Category: Eastern Europe

  • Turkey and Russia Conclude Energy Deals

    Turkey and Russia Conclude Energy Deals

    a1Published: August 6, 2009

    ISTANBUL — Russia and Turkey concluded energy agreements on Thursday that will support Turkey’s drive to become a regional hub for fuel transshipments while helping Moscow maintain its monopoly on natural gas shipments from Asia to Europe.

    Turkey granted the Russian natural gas giant Gazprom use of its territorial waters in the Black Sea, under which the company wants to route its so-called South Stream pipeline to gas markets in Eastern and Southern Europe.

    In return, a Russian oil pipeline operator agreed to join a consortium to build a pipeline across the Anatolian Peninsula, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and Gazprom affirmed a commitment to expand an existing Black Sea gas pipeline for possible transshipment across Turkey to Cyprus or Israel.

    Energy companies in both countries agreed to a joint venture to build conventional electric power plants, and the Interfax news agency in Russia reported that Prime MinisterVladimir V. Putin offered to reopen talks on Russian assistance to Turkey in building nuclear power reactors.

    The agreements were signed in Ankara, the Turkish capital, in meetings between Mr. Putin and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Italy’s prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, who has joined Mr. Putin on several energy projects, attended the ceremony. The Italian company Eni broke ground on the trans-Anatolian oil pipeline this year.

    While the offer of specific pipeline deals and nuclear cooperation represented a new tactic by Mr. Putin, the wider struggle for dominance of the Eurasian pipelines is a long-running chess match in which he has often excelled.

    As he has in the past, Mr. Putin traveled to Turkey with his basket of tempting strategic and economic benefits immediately after a similar mission by his opponents. A month ago, European governments signed an agreement in Turkey to support the Western-backed Nabucco pipeline, which would compete directly with the South Stream project.

    By skirting Russian territory, the Nabucco pipeline would undercut Moscow’s monopoly on European natural gas shipments and the pricing power and political clout that come with it. That may explain why Nabucco, which cannot go forward without Turkey’s support, has encountered a variety of obstacles thrown up by the Russian government, including efforts to deny it vital gas supplies in the East and a customer base in the West.

    Turkey and other countries in the path of Nabucco have been eager players in this geopolitical drama, entertaining offers from both sides. Turkish authorities have even tried, without much success, to leverage the pipeline negotiations to further Turkey’s bid to join the European Union, while keeping options with Russia open, too.

    “These countries are more than happy to sign agreements with both parties,” Ana Jelenkovic, an analyst at Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy, said in a telephone interview from London. “There’s no political benefit to shutting out or ceasing energy relations with Russia.”

    Under the deal Mr. Putin obtained Thursday, Gazprom will be allowed to proceed with seismic and environmental tests in Turkey’s exclusive economic zone, necessary preliminary steps for laying the South Stream pipe, Prime Minister Erdogan said at a news conference.

    After the meeting, Mr. Putin said, “We agreed on every issue.”

    The trans-Anatolian oil pipeline also marginally improves Russia’s position in the region. The pipeline is one of two so-called Bosporus bypass systems circumventing the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, which are operating at capacity in tanker traffic.

    The preferred Western route is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which allows companies to ship Caspian Basin crude oil to the West without crossing Russian territory; the pipeline instead crosses the former Soviet republic of Georgia and avoids the crowded straits by cutting across Turkey to the Mediterranean.

    Russia prefers northbound pipelines out of the Caspian region that terminate at tanker terminals on the Black Sea. The success of this plan depends, in turn, on creating additional capacity in the Bosporus bypass routes. Russia is backing two such pipelines.

    Mr. Putin’s offer to move ahead with a Russian-built nuclear power plant in Turkey suggests a sweetening of the overall Russian offer on energy deals with Turkey, while both Western and Russian proposals are on the table.

    The nuclear aspect of the deal drew protests. About a dozen Greenpeace protesters were surrounded by at least 200 armored police officers in central Ankara on Thursday.

    Andrew E. Kramer contributed reporting from Moscow.

    The New York Times
  • Moscow Market Crackdown Strains Turkish-Russian Trade Relations

    Moscow Market Crackdown Strains Turkish-Russian Trade Relations

    Moscow Market Crackdown Strains Turkish-Russian Trade Relations

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 144
    July 28, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    As Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin prepares to visit Turkey in early August, new items are being added to his agenda. In addition to energy projects, bilateral trade issues, caused by recent problems encountered by Turkish exporters, will occupy a large part of his itinerary. The Russian government’s crackdown on the Cherkizovsky market in Moscow in early June added a new dimension to Turkish-Russian trade issues.

    Russian anti-smuggling teams raided the Cherkizovsky market, confiscating thousands of containers for further examination, and shut it down. The charges against the traders included violations of consumer safety and sanitation codes as well as immigration rules. The incident cost countless jobs, many of whom are foreigners including Chinese, Vietnamese and Turkish traders, and created tension between Russia and China where most of the goods originated (www.russiatoday.ru, June 29; Anadolu Ajansi, July 1).

