Category: Southern Caucasus

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION of the PROTOCOL

FULL TEXT OF THE PROTOCOLS SIGNED BY TURKEY AND ARMENIA

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S E P T E M B E R 0 1 , 2 0 0 9
31 August 2009 | Ankara, Yerevan, Berne
Press Release of The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of The Republic of Turkey, The Republic of Armenia and The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION of the PROTOCOL
Ankara, Yerevan, Berne 31 August 2009
The Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia have agreed to start their internal
political consultations on the two protocols – the “Protocol on the establishment of
diplomatic relations” and the “Protocol on the development of bilateral relations” – which
have been initialled in the course of their efforts under Swiss mediation.
The two Protocols provide for a framework for the normalization of the bilateral relations
within a reasonable timeframe. The political consultations will be completed within six
weeks, following which the two Protocols will be signed and submitted to the respective
Parliaments for the ratification on each side. Both sides will make their best efforts for the
timely progression of the ratification in line with their constitutional and legal procedures.
The normalization of the bilateral relations will contribute to regional peace and stability.
The Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia are committed to pursuing their joint
efforts with the assistance of Switzerland.
FULL TEXT OF THE PROTOCOLS SIGNED BY TURKEY AND ARMENIA
Tuesday, 01 September 2009
Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and
the Republic of Turkey.
The Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey.
Desiring to establish good neighbourly relations and to develop bilateral cooperation in the
political, economic, cultural and other fields for the benefit of their peoples, as envisaged in
the Protocol on the development of relations signed on the same day.
Referring to their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act,
the Charter of Paris for a New Europe,
Reconfirming their commitment, in their bilateral and international relations, to respect and
ensure respect for the principles of equality, sovereignty, non-intervention in internal affairs
of other states, territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers,
Bearing in mind the importance of the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere of trust
and confidence between the two countries that will contribute to the strengthening of peace,
security and stability of the whole region, as well as being determined to refrain from the
threat of the use of force, to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes, and to protect
human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Confirming the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries as
defined relevant treaties of international law,
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Emphasizing their decisions to open the common border,
Reiterating their commitment to refrain from pursuing any policy incompatible with the spirit
of good neighbourly relations,
Condemning all forms of terrorism, violence and extremism irrespective of their cause,
pledging to refrain from encouraging and tolerating such acts and to cooperate against
them,
Affirming their willingness to chart a new pattern and course for their relations on the basis
of common interests, goodwill and in pursuit of peace, mutual understanding and harmony,
Agree to establish diplomatic relations as of the date of the entry into force of this Protocol
accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and to exchange
Diplomatic Missions.
This Protocol and the Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations between the
Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey shall enter into force on the same day, i.e.
on the first day of the first month following of instruments of ratification.
Signed in (place) on (date) in Armenian, Turkish and English languages authentic copies in
duplicate. In case of divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.
For the Republic of Armenia
For the Republic of Turkey
Protocol on Development of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of
Turkey.
The Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey.
Guided by the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic
of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey signed on the same day,
Considering the perspectives of developing their bilateral relations, based on confidence and
respect to their mutual interests,
Determining to develop and enhance their bilateral relations, in the political, economic,
energy, transport, scientific, technical, cultural issues and other fields, based on common
interest of both countries,
Supporting the promotion of the cooperation between the two countries, in the international
and regional organi9zations, especially within the framework of the UN, the OSCE, the
Council of Europe, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the BSEC,
Taking into account the common purpose of both States to cooperate for enchancimg
regional stability and security for ensuring the democratic and sustainable development of
the region,
Reiterating their commitment to the peaceful settlement of regional and international
disputes and the conflicts on the basis of the norms and principles of law,
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Reaffirming their readiness to actively support the actions of eth international community in
addressing common security threats to the region and world security and stability, such as
terrorism, transnational organized crimes, illicit trafficking of drugs and arms,
1. Agree to open the common border within 2 months after the entry into force of this
Protocol,
2. Agree to conduct regular political consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs
of the two countries;
implement a dialogue on the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence
between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical
records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations;
make the best possible use of existing transport, communications and energy infrastructure
and networks between the two countries, and to undertake measures in this regard;
develop the bilateral legal framework in order to foster cooperation between the two
countries;
cooperate in the fields of science and education by encouraging relations between the
appropriate institutions as well as promoting the exchange of specialists and students, and
act with the aim of preserving the cultural heritage of both sides and launching common
cultural projects;
establish consular cooperation in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations of 1963 in order to provide necessary assistance and protection to the citizens of
the two countries;
take concrete measures in order to develop trade, tourism and economic cooperation
between the two countries;
engage in a dialogue and reinforce their cooperation on environmental issues.
3. Agree on the establishment of an intergovernmental bilateral commission which shall
comprise separate sub-commissions for the prompt implementation of the commitments
mentioned in operational paragraph 2 above in this Protocol. To prepare the working
modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-commissions, a working group
headed by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be created 2 months after the day
following the entry into force of this Protocol. Within 3 months after the entry into force of
this Protocol, these modalities shall be approved at ministerial level. The intergovernmental
commission shall meet for the first time immediately after the adoption of the said
modalities. The sub-commissions shall start their work at the latest 1 month thereafter and
they shall work continuously until the completion of their mandates. The timetable and
elements agreed by both sides for the implementation of this Protocol are mentioned in the
annexed document, which is integral part of this Protocol.
This Protocol and the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the
Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey shall enter into force on the same day, i.e.
on the first day of the first month following the exchange of instruments of ratification.
Signed in (place) on (date) in Armenian, Turkish and English authentic copies in duplicate.
In case of divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.
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For the Republic of Armenia
For the Republic of Turkey
Annexed document: Timetable and elements for the implementation of the Protocol on
development of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey.
Timetable and elements for the implementation of the Protocol on development of relations
between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey
Steps to be undertaken
Timing
1. to open the common border within 2 months after the entry into force of the Protocol on
the development of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey
2. to establish a working group headed by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs to prepare the
working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-commission 2 months
after the day following the entry into force of the Protocol on the development of relations
between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey
3. to approve the working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its subcommissions
at ministerial level
within 3 months after the entry into force of the Protocol on the development of relations
between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey
4. to organize the first meeting of the intergovernmental commission
immediately after the adoption of the working modalities of the intergovernmental
commission and its sub-commissions at ministerial level
5. to operate the following sub-commissions:
the sub-commission on political consultations;
the sub-commission on transport, communications and energy infrastructure and networks;
the sub-commission on legal matters;
the sub-commission on science and education;
the sub-commission on trade, tourism and economic cooperation;
the sub-commission on environmental issues: and
the sub-commission on the historical dimension to implement a dialogue with the aim to
restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific
examination of the historical records and archive to define existing problems and formulate
recommendations, in which Armenian, Turkish as well as Swiss and other international
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experts shall take part. at the latest 1 month after the first meeting of the
intergovernmental commission

