, Tivadar, with teaching him how to respond to “far from equilibrium situations”. Captured by the Russians in the first world war, Tivadar was imprisoned in Siberia. He engineered his own escape and return home through a Russia convulsed by the Bolshevik revolution. That sojourn stripped him of his youthful ambition and left him wanting “nothing more from life than to enjoy it”. Yet on March 19 1944, the day the Germans occupied Hungary, the 50-year-old sprang into action, rescuing his immediate family and many others by arranging false identities for them.

    Before the invasion, George was still enough of a child, his father thought, to need a bit of parental coddling. Yet the teenager who spent the war living apart from his parents under a false name found the danger exhilarating. “It was high adventure,” Soros wrote, “like living through Raiders of the Lost Ark.” And as the latest financial crisis gathered momentum, he admitted to the same thrill. “I think the same thing applies again. I feel the same kind of stimulation as I felt then,” he told me.

    Part of the stimulation is intellectual. Soros’s experiences in 1944 laid the groundwork for the conceptual framework he would spend the rest of his life elaborating and which, he believes, has found its validation in the events of 2008. His core idea is “reflexivity”, which he defines as a “two-way feedback loop, between the participants’ views and the actual state of affairs. People base their decisions not on the actual situation that confronts them, but on their perception or interpretation of the situation. Their decisions make an impact on the situation and changes in the situation are liable to change their perceptions.”

    It is, at its root, a case for frequent re-examination of one’s assumptions about the world and for a readiness to spot and exploit moments of cataclysmic change – those times when our perceptions of events and events themselves are likely to interact most fiercely. It is also at odds with the rational expectations economic school, which has been the prevailing orthodoxy in recent decades. That approach assumed that economic players – from people buying homes to bankers buying subprime mortgages for their portfolios – were rational actors making, in aggregate, the best choices for themselves and that free markets were effective mechanisms for balancing supply and demand, setting prices correctly and tending towards equilibrium.

    The rational expectations theory has taken a beating over the past 18 months: its intellectual nadir was probably October 23 2008, when Alan Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve chairman, admitted to Congress that there was “a flaw in the model”. Soros argues that the “market fundamentalism” of Greenspan and his ilk, especially their assumption that “financial markets are self-correcting”, was an important cause of the current crisis. It befuddled policy-makers and was the intellectual basis for the “various synthetic instruments and valuation models” which contributed mightily to the crash.

    By contrast, Soros sees the current crisis as a real-life illustration of reflexivity. Markets did not reflect an objective “truth”. Rather, the beliefs of market participants – that house prices would always rise, that an arcane financial instrument based on a subprime mortgage really could merit a triple-A rating – created a new reality. Ultimately, that “super-bubble” was unsustainable, hence the credit crunch of 2007 and the recession and financial crisis of 2008 and beyond.

    As an investor and as a thinker, Soros has always thrived in times of upheaval. But he has also remained something of an outsider. He recalls how he “discovered loneliness” when he arrived to study at the London School of Economics in 1947. Later on, as he worked his way up from being a journeyman arbitrage trader in London and then New York, to running one of the world’s most successful hedge funds, Soros remained, in the words of one private equity acquaintance, a bit of “an oddball”, both on Wall Street and in the academic world. He is frequently described as “charming”, yet few see the fit, tanned, twice-divorced billionaire as an emotional confidant. “If I had an idea about India-Pakistan, I would talk to him about it,” Wien said. “If I were having a problem in my marriage, I don’t think I would go and talk to George about it.”

    Strobe Talbott, now the president of the Brookings Institute and a former deputy secretary of state, said: “He likes to think of himself as an outsider who can come in from time to time, including to the Oval Office, where I took him on a couple of occasions. But simply hobnobbing with the powerful isn’t important.”

    That lack of clubbiness, and the associated trait of iconoclasm, may explain why, for all his worldly success, Soros has had a rather mixed public reputation. His speculative plays, which have often targeted currencies, have earned him the wrath of political leaders around the world. The ambitious, global reach of his richly funded Open Society foundation has prompted some critics to accuse him of suffering from a Messiah complex. He was so effectively demonised by the US right earlier this decade that he kept fairly quiet about his support of Obama, lest the association hurt his candidate. Probably most painfully, his forays into economics and philosophy often have met with considerable scepticism, especially from academia.

