Category: Eastern Europe

Nabucco Hucksterism, Iran Pollyanishness, and a $5 Billion Bribe. The Oil and Glory Interview: Steven Mann

A Blog on Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus

Saturday, April 11, 2009

On Thursday, a ceremony in the State Department will mark the retirement of Steven Mann, Coordinator for Eurasian Energy Diplomacy, after 32 years with the U.S. diplomatic service. The 58-year-old Mann served most of the last 17 years in senior positions in the Caucasus and Central Asia: He opened the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan in 1992, was ambassador to Turkmenistan, and tried to negotiate a deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh. For the last several years, Mann was America’s man on the spot in the New Great Game on the Caspian Sea.

I visited Mann at his Chevy Chase home. Amid stacked up magazines and books, Mann told me that Europe’s “energy security” is not necessarily at peril. And, for O&G readers, he broke one bit of historical news: Remember the demise of the trans-Caspian pipeline in the chapter An Army for Oil? The one in which then-Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov persisted in demanding a $500 million bribe of the Bechtel-General Electric consortium? It turns out that Niyazov originally requested $5 billion. The edited interview:

Q – Does the U.S. need a high-level ambassador on Eurasian energy? And what is your advice going forward?

A – Yes it is helpful. But we also have to get away from Nabucco hucksterism.

Q – What is that?

A – In terms of the wrong lessons learned from [the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline], the wrong lesson learned is to adopt a project and attempt to bring it about through political will. I think so much of the governmental activism on both sides of the Atlantic the last few years has been devoid of a commercial context. There have been quite a number of officials who know very little about energy who have been charging into the pipeline debate. Nabucco is a highly desirable project, don’t get me wrong. But there are other highly desirable projects besides Nabucco. And the overriding question for all these projects is, Where’s the gas?

Q – South Stream was Putin’s response to Nabucco. Did the U.S. blunder by promoting Nabucco before having the commercial context?

A – In terms of whether we are talking EU or US diplomacy, I think you have to be credible. All too often we’ve gotten out ahead of the commercial realities of Nabucco. You have to be able to point to an upstream supply. You have to have a commercial champion. And governments don’t build successful pipelines. Consortia do. The object of any envoy should be to get all those stars aligned before you give the full embrace to any project.

I think Secretary Clinton will bring a more unified focus to the U.S. effort. In the previous administration, we had six special envoys on energy in the State Department, and three deputy national security advisers on the [National Security Council] staff.

Q – Is that too many?

A – It’s four too many in State. And three too many at NSC.

Q – The stated reason for Nabucco is to diversify Europe’s energy supply. Is that a valid enough reason for U.S. involvement? And is European energy security a genuine issue?

A – Anyone who makes that argument knows very little about energy. And I often heard those arguments in the White House Situation Room. Diversification is an objective good. But it can be achieved in ways other than pipelines. The best thing Europe could do for its security is to link its energy grid, which it’s already doing.

Q – Is there alarmism on the subject?

A – The January cutoff of gas through Ukraine only affected 2-3% of European consumers.

Q – So it is overplayed.

A – Yea, I think it was overplayed. What also was underplayed was how successful the Europeans were in shifting gas, linking grids. That’s the untold story of [the January cutoff].

Q – The corollary – that Russian domination of supply equals a political threat in Europe – is that also alarmist?

A – With the EU, I think it’s hard to make that case. That’s the kind of argument that has to be dissected on a country-by-country basis. But Gazprom has been an extremely reliable supplier for 25 years. And I think Gazprom will continue to be an extremely reliable supplier to Europe.

Q – So really one should not be vexed if and when Nord Stream and South Stream are built? And if it takes some time for the ducks to be lined in a row for Nabucco, so be it?

A – Basically, yes. I think Nabucco is far more important to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan than it is to the EU.

Q – In the late 1990s, there was the initial effort by Bechtel and GE Capital to build a trans-Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan to Baku.