October 7, 2009

Protocols to be Signed and Ratified With Possible Reservations

The President of Armenia spent just 24 hours in Los Angeles on October 4, following brief visits to Paris and New York. Angry protesters greeted him in all three cities, accusing him of making unacceptable concessions in a pending agreement with Turkey.

In a large conference hall in the Beverly Hilton hotel, Beverly Hills, around 60 community leaders were invited to exchange views with the President on the Armenia-Turkey Protocols. They had to first pass through metal-detectors to get into the hall.

Meanwhile, thousands of demonstrators had gathered outside the hotel waving placards, demanding Pres. Sargsyan’s resignation, and chanting slogans that could be heard all the way inside the 8^th floor conference room. A small plane could be seen hovering overhead, flying a large banner with the inscription — “No to Protocols.”

After the President’s opening remarks, I was called upon to address the issues at hand. In welcoming the President to Los Angeles, I wondered why he had decided to consult with Diaspora Armenians, only after the negotiations with Turkey had been concluded and the Protocols already initialed. What was the purpose of this “consulting tour,” when Armenia and Turkey were just days away from signing the Protocols in Switzerland? If the visit was intended to appease the Diaspora, why was it not done earlier, before most Armenians went into a frenzy, causing chaotic scenes in Paris where demonstrators were violently dragged off by the French police to allow the President to lay a wreath at the feet of the Gomidas Statue?

Tense confrontations do not lend themselves to calm and meaningful dialogue.

I also questioned the wisdom of trying to reconcile with Armenia’s long-standing enemies, at a time when Armenians have great difficulty reconciling with each other. Rather than forming an Armenian-Turkish commission, there is a greater need for an intra-Armenian task force to reach a common understanding of their political demands, and agree on a proper division of labor between the Armenian government and Diasporan communities.

