Category: Eastern Europe

  • Killing Two Birds With One Stone?

    Killing Two Birds With One Stone?

    676px Georgia, Ossetia, Russia and Abkhazia %28en%29.svg

    Gulnara Inandzh
    Director
    International Online Information Analytic Center Ethnoglobus

    [email protected]

    RELATED INFO

    https://www.turkishnews.com/ru/content/

    Russia’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia complicated the ethnic situation in the entire Caucasus by creating favorable conditions for the exacerbation of ethnic self-consciousness among many groups and for the manipulation of some of these groups by various countries both in the region and beyond.

    The activities of the Circassians who hope to unite the members of their ethnos into a single republic have attracted a great deal of attention, but developments in Samtskhe-Javakhetia, a Georgian region populated largely by ethnic Armenians have not, although for many reasons, what is going on there may have even greater immediate consequences.

    At the start of this year, the Georgian authorities – as they have in the past sought to prevent the situation in Samtskhe-Javakhetia from getting out of hand – arrested several activists, who Armenians said are completely “innocent.”  But almost at the same moment this exchange occurred, an unusual declaration by Dashgyn Gulmammadov, the president of the National Assembly of Azerbaijanis of Georgia, was released.

    That declaration [1] called for Georgia to be transformed into a confederation of Georgians, Abkhazians and Ossetians.  But despite its Azerbaijani origin, it did not call for ethnic Azerbaijanis to gain autonomy, limiting itself to the demand that in this new state, Azerbaijani should be one of the state languages.  A similar idea surfaced during the Russian-Georgian war of last August.  At that time, its authors were citizens of the Russian Federation and an ethnic Azerbaijani from Iran now living in Sweden.

    And this declaration, by a strange coincidence appearing at the time of the Javakhetia events but one not strange at all if these groups are being manipulated by Moscow and Yerevan, also called for giving the ethnic minorities of Azerbaijan, in particular the Talysh, Avars and Lazgis, similar rights.  By putting out such statements, those who issue them and even more the people who are orchestrating this hope to weaken and fragment Georgia and Azerbaijan and to limit the options of both Tbilisi and Baku.

    Confirmation of this is provided by the following: During the most recent arrests in Samtskhe-Javakhetia, Armenian commentators hurried to accuse Azerbaijan of being behind events there.  In this way, Yerevan sought to take steps to give it greater freedom of action in the future.  First of all, since Javakhetia organizations, in the opinion of Georgian experts, are directed by the Armenian special services and Russia, then the shift in rhetoric toward Georgia regarding its citizens of Azerbaijani nationality beyond any doubt indicates who compiled the “Azerbaijani” declaration.

    Moscow is interested in the further dismemberment of Georgia and consequently views the efforts of the Javakhetia Armenians as a completely logical next step.  Azerbaijanis, on the other hand and as Georgians recognize, do not have separatist ambitions and remain loyal to the Georgian government.  Changing that by a few declarations of the type cited above won’t shift them from that.

    Consequently, it should be obvious that claims to the contrary are simply intended to provide cover for Armenian plans.  Equally indicative of what is going on is that the exacerbating of the ethnic situation in Georgia has slowed the process of the return of Meskhetian Turks to their historical lands in Samtskhe-Javakhetia, a return that Armenians of that region oppose.

    And the sponsors of this exploitation of ethnic minority aspirations have promoted their ideas via scholarly conferences about these communities, propaganda about the dangers of Pan-Turanism and the assimilation of peoples living in Azerbaijan, and the creation of websites which speak out in defense of the rights of ethnic communities living there, to name just a few.  Lazgis, Udins, Tats, Jews, and Kurds who alongside Azerbaijanis and Turks at the beginning of the 20th century were killed by the thousand by Dashnaks have suddenly been transformed into the brothers of the Armenians.  Indeed, Armenian websites are ready to post materials about the interrelationships of the indigenous peoples of Azerbaijan with the power structure which exists in this republic and about the means of expanding relations between them and the Armenian people. [2]

    The latest and especially gratuitous example of this involves the dissemination by the Armenian information agency Panarmenian.net of reports about “Jewish pogroms” in Sumgait this month, events which someone at the agency or somewhere else invented out of whole cloth.  There were no such “pogroms.”  But reports that they were, however false, may help the Armenian lobby in the United States to push through a Congressional resolution about the Armenian genocide.  And it is possible that they were directed at complicating relations between Israel and Turkey.

