Category: Southern Caucasus

  • Houston/TEXAS: TurkishPAC’s Position on the Recently Signed Protocol

    Houston/TEXAS: TurkishPAC’s Position on the Recently Signed Protocol

    Written by Administrator
    Thursday, 15 October 2009 16:00

    Turkey closed its Armenian Border and suspended the relations between Turkey and Armenia as a consequence of the Armenian occupation of the Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno-Karabagh, in 1992.  Recently a protocol between the Turkish and the Armenian governments has been signed, which may lead to the opening of Borders and normalizations of relations between the two nations, if approved by both nations’ parliaments.

    To the best of our knowledge, the protocol agreed by the two sides does not have any provisions that indicate that Armenia has promised to meet any of the conditions Turkey has put forth for opening of the Armenian Border and normalization of the relations between the two nations. Quite the contrary, the Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian has recently stated that normalization of the relations between the two states should have no preconditions, and that Turkey and Armenia have a mutual understanding to that end.

    TurkishPAC firmly opposes normalization of the Turkish-Armenian relations without preconditions. It believes that normalization should depend on Armenia’s agreeing to certain conditions. In particular, Armenia should:

    • Comply with the UN resolution to withdraw from the Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno-Karabagh, which it illegally occupies,
    • Drop false “genocide” claims against Turkey that go back almost 100 years and agree to the establishment of a joint committee of historians, as proposed by Turkey, to study and judge the 1915 events. As Turkey has declared it would do so, Armenia should declare that it would consider the findings of such a committee binding.
    • Withdraw its support to the Armenian Diaspora on the latter’s campaign to disseminate “genocide” propaganda, and,
    • Remove indirect reference to a Greater Armenia in its Constitution by amending Article 13 of Chapter 1 that describes its national coat of arms.

    With regard to items 3 and 4, note should also be made that in its Declaration of Independence in 1990, Armenia declared its support to false “genocide” claims against Turkey and has referred to Eastern Anatolia as “Western Armenia,” and as such, considers this area as part of Armenia. That is not a friendly posture toward a neighbor.

    TurkishPAC continues to view with apprehension the Turkish Government’s signing a protocol with Armenia, which will lead to opening the border and normalization of the relations between the two countries without any preconditions.

    TurkishPAC Board of Directors

  • Letter Of Turkish Armenian Sevan Ince Before Committing Suicide

    Letter Of Turkish Armenian Sevan Ince Before Committing Suicide

    © This content Mirrored From  http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com The other night, we four Armenian friends were out from our Clubhouse and enjoying our water pipes at Galatasaray. The conversation turned around and came to the known topic. I sensed that every one is troubled on the same subject. How would you make this heard to the world as a Turk with Armenian origin being a simple citizen of Turkey? . .

    You are not a reputed artist, politician or president of some association that others would extend the microphone to you for an interview. You are not a columnist, so that you can make your ideas heard from your newspaper corner. All is fine, but we are fed up with this affair. Other persons speak in our place, knowing or having no idea.

    On one side say that “there was a genocide made to Armenians” and on the other side they say “there is no genocide”. Now the latest fashion is those who say, “let us leave it to historians”. I just look to those who say that there was a genocide committed, and I see that they are either diaspora members full of hatred and grudge or politicians, who have a benefit from the matter. I look at those who say “there was no genocide” and I see that they have no deep knowledge, but refuse it as a habit. Moreover, speaking of historians, for God’s sake, what are they going to find out? Can be there a document of genocide? If a document is found by accident, a counter document is found and the argument continues to nowhere.

    The truth is known by me and others like me, but no others! We are persons who heard the incidents from the first hand. We are Turkish Armenians. The Turkish Armenians bear a great difference from the Outside Armenians! We are the grand children of those Armenians who stayed in Turkey during the relocation or those who came back. We did not hear only one type of stories. Diaspora Armenians know only stories of death. They did not come back and did not see the embarrassed faces of their neighbors. They accuse only Turks for these deaths, they name all as genocide. But Turkish Armenians have many other different stories.

    For example, my grandfather was telling how his elder brother was taken from his farm in Erzincan and that he had to pay a donkey-load of gold to a corporal as ransom to save him. None of them, the gold or brother came back! My grandmother was telling how the youngsters of the village were gathered, given arms and made revolutionist gangs. Persons who spoke foreign language gave their uniforms.

