Category: Southern Caucasus

  • Armenia Debates Landmark Deal With Turkey

    Armenia Debates Landmark Deal With Turkey

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 174September 23, 2009 By: Emil Danielyan

    An ARF rally, September 2009

    Yerevan’s fence-mending agreements with Ankara, which are expected to be signed by October 14, have generated lively and bitter debates among Armenia’s leading political groups. Although many of them have voiced misgivings about key parts of the deal, President Serzh Sargsyan should have no trouble in securing its mandatory ratification by the Armenian parliament. Nor is Sargsyan likely to face serious short-term threats to his rule emanating from Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.

    The most vocal critics of the process, notably the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF, also known as the Dashnak Party), lack either the strength or desire to fight for regime change in the country. Their concerns about the two Turkish-Armenian draft protocols publicized on August 31 revolve around three issues. The most important is the planned creation of a Turkish-Armenian panel of historians that will examine the mass killings and deportations of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Critics allege that Ankara might exploit the existence of such a body in order to dissuade other countries from recognizing the massacres as genocide.

    ARF leaders and other government opponents, such as the former Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian, also strongly object to another provision that commits Armenia to explicitly recognizing its existing border with Turkey. They say the clause is unacceptable because it precludes future Armenian territorial claims to formerly Armenian-populated areas in what is now eastern Turkey. They have also speculated that Sargsyan may have pledged to make more concessions to Azerbaijan in return for Ankara’s agreement to make no reference to the Karabakh conflict in either protocol.

    Sargsyan sought to address these concerns as he met with the leaders of 52 Armenian parties mostly loyal to his administration on September 17. “I also recognize the risks, and have concerns,” he said, opening the five-hour meeting behind closed doors. However, Sargsyan insisted that his conciliatory tone in developing relations with Turkey is worth this risk, since it shows that “a nation which endured the cataclysm of genocide” is genuinely committed to making peace with its longtime foe.” He stressed that diplomatic relations between the two neighboring states and an open border would only be the beginning of a long reconciliation process (Statement by the Armenian presidential press service, September 17).

    Many participants in the discussion were reportedly unconvinced by these arguments. “At one point, there was disappointment on Sargsyan’s face,” one unnamed party leader told the Yerevan newspaper Iravunk de Facto. “Sargsyan looked like a different person after the meeting,” claimed Aram Karapetian of the New Times Party, one of the opposition parties that did not boycott the meeting (RFE/RL Armenia Report, September 17).

    According to Armen Rustamian, an ARF leader who represented the nationalist party at the meeting, the president made clear that the controversial protocols cannot be amended in any way prior to signing the inter-governmental agreement. The ARF drafted and circulated several amendments to the documents (stemming from its objections) on September 15, as dozens of its activists staged a protest outside the main government and foreign ministry buildings in Yerevan against the government’s Turkish policy (Yerkir-Media TV, September 15).

    Hrant Markarian, another Dashnak leader, told Radio Free Europe the following day that Sargsyan might fall from power if he signs the deal in its existing form. The warning seemed hollow, since unlike the other opposition forces, the ARF is not demanding the Armenian president’s resignation, despite its harsh criticism of his Turkish policy. Moreover, the influential party known for its hard line on Turkey holds only 16 seats in Armenia’s 131-member National Assembly and is not in any position to block the agreement. It can only rely on the backing of the opposition Heritage party, which controls seven seats. The parliament’s pro-presidential majority has already voiced its unconditional support for the Turkish-Armenian agreements.

    The Armenian National Congress (HAK), the country’s leading opposition force not represented in the assembly, has adopted a surprisingly subtle position on the matter. Jamestown witnessed the HAK’s leader, Levon Ter-Petrosian addressing thousands of supporters in Yerevan on September 18. He once again accused Sargsyan of being “fooled” by the Turkish government last spring, but he stopped short of denouncing the draft protocols. The former Armenian president stood by the HAK’s September 1 statement, which described the protocols as a step forward, while rejecting the planned Turkish-Armenian genocide study. “Who needs this belated hysteria now that it is almost impossible to influence the process?” he said, scoffing at the ARF uproar.