I expressed the opinion that these Protocols were not only poorly negotiated, but also concluded under foreign pressure. Furthermore, contrary to the President’s protestations, the Protocols include several Turkish preconditions, such as acceptance of Turkey’s territorial integrity, and re-examination of the Genocide issue.

While the Armenian side has negotiated in good faith, Turkish leaders have kept repeating their rejectionist refrain — as seen in Pres. Gul’s recent statement in Nakhichevan — that Turkey would not open its border with Armenia, until the Karabagh conflict is settled. What was the whole point of these negotiations and concessions, if Armenia’s border with Turkey would remain closed?

Even if the Protocols are signed and ratified, and the border is opened, Armenia could still end up holding an empty bag, should Turkey, under some future pretext, close it down again. I asked Pres. Sargsyan if he would be prepared to add a reservation to the Protocols, stating that Armenia would nullify the agreement, should Turkey close the border again!

I also expressed my agreement with the President’s concern — stated during an interview with the Armenian Reporter — that some of the provisions of the Protocols were bound to make the pursuit of the recognition of the Armenian Genocide even more challenging. I asked the President if it was wise to make the Armenian activists’ already difficult task of confronting the powerful Turkish state even more difficult!

I concluded my remarks by urging the President not to rush into signing these flawed and detrimental Protocols. Why attempt to resolve through a single document, decades-long problems between Armenia and Turkey? A one-line document simply calling for the establishment of diplomatic relations and opening of the borders would have sufficed.

I pointed out that the President’s acceptance of the Protocols, was forcing Armenians to pin their hopes on the possibility that Turkey itself would inadvertently end up safeguarding Armenia’s interests by refusing to ratify the agreement for its own reasons.

In response to my remarks, Pres. Sargsyan expressed his willingness to accept my suggestion to add a reservation to the Protocols that would call for the repeal of the agreement, should Turkey ever decide to close the border, after opening it.

In the course of the three-hour-long meeting during which very few of the 29 speakers supported the Protocols, Pres. Sargsyan insisted that he would never accept the re-examination of the facts of the Armenian Genocide by the historical sub-commission referred to in the Protocols. He stated that the main task of this sub-commission would be to discuss the steps necessary for the removal of the consequences of the Genocide. The President expected that the agreement would open new avenues to educate the Turkish public about the Armenian Genocide. He also categorically rejected the possibility of being pressured into making concessions on Artsakh!

Given Pres. Sargsyan’s refusal to accept the re-examination of the Genocide and rejection of any concessions on Artsakh — two key Turkish demands — one wonders if members of the Turkish Parliament would ever agree to ratify these Protocols and open the border with Armenia!

Pres. Sargsyan concluded the lengthy session by acknowledging that he himself has concerns about some aspects of the Protocols that have not been fully assessed! He stated that the Protocols could close the door on future demands from Turkey and may cause difficulties in resolving the Artsakh conflict. Similar concerns were also expressed by Arkady Ghoukassian, the former President of Artsakh, who was accompanying Pres. Sargsyan.

Despite such misgivings, it was clear from the Pres. Sargsyan’s overall remarks that he did not entertain any revisions of the Protocols, and seemed fully intent on seeing them signed and ratified, possibly after adding some reservations.

October 6, 2009

Ruling Party Confident of Diaspora Support for Turkey Deal

Armenia — Razmik Zohrabian, one of the leaders of the ruling HHK in a press conference. 05Oct2009

05.10.2009

Sargis Harutyunyan, Ruzanna Stepanian

A senior representative of Armenia’s ruling party on Monday expressed confidence that a majority of the worldwide Armenian Diaspora supports the current rapprochement with Turkey and, in particular, the two draft protocols envisaging the normalization of bilateral relations that the two countries are expected to sign later this month.

Deputy Chairman of the Republican Party of Armenia (HHK) Razmik Zohrabian made the statement amid the continuing tour of President Serzh Sarkisian of the Diaspora communities in Europe, the United States, the Middle East and Russia aimed at discussing his far-reaching overtures to Turkey.

The leading Armenian organizations in the world have expressed conflicting views on Armenia’s dramatic rapprochement with Turkey that Sarkisian initiated last year by inviting his Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gul to Yerevan to attend a football game between the two countries’ national teams. The yearlong process culminated on August 31 in the initialing of two protocols that some leaders in the far-flung Armenian Diaspora have rejected as flawed.