    My grandfather used to tell in cries about the Ottoman Captain Sinan, who did his utmost to save all his family in Kayseri. Thanks to the captain, none in the family was ever hurt. We listened to stories of bloodshed, but we also heard of the Turks who lied in front of the Turkish soldiers to save his Armenian friend carried away, or the neighboring Turks who opened their arms when the relocated persons returned home.

    Therefore, I say let them ask us. No one can be more objective than us. This story has a long version explanation and a short one. The short one is as follows:

    A portion of the community was mislead by imperialist powers and fought for separation. The Ottoman government was angered and took decision for relocation. This relocation was carried under the difficult conditions prevailing at that time. The exiles were carried in various manners, and helpless persons, children suffered and died. These deaths were because of epidemics and hunger. There was no organized killing made by Ottoman soldiers. The deaths out of the epidemics are separate individual cases, and were done by the robbers of the region, to get hold of the gold in possession of the people being marched. It is a matter of debate if the Ottoman army fighting on several fronts, had enough soldiers to avoid the murders during the marches. Under the circumstances and given the fact that Armenians living in the western parts of the country never had such sufferings, this cannot be called a genocide. You can give other names, but none can be named “genocide”. Furthermore, the number of 1.5 million does not signify the number of deaths, but the number of losses.

    We Turkish Armenians know pretty well that Anatolia is full of Armenians who became Moslem, during or after these incidents. These persons, when they became free later, did not return to their own religion and since they hide their past, they were put in the column of those lost. This is the short explanation.

    If one has to speak, we can speak and tell them the long version of the incidents. There can be no other historians better than us!. As regards the French, they should chew musty cheese.

    Sevan İnce

    (Note: This letter was left by Sevan İnce, before he committed suicide, because his business went bad).

  • Turkey’s Caucasus Allies Ponder Armenia Deal

    Turkey’s Caucasus Allies Ponder Armenia Deal

    Azeris say Turkey’s border accord with Armenia is a betrayal of their alliance.

    By Kenan Guluzade in Baku (CRS No. 514, 15-Oct-09)

    The Turkey-Armenia peace deal has angered Azeris, who accuse Ankara of betraying them by not tying its signature to a resolution of the Karabakh conflict.

    Turkey and Azerbaijan, whose people are close ethnic kin, have been allies since the end of the Soviet period, and Turkey broke off ties with Armenia in 1993 to support Azerbaijan over the Karabakh conflict.

    Now, 15 years after the war ended with a ceasefire, Armenians still rule Nagorny Karabakh as a self-proclaimed state – in defiance of the international community, which considers it part of Azerbaijan – and Armenian forces hold around a seventh of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognised territory.

    “Sometimes the opinion is expressed that the normalisation of Turkish-Armenian relations, the opening of the border, could in future help the regulation of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict. I do not support these opinions,” said President Ilham Aliev on the eve of the signing ceremony.

    “I think that if Turkish-Armenian relations normalise before the Karabakh problem is resolved, then the position of Armenia in the talks process will toughen. I am absolutely convinced that these two processes – the regulation of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict and the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border – should move in parallel. Maybe there is no official connection between these processes, but there is an unofficial one.”

    The day after the October 10 signing ceremony, Azerbaijan’s newspaper headlines made clear the country’s reaction to the move. “Everyone agrees, except Azerbaijan,” said the Mirror. “The Armenian-Turkish protocols are signed. Will Turkey keep its promise to Azerbaijan?” asked the Echo.

    On October 13, activists from the Organisation for the Liberation of Karabakh protested outside the Turkish embassy. The next day, they held another protests, with about 40 people taking part – a large number for an unsanctioned demonstration in Baku. The police broke up both protests, and detained several participants, but not before the protesters had shouted their slogans.

    The protesters shouted “Shame on the Turkish government”, “No ratification” and “Turkey, don’t betray Azerbaijan” and burned portraits of the Turkish president, prime minister and foreign minister.

    Analysts doubted the protest would change much, however, and said direct pressure should be put on the Turkish government.

    “To hold this protest in Azerbaijan is ineffective. Only large protests in Turkey can affect the process. And we must act in solidarity with the Turkish opponents of the protocols’ ratification,” said Boyukaga Agayev, an expert on the South Caucasus.