    Ter-Petrosian himself championed better relations with Turkey, for which he was vilified by the ARF and other nationalist groups during his 1991-1998 presidency. His more cautious stance on the latest developments in the Turkish-Armenian dialogue underscores the changed fortunes of Sargsyan. The latter has remained defensive over a Turkish-Armenian statement issued on the eve of the April 24 remembrance of the tragic events of 1915. The statement, which announced a “roadmap” to normalizing bilateral ties, made it easier for U.S. President Barack Obama to ignore his pre-election pledges to describe the massacres as genocide. Many in Armenia and its worldwide diaspora accused Sargsyan of willingly sacrificing U.S. recognition of the Armenian genocide and gaining nothing in return.

    The August 31 publication of the Turkish-Armenian agreements, which set concrete time frames for the re-opening of the Turkish-Armenian border without preconditions, can now be held up by Sargsyan as a diplomatic success, even if Ankara stalls or blocks its ratification by the Turkish parliament. In the latter case, Yerevan would be able to portray itself as the more constructive party in the Western-backed dialogue and avoid making any unpopular concessions resented by the Armenian opposition. Both the United States and the European Union have stressed the importance of a speedy implementation of these agreements.

    Yerevan was unusually quick to criticize Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan for reportedly reiterating that Turkey will not lift the 16-year economic sanctions on Armenia until agreeing to a Karabakh settlement acceptable to Azerbaijan. In a late-night September 18 statement, Armenian Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandian warned that Erdogan risks wrecking both the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and the Karabakh peace process.

    https://jamestown.org/program/armenia-debates-landmark-deal-with-turkey/

  • Oskanian Condemns Turkey-Armenia Protocols

    Oskanian Condemns Turkey-Armenia Protocols


    By Asbarez Staff on Sep 22nd, 2009

    YEREVAN (RFE/RL)–Former Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian condemned the Turkey-Armenia protocols  on Tuesday, subjecting Armenia’s fence-mending agreements with Turkey to harsh criticism and saying that Yerevan is giving the Turks “everything they have wanted for 17 years” and gaining very little in return.

    In an emotional speech, Oskanian echoed the arguments of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and other vocal opponents of the deal. He rejected government assurances that it calls for an unconditional normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations.

    “The document on diplomatic relations with Turkey that we are to sign should lay the groundwork for long-term good-neighborly relations,” he said. “It should enable the two parties to sit down and frankly talk to each other about both the past and the future. But the existing document does not allow for that. In fact, it precludes such discussions.”

    Like other critics, Oskanian singled out two controversial provisions of the Turkish-Armenian protocols on the establishment of diplomatic relations and reopening of the border between the two countries. One of them envisages the creation of a joint panel of experts that would transform the political debate of the Armenia genocide into a historic one by questioning its veracity.

    The idea of such a study was first floated by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a 2005 letter to then President Robert Kocharian. The latter effectively turned down the offer, saying that this and other issues of mutual concern should instead be tackled by a Turkish-Armenian inter-governmental commission.

    The creation of such a commission is envisaged by one of the protocols that are expected to be signed by the two governments next month. One of its seven “sub-commissions” is to conduct an “impartial scientific examination of historical documents and archives.”

    Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandian and other allies of President Serzh Sarkisian have said that the sub-commission would not seek to determine whether the Armenian massacres constituted a genocide. But Ankara has made no secret of its plans to use the very existence of such a body to keep more countries from recognizing the genocide.

    Oskanian also vehemently objected to another protocol provision that obliges Armenia to recognize its existing border with Turkey. “With one sentence, we completely cede our historical rights. We even close the possibility, no matter how formal, of restoring historical justice,” he said in remarks reflecting the ARF’s position on the issue.

    According to US President Woodrow Wilson’s arbitration award in the Sevres Treaty of 1920, Armenia has a legal right to the formerly Armenian-populated territories in what is now eastern Turkey. The Kocharian administration, in which Oskanian served for ten years, avoided explicitly recognizing a 1921 treaty that set the current Turkish-Armenian frontier.