    The one time and place where he instantly became a highly regarded insider was in the former Soviet Union and its satellites, at the moment the Berlin Wall came down. More completely and more swiftly than any other foreigner, Soros grasped and embraced the systemic transformation that was unfolding, and was rewarded with influence and respect. The question for Soros today is whether, as the west undergoes its own once-in-a-century systemic shock, this arch-outsider will finally find himself in the mainstream in the society which has been his main home for more than half a century.

    . . .

    Soros’s most famous – or infamous – speculative play as an investor was his bet against sterling in 1992, a wager which won him more than $1bn and earned him the epithet from the British press of “the man who broke the Bank of England”. That bet also turns out to be a perfect illustration of the specific talent which his past and present fund managers agree has been central to his investing success.

    Soros’s best-known investment was not, in actual fact, his own idea. According to both Soros and Druckenmiller, who was managing Quantum at the time, it was Druckenmiller who came up with the plan to short the pound. But when Druckenmiller went through his rationale with Soros, in one of their twice- or thrice-daily conversations, Soros told his protégé to be bolder: “I said, ‘Go for the jugular!’.” Druckenmiller duly raised their stake – Quantum and several related funds wagered nearly $10bn, according to interviews Soros gave afterwards – and Soros earned both a fortune and an international reputation.

    Druckenmiller, who spent 12 years at Quantum, says that conversation exemplifies Soros’s singular financial gift: “He’s extremely good at using the balance sheet – probably the best ever. He is able to use leverage when he likes it, but he is also able to walk away. He has no emotional attachment to a position. I think that is an unusual characteristic in our industry.”

    Chanos agrees: “One thing that I’ve both wrestled with and admired, that [Soros] conquered many years ago, is the ability to go from long to short, the ability to turn on a dime when confronted with the evidence. Emotionally, that is really hard.”

    Soros denies any great degree of emotional self-control. “That’s not true, that’s not true,” he told me, shaking his head and smiling. “I am very emotional. I am as moody as the market, so I’m basically a manic depressive personality.” (His market-linked moodiness extends to psychosomatic ailments, especially backaches, which he treats as valuable investment tips.)

    Instead, Soros attributes his effectiveness as an investor to his philosophical views about the contingent nature of human knowledge: “I think that my conceptual framework, which basically emphasises the importance of misconceptions, makes me extremely critical of my own decisions … I know that I am bound to be wrong, and therefore am more likely to correct my own mistakes.”

    Soros’s radar for revolution is the second key to his investing style. He looks for “game-changing moments, not incremental ones”, according to Sebastian Mallaby, the Washington Post columnist and author who is writing a history of hedge funds. As examples, Mallaby cites Quantum’s shorting of the pound and Soros’s 1985 “Plaza Accord” bet that the dollar would fall against the yen – his two most famous currency trades – as well as a lesser-known 1973 bet that, as a consequence of the Arab-Israeli war, defence stocks would soar. “It’s not that reflexivity tells you what to do, but it tells you to be on the look-out for turn-around situations,” Mallaby said. “It’s an attitude of mind.”

    Some Soros-watchers intimate that his vast network of international contacts might be an important source of his market prescience. But it was in the one part of the world where Soros really did have an inside track – the former Soviet bloc – that he made his most disastrous deal. In Russia, as in much of the former Soviet Union, he was intensely engaged with the country’s political and economic transformation. In June 1997, as the Kremlin struggled to pay overdue wages, Soros extended a bridge loan to the Russian government, acting as a one-man International Monetary Fund.

    He came to believe in Russia’s commitment to reforms, and to see himself as an insider – two convictions that were his financial undoing. He invested $980m with a consortium of oligarchs who acquired a 25 per cent stake in Svyazinvest, the national telecoms company, deciding to participate because “I thought that this is the transition from robber capitalism to legitimate capitalism”. But instead, the Svyazinvest privatisation turned out to be the moment when the oligarchs redirected their energies from fleecing the state to fleecing one another. Soros, as an outsider, was an obvious casualty. “Never have I been screwed so much since Russia. For them, they get a satisfaction out of doing it.