    Why the Russian government decided to close the Cherkizovsky market, after allowing it to flourish for twenty years, remains unclear. Prior to the crackdown on the market, Putin complained about the failure of the anti-smuggling mechanism, and signaled his readiness to strengthen the fight against smuggling (Cihan, June 29).

    The Turkish press speculated that Putin used these allegations as a pretext to punish the owner of the market, the business mogul Telman Ismailov, for his recent investments in Turkey. In May, Ismailov opened a luxurious hotel in the Turkish city of Antalya, a frequent destination for Russian tourists, which is estimated to yield $1.4 billion annually for the local economy. Putin was reportedly angered by the lavish opening party in the context of the global financial crisis. Moreover, the Turkish press suggested that Ismailov’s decision to invest in Antalya was in defiance of Russian authorities’ advice to open the hotel in Sochi, which had further upset Putin (Radikal, June 10; Yeni Safak, July 13).

    In an interview to the Turkish press, Ismailov even expressed his desire to obtain Turkish citizenship (Yeni Safak, May 25), which also negatively affected his reputation in Russia. He did not officially file an application, but changes to the Turkish citizenship code around the same time eased the conditions for citizenship on exceptional grounds, such as for foreigners investing in Turkey (Hurriyet, June 11).

    However, the Turkish press initially preferred to present the market crackdown as a measure against Ismailov, downplaying the broader context of the developments in Russia. Last week, its coverage of the crisis took a new turn. Several reports highlighted the “plight” of Turkish businessmen who were affected in the midst of this crisis caused by Russia’s internal competition. Hundreds of Turkish firms are believed to sell textile, leather and other goods, by registering them and paying the necessary fees at this market first, before they are further distributed within Russia. Turkish businessmen claimed that, due to the ongoing Russian anti-smuggling investigation, they cannot retrieve their goods from storage facilities. Many criticized Russia’s treatment of the Turkish businessmen as unfair, and compared it to the “customs crisis” between Ankara and Moscow, which has continued for more than one year (Cihan, July 25). Some Turkish businessmen, however, support these Russian actions and maintain that this was long overdue. In their view, the smugglers in the market were creating unfair competition for the traders who were operating legally (www.turkrus.com, July 27).

    The growing protests from the Turkish business community exerted pressure on the Turkish government to protest officially to Russia. Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz, who is also the co-chair of the Russian-Turkish joint economic council, described this development as an internal Russian affair, and stressed that this issue was not raised in bilateral contacts with Russia (Cihan, July 27). His Russian counterpart, Igor Sechin visited Turkey last week to hold talks with Yildiz and the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan ahead of Putin’s visit to Turkey in early August.

    Nonetheless, the State Minister responsible for Foreign Trade Zafer Caglayan issued a written statement, which described Russia as a major trading partner and noted that the under-secretariat for foreign trade had formed a commission to investigate the claims of Turkish businessmen and explore new marketplaces in Moscow. Although Caglayan recognized that the decision of the Russian authorities did not directly target Turkey, given the volume of Turkish goods in the market, he stressed that this did indirectly affect the country. However, the figures released by Caglayan contradicted those which appeared in earlier press reports. Whereas the Turkish press maintained that as many as 5,000 businesses were affected by the market crackdown, Caglayan said that only 200 were owned by Turks. Moreover, Caglayan noted that only 10 percent of the total goods sold in the market were of Turkish origin (www.ihlassondakika.com, July 27).

    Caglayan also signaled that he might raise this issue with Russian officials in order to protect the rights of the Turkish businessmen in accordance with the Russian and international rules. Moreover, he added that these problems and the “customs issue” will be on the agenda when Putin visits Turkey next month.

    A highly busy schedule awaits Putin in Turkey, most importantly over future cooperation in energy projects. Despite Ankara’s signing of the Nabucco treaty, Turkey is still pursuing joint investments with Russia in nuclear power, and other gas transportation projects. Turkish exports to Russia were damaged by the new customs regulations imposed by Russia prior to the Georgian war in August 2008. Russia and Turkey reached a deal in September 2008 to simplify customs procedures for Turkish goods, but Ankara claimed that Moscow has not complied with the agreement. The problem was not resolved during President Abdullah Gul’s and Yildiz’s visits to Moscow earlier this year. Although Russia was confirmed as Turkey’s main trading partner, its reluctance to resolve such issues remains a constant source of tension between both countries. More importantly, the timing of those “commercial” crises provides justification over the speculation that Russia is exploiting Turkey’s economic and energy dependence to punish Ankara for its political decisions.

    https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-market-crackdown-strains-turkish-russian-trade-relations/
  • Aliyev and Sarksyan Meet in Moscow

    Aliyev and Sarksyan Meet in Moscow

    Aliyev and Sarksyan Meet in Moscow

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 139
    July 21, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev met his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sarksyan in Moscow on July 17 in their latest round of reconciliation talks. Turkey has closely followed the talks between the two presidents, facilitated by the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, hoping that the resolution of the Karabakh issue might also facilitate Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.