    Speaking during an event organized by his Civilitas Foundation think-tank, Oskanian linked the perceived alarming developments in Yerevan’s dealings with Ankara to what he described as a lack of democracy in Armenia. “Unfortunately, our country is very far from being a democratic country,” he said. “And yet that’s what our future and security depend on. We have not made serious investments in strengthening our democratic institutions.”


    Below is an abridged version of Oskanian’s speech:


    We are facing a critical historic and political decision as a country and as a people and Civilitas believes in the importance of public debate. But in the case of these protocols, the debate is going off in the wrong direction. Not only are we presented with a fait accompli, but they’re also telling us nothing is changeable, and those documents have no preconditions.

    Reading these protocols one unwillingly comes to the following conclusion: That these documents were prepared, somewhere, with Turkey’s participation, and imposed on the Armenian side, or the Armenian side really did negotiate this document having fully convinced itself that Armenia’s future development and survival is indeed completely linked to the opening of this border.

    Those are the only two possible explanations. Otherwise, it’s not possible to understand the logic of these documents that unequivocally give Turkey what it has wanted for 18 years. Let’s not fool ourselves, let’s not mislead our people, let’s not trample on our own dignity, and let’s call things by their name.

    For a moment, let’s assume that the border will indeed open. We will, as a nation, have to recognize that the border is being opened in exchange for important concessions of history and national honor, and of our sense of who we are and how we view our role and place in this region. We will have conceded our equal place in our future relations with Turkey.

    At the base of this document is a defeatist attitude. It reminds me of the mood in 1997, when we were being told Armenia has no hope of further development, that it can’t be a stable, fully independent state if the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is not quickly resolved. The next 10 years came to disprove this. Despite the many problems and faults of that period, with the border still closed, there was in fact serious economic improvement. Our economy saw double-digit growth thanks to old and new economic reforms and their continuation. The country became more stable, with a new sense of unity, however fragile and incomplete, and with broader Diaspora inclusion.

    Today, Armenia’s situation is again very difficult. We have an inexplicable 18.4% decline in growth, when the average world decline is two to three percent. Diaspora and Armenia have never been so distant from each other. Our society has never been so polarized. Our people have never felt so hopeless about our country’s future. Under these conditions, old sentiments have emerged again, telling us that Armenia can never become a fully independent state and cannot develop economically because of the closed border and the unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

    Today, since we’ve already gone down this road, I can say with even greater confidence, that that’s not the case.

    We must have trust in our own resources, in our people, in our country, in our future. If we successfully completed first generation economic reforms, we must move on to the second, third, fourth, fifth generations. These hold huge potential for our prosperity. We have an ever greater potential source: our unity and common sense of purpose.

    Despite all this, there is also a new area where no one — not past administrations and not this one either – has seriously and honestly ventured. Very little has been done in the thorny but vital area of political reform. Unfortunately, our state is not a democratic state yet. But our whole future and security depend on that one word. We have not invested in fortifying and consolidating our democratic institutions, and now instead of going forward, we are going backwards. Our people, any people, are creative when they are free; but we have not created the conditions, the equal playing field, an assured rule of law society that protects the freedoms that enable prosperity. The closed border has not kept them out. Our succeeding governments have not nourished the seeds that are here on our land.

    Our problems are here, at home. The solutions, too, must be sought here. No one says no to open borders or to an agreement on Nagorno Karabakh. But we must do so in the right way, in a dignified way, not with an imposed external solution, but a solution achieved from positions of strength among equal partners.

    Signing these documents will not solve our problems. On the contrary, they will bring on entirely new setbacks and problems that can only be tackled by a unified, free, hopeful society.

    That is not to say protocols with Turkey should not be signed. Of course they should. Even these two protocols, with all their major and minor unacceptable, controversial, questionable provisions would be acceptable, if at the very least, one sentence were removed, and a few words changed.

    But as currently formulated, they cannot be signed.

    First, if we were to assume that Turkey, after signing the protocols, will ratify them as well, we must ask ourselves, will the opening of the Turkish border be worth the price we will pay? This is the price they have been asking since 1991, when after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey recognized and established diplomatic relations with all former soviet republics except Armenia. Since the beginning, they’ve had two demands – that Armenia renounce any territorial claims, and that Armenians renounce the international genocide recognition campaign. A third demand was added in 1993 – that Armenians withdraw from the territories surrounding Nagorno Karabakh.