    “It was the biggest mistake of my investment career. I was deceived by my own hope.” In his most recent book he dismisses Russia with a single sentence, further diminished by parenthesis: “(I don’t discuss Russia, because I don’t want to invest there.)”

    . . .

    On a chilly Monday night in December, Soros took the hour-long drive from Manhattan to the Bruce Museum in Greenwich, Connecticut. He was due to speak at a benefit for the Scholar Rescue Fund, a programme he has partly financed and which, since 2002, has provided safe havens for 266 persecuted academics from 40 countries. After his talk (on the global financial crisis, of course), Soros filed out of the auditorium chatting with Stanley Bergman, a founding partner of the law firm that had sponsored the evening.

    “You like the game?” Soros asked his host with a smile.

    “Yes,” the white-haired Bergman replied.

    Then, in a flash of the competitive spirit that makes Soros an avid skier and player of tennis and chess, Soros asked: “And how old are you?”

    “75.”

    “I’m 78,” Soros replied. “But what’s the use of good health if it doesn’t buy you money?” The vigorous septuagenarians flashed each other a complicit smile.

    According to Wien, Soros likes the game, too: “George loves to be able to show from time to time that he can do it.” But while he loves to play, he is disdainful of a life lived purely to accumulate more chips. His epiphany came in 1981, when he had to scramble to raise money to pay for an investment in bonds. “I thought I would have a heart attack,” he told me. “And then I realised that to die just for the sake of getting rich, I would be a loser.”

    For Soros, the solution was philanthropy. “To do something really that would make a significant difference to the world, that would be worth dying for,” he said. “The Foundation enabled me to get out of myself and to somehow be concerned with other people than myself.” Soros’s fortune has given his causes enormous firepower: according to Aryeh Neier, the human rights activist who has been running the Open Society Foundation since 1993, its budget was $550m in 2008 and will increase to $600m this year. By his own calculation, Soros has donated a total of more than $5bn to his causes, primarily directing his giving through his foundation.

    “No philanthropist in the second half of the 20th century has done better in deploying resources strategically to change the world,” Larry Summers, the newly appointed head of Barack Obama’s National Economic Council, told me in a conversation early last autumn. Talbott compares Soros’s impact to that of a sovereign nation. In the 1990s, says Talbott, “when I got word that George Soros wanted to talk, I would drop everything and treat him pretty much like a visiting head of state. He was literally putting more money into some of the former colonies of the former Soviet empire than the US government, so that merited treating him as someone with a very high impact.”

    Soros’s philanthropic lieutenants report an approach remarkably similar to the investing style observed by his fund managers: he knows how to make big, original bets, and he isn’t afraid to cut his losses when a project isn’t working out. Anders Aslund, an economist who has studied Russia and Ukraine and who has worked with Soros on various projects, believes his philanthropic style “is very much formed by the money markets, which are always changing. He assumes any idea he has now will be wrong in a few years. He is always asking himself, when he has a wonderful project going, ‘When should I stop this project?’.”

    Soros’s war chest, and his determination to deploy it beyond the usual blue-chip charities of hospitals, universities, museums or even poverty in Africa, had long made him an occasionally controversial figure outside the US. He was among the western culprits accused by the Kremlin of inciting Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution; his foundation’s offices have been raided in Russia and he was forced to close them down in authoritarian Uzbekistan.

    America, it turns out, can also be sensitive to plutocrats using their wealth to address socially contentious subjects. In recent years, his foundation became more active in the US, taking on issues including drug policy. His engagement became more intense during the George W. Bush presidency, when Soros decided that the open society he had worked to foster in repressive regimes abroad was imperilled in his adopted home.

    Some admired his chutzpah. The famously independent-minded Paul Volcker, who was appointed to lead the Fed by Jimmy Carter and reappointed by Ronald Reagan, said: “The drug thing is a perfect example that he doesn’t adopt a conventional view. I think drug policy needs a new look and he’s been one of the people who say that.”

    Soros’s money has been crucial in enabling him to voice maverick views: “That’s what led me to oppose Bush very publicly, because I was in a position that I could afford to do it,” he said. But he also believes his fortune and the automatic credibility it gives him in America has drawn the fire of conservative pundits such as Fox’s Bill O’Reilly and extremist pamphleteer Lyndon LaRouche. “Given the excessive esteem in which people who make money are held in America, I had to be demonised,” he said.