    The meeting was the sixth between Aliyev and Sarksyan since their first meeting in June 2008. As one of the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk group, Russia accelerated its peacemaking efforts toward finding a solution to the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Medvedev hosted the two presidents in Moscow for a second time in November 2008, and since then the two leaders have met in Zurich, Prague and St. Petersburg (Trend News, July 17).

    The meeting came in the context of growing international interest. Other major actors had also expressed their support for this mechanism, hoping that it might facilitate a solution. The presidents of Russia, France and the United States issued a statement during the G8 summit in Italy the previous week, and urged all sides to step up their work toward the resolution of the remaining differences on Karabakh, on the basis of the principles outlined in the 2007 Madrid agreement (www.osce.org, July 10).

    Representatives from the other two co-chairs of the Minsk group and the OSCE representatives were also in Moscow. On July 17, the Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and his Armenian counterpart Edward Nalbandyan met with the Minsk group co-chairmen Yuri Merzlyakov (Russia), Bernard Fassier (France) and Matthew Bryza (United States), as well as the OSCE Chairman’s Special Envoy Andzey Kasprzyk. The Azeri and Armenian presidents also held bilateral talks, and later the ministers as well as the co-chairs joined them. The following day, the leaders held trilateral talks with the participation of Medvedev.

    No documents were signed at the meeting and no official statement was issued. Medvedev’s spokesperson told reporters that the parties had a chance to discuss in detail the remaining issues. He added that he is optimistic that “it will be possible to settle the Karabakh conflict in the foreseeable future.” According to Armenian diplomatic sources, the presidents instructed their foreign ministers to work in close cooperation with the Minsk group co-chairs to organize a high-level meeting on Karabakh in the fall. The co-chairs of the Minsk group reiterated their support for the ongoing talks. They added that they would continue their contacts in the region. The two presidents might meet again in September, they added (Trend News, ITAR-TASS, www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 18).

    On July 20, Mammadyarov said that some progress was achieved in Moscow. He added that the parties agreed on some principles of a possible solution, but that further work was required on the precise details. He maintained that both sides were working toward a schedule for withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the occupied Azeri territories. Once this is achieved, it will be possible to discuss other issues such as the repatriation of refugees, the rebuilding of the region and determining the status of Karabakh. However, he ruled out independence for Karabakh by saying “whatever its status, Karabakh will remain part of Azerbaijan” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 20).

    Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, the head of the E.U. troika delegation visiting the region, said in Yerevan that the E.U. supported the Minsk group’s activities and was ready to assist in the implementation of an agreement. However, in implicit defiance of Mammadyarov’s statements, Nalbandyan said that the “return of any territories to Azerbaijan was not discussed in Moscow.” He also added that Armenia did not officially endorse the Madrid principles (ANKA, July 20; Trend News, July 21).

    Despite the contradictory accounts from Yerevan and Baku, it appears that the removal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azeri territories has been on the agenda for some time. Prior to the meeting in Moscow, Aliyev had explained the details of the plan to a Russian TV station (www.cnnturk.com, July 8). According to the Turkish press, the two presidents in fact discussed the specifics of Armenian withdrawal from the occupied Azeri territories, even including the deployment of international forces. Whereas, the Armenian side insisted on Russian forces, the Azeris requested Turkish troops. Turkey reportedly expressed its readiness to send troops, if the parties agreed on such a solution (Zaman, July 19). However, no official Turkish diplomatic source has corroborated this proposal.

    Turkey has been supportive of the process led by the Minsk group and Russian initiatives. Ankara reportedly plans to contribute to the initiatives of the Minsk group through a new round of contacts with Baku and Yerevan. Nonetheless, currently the earliest direct talks between Yerevan and Ankara to discuss Turkish-Armenian normalization are scheduled in September at the U.N. General Assembly (Sabah, July 20).

    After intensive diplomatic traffic between Turkey and Armenia, which resulted in the announcement of a roadmap for normalization in April, Ankara had to slow down the process to satisfy concerns in Baku. During his visit to Baku in May, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan underlined clearly that Ankara would not proceed with its Turkish-Armenian rapprochement before a solution over the Karabakh issue could be achieved. Although Ankara came under criticism for stalling its dialogue with Yerevan, diplomatic sources maintain that secret talks between the two countries are continuing (EDM, June 30).

    Commenting on these recent developments, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu denied that Turkish-Armenian normalization was stalled. He said that “[Turkish-Armenian and Azeri-Armenian] processes would affect each other positively.” Though declining to set a date on the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border, he expressed his hope that positive developments might take place before the end of the year (Hurriyet Daily News, July 20).

    Erdogan took a very clear position, saying that he will maintain his support for Azerbaijan over the Karabakh dispute. It would be difficult for him to step back from this, given the enormous costs of such a move to his popularity at home and in Baku. Therefore, before taking any steps to revitalize its relations with Yerevan, Ankara hopes that the recent initiatives could produce at least partial progress between Baku and Yerevan.

    https://jamestown.org/program/aliyev-and-sarksyan-meet-in-moscow/
  • Washington is Playing a Deeper Game with China

    Washington is Playing a Deeper Game with China

    by F. William Engdahl

    14327

    Global Research, July 11, 2009

    https://www.globalresearch.ca/washington-is-playing-a-deeper-game-with-china/14327

    After the tragic events of July 5 in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China, it would be useful to look more closely into the actual role of the US Government’s ”independent“ NGO, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). All indications are that the US Government, once more acting through its “private” Non-Governmental Organization, the NED, is massively intervening into the internal politics of China.