    Armenia, even as it remains in occupation of Azerbaijani territory, has always sought to convince the world that the rights of ethnic minorities are not protected in Azerbaijan and consequently that it would be unthinkable to return the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh to a position in which they would be threatened by discrimination and destruction.  The ethnic minorities of Azerbaijan and “the defense of their rights” thus remain under the constant control of political operatives in Armenia.

    Unfortunately, this effort is often supplemented by the dispatch of Islamic groups and even criminal elements into Azerbaijan where they pose as “defenders” of the interests of ethnic Daghestanis.  Indeed, the appearance in Daghestan of the youth movement Anti-Turan, the goal of which is the struggle with the spread of Turkish throughout the Caucasus, is a measure of the lengths Armenia and its Russian backers are prepared to go to promote anti-Azerbaijani attitudes. [3]

    Notes
    [1]  Regnum (2009), ‘Настало время добиваться своих национальных целей: президент Национальной ассамблеи азербайджанцев Грузии’, January 30, available at (accessed February 12, 2009).

    [2]  E.g. explore .

    [3]  Khabal.info (2009) ‘Заявление молодежного патриотического движения “Анти-Туран”’, January 18, available at (accessed February 12, 2009).

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  • Georgian Human Rights Groups Meet Western Diplomats

    Georgian Human Rights Groups Meet Western Diplomats

    Civil Georgia, Tbilisi / 10 Mar.2010

    Georgian human rights and advocacy groups met with British, French and U.S. ambassadors in Tbilisi on March 10 to convey their concerns regarding recent cases of, as they put it, targeting human rights groups and activists.

    Representatives from Human Rights Centre (HRC), Georgian Young Lawyers Association (GYLA) and Multinational Georgia, an umbrella organization for dozens of NGOs working on ethnic and religious minority issues, participated in the meeting held in the office of HRC.

    “There have been cases of direct or indirect pressure on activists and human rights groups and we wanted to inform ambassadors about these cases,” Ucha Nanuashvili, head of Human Rights Centre, said.

    He said, among other issues, the case of Arnold Stepanian, founder of Multinational Georgia and representative of Armenian community in Georgia, was raised during the meeting.

    Some Georgian media outlets alleged recently Stepanian was working for the Russian intelligence. Posts made by anonymous users on several Russian internet discussion forums were cited as source of information.

    One of such reports was aired recently by Tbilisi-based Real TV, a station going out in Tbilisi through cable. Its 9-minute long report on the issue opens with footage from a meeting of leaders of Alliance for Georgia (Irakli Alasania, Davit Usupashvili, Davit Gamkrelidze and Sozar Subari) with representatives of Armenian community, also attended by Arnold Stepanian; the footage is accompanied by voiceover saying: “Irakli Alasania, Davit Usupashvili, Davit Gamkrelidze and Sozar Subari are sitting alongside with a presumed special agent of Russia’s Federal Security Service Arnold Stepanian.

    In general targeting opposition politicians has become a hallmark of Real TV; but the way how the station does it has become a source of criticism from many journalist and media experts saying that the station’s reports are often mudslinging.

    After the meeting in HRC office, French Ambassador Eric Fournier told a reporter from Real TV: “Your channel has specifically targeted some members of the opposition to make a very cynical portrait of them and it has been considered as concern by many of us.”

    John Bass, the U.S. ambassador, said the meeting aimed at getting “first-hand impression, first-hand assessment” about the human rights landscape in Georgia.