Those opposed to the signing of the protocols as well as some of those with moderate views are particularly concerned over several key points. One such point envisages the establishment of a Turkish-Armenian intergovernmental sub-commission to conduct an “impartial scientific examination of historical documents and archives.” Many in Armenia and its Diaspora fear this provision is tantamount to debating and therefore questioning what Armenians view as the body of ample evidence that the 1915-1918 mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire constituted genocide.

Diaspora groups are also critical of another protocol clause that commits Armenia to recognizing its existing border with Turkey. They argue that it would thus preclude future Armenian territorial claims to areas in eastern Turkey that were populated by their ancestors until the Ottoman-era massacres.

Answering an RFE/RL question on Monday, the HHK’s Zohrabian downplayed the scale of protest against the protocols in Diaspora communities during the Sarkisian trips.

So far, Sarkisian was met with protests in all of the three communities that he visited, including Paris, New York and Los Angeles.

Zohrabian said that while he did not object to people staging protests, but he objected to them doing so in “an insulting manner.”

“The president himself said that people may come and express their discontent in a silent manner, because, after all, the matter concerns the 1915 Genocide and subsequent years. That is, that we also remember, are silent and in grief, but not by shouting,” said Zohrabian.

“Anyway, that’s bearable too, because not all in society are of the same opinion. One may shout loudly, even make offensive comments, others may treat it calmly,” he added. “In any case, the number of protesters was not that large.”

Zohrabian sounded confident that the Armenia-Turkey protocols will be signed on October 10. He stressed that the governing coalition will bear responsibility “if the protocols prove to be detrimental to Armenia’s state interests.”

Zohrabian’s optimism about the future benefits from the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border is shared also by wealthy Armenian-American benefactor Vahakn Hovnanian.

At a press conference in Yerevan on Monday, Hovnanian stressed that the opening of new roads for transport goods will have a positive effect on the cost of living in Armenia.

Hovnanian said in the past he, too, had a tough stance on Turkey, but having lived in Armenia and “having seen the difficulties in the homeland”, he had arrived at the conclusion that the Turkish-Armenian border must be reopened.

At the same time, Hovnanian called it “normal emotions” that some in the Diaspora oppose the Armenia-Turkey deal. “We always had protests near Turkish consulates on [Genocide commemoration day] April 24. We all would gather and go for demonstrations near Turkish embassies,” he explained.

Yet, Hovnanian contradicted the opinions that the signing of the protocols will hamper the Armenian push for the world’s governments to recognize the Ottoman-era mass killings and deportations of Armenians as genocide. “It can’t… As many as 22 countries and 44-45 states in the United States have already recognized the genocide. The next day after the opening of the border we can sue them [Turks] in court to defend our cause,” said Hovnanian.

https://www.azatutyun.am/a/1844039.html

October 5, 2009
Sarkisian Continues Diaspora Tour

Serzh Sarkisian, President of Armenia, meets representatives of the Armenian Diaspora in New York, 03Oct, 2009

05.10.2009

Hasmik Smbatian, Gevorg Stamboltsian

President Serzh Sarkisian on Monday continued his weeklong tour of major Armenian communities to discuss and promote his far-reaching diplomatic overtures to Turkey that many in the Diaspora have been following with unease.

After his visit to French capital Paris on Friday that met with some protests from local Armenians, Sarkisian crossed the Atlantic Ocean to continue his tour in the United States, meeting with prominent Diaspora members in New York and Los Angeles. Sarkisian’s other scheduled stops include Beirut and Rostov-on-Don in southern Russia.

In American soil, meanwhile, Sarkisian was also reportedly greeted by protesters outside his meeting places. Many urged the Armenian president not to sign a deal with Turkey in its current form that they claim will be damaging to the state and national interests of Armenia and will disregard the national

Serzh Sarkisian meets representatives of the Armenian Diaspora in Los Angeles, 04Oct, 2009

aspirations of Armenians in Diaspora communities.

Thousands of Armenian Americans from throughout California reportedly gathered near Beverly Hilton Hotel as part of a protest organized Sunday by a local campaign group.

During his meetings in all three cities, Sarkisian attempted to persuade Diaspora Armenians that the initialed protocols between Yerevan and Ankara on establishing diplomatic ties and developing bilateral relations do not harm Armenian state and national interests, but, on the contrary, open new opportunities for resolving the centuries-old feud between the two neighbors.