A – What happened was that Niyazov, with his Soviet mentality, demanded so-called preliminary financing. That is, an upfront payment to do the project. [The consortium] already paid a signing bonus of $10 million. But then Niyazov demanded in the range of $5 billion. Then it came down to $3 billion. And the consortium said, ‘This is utterly unrealistic.’ Niyazov thought they were bargaining. So he dropped the demand to $1 billion; then it came down to $500 million. The consortium said, You have until March 2000 or we walk. And at that time, they walked.

The fundamental problem, and it’s relevant today, is that a foreign investor cannot rely on a governmental entity [in Turkmenistan] to supply the upstream, to supply the product.

Q – Was it ever realistic that Niyazov was going to hook up with the East-West Corridor?

A – It was and it is realistic. Without alternatives to the Gazprom monopoly, Turkmenistan has to accept the price that Gazprom is willing to pay. There is a powerful commercial logic to a trans-Caspian pipeline.

Q – What is the best way today for a Caspian republic to get along in the region?

A – Kazakhstan is a good model of how to develop a Eurasian energy sector. You’re good partners with Russia, but you take advantage of foreign technology and capital.

Q – Does Russia have a role in helping to create a thaw between the U.S. and Iran?

A – Every time there is a substantial political change in the U.S., the oil and gas industry gets up on its tip-toes and says, ‘Aren’t we about to have a change in policy?’ You saw this with the Bush-Cheney election in 2000; the industry thought now was the time it would happen. You saw it after the [2001] invasion of Afghanistan, with certain cooperation and contact between the U.S. and Iran. You’re seeing it now with the advent of the Obama administration. So this is something that the oil and gas industry is always waiting for – that change.

Q – You are saying that this is nothing new.

A – It is nothing new.

Labels: Azerbaijan, Caspian, Kazakhstan, Nabucco, nord stream, oil, south stream

http://oilandglory.com/

April 14, 2009
Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders

Europe Report N°199
14 April 2009

To access the media release of this report in Turkish, please click here.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Turkey and Armenia are close to settling a dispute that has long roiled Caucasus politics, isolated Armenia and cast a shadow over Turkey’s European Union (EU) ambition. For a decade and a half, relations have been poisoned by disagreement about issues including how to address a common past and compensate for crimes, territorial disputes, distrust bred in Soviet times and Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani land. But recently, progressively intense official engagement, civil society interaction and public opinion change have transformed the relationship, bringing both sides to the brink of an historic agreement to open borders, establish diplomatic ties and begin joint work on reconciliation. They should seize this opportunity to normalise. The politicised debate whether to recognise as genocide the destruction of much of the Ottoman Armenian population and the stalemated Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh should not halt momentum. The U.S., EU, Russia and others should maintain support for reconciliation and avoid harming it with statements about history at a critical and promising time.

Turks’ and Armenians’ once uncompromising, bipolar views of history are significantly converging, showing that the deep traumas can be healed. Most importantly, the advance in bilateral relations demonstrates that a desire for reconciliation can overcome old enmities and closed borders. Given the heritage and culture shared by Armenians and Turks, there is every reason to hope that normalisation of relations between the two countries can be achieved and sustained.

Internal divisions persist on both sides. Armenia does not make normalisation conditional on Turkey’s formal recognition as genocide of the 1915 forced relocation and massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire. But it must take into account the views of Armenians scattered throughout the global diaspora, which is twice as large as the population of Armenia itself and has long had hardline representatives. New trends in that diaspora, however, have softened and to some degree removed demands that Turkey surrender territory in its north east, where Armenians were a substantial minority before 1915.

Over the past decade, Turkey has moved far from its former blanket denial of any Ottoman wrongdoing. Important parts of the ruling AK Party, bureaucracy, business communities on the Armenian border and liberal elite in western cities support normalisation with Armenia and some expression of contritition. Traditional hardliners, including Turkic nationalists and part of the security services, oppose compromise, especially as international genocide recognition continues and in the absence of Armenian troop withdrawals from substantial areas they occupy of Turkey’s ally, Azerbaijan. These divisions surfaced in events surrounding the assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007. That the new tendencies are gaining ground, however, was shown by the extraordinary outpouring of solidarity with Armenians during the Dink funeral in Istanbul and a campaign by Turkish intellectuals to apologise to Armenians for the “Great Catastrophe” of 1915.