    Large protests in Turkey have not materialised, however, although opposition parties have pledged to disrupt the ratification process, and pro-Azerbaijan activists have distributed anti-Armenian stickers and Azerbaijani flags.

    Not everyone in Azerbaijan thinks they should. Ilgar Mammadov, co-founder of the opposition Republican Alternative Civic Union movement, said he hoped Turkey and Armenia would sign their peace deal, thus giving Turkey a chance to counteract Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Armenia is currently a close Russian ally, and Moscow has military bases there.

    “If the border is opened, over time Turkey and its western partners will be able to build a solid and legitimate economic and political presence in Armenia. That presence would allow them to drag Armenia out of the hands of the decision-makers in the Kremlin when Baku and Yerevan are close to a deal next time,” he said.

    But his opinion is a rare one. Most opposition politicians in Azerbaijan, no matter how fierce their criticism of the government on other questions, line up behind Aliev when it comes to Karabakh.

    “I think it is necessary to hold talks with the Turkish government and appeal to the Turkish people. In Turkey, the government cannot take a step on this without the support of the nation. The will of the Turkish nation could force the government to refrain from taking this step,” said Ali Kerimli, chairman of the opposition Party of the National Front of Azerbaijan.

    Turkey’s parliament is due to vote on ratifying the deal on October 21, according to officials in Ankara, and Azeri politicians still hope the deal might be avoided.

    “We hope that during the discussion of the protocols in the Turkish parliament, the deputies will unanimously tell Armenia and the world that ratification of these documents is possible only after the liberation of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan,” said Ganira Pashayeva, who also singled out France, Russia and America, which attended the signing ceremony , as possible friends of Azerbaijan.

    “First of all, they must put pressure on Yerevan, so Armenia frees the Azerbaijani lands. Peace and cooperation in the region are possible only after Armenia leaves the occupied territories.”

    Kenan Guluzade is editor of www.analitika.az.

  • Armenia: Turkey Accord Rings Alarm Bells

    Armenia: Turkey Accord Rings Alarm Bells

    Armenians do not share world’s joy over protocols, fear Ankara has a hidden agenda.

    By Naira Melkumian and Gayane Mkrtchian in Yerevan, and Karine Ohanian in Stepanakert (CRS No. 514, 16-Oct-09)

    Armenia’s diplomatic and border agreement with Turkey, signed in Zurich on October 10, comes against a background of strong misgivings at home and even stronger concerns among the powerful Armenian diaspora.

    The two protocols that were signed set a timetable for restoring diplomatic ties and reopening their joint border and are subject to approval in the two parliaments.

    The deal was mediated by Switzerland and signed in the presence of senior officials from several countries including United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

    “We believe strongly that this is in the best interests of both Armenia and Turkey. We recognise how hard it is, and what courage it takes to move forward in the face of very strong opposition in both countries,” Clinton told journalists later.

    That was an understatement. Many Armenians say the government betrayed the memories of up to 1.5 million Armenians killed in Turkey in 1915 by making peace with the successor of the Ottoman Empire.

    Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan spent the first week of October travelling around the main centres of Armenia’s ten million-strong diaspora, seeking to persuade them of the importance of the deal.

    “I am convinced that your support and your desires are directed at making our visits interesting and successful, and will give me the possibility of expressing my sincere opinion to our brothers and sisters abroad, of finding out their opinion, and of course, take into account both their opinion and the fact that the majority of Armenians live outside Armenia,” Sargsyan told the country on the eve of his trip.

    But his appeal was not successful. In Paris, the police clashed with Armenian demonstrators when they tried to clear a space so that Sargsyan could lay flowers at the memorial to the 1915 victims. There were also large protests in New York, Los Angeles and Lebanon, where protesters chanted “no to the protocols” and “president, don’t betray us”.

    The opinion of Hakob Petrosian, an Armenian living in Cyprus, was typical. He said Sargsyan might consider himself president of all Armenians, but those in the diaspora felt betrayed.

    “Sooner or later, Turkey would open its border so as to become a member of the European Union. He should have waited,” Petrosian said.
    The opinion is common inside Armenia as well, and analysts said Sargsyan’s decision to force through peace with Armenia’s large, wealthy neighbour could backfire on the president.

