Category: Eastern Europe

Turkey And Russia Jockey For Position In The Region

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Gulnara Inandzh
Director
International Online Information Analytic Center Ethnoglobus

mete62@inbox.ru

ethnoglobus@rambler.ru

The military conflict between Russia and Georgia has opened the way for Turkey to increase its role in the South Caucasus, not only because of its own skillful policies but also because both Moscow and Washington want it to, albeit for different reasons. And what is most remarkable is that this transformation of the roles of the various players in the South Caucasus has been most visible in the evolution of the relationship between Turkey and Armenia, two countries long at odds that many felt could never reach an accord.

The failure of the OSCE Minsk Group to move toward a resolution of the Karabakh problem has, in the wake of the Georgian war, led both Moscow and Washington to welcome Turkey’s offer to play a role on this question, the first lest it lose even more influence in the region and the second lest a reignited Karabakh war threaten its access to Caspian basin oil and gas.

Armenia appears to welcome Turkey’s intervention in this regard not only because it promises to move the talks ahead but also because it would open the Turkish border for Armenian goods. But Yerevan is constrained by the Armenian diaspora which insists that every country, including Turkey, must recognize the events of 1915 as genocide. Only if the diaspora shifts its position on this will real progress be possible, and consequently, it is not surprising that the United States is seeking dialogue with various parts of the Armenian diaspora abroad about the utility for Armenia of a Turkish role in resolving the Karabakh dispute.

But however that may be, the negotiations behind the scenes between Ankara and Yerevan began in July 2008 in Switzerland, well before the Georgian events. And it is important to note that Yerevan did not make the recognition of the events of 1915 as genocide a precondition to these talks.

For not Turkey but Armenia is subject to a blockade and in difficult economic circumstances, Turkish move to engage in talks with Armenia have been most likely prompted by the influence of the United States, the final goal being the opening of the border between Armenia and Turkey.

The opening of that border and the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries would give “a green light” for American and Western expansion into Armenia. That is something opposition leader Levon Ter-Petrosyan has been waiting for. His last declarations of a desire for constructive relations with the authorities and his refusal to call for their ouster are maneuvers with an eye to the Turkish-Armenian talks.

The United States would like to see Ter-Petrosyan as president of Armenia but to make that happen will require more than just talks with Turkey. It will require massive economic assistance to get Armenia out of its current slump. And that in turn will require the inclusion of Armenia in regional economic projects like the one that Turkey has proposed.

With the opening of the border with Turkey, Yerevan will be able to reach out to the world directly and thus free itself from its forced dependence on Russia. But before Armenia can expect that to happen, it will have to withdraw its forces from the seven regions of Azerbaijan that it has occupied beyond the borders of Karabakh. From the point of view of the Kremlin, this needs to take place with the participation of Russia and under the pro-Russian presidency of Serzh Sargsyan lest Moscow’s position in Armenia weaken.

How this will play out depends not only on how each of these players sees the other but on others besides. And consequently, what would appear to be a simple vector in the relations of the countries of the South Caucasus this time as so often in the past may go in entirely unexpected directions and undercut the policies of one or more of the governments that are trying to arrange things to their liking.

March 3, 2010
Australian Tatars Mark 60th Anniversary Of First Immigrants

Tatar children dance at a celebration of the 60th anniversary of Tatar immigration to Australia in Adelaide.

February 13, 2010

ADELAIDE, Australia — Ethnic Tatars living in Australia marked the 60th anniversary of their immigration to Australia this week with a series of events, RFE/RL’s Tatar-Bashkir Service reports.

The majority of the estimated 500 Tatar-Australians are concentrated in Adelaide, South Australia, where they came to settle after World War II.

Special events were held by Tatar organizations in Adelaide to mark the anniversary. Michael Atkinson, South Australia’s minister for multicultural
affairs, attended events along with other local officials.

Tatars also have a cultural center in Adelaide where children can study the Tatar language and culture.

https://www.rferl.org/a/Australian_Tatars_Mark_60th_Anniversary_Of_First_Immigrants/1957128.html

February 17, 2010
Linguists Urge Crimean Tatars To Switch To Latin Alphabet

February 17, 2010

SIMFEROPOL, Ukraine — Crimean Tatar language experts have approved a move to stop using the Cyrillic alphabet and return to the Latin alphabet, RFE/RL’s Tatar-Bashkir Service reports.
The issue was discussed by dozens of linguists and other language experts at a special seminar held in Simferopol, Ukraine, on February 15. The experts presented research outlining the grammar of the Crimean Tatar language using the Latin alphabet and agreed on orthographic rules for it to be written using Latin letters.
They have also recommended that the World Congress of Crimean Tatars (KTDK) formally approve the change.