     

    The reasons for Washington’s intervention into Xinjiang affairs seems to have little to do with concerns over alleged human rights abuses by Beijing authorities against Uyghur people. It seems rather to have very much to do with the strategic geopolitical location of Xinjiang on the Eurasian landmass and its strategic importance for China’s future economic and energy cooperation with Russia, Kazakhastan and other Central Asia states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

     

    The major organization internationally calling for protests in front of Chinese embassies around the world is the Washington, D.C.-based World Uyghur Congress (WUC).

     

    The WUC manages to finance a staff, a very fancy website in English, and has a very close relation to the US Congress-funded NED. According to published reports by the NED itself, the World Uyghur Congress receives $215,000.00 annually from the National Endowment for Democracy for “human rights research and advocacy projects.” The president of the WUC is an exile Uyghur who describes herself as a “laundress turned millionaire,” Rebiya Kadeer, who also serves as president of the Washington D.C.-based Uyghur American Association, another Uyghur human rights organization which receives significant funding from the US Government via the National Endowment for Democracy.

     

    The NED was intimately involved in financial support to various organizations behind the Lhasa ”Crimson Revolution“ in March 2008, as well as the Saffron Revolution in Burma/Myanmar and virtually every regime change destabilization in eastern Europe over the past years from Serbia to Georgia to Ukraine to Kyrgystan to Teheran in the aftermath of the recent elections.

     

    Allen Weinstein, who helped draft the legislation establishing NED, was quite candid when he said in a published interview in 1991: “A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.”

     

    The NED is supposedly a private, non-government, non-profit foundation, but it receives a yearly appropriation for its international work from the US Congress. The NED money is channelled through four “core foundations”. These are the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, linked to Obama’s Democratic Party; the International Republican Institute tied to the Republican Party; the American Center for International Labor Solidarity linked to the AFL-CIO US labor federation as well as the US State Department; and the Center for International Private Enterprise linked to the US Chamber of Commerce.

     

    The salient question is what has the NED been actively doing that might have encouraged the unrest in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and what is the Obama Administration policy in terms of supporting or denouncing such NED-financed intervention into sovereign politics of states which Washington deems a target for pressure? The answers must be found soon, but one major step to help clarify Washington policy under the new Obama Administration would be for a full disclosure by the NED, the US State Department and NGO’s linked to the US Government, of their involvement, if at all, in encouraging Uyghur separatism or unrest. Is it mere coincidence that the Uyghur riots take place only days following the historic meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?

     

    Uyghur exile organizations, China and Geopolitics

     

    On May 18 this year, the US-government’s in-house “private” NGO, the NED, according to the official WUC website, hosted a seminal human rights conference entitled East Turkestan: 60 Years under Communist Chinese Rule, along with a curious NGO with the name, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO).

     

    The Honorary President and founder of the UNPO is one Erkin Alptekin, an exile Uyghur who founded UNPO while working for the US Information Agency’s official propaganda organization, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty as Director of their Uygur Division and Assistant Director of the Nationalities Services.

     

    Alptekin also founded the World Uyghur Congress at the same time, in 1991, while he was with the US Information Agency. The official mission of the USIA when Alptekin founded the World Uyghur Congress in 1991 was “to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics in promotion of the [USA] national interest…” Alptekin was the first president of WUC, and, according to the official WUC website, is a “close friend of the Dalai Lama.”

     

    Closer examination reveals that UNPO in turn to be an American geopolitical strategist’s dream organization. It was formed, as noted, in 1991 as the Soviet Union was collapsing and most of the land area of Eurasia was in political and economic chaos. Since 2002 its Director General has been Archduke Karl von Habsburg of Austria who lists his (unrecognized by Austria or Hungary) title as “Prince Imperial of Austria and Royal Prince of Hungary.”

     

    Among the UNPO principles is the right to ‘self-determination’ for the 57 diverse population groups who, by some opaque process not made public, have been admitted as official UNPO members with their own distinct flags, with a total population of some 150 million peoples and headquarters in the Hague, Netherlands.

     

    UNPO members range from Kosovo which “joined” when it was fully part of then Yugoslavia in 1991. It includes the “Aboriginals of Australia” who were listed as founding members along with Kosovo. It includes the Buffalo River Dene Nation indians of northern Canada.

     

    The select UNPO members also include Tibet which is listed as a founding member. It also includes other explosive geopolitical areas as the Crimean Tartars, the Greek Minority in Romania, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (in Russia), the Democratic Movement of Burma, and the gulf enclave adjacent to Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and which just happens to hold rights to some of the world’s largest offshore oil fields leased to Condi Rice’s old firm, Chevron Oil. Further geopolitical hotspots which have been granted elite recognition by the UNPO membership include the large section of northern Iran which designates itself as Southern Azerbaijan, as well as something that calls itself Iranian Kurdistan.