    Their attacks worked. So much so that last year, as the Obama bandwagon gained speed and American financiers, along with much of the rest of the country, clamoured to jump on, his earliest heavyweight Wall Street backer kept a low profile. “Obama seeks to be a unifier,” Soros said. “And I have been a divisive figure because I’ve been demonised by the right. I thought my vocal support for him would not necessarily benefit him.”

    . . .

    At around 1.00am on November 5 2008, Soros sat on a peach-coloured sofa in his elegant Fifth Avenue apartment, with Queen Noor of Jordan to his left and Steve Clemons, of the New America think-tank, perched on the edge of a chair to his right. Around them milled a crowd of eclectic and jubilant guests, many still teary-eyed from Obama’s Grant Park victory speech, which had been broadcast on four flat-screen television sets in the apartment. Like most Soros soirées, the gathering included more artists and statesmen than Masters of the Universe: Michèle Pierre-Louis, the prime minister of Haiti and former head of her country’s Soros foundation; former World Bank chief James Wolfensohn; Volcker; and twentysomething Kwasi Asare, a hip-hop music promoter, were among the visitors.

    Soros drank an espresso and, a few minutes later, a final champagne toast with the last of his guests. Alexander, his 23-year-old son, perched on the arm of his chair and ruffled his father’s hair in farewell. Everyone else took that as a signal to depart, too. Soros was in a mellow, triumphant mood that night – and with good reason. He had spotted Obama early on. His ubiquitous political consigliere, Michael Vachon, still has among his papers a rumpled itinerary from a trip he and Soros took to Chicago in February 2004. In the upper right-hand corner of the page, Vachon had scrawled, “Barack guy”. The Senate candidate had been keen to meet Soros and called the pair repeatedly during their visit. But it was a packed schedule and Soros could only offer a 7.30am breakfast slot at the Four Seasons.

    Soros left that meal “very impressed”, a view that was confirmed when he read Obama’s autobiography and deemed him “a real person of substance”. A few months later, on June 7, Soros hosted a packed fundraiser for Obama’s Senate campaign at his upper east side home. Soros and his family contributed roughly $80,000, then the legal maximum.

    Obama was impressing a lot of people at that time. But once it became clear that Hillary Clinton would be in the presidential race, nearly all of the established New York Democrats, particularly the older Wall Street crowd, lined up behind their local Senator and her machine, driven by a combination of loyalty and calculation. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, now the head of the IMF and then a possible French presidential candidate, said Soros told him in 2006 he was supporting “this young guy, Barack Obama. He was the first one to tell me this and he was right.” On January 16 2007, the day Obama formed a presidential exploratory committee, Soros contributed to his campaign and officially offered his backing. Before doing so, Soros called Hillary Clinton to let her know. “I look forward to your support in the general election,” she told him.

    His decision to back Obama was consistent with his life-long affinity for moments of radical change. “I felt that America had gone so far off base that there was a need for discontinuity,” he said. As in the markets, Soros’s political bet on systemic transformation – his support for Obama, but also his early opposition to the war in Iraq and the “war on terror” – has come good.

    For Soros, one happy consequence of now being in tune with the zeitgeist is that he is being taken seriously as a thinker on American public policy issues, particularly to do with the financial crisis. When he, along with the other four highest-earning hedge fund managers, testified before Congress in November, he was treated with respect and even deference – not the prevailing attitude towards billionaire financiers at the moment. Before Soros had even taken his coat off, he was greeted in the corridors by Democratic New York Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney. “Give him a nice office,” she told a staffer who was looking for a place where Soros could wait before his testimony. “He creates a lot of jobs in my district and supports a lot of good people.” After the hearing, a lawmaker and a staffer both approached Soros and asked him to autograph their copies of his book.

    . . .

    Being listened to on Capitol Hill, and by global policymakers more generally, is important to Soros. But what matters to him most of all – more than money, more than the political and social accomplishments of his foundation – is leaving an enduring intellectual legacy. He describes reflexivity as “my main interest”. Even as Soros met with increasing financial and public success through his fund and his foundation, he was deeply frustrated by his failure to be accepted as a serious thinker. He titled one chapter in his latest book “Autobiography of a Failed Philosopher”, and once delivered a lecture at the University of Vienna called “A Failed Philosopher Tries Again”. As a young man, he wanted to become an academic, but “my grades were not good enough”.