The leading Armenian organizations in the world have expressed conflicting views on Armenia’s dramatic rapprochement with Turkey that Sarkisian initiated last year by inviting his Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gul to Yerevan to attend a football match between the two countries’ national teams. The yearlong process culminated on August 31 in the publication of two draft protocols expected to be signed by Yerevan and Ankara later this month and submitted for further ratification to parliaments.

Some Diaspora leaders have expressed serious concern about key points of the two draft protocols envisaging the normalization of bilateral relations. They are particularly critical of the planned creation of a Turkish-Armenian panel of historians that would look into the 1915 mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, claiming that this provision is tantamount to questioning the fact of the Armenian Genocide.

Diaspora groups also object to another protocol clause that commits Armenia to recognizing its existing border with Turkey. They argue that it would preclude future Armenian territorial claims to areas in eastern Turkey that were populated by their ancestors until the 1915-1918 massacres.

There are also lingering concerns in and outside Armenia about a possible linkage between Armenian-Turkish normalization and the Armenian-Azerbaijan talks on the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.

In Paris, New York and Los Angeles, President Sarkisian reiterated that Armenia is pursuing an unconditional normalization with Turkey.

“I think that we have managed to get the maximum for now,” said Sarkisian in New York on Saturday, as reported by his press office.

Sarkisian, in particular, said that the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008 created a new situation in the South Caucasus, which, according to him, to some extent prepared ground for an Armenian-Turkish dialogue. He added that the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations would in turn promote regional détente by creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence.

At his meeting with several dozen Diaspora representatives Sarkisian emphasized that the fact of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire cannot be discussed in the context of rapprochement with Turkey.

“The only question in connection with the Genocide that can become a subject for discussion is how we can help the Turkish people to be more unbiased in going through the pages of their own history or, to be more precise, how to overcome the consequences of the Genocide,” Sarkisian stressed.

On the third leg of his tour in Los Angeles, Sarkisian met Sunday with Diaspora representatives of the western coast of the United States as well as South American countries with large Armenian communities.

Speaking about the Armenia-Turkey dialogue, Sarkisian underscored that negotiations with Ankara have been conducted ever since Armenia became independent in 1991 and simply became “public” following the initiative during his presidency.

“I believe that it is possible to have normal negotiations, have normal relations with Turkey and benefit from it,” Sarkisian underscored.

Meanwhile, American-Armenian groups voiced mixed reaction to Sarkisian’s meetings in New York and Los Angeles.

New York – Representatives of the Armenian Diaspora protest possible signing of Armenian – Turkish protocols, 03Oct, 2009

Executive Director of the Armenian National Committee of America Aram Hamparian, who coordinated the protest actions of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in New York, said to RFE/RL: “The negotiations on these protocols proceeded in a secret atmosphere. A six-week period was set for the Armenian and Turkish sides to give approval to the documents. In reality, however, the protocols are not subject to change, even to the slightest alteration.”

“Two leading Armenian publications in the United States, Asbarez and The Armenian Reporter, conducted opinion polls among 2,400 local Armenians. The polls show that 90 percent of the respondents are against the protocols. And between 94 and 95 percent of the respondents consider that the protocols are more favorable for Turkey,” said Hamparian.

In response to this, Haig Deranian, the head of one of American-Armenian organizations, the Knights of Vartan, that supports the ratification of the protocols, said: “This is not true. Armenian organizations with a more moderate position are very angered at the circumstance that the ANCA speaks on behalf of the entire Diaspora. They represent a small group of Armenians who are treated with respect, but they have no right to speak on behalf of the majority. I can speak only on my behalf and on behalf of my organization, but not all Armenians.”

“The Armenian government should know well that the Diaspora has an emotional approach to this matter as it has felt the consequences of the genocide from the very beginning. But emotions notwithstanding, we should also be objective and try to support the Armenian nation and promote the welfare of our country,” Deranian emphasized.

According to the schedule of the tour announced by Sarkisian’s office, the Armenian president’s next stop is in Beirut to be followed by his meetings in Rostov-on-Don in southern Russia.

Meanwhile, Sarkisian’s spokesman Samvel Farmanian on Monday confirmed to RFE/RL that the Armenian president had received an official invitation from his Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gul to visit Turkey to attend the return match between the two countries’ national football teams.