     

    In April 2008 according to the website of the UNPO, the US Congress’ NED sponsored a “leadership training” seminar for the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) together with the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. Over 50 Uyghurs from around the world together with prominent academics, government representatives and members of the civil society gathered in Berlin Germany to discuss “Self-Determination under International Law.” What they discussed privately is not known. Rebiya Kadeer gave the keynote address.

     

    The suspicious timing of the Xinjiang riots

     

    The current outbreak of riots and unrest in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang in the northwest part of China, exploded on July 5 local time.

     

    According to the website of the World Uyghur Congress, the “trigger” for the riots was an alleged violent attack on June 26 in China’s southern Guangdong Province at a toy factory where the WUC alleges that Han Chinese workers attacked and beat to death two Uyghur workers for allegedly raping or sexually molesting two Han Chinese women workers in the factory. On July 1, the Munich arm of the WUC issued a worldwide call for protest demonstrations against Chinese embassies and consulates for the alleged Guangdong attack, despite the fact they admitted the details of the incident were unsubstantiated and filled with allegations and dubious reports.

     

    According to a press release they issued, it was that June 26 alleged attack that gave the WUC the grounds to issue their worldwide call to action.

     

    On July 5, a Sunday in Xinjiang but still the USA Independence Day, July 4, in Washington, the WUC in Washington claimed that Han Chinese armed soldiers seized any Uyghur they found on the streets and according to official Chinese news reports, widespread riots and burning of cars along the streets of Urumqi broke out resulting over the following three days in over 140 deaths.

     

    China’s official Xinhua News Agency said that protesters from the Uighur Muslim ethnic minority group began attacking ethnic Han pedestrians, burning vehicles and attacking buses with batons and rocks. “They took to the street…carrying knives, wooden batons, bricks and stones,” they cited an eyewitness as saying. The French AFP news agency quoted Alim Seytoff, general secretary of the Uighur American Association in Washington, that according to his information, police had begun shooting “indiscriminately” at protesting crowds.

     

    Two different versions of the same events: The Chinese government and pictures of the riots indicate it was Uyghur riot and attacks on Han Chinese residents that resulted in deaths and destruction. French official reports put the blame on Chinese police “shooting indiscriminately.” Significantly, the French AFP report relies on the NED-funded Uyghur American Association of Rebiya Kadeer for its information. The reader should judge if the AFP account might be motivated by a US geopolitical agenda, a deeper game from the Obama Administration towards China’s economic future.

     

    Is it merely coincidence that the riots in Xinjiang by Uyghur organizations broke out only days after the meeting took place in Yakaterinburg, Russia of the member nations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as well as Iran as official observer guest, represented by President Ahmadinejad?

     

    Over the past few years, in the face of what is seen as an increasingly hostile and incalculable United States foreign policy, the major nations of Eurasia—China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan have increasingly sought ways of direct and more effective cooperation in economic as well as security areas. In addition, formal Observer status within SCO has been given to Iran, Pakistan, India and Mongolia. The SCO defense ministers are in regular and growing consultation on mutual defense needs, as NATO and the US military command continue provocatively to expand across the region wherever it can.

     

    The Strategic Importance of Xinjiang for Eurasian Energy Infrastructure

     

    There is another reason for the nations of the SCO, a vital national security element, to having peace and stability in China’s Xinjiang region. Some of China’s most important oil and gas pipeline routes pass directly through Xinjiang province. Energy relations between Kazkhstan and China are of enormous strategic importance for both countries, and allow China to become less dependent on oil supply sources that can be cut off by possible US interdiction should relations deteriorate to such a point.

     

    Kazak President Nursultan Nazarbayev paid a State visit in April 2009 to Beijing. The talks concerned deepening economic cooperation, above all in the energy area, where Kazkhastan holds huge reserves of oil and likely as well of natural gas. After the talks in Beijing, Chinese media carried articles with such titles as “”Kazakhstani oil to fill in the Great Chinese pipe.”

     

    The Atasu-Alashankou pipeline to be completed in 2009 will provide transportation of transit gas to China via Xinjiang. As well Chinese energy companies are involved in construction of a Zhanazholskiy gas processing plant, Pavlodar electrolyze plant and Moynakskaya hydro electric station in Kazakhstan.

     

    casp kaz china ppl

    According to the US Government’s Energy Information Administration, Kazakhstan’s Kashagan field is the largest oil field outside the Middle East and the fifth largest in the world in terms of reserves, located off the northern shore of the Caspian Sea, near the city of Atyrau. China has built a 613-mile-long pipeline from Atasu, in northwestern Kazakhstan, to Alashankou at the border of China’s Xinjiang region which is exporting Caspian oil to China. PetroChina’s ChinaOil is the exclusive buyer of the crude oil on the Chinese side. The pipeline is a joint venture of CNPC and Kaztransoil of Kazkhstan. Some 85,000 bbl/d of Kazakh crude oil flowed through the pipeline during 2007. China’s CNPC is also involved in other major energy projects with Kazkhstan. They all traverse China’s Xinjiang region.