The unresolved Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh still risks undermining full adoption and implementation of the potential package deal between Turkey and Armenia on recognition, borders and establishment of bilateral commissions to deal with multiple issues, including the historical dimension of their relations. Azerbaijan has strong links to Turkey based on energy cooperation and the Turkic countries’ shared linguistic and cultural origins. Ethnic Armenian forces’ rapid advance into Azerbaijan in 1993 scuttled plans to open diplomatic ties and caused Turkey to close the railway line that was then the only transport link between the two countries. For years, Turkey conditioned any improvement in bilateral relations on Armenian troop withdrawals. Baku threatens that if this condition is lifted, it will restrict Turkey’s participation in the expansion of Azerbaijani energy exports. While Azerbaijani attitudes remain a constraint, significant elements in Turkey agree it is time for a new approach. Bilateral détente with Armenia ultimately could help Baku recover territory better than the current stalemate.

Outside powers have important interests and roles. The U.S. has long fostered Armenia-Turkey reconciliation, seeking thereby to consolidate the independence of all three former Soviet republics in the south Caucasus and to support east-west transit corridors and energy pipelines from the Caspian Sea. Washington was notable in its backing of efforts that kick-started civil society dialogue between Turkey and Armenia. The Obama administration is working hard at repairing the damage done to U.S. relations with Turkey by the war in Iraq. Although Obama repeatedly promised on the campaign trail to formally recognise the 1915 forced relocation and massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as genocide, he should continue to steer the prudent middle course he has adopted as president. The U.S. Congress, which has a draft resolution before it, should do the same. At this sensitive moment of Turkish-Armenian convergence, statements that focus on the genocide term, either to deny or recognise it, would either enrage Armenians or unleash a nationalist Turkish reaction that would damage U.S.-Turkish ties and set back Turkey-Armenia reconciliation for years.

U.S. support for Turkey-Armenia reconciliation appears to be mirrored in Moscow. Russian companies have acquired many of Armenia’s railways, pipelines and energy utilities and seek to develop them; Russian-Turkish relations are good; and Moscow is looking for ways to mitigate the regional strains produced by its war with Georgia in August 2008. If sustained, the coincidence of U.S.-Russian interests would offer a hopeful sign for greater security and prosperity in the South Caucasus after years of division and conflict. All sides – chiefly Armenia and Turkey but potentially Azerbaijan as well – will gain in economic strength and national security if borders are opened and trade normalised.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Turkey:

1. Agree, ratify and implement a normalisation package including the opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic relations and bilateral commissions; continue to prepare public opinion for reconciliation; cultivate a pro-settlement constituency among Armenians; and avoid threatening or penalising Armenia for outside factors like resolutions or statements in third countries recognising a genocide.

2. Avoid sacrificing implementation of the normalisation package to demands for immediate resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and withdrawal of Armenian troops from occupied territories in Azerbaijan; and seek opportunities to show Baku that by easing Yerevan’s fears of encirclement, normalised Turkey-Armenia relations may ultimately speed up such an Armenian withdrawal.

3. Make goodwill towards Armenia clear through gestures such as joint work on preserving the ancient ruins of Ani, stating explicitly that Turkey will recognise and protect Armenian historical and religious heritage throughout the country.

4. Encourage universities and institutes to pursue broader research on matters pertaining to the events of 1915, preferably with the engagement of Armenian and third-party scholars; modernise history books and remove all prejudice from them; and increase funding for cataloguing and management of the Ottoman-era archives.

To the Government of Armenia:

5. Agree, ratify, and implement a normalisation package including the opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic relations and bilateral commissions; continue to prepare public opinion for reconciliation; and avoid statements or international actions relating to genocide recognition that could inflame Turkish public opinion against the current process.