    He writes that his first book, The Alchemy of Finance, was “dismissed by many critics as the self-indulgence of a successful speculator”. That reaction still prevails in some circles. Paul Krugman, the Nobel prize-winning economist, devotes half a chapter to Soros in his latest book, characterising him as “perhaps the most famous speculator of all times”. He also raises an eyebrow at Soros’s intellectual “ambitions”, tartly observing that he “would like the world to take his philosophical pronouncements as seriously as it takes his financial acumen”.

    Another barrier to academic respectability is Soros’s self-confessed “phobia” of formal mathematics: “I understand mathematical concepts but I’m afraid of mathematical symbols, because you can easily get lost in them.” That fear proved no impediment to success in the quantitative world of finance, but it has hurt Soros’s street cred in economics departments. “Among academics, he suffers from the additional liability of not expressing it in the language of mathematics that has become fashionable,” Joe Stiglitz, another Nobel prize-winning economist, said. But Stiglitz believes his friend’s writing has become more current, partly thanks to the financial crisis: “By those economists interested in ideas, I think his work is taken seriously as an idea that informs their thinking.”

    In the view of Larry Summers: “Reflexivity as an idea is right and important and closely related to various streams of existing thought in the social sciences. But no one has deployed a philosophical concept as effectively as George has, first to make money and then to change the world.”

    Paul Volcker delivered a similar verdict: “I think he has a valid insight which is not always expressed as clearly by him as I might like.” Overall, he said, Soros is “an imaginative and provocative thinker … he’s got some brilliant ideas about how markets function or dysfunction.”

    This is as close to mainstream intellectual acceptance as Soros has come in his two decades of writing and more than five decades since he gave up on academia. It feels like a breakthrough. When I asked him if he would still describe himself as a failed philosopher, he said no: “I think that I am actually succeeding as a philosopher.” For him, that is “obviously” the most important human accomplishment.

    “I think it has to do with the human condition,” he said. “The fact that we are mortal and we would like to be immortal. The closest thing you can come to that is by creating something that lives beyond you. Wealth could be one of those things, but evidence shows that it doesn’t survive too many generations. However, if you can have an artistic or philosophical or scientific creation that withstands the test of time, then you have come as close to it as possible.”

    Chrystia Freeland is the FT’s US managing editor

    Click here to read an extract from George Soros’s e-book update to The New Paradigm for Financial Markets – The credit crisis of 2008 and what it means

  • Is the Russian-Led Consortium Trying to Overcharge Turkey for Its First Nuclear Power Plant?

    Is the Russian-Led Consortium Trying to Overcharge Turkey for Its First Nuclear Power Plant?

    Is the Russian-Led Consortium Trying to Overcharge Turkey for Its First Nuclear Power Plant?

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 16
    January 26, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey is continuing to debate the construction of its first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, Mersin. After the tender was launched in March 2008, 13 foreign and local companies purchased documents. All but one, however, failed to submit an offer, because they did not have sufficient time to prepare the necessary documentation. The government did not respond to their call for extending the September 2008 deadline; and only one consortium, a joint venture of Russia’s state-run Atomstroyexport, Inter RAO, and the private Turkish company Park Teknik submitted a bid (EDM, October 10).

    Although many within the energy sector called for the cancellation of the tender, the AKP government went ahead with the plans. The sole bidder submitted its offer to the Turkish government; and, upon technical evaluation, the Turkish Atomic Energy Agency (TAEK) concluded in December that the proposal met the necessary criteria.

    On January 19 the Energy Ministry opened the sealed letter with the offer, which also included the price. This was the third and final stage of the tender process. Energy Minister Hilmi Guler announced that the consortium had offered a price of 21.16 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) for the electricity it would sell to Turkey. In the coming days, the state-run Turkish Electricity Trading and Contracting Company (TETAS) will evaluate the proposal and present a report to the cabinet for final approval (Dogan Haber Ajansi, January 19).