     

    In 2007 CNPC signed an agreement to invest more than $2 billion to construct a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China. That pipeline would start at Gedaim on the border of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and extend 1,100 miles through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Khorgos in China’s Xinjiang region. Turkmenistan and China have signed a 30-year supply agreement for the gas that would fill the pipeline. CNPC has set up two entities to oversee the Turkmen upstream project and the development of a second pipeline that will cross China from the Xinjiang region to southeast China at a cost of some $7 billion.

     

    chinapipelines

    As well, Russia and China are discussing major natural gas pipelines from eastern Siberia through Xinjiang into China. Eastern Siberia contains around 135 Trillion cubic feet of proven plus probable natural gas reserves. The Kovykta natural gas field could give China with natural gas in the next decade via a proposed pipeline.

     

    During the current global economic crisis, Kazakhstan received a major credit from China of $10 billion, half of which is for oil and gas sector. The oil pipeline Atasu-Alashankou and the gas pipeline China-Central Asia, are an instrument of strategic ‘linkage’ of central Asian countries to the economy China. That Eurasian cohesion from Russia to China across Central Asian countries is the geopolitical cohesion Washington most fears. While they would never say so, growing instability in Xinjiang would be an ideal way for Washington to weaken that growing cohesion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization nations.

     

    William Engdahl is the author of Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy in the New World Order.

  • Azeri Visit to Karabakh Sparks Row

    Azeri Visit to Karabakh Sparks Row

    War of words breaks out as public relations exercise by Baku representatives goes wrong.

    By Samira Ahmedbeili in Baku, Sara Khojoian in Yerevan and Anahit Danielian in Stepanakert (CRS No. 501, 10-July-09)

    A visit by Azerbaijani officials and cultural leaders to the self-declared state of Nagorno-Karabakh was intended to build ties with its ethnic Armenian rulers, but degenerated into the usual verbal sparring within days.

    However, analysts were wrong-footed by an unusually conciliatory statement from Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliev after the trip, in which he appeared sympathetic to some Armenian demands.

    Nagorny Karabakh, ruled by Armenians but internationally considered part of Azerbaijan, has been a block to good relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan since Soviet times.

    More than a million refugees fled out of both countries before and during the war, which started in 1991 and ended with a ceasefire three years later. Since then, there have been almost no ties between the two neighbouring nations, while Karabakh declared independence unilaterally.

    Armenian forces control some 14 per cent of what Azerbaijan considers to be its territory, and exchanges of fire are frequent over the line of control.

    The visit to Karabakh, which started on July 3 and was headed by the ambassadors to Moscow of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, was intended to help ease the tensions.

    “I want to stress that neither Armenians nor Azeris are going to fly off into space. We must live together, and therefore we need to create contacts, joint ties, create mutual respect between each other,” Polad Bulbuloglu, the Azerbaijan ambassador, told reporters in Karabakh.

    But, even before he left the region, he had succeeded in offending the locals by following the terminology used in Azerbaijan to describe Karabakh. He met Bako Sahakian, leader of the self-proclaimed state, but presented it as just a meeting with local civil society figures, outraging political commentator David Babian.

    “It is unacceptable that non-constructive statements should be made after a visit, as was done by this Polad Bulbuloglu and his delegates. President Bako Sahakian from the start of the visit held onto the principal of equality of the two sides, stressing that no other format was acceptable, including the so-called possibility of holding talks between two communities,” the commentator said.

    “Such meetings are ineffective, since they once more make people angry, instead of creating an atmosphere of trust, as the authors insist.”

    The misunderstandings pursued the delegates, who also visited Yerevan and Baku, throughout their journey. On returning to the Azerbaijani capital, one delegate told a local news agency that the Armenian president had told them he understood that Aghdam – a region of Azerbaijan outside Nagorny Karabakh itself which is almost entirely controlled by Armenian forces – was not Armenian land, and that he respected Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.

    The comments were disowned by a spokesman for the president, and provoked outrage in Yerevan.

    “This is an arrogant lie,” President Serzh Sargsian’s spokesman said. “But we are no longer surprised that the Azerbaijani delegates distorted the facts when they returned to Baku, since they always do. The lack of tolerance from Azerbaijani society is clear.”

    Similar distrust was sparked in Baku, where the supposed peacemakers found themselves suspected of selling out the interests of their country. Any suggestion that Karabakh is not actually part of Azerbaijan meets fury in Baku, and Akif Nagi, head of the Organisation for the Liberation of Karabakh, suggested that by meeting Sahakian, the delegates were effectively recognising his rule.

    “As a result of such meetings the fact of the Armenian seizure of Azerbaijan’s territory retreats into the background. By making a statement… about visiting Karabakh through Azerbaijan’s territory, they present this as if it’s heroism. But if you meet the head of a separatist, puppet regime, and basically recognise his legitimacy, then it is unimportant how you got there,” Nagi said.