6. Agree together with Azerbaijan to the OSCE Minsk Group basic principles on a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement; then start withdrawals from Armenian-occupied territories in Azerbaijan; and pursue peace with Azerbaijan in full consciousness that only in this way can normalisation with Turkey be consolidated.

7. Make clear that Armenia has no territorial claim on Turkey by explicitly recognising its territorial integrity within the borders laid out in the 1921 Treaty of Kars.

8. Encourage universities and institutes to pursue more research on matters relating to the events of 1915, preferably with the engagement of Turkish and third-party scholars; modernise history books and remove all prejudice from them; and organise the cataloguing of known Armenian archives pertaining to the events in and around 1915 wherever they may be located.

To the United States, Russia and the European Union and its Member States:

9. Avoid legislation, statements and actions that might inflame public opinion on either side and so could upset the momentum towards Turkey-Armenia normalisation and reconciliation.

10. Raise the seniority and intensify the engagement of the U.S., Russian and French co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group until Armenia and Azerbaijan reach final agreement on Minsk Group basic principles for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

11. Back up Turkey-Armenia reconciliation with projects to encourage region-wide interaction, heritage preservation and confidence building; and support as requested any new bilateral historical commission or sub-commission, development of archive management and independent Turkish- or Armenian-led scholarly endeavours to research into aspects of the 1915 events.

Istanbul/Yerevan/Baku/Brussels, 14 April 2009

April 14, 2009
Nabucco as a Chess Game: Azerbaijan’s Next Move

On March 27, 2009, a memorandum was signed between the Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR and Russia’s Gazprom. This memorandum includes a statement of deliveries, beginning in January 2010, of Azerbaijani natural gas to Russia on the boundary conditions, DAF Azerbaijan / Russia. In the near future the Baku – Novo Filya pipeline, part of the transmission system of Azerbaijan, which runs from Baku to the Russian border on the Caspian coast, will be inspected. The length of the pipeline is about 200 km; the diameter of the pipe is the same 1220 mm.

On March 27, 2009, a memorandum was signed between the Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR and Russia’s Gazprom. This memorandum includes a statement of deliveries, beginning in January 2010, of Azerbaijani natural gas to Russia on the boundary conditions, DAF Azerbaijan / Russia. In the near future the Baku – Novo Filya pipeline, part of the transmission system of Azerbaijan, which runs from Baku to the Russian border on the Caspian coast, will be inspected. The length of the pipeline is about 200 km; the diameter of the pipe is the same 1220 mm.

This agreement is important because for the first time since its independence Azerbaijan, which imported gas from Russia, has become an exporter to this country. The signing of this memorandum has led to a number of preconditions, which are the causes of events occurring in the region. The first is to note that Gazprom was particularly interested in signing such an agreement with Azerbaijan. This serves several reasons. The first reason is that in the past few years, production of natural gas in Russia has been decreased. Preferring not to invest large amounts of capital in the development of natural gas, Gazprom to date has preferred to operate with the Soviet Union deposits, although these deposits have begun to dry up over time. However, a treaty signed with European suppliers obliges Russia to search for additional volumes of gas. Therefore, first of all Russia has guaranteed the supply of gas from Central Asia, significantly increasing the price for it. Russia also extended the proposal to Azerbaijan, which opened the large Shahdeniz gas field in the late 90s.

Russia’s second reason lies in the problems of gas supplies to southern Russia. Thus, one could guarantee the stable supply in the North Caucasus republics. But the main reason is the desire of Russia to concentrate the supply of natural gas from former Soviet republics on its territory. Actually, Azerbaijan is the only state that could supply gas to the planned Nabucco pipeline. Proposed by the EU, this pipeline would transport natural gas from Azerbaijan and the Central Asia states through Turkey to south-eastern Europe. In reality, gas may come only from Azerbaijan.

Russia has proposed an alternative to Nabucco project, South Stream, which is also in need of Azerbaijani gas. In this case, Russia tries to prevent the realization of Nabucco.