    Since that day, those three conditions have been consistently repeated. Today, the first two are formalized in the protocol. It’s there, black on white, and our government has apparently agreed to meet those demands. The protocol is worded such that not only do we agree to respect the territorial integrity of Turkey, but in the next sentence, we consent to renounce our historic rights as well as even the theoretical possibility of regaining historic justice.

    Today there are more than 190 countries in the world, and there are nearly that many territorial disputes among them. That means that pairs of countries with normal relations with each other continue to disagree over their borders. A fourth of those disputes are in Europe. They have embassies, they trade, they have friendly relations, but their diplomats continue to talk and argue, respectfully, over their differing interpretations of history and territory. Those countries have signed protocols and have diplomatic relations.

    In our region, even with our friendly, brotherly Georgia, Armenia and Georgia have not ‘recognized current existing borders.’ Demarcation is just now ongoing between us. Neither have Georgia and Azerbaijan. There, demarcation hasn’t even begun. But there are diplomatic relations. Those other 190 countries have agreed to respect each other’s territorial integrity, not their current existing borders. That is the international practice. There is a clear distinction in international relations between respecting territorial integrity and recognizing current borders. Look, we often say that we recognize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. But we continue the sentence and point out that Nagorno Karabakh has nothing to do with Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity since it’s never been a part of independent Azerbaijan.

    Today, we can recognize Turkey’s territorial integrity. But how we continue that sentence is a right that no one can take from us or our future generations.

    A protocol to establish diplomatic relations between two states sets the start for a long-term relationship during which two countries will tackle and resolve many new and ongoing bilateral problems. When the document that formalizes this relationship includes language that transforms the relationship to an unequal one, extracting one-sided concessions, one wonders about the future of such relations.

    We want relations with Turkey, but we want them with a Turkey that wants equal and reciprocal relations with Armenia. We want relations with a Turkey that understands that the Europe to which we both aspire is not a Europe without disputes, but a Europe where neighbors agree to disagree while continuing to live neighborly and in dignity. We deserve no less.

    The same concerns exist with the protocol provision about a historical subcommission and the ‘impartial scientific examination of the historical records’. Our neighbor, the successor to a state which committed Genocide, has not itself condemned this internationally recognized crime, yet expects to use this protocol to formalize its own unwillingness to confront history. Worse. Armenia’s government has acquiesced and agreed to be dragged into another endless process of denying and rewriting. Already, before the documents are even signed, there is talk of Turkey’s asking countries to re-visit their own statements of genocide recognition and condemnation. Turkey will cite the protocol and proceed with its efforts to rewrite history. Armenia and Armenians will expend energy and time to confirm historic facts.

    These are the pitfalls that await us if Turkey intends to ratify the protocols. But what if this is all intended to show the world that they are ready to proceed with open borders, while at the same time their parliament withholds ratification until Azerbaijan is satisfied with the Nagorno Karabakh resolution?

    This is the fundamental danger. These are not empty fears, this is not the product of an active imagination. Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu remind us of this condition daily. Their demands on Nagorno Karabakh are Azerbaijan’s demands. Already, even before the protocols are signed, they continue to speak of those conditions. During the last year, there has not been an opportunity when Erdogan has spoken of Armenia-Turkey relations, without mentioning a return of the territories surrounding Nagorno Karabakh, and sometimes even return of Nagorno Karabakh itself. There hasn’t been one opportunity when Erdogan in his bilateral meetings, has not spoken about Nagorno Karabakh as an important agenda item. Apparently, Turkey is not concerned that as a consequence of such announcements, Armenia will withdraw from this process or from signing the document. Thus, Turkey is going against the letter and spirit of the document, by taking sides with one neighbor, at the expense of another.

    In other words, if the purpose of this document and this process is to look to the future, that is not happening.

    The only part about this that is surprising is that our leadership either does not hear them, does not want to hear them, or wants to believe they really mean something other than what they say.