    Under the bid, the consortium would build “four units of the Russian VVER-1200 pressurized water reactors that generate 1,200 megawatts of electricity each.” The plant would produce around 4,800 megawatts of electricity per year. Since the Turkish government must commit itself to buying electricity from the company for 15 years, it would be paying $86.3 billion for 415.5 billion kWh during that period (Hurriyet Daily News, January 20).

    Turkey is considering the construction of nuclear plants as a source of clean and cheap energy and as a means for reducing energy dependency. By 2020 it seeks to produce 8 percent of its electricity from nuclear plants and increase that amount to 20 percent by 2030 (www.ntvmsnbc.com, January 20).

    The price of electricity is a crucial factor. Earlier, Turkish officials had said that they expected the consortium to make a reasonable offer. Some observers had predicted a price offer in the vicinity of 12 to 15 cents. Many observers found the price excessive, arguing that 21.16 cents per kWh was above market prices. Experts and representatives from the energy sector noted concerns about a price that was almost four times higher than the current rates in the Turkish market, which varied from 4 cents to 14 cents. Some described it as the world’s most expensive electricity generated at a nuclear plant, arguing that the world average was around 10 to 15 cents per kWh. Others noted that Turkey had cancelled another tender for the construction of a coal-fired power plant, because even the anticipated 14.7 per kWh had been found too expensive. Turkey also is investing extensively in natural gas power plants, which reportedly produce electricity for around 7 to 10 cents per kWh (Referans, January 20; Today’s Zaman, January 20).

    The chairman of the Electricity Producers Association, however, cautioned that although the price was high, it was also important to remember that this tender model was a first in the world. Under this model, the private sector was assuming all the risks for such a large-scale investment, which might account for why the offer turned out so high. A board member of the Chamber of Electrical Engineers, however, said that since there was no competition, the chamber deemed the tender illegal and incompatible with Turkey’s national interests (ANKA, January 20).

    The same day, the consortium submitted another letter with a revised price. Since the 21.16 cents was offered in September, the company said it wanted to adjust the price, reflecting changes in the world economy and energy costs (www.cnnturk.com, January 19). Guler avoided commenting on the amount but said that there was no obstacle to renegotiating the price. TETAS, however, concluded that the rules regulating the tender prohibited submission of revised
    , because a new price would in essence constitute a new offer. On a TV show the same night, Guler said that the revised letter had been rejected (Anadolu Ajansi, January 19).

    The Turkish press speculated that in its report to the cabinet, TETAS would probably suggest rejecting the consortium’s offer (Vatan, January 21). Responding to questions on this subject, Guler told reporters that the tender process was proceeding well, and a cancellation was not on the agenda (Anadolu Ajansi, January 23).

    The government is keen on building nuclear power plants to diversify Turkey’s energy sources, and plans for the construction of two more plants are also underway. For obvious reasons, environmentalist groups have opposed Turkey’s nuclear energy projects since the beginning. Even the representatives of the energy sector continue to question the government’s policy on nuclear energy, in particular its hasty approach. Moreover, as Turkey is seeking to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, which accounts for 35 percent of Turkey’s electricity production, it would be ironic to award the tender to a Russian company. The government’s disregard of the global financial crisis and insistence on proceeding with these costly projects is also a cause of concern (Today’s Zaman, January 20).

    Guler continuously emphasizes that although Turkey is looking to increase its use of hydroelectric and renewable energy sources, it does not have the luxury to ignore nuclear energy. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether the government will be able to realize Turkey’s nuclear energy ambitions, which have been thwarted for decades. As things stand, most observers see little chance that the cabinet will approve the Russian offer for the Akkuyu plant. In the unlikely event that the cabinet does endorse the Russian offer, Turkey will most probably bargain to decrease the price before it signs the final agreement.

    The government, however, might have learned some lessons from its handling of the project so far. Preparations are reportedly under way to streamline the nuclear energy policy. As a first step, it would push for revising the Nuclear Tender Law. Since the current law prevents opening a second tender, allowing flexibility on that score would be the first rule to change. Also, the current competition model, which discourages many possible contenders from participating, is likely to be amended. Instead of a free market model of private companies undertaking construction, a model based on greater public involvement is likely to be considered (www.ntvmsnbc.com, January 21).

    https://jamestown.org/program/is-the-russian-led-consortium-trying-to-overcharge-turkey-for-its-first-nuclear-power-plant/