With regard to Azerbaijan, it is the first time, after gaining its independence, that it shifted its energy exports from west to the north. There were several reasons for this.

The primary reason was the passive attitude of Western partners in the implementation of the project. Lack of coordination and understanding in the sphere of energy between the members countries of the EU led to the fact that this organization could not determine the strategy for the implementation of Nabucco. Paradoxically, the EU and its members are waiting for more concrete steps from potential exporters, hoping thereby to strengthen the project. However, Azerbaijan does not have a desire to pursue their own policies without the support of the West, and thereby worsen relations with Russia. This fact was especially true after the 5-day war in Georgia. Despite the fact that the political regime in Georgia came to power with broad support from the West, these countries did not provide the support it expected to receive. Azerbaijan also has the problem of separatism. In this case, in the interest of Azerbaijan is not to commit acts that could provoke Russia.

Another reason for signing the memorandum with Russia lies in the position of Turkey. Turkey is trying to address not only the transit of Azerbaijani gas through Nabucco, but also wants to become the seller. In particular, Turkey wants to purchase natural gas at the border with Azerbaijan and resell it to Western consumers at a several-fold price increase. This situation would not benefit Azerbaijan. In addition to that, Russia’s proposal to buy Azerbaijani gas is commercially much more attractive. Azerbaijan profits more from selling gas in Russia than Turkey.

In addition, between Turkey and Azerbaijan, disagreements arose about the intentions of Turkey to open its border with Armenia. This border has been closed since 1993, after Armenian troops occupied the Azeri region of Kelbedzhar. Recently, however, the government of Turkey has decided to develop relations with Armenia, and the first step was the visit of President Gul to Armenia’s capital Yerevan to watch a soccer qualifying match between the two national teams. The next step in the development of relations is to be the opening of borders between the two countries in mid-April. It should be noted that the prior condition for the opening of the border was the unconditional release of Armenian-occupied Azerbaijani territories.

This decision has received a sharp reaction in Azerbaijan. Public opinion in the country reacted negatively to the intentions of Turkey, which severely condemned the possible turn of events. Another reaction to the Turkish intention can be described with the signing of a contract between SOCAR and Gazprom. The President of SOCAR, Rovnaq Abdullayev, is also the president of the Football Federation of Azerbaijan. He arrived in Moscow on the eve of the qualifying soccer match between Azerbaijan and Russia. The signed contract has become a kind of symbolic response to Gul’s «football diplomacy» in Yerevan.

It should be noted that the signed memorandum negotiates gas exports to Russia for 2010. In this case, there is a certain amount of time to solve the problems of the realization of Nabucco, as the second phase of gas production at Shahdeniz has not yet begun. However, if there will be no concrete steps to implement Nabucco, gas for this pipeline could go in a northerly direction.

Rovshan İbrahimov

International Research Club – www.interesclub.org

April 13, 2009
Kazan Tatars, Muslims and Shamans Present Three New Challenges to Moscow