Eden Mamut, the secretary-general of the Black Sea Regional Union of Universities and professor at Romania’s Ovidius University, said establishing a common orthography for Crimean Tatar based on the Latin alphabet is an important step in helping unite the some 1.4 million Crimean Tatars who live in several different countries, the majority in Turkey.

KTDK President Refat Chubarov stated at the seminar that “there is no other alternative for the creation of a productive, communicative system for understanding between all Crimean Tatars than returning to the Latin alphabet and developing a single Crimean Tatar language.”
Crimean Tatars are an indigenous people of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula who were deported by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin to Central Asia in the 1940s. Many returned to Crimea after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Crimean Tatars used the Arabic alphabet before the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in 1917. They were then forced — as were all other Muslim minorities in the Soviet Union — to use the Latin alphabet. They were later ordered to use Cyrillic starting in the 1940s. Many Crimean Tatars abroad still use the Arabic and Latin alphabets, while those living in post-Soviet countries use Cyrillic.

https://www.rferl.org/a/Linguists_Urge_Crimean_Tatars_To_Switch_To_Latin_Alphabet/1960330.html

February 17, 2010
Russo-Turkish Rapprochement through the Idea of Eurasia

INTRODUCTION

In the 1990s, relations between Russia and Turkey were strained, due mostly to the geopolitical reorganization of Eurasia following the demise of the Soviet Union. Both countries entered into direct competition in strategic zones like the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans.

However, relations began to improve with the visit of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to Ankara in December 1997, followed by that of Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit to Moscow in November 1999 and that of Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov to Ankara in October 2000. Public recognition of this strengthening of Russo-Turkish relations was consolidated during Vladimir Putin’s visit to Ankara in December 2004, which was immediately reciprocated by Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Moscow in January 2005.

Read more…

January 25, 2010
How Gorbachev Contributed to the ‘Karabakhization’ of Azerbaijani Politics

Paul Goble

Vienna, January 19 – Twenty years ago this week, Mikhail Gorbachev sent troops into Azerbaijan to crush the popular front there, but what the Soviet president achieved by his actions was the further radicalization of Azerbaijan and the “Karabakhization” of Azerbaijani politics, a situation that continues to this day, according to a leading Moscow commentator.
In an article posted on the “Novaya politika” site yesterday, Sergey Markedonov says that the unwillingness of the Soviet government to force Armenia to return Karabakh to Azerbaijan and its dispatch of Soviet forces to Baku “became a transforming moment in the process of the national self-determination of Azerbaijan” (novopol.ru/text80474.html).
Both Moscow’s failure to defend the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan SSR and the brutality of its forces in the Azerbaijani capital changed everything, Markedonov continues. Until then, Azerbaijan “had lacked a powerful dissident movement,” unlike Georgia or the Baltic states.
However, “the striving of the Kremlin to refrain from the adoption of a one-sided resolution of the ‘Karabakh question’ and the refusal of Moscow to fulfill its political contract to guarantee Azerbaijani territorial integrity pushed Baku onto the path of the search for national independence and sovereignty.”
And that drive, one based on a near universal popular consensus that Karabakh must be reintegrated into Azerbaijan, meant that nationalism rather than communism became the republic’s dominant ideology. Indeed, Markedonov says, it is possible to speak of “Karabakhization” as “the foundation” for Azerbaijan’s statehood.
In response to the Soviet invasion, 45,000 Azerbaijanis quit the ranks of the CPSU, and Heidar Aliyev, who had been forced from the Politburo, reemerged as a national leader by speaking to a meeting of Azerbaijanis and others at the permanent representation of his republic in Moscow,
For him and for all Azerbaijanis, Markedonov continues, “problem number one for independent Azerbaijan” was the question of the restoration of the territorial integrity of the country, because its military defeat by the Armenians had had such “a serious influence on the self-identification of Azerbaijanis.”
In the judgment of the Moscow analyst, “Heidar Aliyev’s return to Azerbaijani politics” allowed the country to overcome ethnic separatism at home from the Talysh, Lezgins, and Avars) and “also to minimize the threat [to predominantly Shiite Azerbaijan] from the side of radical Islam.”
After 1993, Markedonov says, “Baku easily dealt with both military risings and ‘rose revolutions,’ but “the main thing that Aliyev was able to achieve is an adequate assessment of the military and foreign policy resources of an independent Azerbaijan and on the basis of this assessment to form a sensible strategy.”
Aliyev recognized that using military force to resolve the problem was not a promising strategy and thus was willing to reach a ceasefire accord with Armenia, and he also understood, Markedonov says, that Baku needed to “overcome the unique diplomatic vacuum around the republic” by reaching out to all major powers and portraying Azerbaijan as “a civilized state.”
In recent years, many people have asked how long this “breathing space” and “concentration” can continue, Markedonov notes, but he argues that however emotionally powerful appeals to recover Karabakh may be, Azerbaijan would not profit from any use of military power anytime soon.
First of all, the Moscow specialist on the Caucasus says, “both Armenia and unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh are serious competitors,” something that dashes any hopes for “a blitzkrieg.” Second, the unsuccessful use of force could threaten the stability of political arrangements in Azerbaijan, as the case of Elchibey in the early 1990s shows.
And third, any military campaign “would create problems not only of a military but also of an informational-political character.” Overnight, such actions would “destroy the image of Azerbaijan, which has been carefully cultivated over the years, as a victim of ‘Armenian aggression.’”
Even if Baku were successful, it would not be forgiven, Markedonov argues, saying that Azerbaijanis should not see the Russian moves in Chechnya as a precedent. That is because, he continues, “what the world forgave Moscow for is something it would not forgive Baku.” Consequently, Azerbaijan’s only option, he concludes is to “wait and ‘concentrate.’”
But the passions ignited by the events of Black January and the centrality of the fate of Karabakh and the other occupied territories remain so great that it is perhaps no surprise that on this “round” anniversary, many Azerbaijanis are hoping against hope that the negotiations will lead to the recovery of their lands or seeking alternatives.
And one of the most interesting – and, following Markedonov’s argument, instructive — is the call by the Sheikh ul-Islam Pasha-Zade, the head of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate in Azerbaijan, for Gorbachev to be brought to trial in the Hague for his crimes against the Azerbaijani nation (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=33786).
That won’t happen, of course, but it is a reminder of the continuing sensitivity of the events of a generation ago in the Caucasus now, an impact that any who are seeking to address the problems there must not only acknowledge but also face up to, all the more now because these feelings have been allowed to fester so long.