The FIFA World Cup 2010 qualifier between Turkey and Armenia will be held in the northwestern Turkish city of Bursa on October 14.

According to announcements made by Turkish leaders that yet need to be confirmed by the Armenian side, the foreign ministers of Armenia and Turkey are scheduled to sign the protocols in Switzerland on October 10.

https://www.azatutyun.am/a/1843752.html

October 5, 2009
Turkey’s EU Membership: Will the ‘Armenian Opening’ Help?

Caucasus Update No. 49, October 5, 2009

Caucasian Review of International Affairs

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Turkey’s foreign policy, as emphasised by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, is to have ‘zero problems with neighbours’ (Today’s Zaman, September 13). This is, first and foremost, intended to stabilise Turkey’s complex regional environment and ensure Turkey’s reputation as a peacemaker. It is also, more tactically, intended to boost Turkey’s long-running EU membership application. Ankara hopes to show that it is a responsible, and indeed indispensable, partner for Europe in Eurasia and the Middle East.
The rapprochement with Armenia, which seems to be gathering pace, is sometimes interpreted in this light. Turkey’s chief EU negotiator, Egemen Bağış, stated in early September that he expected the ‘Armenian opening’ to help Turkey’s EU bid (Today’s Zaman, September 2). However, this view is rather optimistic. In reality, normalization of relations with Armenia will have a marginal effect on Turkey’s EU application, at best.

In truth, the EU has never been particularly concerned about the closed border between Armenia and Turkey. European policy towards the South Caucasus as a whole has been patchy and vague. It took the war in Georgia for the EU to take an active stance, and in truth this was mainly the product of Nicolas Sarkozy’s energetic diplomacy as EU President, rather than any institutional determination on behalf of the whole Union.

The EU Monitoring Mission now keeping the peace between Georgia and Russia is welcome: however, as the Caucasus Update has argued before, the lack of subsequent hostilities is due to Russia’s lack of interest in a new conflict, not the EU’s efforts (Caucasus Update, March 16).

The EU has been less concerned about the Turkish-Armenian confrontation and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Europe has let the OSCE take the lead on Karabakh, and has been content to sit back and express its support for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. There is little appetite within Brussels, for instance, for an EU peacekeeping force to be deployed in such a tense environment.

However, the EU still has an interest in preventing major conflicts in the ‘wider European space’. The cold war between Turkey and Armenia does not pose this risk. Although Turkish troops might intervene in the event of a new Karabakh war, they did not do so in the early 1990s, partly out of a desire to maintain a semblance of a balanced policy towards the conflict. Ankara, now more than ever, values its role as a peacemaker. Military intervention would destroy that reputation and cripple Turkey’s EU accession hopes.

Without a risk of war, it is clear that the thaw between Armenia and Turkey is hardly at the top of the EU’s list of priorities. Brussels already has evidence of Turkey’s good intentions as a regional mediator: it is currently negotiating between Iraq and Syria (BBC, August 31), has been intermittently involved in the Israel-Palestine peace process, and has also been quietly acting as a bridge between the West and Iran. Although welcome, opening the border with Armenia would not be a ‘game-changer’ in Turkey’s relationship with the EU.

Indeed, the two biggest game-changers in Ankara’s membership talks are Cyprus and the ‘Kurdish question’. Cyprus is, superficially, similar to the Armenian issue – an inter-state dispute with deep roots, which currently hinges on a closed border and diplomatic recognition. Unlike the Armenian issue, Cyprus is an EU member. Consequently, the dispute with Cyprus is the biggest single stumbling block in Turkey’s EU application.

Clearly it is not the only issue – there are 35 ‘chapters’ on which Ankara must satisfy Brussels, and only one (science and research) has been completed. But Cyprus’ significance is such that, when Turkey failed to apply a 2005 protocol on free movement of goods and people to the Cypriot government, the EU insisted that no ‘chapters’ could be closed, and that several would not be discussed until it had applied the protocol. The stakes are hardly as high in the Armenian thaw.

The Kurdish question is less significant than Cyprus, but more so than Armenia. The EU is reluctant to move forward on membership talks with a state which still – despite much recent progress – faces a serious ethnic insurgency. Until Ankara can, in the eyes of Brussels, get its house in order and negotiate a peaceful settlement with its Kurdish population, it will continue to be viewed as an irresponsible and unsuitable candidate for membership by some within Brussels.