    He also expressed disquiet that the delegation had included Mikhail Shvidkoy, the head of the Russian Cultural Agency, and appeared to have been initiated in Moscow. “The visit of the so-called Azerbaijan intelligentsia to Karabakh contradicts the interests of Azerbaijan. This visit was conducted at the orders of Russia. Russia is just demonstrating that the Karabakh conflict is completely under its control and that it can make the two sides play by its rules any time it wants,” he said.

    Under the circumstances, therefore, it was not surprising that few observers expected positive results from the trip. However, comments from President Aliev to Russian television after the visit suggested a change of heart in Baku, which has previously been uncompromising in its opposition to any recognition of Armenian rights to Azerbaijan’s territory.

    “As for the status of Nagorny Karabakh, that is a question of the future. A resolution of its status is not one of the proposals accepted by us and under discussion at the moment,” Aliev told Russia’s RTR television.

    “Of course, Azerbaijan will never agree to the independence of Nagorny Karabakh. I think Armenia understands this. Today we must resolve the results of the conflict and secure an end of the occupation. The security of all nationalities in Karabakh must be secured, after which communication must be restored. We understand that Nagorny Karabakh must have a special status, and we see it as being within Azerbaijan.”

    Despite Aliev’s uncompromising refusal to countenance independence for the region, those were still remarkably conciliatory remarks by the standards Baku has set since 1991.

    “Over the last month there has been a flurry of activity in the Karabakh negotiations: an intense round of diplomacy, the visit of the intellectuals to Karabakh and the first visit by Armenians to Baku in a long time, [and] a more positive tone from many of the political leaders,” said Tom de Waal, an analyst from the NGO Conciliation Resources and an expert in Karabakh’s history.

    “President Aliev adopted a more moderate tone than I can remember in an interview on the Karabakh issue. I was struck by the way he said that ‘we understand the concerns of the people of Karabakh’ and that he said that the status of Karabakh is a ‘matter for the future’. Now of course this was an interview to Russian television. I think things will really change only when the presidents say this kind of thing to a domestic audience, but it is a very positive signal.”

    Samira Ahmedbeili, Sara Khojoian and Anahit Danielian are IWPR contributors.

  • Equal Partners or Equal Rivals?

    Equal Partners or Equal Rivals?

    By Aaron Mulvihill
    Special to Russia Profile

    July 6, 2009

    As Europe and Russia Manoeuvre for Control of Energy Routes Across the Caucasus and the Black Sea, Turkey Has Emerged as a Key Broker

    As the jet carrying Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Energy Minister Taner Yildiz took off from Moscow after a meeting with their Russian counterparts, reports were already circulating about the conclusion of a deal on the Nabucco gas pipeline, which is to pump gas from the Caspian Sea into Europe, bypassing Russia. A coincidence? Or a sign, perhaps, that the meetings could have gone a little better for the Kremlin?

    The dossiers on energy and foreign relations are never far apart when Russian and Turkish delegations meet. The foreign minister was officially visiting to discuss relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the energy minister was to negotiate the building of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant – but the Nabucco pipeline is central to both issues, and it is unlikely to have been left off the agenda.
    The planned 3,300km Nabucco pipeline, which is to pump natural gas from the Caspian Sea into Europe as far as Austria, is designed to reduce European dependence on Russian energy. The final agreement on the construction of the $7.9 billion conduit is to be signed on 13 July in Ankara, it was revealed last Friday.

    Determined to maintain what the media has termed its “energy weapon,” Russia put forward a rival project: South Stream, which would pump Russian gas through the Black Sea to Bulgaria and beyond, also as far as Austria. Turkish representatives earlier in the year hinted that the country would put its full support behind Nabucco only if given guarantees on EU accession. The plausible alternative of South Stream, then, allowed both Russia and Turkey to exert leverage on Europe: Turkey could hold out for an EU quid-pro-quo, while Russia had time to put obstacles in Nabucco’s path, such as buying up its intended sources of gas. Turkey was last week formally invited to take part in the South Stream project, but it was not announced what form this might take, as the pipeline does not pass through Turkish land in its current draft form.

    It is unclear whether, by dragging its heels, Turkey has secured any EU promises (11 of 35 negotiation “chapters” are now open, but the one on energy, significantly, remains blocked), but it certainly has not damaged relations with the Kremlin.

    Since then-President Vladimir Putin’s landmark visit to Ankara in 2004 – the first by a Russian head of state – trade turnover has multiplied, reaching a total volume of $38 billion dollars in 2008, and with increasing frequency observers began referring to a “special relationship” between the two countries. Turkish President Abdullah Gul paid a state visit to Moscow as recently as February 2009.
    Is the Turkey-Russia “equal partnership” more equal than others, as officia1 announcements from both sides would have observers believe? Or do Russia and Turkey regard each other as equally-matched rivals in a shared exclusion from Europe, as did the Russian and Ottoman Empires? 
    Sinan Ogan, the chairman of the Turkish Centre for International Relations and Strategic Analysis, argues that Russo-Turkish relations exhibit a special character. “Our economic structures complement each other and few countries in the world economy have such a feature. The other interesting thing in this relation is that both cooperation and competition exist at the same time within these relations, especially in the field of energy,” said Ogan.