    For 15 years, Turkey has maintained the blockade, hoping for our economic and political capitulation. It didn’t happen and will not happen. Today, it is they who desperately need to come out of that political corner in which they placed themselves, it is they who need that border open, and they seem to have found a way to do it, at our expense.

    Today, they need to open the border. It is they who are under great European pressure within their accession time frames. Today, they need to open the border because they are the ones who have economic issues at their eastern border that they need resolved. Today, they need to open the border because they are the ones in fear of the genocide recognition process that has been moving quickly and has culminated in great US pressure. Finally, they need the border open in order to reinforce their leadership role in this region.

    Instead, our government has been making concessions, in their haste to move this process forward. From the beginning, if they were not farsighted enough to avoid being put in this position, now that this situation has been created, they must find a way to change course.

    They have no choice. We are at a crossroads in our history. We have on the table the first bilateral document that the independent sovereign Republic of Armenia intends to sign with the Republic of Turkey. These documents not for and by third parties, as with the countless historical documents of the past where Armenia is a subject and not a party, but for the first time in history, a document in which Armenia is signing on to its own perceived place in history.

    I wanted to make clear the basis of my criticism: we must and should move to normal relations with Turkey. But this document with these formulations should not be signed. Indeed, no one is authorized to sign this document with such formulations.

    When people hear my criticism, sometimes they accuse me of jealousy. I think they do this so that they don’t have to have to deal with the substance of my criticism but instead, they trivialize it so they can dismiss it.

    Nevertheless, I want to confess, I am sometimes envious. But of Turkish diplomacy. I would not dare to bring such a document to the table, I wouldn’t sign it and I don’t envy the man who will soon do so.

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  • Oskanian Condemns Turkish-Armenian Deal

    Oskanian Condemns Turkish-Armenian Deal

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    Armenia — Former Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian criticizes Turkish-Armenian agreements in a speech, 22Sep2009

    22.09.2009

    Tigran Avetisian

    Former Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian subjected Armenia’s fence-mending agreements with Turkey to harsh criticism on Tuesday, saying that Yerevan is giving the Turks “everything they have wanted for 17 years” and gaining very little in return.

    In an emotional speech, Oskanian echoed the arguments of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun) and other vocal opponents of the deal. He rejected government assurances that it calls for an unconditional normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations.

    “The document on diplomatic relations with Turkey that we are to sign should lay the groundwork for long-term good-neighborly relations,” he said. “It should enable the two parties to sit down and frankly talk to each other about both the past and the future. But the existing document does not allow for that. In fact, it precludes such discussions.”

    Like other critics, Oskanian singled out two controversial provisions of the draft Turkish-Armenian protocols on the establishment of diplomatic relations and reopening of the border between the two countries. One of them envisages the creation of a joint panel of experts that would look into the 1915 mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.

    The idea of such a study was first floated by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a 2005 letter to then President Robert Kocharian. The latter effectively turned down the offer, saying that this and other issues of mutual concern should instead be tackled by a Turkish-Armenian inter-governmental commission.

    The creation of such a commission is envisaged by one of the protocols that are expected to be signed by the two governments next month. One of its seven “sub-commissions” is to conduct an “impartial scientific examination of historical documents and archives.”

    Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandian and other allies of President Serzh Sarkisian have said that the sub-commission would not seek to determine whether the Armenian massacres constituted a genocide. Critics, including Oskanian, insist, however, that Ankara will use the very existence of such a body to keep more countries from recognizing the genocide.

    Oskanian also vehemently objected to another protocol provision that obliges Armenia to recognize its existing border with Turkey. “With one sentence, we completely cede our historical rights. We even close the possibility, no matter how formal, of restoring historical justice,” he said in remarks reflecting Dashnaktsutyun’s position on the issue.

    The nationalist party believes that Armenia should eventually lay claim to formerly Armenian-populated areas in what is now eastern Turkey. While having no such territorial claims, the Kocharian administration, in which Oskanian served for ten years, avoided explicitly recognizing a 1921 treaty that set the current Turkish-Armenian frontier.