It is instructive to look at the question in reverse. If, for instance, Turkey had resolved Cyprus and the Kurdish question, but had failed to make headway on opening the Armenian border, would this impede its membership process? It is unlikely.

Indeed, the only EU members which would be likely to turn the Armenian issue into an obstacle would be those – notably France – which already oppose Turkish accession. Most pragmatists in Brussels would probably be willing to move on, and urge Ankara towards an open border whilst continuing the membership negotiations.

It would be wrong to think that the EU does not value the thaw between Turkey and Armenia. It does improve Turkey’s reputation. But that reputation is already high, for more important reasons. And it is not the lack of an open border with Armenia – which the EU has little interest in – which is blocking Ankara’s accession to the Union. Until Cyprus and the Kurdish question are resolved, whether or not the Armenian border is open will be a minor footnote in Turkey’s relationship with Brussels.

Caucasian Review of International Affairs

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October 5, 2009
Azerbaijan: the next flashpoint between the U.S. and Iran

by Maksud Djavadov

“The most widely propagated idea by the state controlled media in Azerbaijan is not the liberation of occupied Karabakh but the “unification” of Tabriz with the Republic of Azerbaijan: essentially, the partition of Iran. In the coming years, if not sooner it will not be surprising to witness Azerbaijan as the next U.S. theatre from which political, social and economic pressure will be exerted on Iran. The U.S. knows that Azerbaijan is Iran’s vulnerable spot.”

Iran has played an important role in the crucial events affecting global politics for at least 3,000 years. At no time in history, however, has Iran been more important in global politics than since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Some historians might contend that during the rule of Cambyses II in 530 bc, Persia was at its peak because of the vast territory it controlled and the great power it wielded. But the Persia of those days was only first among equals. Indeed it controlled vast territory but it was a pagan state ruled by an absolute monarch with a hierarchy of social values and a political system similar to most other existing states at the time.

Thus, it was simply part of an established political order lacking its own unique character and an alternative system. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 is radically different because it challenged the Western-imposed political order by demolishing many key pillars of its control through the implementation of an alternative system of governance. At no time since the victory of the Islamic Revolution has Iran been more of a challenge to the colonial powers, especially the U.S., than it is now. This challenge manifests itself at different levels globally. The next most probable point where this confrontation will heat up will be the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The U.S.-Iran confrontation in Afghanistan, Lebanon and Iraq must be briefly analyzed in order to understand the potential for a new flashpoint. Before its invasion and occupation of Afghanistan the U.S. did not have direct military presence in regional conflicts. Prior to 9/11 the U.S. was mostly involved through its proxies, namely the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and Central Asia. The only occasion when it became directly involved in a Middle Eastern conflict before the invasion of Afghanistan was the Gulf War of 1991, but even then Washington tried to reduce its involvement by making other countries pay 85% of the total war bill of $61 billion and by not marching on Baghdad.

After 9/11, the U.S. became a direct party to conflicts in the region. Many US officials thought that after invading and occupying Afghanistan, that borders Iran, Washington would gain the upper hand vis-a-vis Iran. In reality, the U.S. weakened its most powerful anti-Iranian partner in Afghanistan, namely the pro-Wahhabi movement of the Taliban. After the fall of the Taliban, Iran quickly moved into Afghanistan by investing over $600 million into the reconstruction of Afghanistan and strengthening the Hizb-e Wahdat Party, which shares similar ideals to that of Islamic Iran. Tehran also engaged selected elements in the newly formed Afghan government and secured some support. Through careful use of ideological and cultural bonds that unify the people of Iran and Afghanistan, Tehran managed to isolate the U.S. both politically and socially in Afghanistan. Washington tried to correct and compensate for its failure to pressure Iran through Afghanistan by occupying Iraq.

Official thinking in Washington was that by deposing Saddam Husain so easily and installing a new government, the U.S. would whip up Arab and Kurdish nationalist sentiment to exert pressure on Iran. Again the U.S. failed to see the strong Islamic bond between Muslims in Iraq and Iran. Elimination of the former U.S. ally Saddam, created a political, economic and social vacuum in Iraq. Islamic movements who shared the same political and existential ideals of Islamic Iran quickly filled the vacuum. Once again, the U.S. became isolated politically and socially and had to rely entirely on its military to pressure Iran. However, after targeting those forces the US deemed “pro-Iranian” and triggering Islamic resistance spearheaded by the Mahdi Army, the US realized the limits of its power due to its political and social isolation and halted its military offensive. The U.S. desperation forced its military and intelligence services to establish links with former al-Qaeda members. This new structure came to be known as al-Sahwa whose main purpose was and remains countering political movements in Iraq that are not hostile to Iran. This also backfired and the mighty “superpower” was for the first time accused by its allies in the region of incompetence due to its inability to fully control former al-Qaeda members. Nevertheless, the U.S. has not given up on its desire to dominate the region.