    Energy

    The construction of Nabucco will not only mean that Europe becomes less reliant on Russian imports – the same applies to Turkey itself. Russia currently supplies Turkey with the bulk of its gas imports. In 2007, Russia overtook Iran to become Turkey’s top oil supplier as well. Turkey has few hydrocarbon resources of its own, yet its domestic demand for energy has risen sharply in recent years. Ankara’s latest answer to energy security is a balanced one: it has demanded that a percentage of the Nabucco capacity be made available for domestic distribution, and even possible re-sale, while at the same time is enlisting Russian help in constructing the republic’s first nuclear plant. Neither plan has yet been officially confirmed.

    Turkey’s role as an energy hub makes it politically perilous to accept overtures from one neighbour over another. Ankara’s balancing act is complicated by its simultaneous membership of several, sometimes conflicting, groups.

    Turkey’s NATO allies frown upon its purchase of Russian military hardware, while conscious that the secular Muslim democracy and leading member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference is a vital partner in Afghanistan and in the fight against Islamic extremism. Russia and Turkey found themselves on the same side in vocal opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and Turkey reversed years of close cooperation with the United States by refusing to cooperate in the offensive. But in August 2008, Turkey aggravated the Kremlin by allowing U.S. warships to pass through the Bosporus en route to Georgia, which was then struggling to regain control over the Russian-backed breakaway province of South Ossetia.

    NATO and Russia cut off ties as a result of the Georgia crisis, and formal co-operation resumed only in late June 2009. The continuing thaw, and possible resumption of military cooperation, is heavily dependent on internal lobbying from Turkey, though it has not prevented Russia from expressing its irritation by erecting barriers to trade.

    Trade

    In an almost immediate retaliation for the Georgian incident, in September 2008 Russia turned away convoys of Turkish trucks at its border, claiming the Turkish produce was of poor quality. According to Sinan Ogan, Turkish exporters are still facing problems with customs officials, despite the fact that “measurements made by Turkish official institutions have proved that there is nothing harmful in these products.” Turkish convoys, he added, are singled out for lengthier checks, and “Turkish trucks have to wait for days and sometimes for weeks [before clearing customs].” 

    In trade, as well as energy, Russia holds the trump cards. Turkey’s trade deficit against Russia reached a colossal $18 billion in 2008, giving its northern neighbour significant economic leverage. The three million Russians who holiday in Turkey annually are perhaps the most visible indicator of this booming trade. Turkish companies are key players in the Russian construction market – Terminal 3 of Moscow’s Sheremetyevo airport, due to open shortly, is only the most prominent example of Turkish firms’ appetite for major Russian government tenders.

    But Moscow’s continuing dominance in trade is not assured. Its main exports to Turkey are in the volatile sectors of energy and tourism, while it imports durable goods and foodstuffs from Turkey, the demand for which is more stable in the long term even if it has recently fallen. Analysts and rating agencies such as Fitch and Barclays Capital have tipped Turkey as the first country in the “emerging Europe” region, which includes Russia, to buck the economic downturn with strong growth in 2010. They point to its large domestic consumer base and robust banking system.

    Security

    The need for close cooperation between Ankara and Moscow, if not a “special relationship,” is vividly apparent in the sphere of national security. Chechen terrorist cells are thought to be still active in Turkey, and the armed wing of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) is known to use Russian territory as a safe haven. It has almost become a ritual to accompany each official state visit with a raid on the respective terrorist group’s hideout and a joint declaration of cooperation in the fight against terror. But Moscow has so far declined to add the PKK to its official list of terrorist organisations, despite token pledges of support.

    Tangible security cooperation on a larger scale in the Caucasus region is fraught with complexity. Turkey and Russia de facto support opposite sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which flared up between Armenia and Azerbaijan when they achieved independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Armenia is Russia’s lone ally in the region, and the republic enjoys generous military support from Moscow. Azerbaijan, whose citizens consider themselves Turkish, rather than Turkic, is the source of much of the crude oil flowing through Turkey, carried by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
    After a long and bloody stalemate, both Russia and Turkey have begun to promote the OSCE Minsk Group peace process. Pipeline politics certainly have their part to play. The Georgian crisis demonstrated how violence in the Caucasus can play havoc with energy distribution, and consequently Turkey is anxious to normalise its strained relations with Armenia. In its turn, Russia’s state-owned gas giant Gazprom signed a deal with its Azeri counterpart in June 2009 to import 500 million cubic metres of gas in 2010 for eventual resale in Europe.

    Caucasus battleground

    Backers of the Nabucco pipeline are anxious that, with Russia snapping up large chunks of Caspian gas production, they will struggle to fill the pipeline when it opens in 2014. As far as energy competition is concerned, the Caucasus and Black Sea region has become as significant a battleground as it ever was during the rivalry of the Russian and Ottoman Empires.

    Accordingly, the historical logic of Turkey and Russia as “equals apart from Europe” is perhaps as useful now as it was during the 16th century.