    Speaking during an event organized by his Civilitas Foundation think-tank, Oskanian linked the perceived alarming developments in Yerevan’s dealings with Ankara to what he described as a lack of democracy in Armenia. “Unfortunately, our country is very far from being a democratic country,” he said. “And yet that’s what our future and security depend on. We have not made serious investments in strengthening our democratic institutions.”

    https://www.azatutyun.am/a/1828694.html

  • Obama Marks Armenian Independence Day

    Obama Marks Armenian Independence Day

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    U.S. — President Barack Obama speaks about health care reform before a joint session of congress on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC, 09Sep2009

    22.09.2009

    U.S. President Barack Obama marked the 18th anniversary of Armenia’s declaration of independence late Tuesday with a special statement and a congratulatory message to his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sarkisian.

    “The people of the United States join the people of Armenia in celebrating Armenia’s day of independence today,” Obama said in a statement posted on the White House website. “We deeply value the many cultural and historic ties that bind our two countries.”

    “The United States gains strength as a nation from the contributions of so many Americans of Armenian ancestry. We congratulate the people of Armenia on their national day,” he added.

    According to Sarkisian’s office, Obama also extended such congratulations in a separate letter to the Armenian president. The holiday is dedicated to the September 21, 1991 referendum in which the vast majority of Armenians voted for secession from the disintegrating Soviet Union. The then Soviet republic formally declared independence two days later.

    Obama similarly congratulated Armenians on the occasion and hailed their “spirit of independence, self-reliance, and survival” one year ago, when he was still a presidential candidate. “Even in the face of genocide, the pain of the past has not defeated the Armenians, either in Armenia or the far-flung diaspora,” he said in a September 2008 letter to Sarkisian.

    https://www.azatutyun.am/a/1828274.html

  • Turkey’s Erdogan Urges Progress On Nagorno-Karabakh

    Turkey’s Erdogan Urges Progress On Nagorno-Karabakh

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    Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian (left) with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in January

    September 22, 2009

    ANKARA (Reuters) — Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has urged international mediators to speed up efforts to resolve a dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave as Ankara aims to normalize ties with long-time foe Armenia.

    Talks on the future of Nagorno-Karabakh, disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan after a war in the 1990s, have been dragging on for more than a decade under the auspices of the Minsk Group linking Russia, France, and the United States.

    Turkey has said it hopes to open its border with Armenia by the end of the year under a protocol to establish diplomatic ties, but further progress has been hampered in the past by the frozen Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

    Turkey closed the frontier in 1993 in solidarity with Muslim ally Azerbaijan, which was fighting Armenian-backed separatists in the breakaway mountain region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

    “Erdogan said the Minsk group that is co-presided by the U.S. has an important role in contributing to the improvement of the relations with Armenia and asked the group to increase their efforts,” Anatolian quoted him as saying on September 22.

    Erdogan made his comments in New York, where he traveled to attend the UN General Assembly. Turkish newspapers have reported that Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu will meet his Armenian counterpart on the sidelines of the gathering.

    Anticipation over an Ankara-Yerevan thaw has been growing ahead of a planned visit by Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian to Turkey on October 14, when he is due to attend the return leg of a World Cup qualifying football match between the two countries.

    Sarkisian has said he will not travel to the game, the first leg of which Turkish President Abdullah Gul watched last year in Yerevan, unless the border has reopened or there are clear signs it is about to open.

    Turkey and Armenia have no diplomatic ties and share a history of animosity stemming from the mass killing of Armenians by Ottoman Turks during World War I.

    Turkey denies the 1915 killings amounted to genocide, but has agreed to set up a commission of international experts on the issue under the protocol it signed with Armenia.

  • Maritime Security Weaknesses in the Black Sea

    Maritime Security Weaknesses in the Black Sea

    By: Vladimir Socor

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 171 September 18, 2009 04:34 PM Age: 8 hrs

    The Russian navy cruiser Moskva in Abkhazia, 2008 

     

    Russian naval operations in August 2008 highlighted the security deficit in the Black Sea. As a littoral country, Russia misused the territory of another littoral country, Ukraine, as a staging ground for attacking a third littoral country, Georgia, using its Black Sea Fleet based in Ukrainian territory in Sevastopol (warships from Novorossiysk also participated in the operation). The Russian fleet landed thousands of troops on the Abkhaz coast, attacked Georgian coastal guard vessels, as well as shore targets further south in Georgia, and blockaded Poti. In that port, Russian troops blew up Georgian coastal guard cutters at the pier.