The U.S. launched its most desperate attempt to make up for losses against Islamic Iran by supporting Israel’s July 2006 aggression in Lebanon. Again, the US plan implemented by the Zionist military suffered a historic defeat at the hands of Hizbullah’s valiant resistance. The U.S. is currently trying to make up for its defeat by instigating armed conflict in Lebanon. This too is doomed to fail because of Hizbullah’s popularity among all segments of Lebanese society owing to its courageous defence of Lebanese territorial integrity.

The foregoing review brings us to the next point where another U.S.-Iran conflict, this time in Azerbaijan, is a strong possibility. No two countries bond more strongly religiously, culturally and historically than Iran and Azerbaijan. Although ethnic Azeris inhabit a large part of Iran where they have always played a key role in various aspect of the Islamic Republic, Tehran appears not to have paid as much attention to securing its interests in Azerbaijan as it did in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon. Azerbaijan is the only country where Iran’s interests are vulnerable while the U.S. has struck deals with Baku to secure its interests. Azerbaijan alone openly supports the presence of forces hostile to Islamic Iran despite no direct U.S. military presence on its soil. Anti-Iranian forces are protected by the current regime in Azerbaijan. All other strategic locations bordering Iran that host opponents of Islamic Iran, also host U.S. military personnel because the proxy governments alone are not able to fully secure American interests. This is not the case in Azerbaijan.

Over the years, the U.S. has built two radar stations in Azerbaijan. The first is located north of Baku while the second is near Azerbaijan’s southern border with Iran in the region of Astara. Officially, the American sponsored radars are designed to monitor the movement of weapons of mass destruction; unofficially, they are there to spy on Iran. The current Azeri regime has been a staunch supporter of U.S. strategic advances in the region. Baku supported the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by contributing troops and therefore conferring legitimacy on the fiction that the US had international support. Apart from siding with Iran’s political rivals, the Azeri regime that maintains tight control over the media has also been bolstering anti-Iranian sentiment inside Azerbaijan for over a decade.

The most recent example was the anti-Iranian propaganda played out on September 3, 2007. From this date onward, major Azeri media sources continuously reported “breaking news” about alleged Iranian citizens serving with armed gangs of Armenian nationalists in Karabakh. The propaganda portraying Iran as an ally of the occupation forces in Karabakh is an old stunt, but one that has a strong effect. Iran has so far not countered even such false reports by simply reminding the Azeris that it was Iran that aided the arrival of 1,300 Afghan volunteers to fight for Azerbaijan during the war with Armenia. The Azeri regime blocks all information that may show Iran as a friend of the Azeri people.

On the political landscape in Azerbaijan, Iran lacks the kind of allies it has in Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. Most socio-political NGOs in Azerbaijan and the so-called political “opposition” groups are funded by the U.S. and its allies. However, any contact between Azeri socio-political movements with Islamic institutions in Iran is immediately branded as espionage by the Baku regime and the people involved are punished harshly. In addition to the government’s systematic policies against Islamic Iran, the regime has also managed to create a strong sense of Iranophobia in a small, but significant portion of Azeri society.

The U.S. knows that unlike Iraq where Iran has the support of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and Lebanon where Hizbullah is a committed ally of Iran, in Azerbaijan Iran has few allies to counter U.S. pressure. Perhaps there is inadequate realization in Tehran that the Azeri government has supported all of the strategically important U.S. policies aimed at exerting pressure on Iran. The most widely propagated idea by the state controlled media in Azerbaijan is not the liberation of occupied Karabakh but the “unification” of Tabriz with the Republic of Azerbaijan: essentially, the partition of Iran. In the coming years, if not sooner it will not be surprising to witness Azerbaijan as the next U.S. theatre from which political, social and economic pressure will be exerted on Iran. The U.S. knows that Azerbaijan is Iran’s vulnerable spot.

Source: usa.mediamonitors.net/, October 4, 2009)

October 5, 2009