    “It’s part of our broad interaction with wide range of organizations so that we can assess human rights situation as part of our broad commitment to help Georgia to realize its goals of membership in Euro-Atlantic community,” Bass said.

    Denis Keefe, the British ambassador, said work of human rights groups was “fundamental to Georgia’s democratic development.”

    “We have good cooperation with number of these NGOs… and we have very useful and serious discussion,” Keefe said.

    Ucha Nanuashvili of HRC said that another case raised with the diplomats was related to a long-time investigative journalist Vakhtang Komakhidze, who has requested asylum in Switzerland, citing pressure from the authorities.

    On February 26 eighteen human rights and advocacy groups released a joint statement expressing concern over, as they put it, smear campaign against them.

    “Information campaign against human rights organizations has intensified since December 2009. Those media outlets, which are either controlled by or have links with the authorities, have reported biased stories one after another, where some human rights groups were portrayed as the country’s enemies working against public interests,” a joint statement by 18 non-governmental organizations.

  • Turkey And Russia Jockey For Position In The Region

    Turkey And Russia Jockey For Position In The Region


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    source

    Gulnara Inandzh
    Director
    International Online Information Analytic Center Ethnoglobus

    [email protected]

    [email protected]

    The military conflict between Russia and Georgia has opened the way for Turkey to increase its role in the South Caucasus, not only because of its own skillful policies but also because both Moscow and Washington want it to, albeit for different reasons.  And what is most remarkable is that this transformation of the roles of the various players in the South Caucasus has been most visible in the evolution of the relationship between Turkey and Armenia, two countries long at odds that many felt could never reach an accord.

    The failure of the OSCE Minsk Group to move toward a resolution of the Karabakh problem has, in the wake of the Georgian war, led both Moscow and Washington to welcome Turkey’s offer to play a role on this question, the first lest it lose even more influence in the region and the second lest a reignited Karabakh war threaten its access to Caspian basin oil and gas.

    Armenia appears to welcome Turkey’s intervention in this regard not only because it promises to move the talks ahead but also because it would open the Turkish border for Armenian goods.  But Yerevan is constrained by the Armenian diaspora which insists that every country, including Turkey, must recognize the events of 1915 as genocide.  Only if the diaspora shifts its position on this will real progress be possible, and consequently, it is not surprising that the United States is seeking dialogue with various parts of the Armenian diaspora abroad about the utility for Armenia of a Turkish role in resolving the Karabakh dispute.

    But however that may be, the negotiations behind the scenes between Ankara and Yerevan began in July 2008 in Switzerland, well before the Georgian events.  And it is important to note that Yerevan did not make the recognition of the events of 1915 as genocide a precondition to these talks.

    For not Turkey but Armenia is subject to a blockade and in difficult economic circumstances, Turkish move to engage in talks with Armenia have been most likely prompted by the influence of the United States, the final goal being the opening of the border between Armenia and Turkey.

    The opening of that border and the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries would give “a green light” for American and Western expansion into Armenia.  That is something opposition leader Levon Ter-Petrosyan has been waiting for.  His last declarations of a desire for constructive relations with the authorities and his refusal to call for their ouster are maneuvers with an eye to the Turkish-Armenian talks.

    The United States would like to see Ter-Petrosyan as president of Armenia but to make that happen will require more than just talks with Turkey.  It will require massive economic assistance to get Armenia out of its current slump.  And that in turn will require the inclusion of Armenia in regional economic projects like the one that Turkey has proposed.

    With the opening of the border with Turkey, Yerevan will be able to reach out to the world directly and thus free itself from its forced dependence on Russia.  But before Armenia can expect that to happen, it will have to withdraw its forces from the seven regions of Azerbaijan that it has occupied beyond the borders of Karabakh.  From the point of view of the Kremlin, this needs to take place with the participation of Russia and under the pro-Russian presidency of Serzh Sargsyan lest Moscow’s position in Armenia weaken.