Paul Goble

Vienna, April 10 – Three very different actions by the Kazan Tatars, a major Muslim Spiritual Directorate, and the shamans of the Russian Federation both reflect the unintended consequences of Moscow’s approach to ethnic and religious issues and present new challenges to the Russian government that it may find difficult to dismiss out of hand.
First of all, having secured Moscow’s agreement to declare Kazan “the third capital” of Russia, some Kazan Tatars are now seeking to have the central government declare their language “the second state language of Russia” because the Tatars are the second largest language community there and serve as Russia’s bridge to other Turkic-speaking peoples.
The World Forum of Tatar Youth, which has organized this effort and put up a special website (uzebez.org/) to press its case, seeks more than just recognition. It hopes to use this campaign to reverse recent cutbacks in Tatar language use outside of Tatarstan because unlike other nations in Russia, most Kazan Tatars live beyond their republic’s current borders.
And to that end, the group plans an online petition campaign, something that will both raise national awareness among young Tatars (another goal of the group) and challenge Moscow’s policy under Putin and Medvedev of cutting back the national component of education in many areas (mariuver.wordpress.com/2009/04/09/tatar-2-gosjazyk/#more-7442).
Second, the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of the European Part of Russia has pub two books by Said Nursi on its list of “approved Islamic literature,” even though these and other works of the Islamic writer have been declared “extremist” by Russian courts and are included in the Federal List of Extremist Materials (www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=29686).
On the one hand, this action by the MSD reflects a widespread view among many Muslim leaders that Russian courts lack the expertise to decide who is “extremist” among Muslims. And on the other, the timing of this action appears to be a protest against the composition of the new justice ministry group that is supposed to provide such testimony.
However that may be, at least some Muslims close to the Russian government, including Mufti Mukhammedgali Khuzin, who is himself a member of that new justice ministry group, say that the MSD’s actions represents “a challenge to the leadership of the country” (www.interfax-religion.ru/print.php?act=news&id=29689).
Such “a demonstrative approval of materials which form the ideological foundation of the Nurjilar organization, which the Supreme Court recognized last year as extremist, is an unconcealed challenge and may be considered as spitting in the face of the Russian powers that be,” Khuzin told Interfax.
At the very least, this decision of the MSD for the European Part of Russia, especially given the prominence of that group within the Union of Muftis of Russia and its authority among many Muslims as a traditional rather than radical forum, will spark new tensions between the government and Muslim leaders, at a time when Moscow would like to avoid them.
And third, there is another emerging challenge, although it may seem extraordinarily distant from Russia’s corridors of power. The shamans of Russia have announced plans to hold the “first popular elections of the Supreme Shaman of Russia,” thus creating a leader who could speak for them in Moscow (www.shamanstvo.ru/choice.htm).
In recent months, shamans in Siberia and the Far East have been among the leaders of protests against the destruction of the environment by Russian officials and Russian firms, and with a popularly elected leader, they are likely to demand that they should be represented in Russia’s Inter-Religious Council as one of the country’s “traditional” religions.
Patriarch Kirill, who in his earlier incarnation as the head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s External Affairs Department took the lead in organizing that group and using the term “traditional” to embrace only Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism, will thus face a new test, especially since many in Russia see shamanism as part of their heritage.
But Moscow is unlikely to make a concession on this point because many would see the addition of yet another “traditional” religion as opening the way for the inclusion of other groups, including Catholics and Protestants, and that could destroy precisely the exclusionary, religious “power vertical” in which both Kirill and the Kremlin have invested so much.

http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2009/04/window-on-eurasia-kazan-tatars-muslims.html

April 11, 2009
Are Turkey And Armenia About To Normalize Relations?

In September, Turkish President Abdullah Gul (left) accepted Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian’s invitation to attend a soccer match between their countries.

April 02, 2009

There are increasing hints that Turkey and Armenia could soon announce a deal reopening their border — which has been closed since 1993 — and restoring diplomatic relations.

Regional analyst Richard Giragosian, director of the Yerevan-based Armenian Center for National and International Studies, discusses the possibilities of such a deal with RFE/RL correspondent Charles Recknagel.

RFE/RL: You are one of an increasing number of regional analysts who see a forthcoming accord between Ankara and Yerevan. Why is that?

Richard Giragosian: We see broader developments that have moved both parties, Armenia and Turkey, much closer to forging a historic agreement. These broader trends include not only Russian support for such an initiative but we also see [that] the upcoming visit of U.S. President [Barack] Obama to Turkey [on April 6-7], the recent visit of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Turkey, and several months of secret negotiations and diplomatic negotiations between the Armenians and Turks in Switzerland have paved the way for a historic breakthrough agreement.

RFE/RL: There are some additional variables to consider that might increase pressure to reach agreement, including Obama’s campaign promise to support a Congressional resolution that would recognize as genocide the killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in the period of World War I, and the upcoming Armenian Remembrance Day on April 24, which the White House traditionally marks with a statement. How soon do you think a Turkish-Armenian accord might be announced?