http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2010/01/window-on-eurasia-how-gorbachev.html

January 19, 2010
In Search of a Russian Atatürk

07 December 2009

By Alexei Bayer

Russia has found a great way to be complacent about its deficiencies. No matter how extraordinary or hair-raising events are in Russia, parallels can be found with events and trends in the West.

If election fraud is alleged, the recount in Florida during the 2000 presidential vote is mentioned in response. The war in Chechnya can be compared to the invasion of Iraq, while the recent attack on the Nevsky Express fits in with international terrorism.

In the West, these examples represent isolated defects of functioning societies. In Russia, however, they paint a picture of national decay.

Take demographics. While Italy and Spain have a low birth rate, in Russia it goes hand-in-hand with high mortality and low life expectancy. Despite an influx of immigrants, the Russian population is falling rapidly, and the countryside is dotted with ghost villages.

Corruption is also a breed apart. Even in the most corrupt Western countries, officials still work for the state. In Russia, the state seems to exist for the benefit of bureaucrats, and most laws passed by the State Duma make it easier to take bribes, pillage government funds and stifle economic and social development.

Between 1914 and 1953, Russia and the Soviet Union suffered bloodletting on an unprecedented scale. World War I, the Civil War, relentless state terror and World War II, in which Stalin and Hitler combined their efforts to murder tens of millions of Russians, damaged the social fabric, destroyed the best and the brightest, and turned survivors into a quivering herd. It might have been too much for any people to bear. We may now be witnessing the death throes of a once-great nation.

Indeed, Russia’s recent history looks like a steady downtrend. The 1979 invasion of Afghanistan marked the peak of its geographic expansion, after which the Soviet empire began to crumble. First came the loss of Eastern Europe and, soon thereafter, the dissolution of the old Russian Empire. Then it was the superpower status and global influence that disappeared. Now, Chinese migrants are encroaching on depopulated Eastern Siberia, while Beijing wins concessions to explore Russian natural resources that Moscow can’t do on its own. What commodities Russia is still able to produce independently are wasted. While record oil prices brought wealth to oligarchs and state officials, for the average Russian they meant only high inflation. Moreover, the police, the military, health care, education and social services have become degraded.

The Ottoman Empire, which Tsar Nicholas I once called “the sick man of Europe,” decayed in a similar fashion in the 19th century. Wars erupted across Europe as a result, but Turkey was saved from a national catastrophe by liberal reforms enacted by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a military officer and an admirer of the Enlightenment.

Unfortunately, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin didn’t become such a modernizer. He rose to power suddenly and had to rely on his former siloviki colleagues. Russia’s decay only accelerated on his watch. Yet, he can still become a Russian Atatürk. Putin is still Russia’s most powerful man. He is both admired and feared. Although Medvedev is a political lightweight and relies on Putin’s protection, he has started to make tough decisions like firing incompetent bureaucrats.

Whether Putin planned it this way or it happened by accident, Russia’s ruling tandem may yet bring about a national revival. But they will have to ram it down the throat of the boggy system over which they preside.

Alexei Bayer, a native Muscovite, is a New York-based economist.

December 7, 2009