    How this will play out depends not only on how each of these players sees the other but on others besides.  And consequently, what would appear to be a simple vector in the relations of the countries of the South Caucasus this time as so often in the past may go in entirely unexpected directions and undercut the policies of one or more of the governments that are trying to arrange things to their liking.

  • Australian Tatars Mark 60th Anniversary Of First Immigrants

    Australian Tatars Mark 60th Anniversary Of First Immigrants

    CA80BE07 744F 4D86 8CD0 5713BD91CD2B mw270 sTatar children dance at a celebration of the 60th anniversary of Tatar immigration to Australia in Adelaide.

    February 13, 2010
    ADELAIDE, Australia — Ethnic Tatars living in Australia marked the 60th anniversary of their immigration to Australia this week with a series of events, RFE/RL’s Tatar-Bashkir Service reports.

    The majority of the estimated 500 Tatar-Australians are concentrated in Adelaide, South Australia, where they came to settle after World War II.

    Special events were held by Tatar organizations in Adelaide to mark the anniversary. Michael Atkinson, South Australia’s minister for multicultural
    affairs, attended events along with other local officials.

    Tatars also have a cultural center in Adelaide where children can study the Tatar language and culture.

    https://www.rferl.org/a/Australian_Tatars_Mark_60th_Anniversary_Of_First_Immigrants/1957128.html
  • Linguists Urge Crimean Tatars To Switch To Latin Alphabet

    Linguists Urge Crimean Tatars To Switch To Latin Alphabet

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    February 17, 2010

    SIMFEROPOL, Ukraine — Crimean Tatar language experts have approved a move to stop using the Cyrillic alphabet and return to the Latin alphabet, RFE/RL’s Tatar-Bashkir Service reports.
    The issue was discussed by dozens of linguists and other language experts at a special seminar held in Simferopol, Ukraine, on February 15. The experts presented research outlining the grammar of the Crimean Tatar language using the Latin alphabet and agreed on orthographic rules for it to be written using Latin letters.
    They have also recommended that the World Congress of Crimean Tatars (KTDK) formally approve the change.

    Eden Mamut, the secretary-general of the Black Sea Regional Union of Universities and professor at Romania’s Ovidius University, said establishing a common orthography for Crimean Tatar based on the Latin alphabet is an important step in helping unite the some 1.4 million Crimean Tatars who live in several different countries, the majority in Turkey.

    KTDK President Refat Chubarov stated at the seminar that “there is no other alternative for the creation of a productive, communicative system for understanding between all Crimean Tatars than returning to the Latin alphabet and developing a single Crimean Tatar language.”
    Crimean Tatars are an indigenous people of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula who were deported by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin to Central Asia in the 1940s. Many returned to Crimea after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

    Crimean Tatars used the Arabic alphabet before the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in 1917. They were then forced — as were all other Muslim minorities in the Soviet Union — to use the Latin alphabet. They were later ordered to use Cyrillic starting in the 1940s. Many Crimean Tatars abroad still use the Arabic and Latin alphabets, while those living in post-Soviet countries use Cyrillic.

    https://www.rferl.org/a/Linguists_Urge_Crimean_Tatars_To_Switch_To_Latin_Alphabet/1960330.html

  • Russo-Turkish Rapprochement through the Idea of Eurasia

    Russo-Turkish Rapprochement through the Idea of Eurasia

    INTRODUCTION
    In the 1990s, relations between Russia and Turkey were strained, due mostly to the geopolitical reorganization of Eurasia following the demise of the Soviet Union. Both countries entered into direct competition in strategic zones like the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans.
    However, relations began to improve with the visit of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to Ankara in December 1997, followed by that of Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit to Moscow in November 1999 and that of Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov to Ankara in October 2000. Public recognition of this strengthening of Russo-Turkish relations was consolidated during Vladimir Putin’s visit to Ankara in December 2004, which was immediately reciprocated by Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Moscow in January 2005.
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