Giragosian: We see leaks of such a deal in the Turkish media and it seems both sides are now preparing their respective societies to brace for an announcement that possibly could come as early as April 16, when the Turkish foreign minister arrives in Armenia in the form of a meeting of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization.

However, I do not expect a breakthrough agreement to be unveiled during the April 16 meeting. It seems more likely that Turkey will decide to wait until after April 24 in order to exert maximum leverage over the Obama administration to refrain from recognizing the “Armenian Genocide” in his April 24 statement.

Thawing Relations

RFE/RL: If there is an announcement of an accord, what points might it include?

Giragosian: Several elements will be announced, starting with an agreement to open the long-closed border between Armenia and Turkey, followed by an agreement to move toward diplomatic relations, with the Turkish ambassador in Georgia most likely assuming the portfolio of representing Turkey in Armenia.

Third, we see an agreement as well to form a large, all-encompassing governmental commission to resolve several issues, most importantly including the “Armenian Genocide” issue. And fourthly, we do see signs of a possible Turkish unveiling of a new document or road map on Nagorno-Karabakh committing all sides to work within the OSCE Minsk Group mediation process and committing all sides to working hard to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which is the last frozen conflict in the region.

RFE/RL: How much opposition is there in Turkey and Armenia to an accord?

Giragosian: Once the agreement is announced publicly, this will invite confrontation with powerful vested interests. On the Turkish side, the vested interests which will oppose this will perhaps be a nationalist reaction against normalization. From the Armenian side, the Armenian government will have to deal with the Armenian diaspora, which has taken the lead role in terms of Armenian nationalism on this issue and the lead role in genocide-recognition efforts.

All Sides In Favor

RFE/RL: You are in Yerevan. What is motivating the Armenian government to pursue an accord at this time?

Giragosian: The timing is both ironic and inductive to normalization and an agreement, mainly because it is this Armenian government that is much less popular and much less legitimate than any previous Armenian government, making its desire for a foreign-policy success even more profound.

The Armenian government, embattled by a political internal stalemate, needs a foreign-policy success to distract international attention and divert it away from domestic shortcomings and also to endow it with a degree of legitimacy, which it lacks.

RFE/RL: And what about the Turkish side?

Giragosian: We also see, for the first time, that it is in Turkey’s national security interest to open the border, to stabilize the restive Kurdish regions of eastern Turkey, which, after the war in Iraq, is even a larger concern for Turkey.

RFE/RL: Finally, what is Russia’s position on a Turkish-Armenian accord? In the past, Moscow — which has strong ties with Yerevan — has been seen as against it. Has that changed?

Giragosian: The key difference here is that after the war in August [in South Ossetia between Russia and Georgia], the Russians are now supporting the process, unlike in the past, and in fact they are also looking to use open borders between Armenia and Turkey to their own economic benefit by virtue of their control over energy and telecommunications in Armenia, but also to further isolate and marginalize Georgia, which is in their strategic interest.

But despite the negative agenda I do think that, regardless of the motivations, that the end result is a net benefit for all sides.

https://www.rferl.org/a/Are_Turkey_And_Armenia_About_To_Normalize_Relations/1600894.html

April 2, 2009
Crimean Tatars Demonstrate On Land Issue

March 30, 2009

SIMFEROPOL, Ukraine — About two thousand Crimean Tatar activists demonstrated in front of the building of Crimea’s Council of Ministers, demanding that the government take concrete steps to provide land for Tatar repatriates, RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service reports.

A leader of the Crimean Tatar community, Daniyal Ametov, told journalists that future protests will be held in the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv.

Ametov said the government of Ukraine has not implemented all the chapters of the presidential decree on creating a commission to solve the land issue for the Crimean Tatar repatriates.

The Crimean Tatars were deported to Central Asia by the regime of Josef Stalin in the 1940s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, they returned to the Crimean peninsula, where about 265,000 of them now live. Some 10,000 Crimean Tatars are struggling to acquire land to live on.

https://www.rferl.org/a/Crimean_Tatars_Demonstrate_On_Land_Issue/1564654.html

March 31, 2009