    The Russian fleet’s actions violated Ukraine’s neutrality, which Russia otherwise professes to uphold vis-á-vis NATO. The naval operation also breached the 1997 basing agreements, which rule out any involvement in hostilities by the Russian fleet based in Ukraine.

    According to Russian media accounts from naval sources in the war’s aftermath, the Russian naval group moved slowly from Sevastopol in the direction of Georgia, four or five days before the August 8 assault. Yet, no littoral or non-littoral country or organization reacted at the political level, before or afterward, to Russia’s naval operation.

    In the war’s aftermath, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko issued a decree requiring the Russian Black Sea Fleet command to provide advanced notification to Ukrainian authorities in each case when its ships and personnel exit and re-enter Ukrainian territory. The decree cites international law and the 1997 basing agreements as the basis for this requirement. Ukraine’s foreign ministry has repeatedly taken up the issue with its Russian government counterparts. Yet the Russian government and naval command have largely ignored it.

    As part of its naval modernization program, Moscow hopes to buy a Mistral-class helicopter carrier from France. Announcing that intention, the Russian Navy’s Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, said: “In the conflict in August last year [against Georgia], a ship like that would have allowed the Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its mission in 40 minutes, not 26 hours which is how long it took us [to land the troops ashore].” The navy also hopes to acquire the license to build three or four Mistral-class ships in Russia. Moscow is preparing an international tender for France, the Netherlands, and Spain – states which also build helicopter carriers of this class- to compete for selling the ship and the technology to Russia (Interfax, September 11, 15).

    According to Vysotskiy, the negotiations are in progress. Moscow apparently expects these NATO countries to enhance Russia’s military capabilities in order to intimidate its neighbors, after the same countries helped block Ukraine’s and Georgia’s membership action plans with the Alliance.

    Moscow has recently introduced adjustments to the command arrangements for its Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine. The fleet shall be subordinated to the Russian North Caucasus Military District (ground forces), headquartered in Rostov-on-the-Don, in the event of “operational missions in the southern and southwestern directions.” Prior to this change, the Russian Fleet in Ukraine was subordinated to the naval command at all times. The change is designed to integrate these naval forces with Russia’s ground forces for operations in the Black Sea region. By the same token this change erodes the provisions of the 1997 Russia-Ukraine agreements that ensure this fleet’s separation from the Russian ground forces and precludes the fleet’s involvement in hostilities (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 3; Interfax, September 11).

    Russia openly questions Ukraine’s sovereignty in the Crimea while signaling that it will try to prolong the stationing of its fleet beyond the 2017 deadline. For that deadline to be observed, the fleet would have to begin the process of withdrawal by 2011-2012. However, Moscow is unwilling and international attention is also lacking. Even some leading Ukrainian proponents of the orientation toward NATO believe that the Alliance and the United States lack a strategy for securing Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity, particularly in the case of escalating Russian pressures in the Crimea (Volodymyr Horbulin and Valentyn Badrak, Defense Express [Kyiv], September 11).

    The existing arrangements for confidence-building and security in the Black Sea are proving inadequate to these challenges. The naval confidence-building undertaking BlackSeaFor and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) are consensus-based groups, unable even to discuss officially, let alone deal with, hard-security challenges such as those relating to the territorial integrity of littoral countries.

    Those groupings and arrangements were not designed to cope with those hard-security challenges; indeed such challenges were not initially anticipated, and went unaddressed after becoming manifest. In terms of naval security, the current situation in the Black Sea amounts to a Russian-Turkish naval condominium, with Turkey probably being the stronger side. The Turkish-led exercise Black Sea Harmony, held periodically with Russia in the southern Black Sea, also has no restraining impact on Russian behavior in the eastern and northern Black Sea.

    https://jamestown.org/program/maritime-security-weaknesses-in-the-black-sea/