    “Many Armenians think these protocols are badly thought through, and contain a number of diplomatic and political time bombs. In such a situation, the opposition parties with support from a significant part of the population could become a major force. This could provoke a new political crisis in Armenia,” said Shushan Khatlamajian, a respected Armenian analyst.

    The Armenian government said the protocols did not imply that it was abandoning its demand that Turkey recognise the deaths of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey during World War One as genocide. Turkey denies that genocide is a correct description.

    “With these protocols, Armenia is not accepting any obligations, is not making any unilateral promises. Armenia is signing these protocols with the aim of creating conditions for the establishment of normal conditions between the two countries,” said Sargsyan in a television address on the eve of the ceremony.

    But Armenians, as always when the genocide question is discussed, were distrustful.

    “The genocide, which killed millions of Armenians, the mass resettlement of Armenians across the whole world as a result, and the mistrust between the two peoples created an emotional, rather than a rational assessment of these events,” said Gagik Baghdasarian, a Yerevan schoolteacher.

    Armenia’s business elite, however, had no hesitation in welcoming the move, which will give Armenian producers and importers a whole new market to trade with. Turkish goods have entered Armenia for years, but only via Georgia, meaning they have been more expensive than they need be.

    The Armenian parliament’s economics committee said that, by even a pessimistic estimate, the national economy would expand by three per cent because of the move, while exports would increase by almost a third.

    “If the border is opened, the economy of Armenia will get new possibilities, we will receive access to new markets, the possibilities of communication will improve and we will be able to integrate further into the world economy,” said Finance Minister Tigran Davtian.

    But the doubters are not convinced by the argument, saying that economic ties could undermine Armenian independence, since the country’s businessmen are in no position to compete with their counterparts in much larger Turkey.

    The opposition Dashnaktsutiun party, which has battled for recognition of the 1915 deaths as genocide for nearly a century, said Armenia lacked methods to protect its own producers, who could be swallowed up by competition from over the border.

    Dashnaktsutiun is particularly strong in the diaspora, which is an important source of financial help for Armenia and also lobbies for its interests abroad, and some opposition politicians fear the protocols could undermine global Armenian unity.

    “The Dashnaktsutiun party decisively intends to block the ratification process of the Armenian-Turkish protocols. To achieve this, it is prepared to use all possible political and constitutional methods,” said Hay Dat, head of the party’s political office.

    Kiro Manoian, head of the party’s office for political issues, pointed to a statement made by Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that Turkey would not open the border until there was a resolution to the conflict over Nagorny Karabakh. Karabakh, which is ruled by Armenians but internationally considered part of Turkey’s ally Azerbaijan, has long been a block to relations between Ankara and Yerevan.

    “Turkey does not intend to open the border with Armenia, and is using all its force to avoid recognition of the genocide,” Manoian said.
    A number of Armenian analysts agree with him, and point to press reports that a three-hour delay in the Zurich signing ceremony was caused by Armenia’s insistence that the Turkish foreign minister remove a veiled reference to Karabakh in a speech he was due to make.

    “The delay in the signing of the protocols revealed Turkey’s strategy, to play with Armenia and to create new conditions before every issue can be resolved. This causes me concern, although the Armenian side is holding to its positions,” said Ruben Safrastian, director of the Oriental Institute at the Armenian National Academy of Sciences.

    Movses Hakobian, defence minister in the government that rules Nagorny Karabakh, said he was not concerned.

    “I have an Armenian education and reading these protocols I have no fears for the Nagorny Karabakh republic. As defence minister, I do not want to comment on the actions of the president of Armenia. I can just say that the Nagorny Karabakh problem cannot be resolved without Karabakh’s participation,” he told A1+ television.

    However, ordinary residents of the unrecognised state were not so confident.

    “Today it is clear that the Turkish authorities are linking the protocols’ ratification in parliament with the Karabakh question, and are aiming to gain territorial and political concessions from the Armenians… There is no doubt that the Turks are trying to focus their interest on territorial concessions in Karabakh. This is a real threat for us,” said Masis Mayilian, chairman of Nagorny Karabakh’s public council for foreign politics and security.

    Naira Melkumian is freelance journalist in Yerevan. Karine Ohanian and Gayane Mkrtchian are members of IWPR’s Cross Caucasus Journalism Network. 

    Armenians do not share world’s joy over protocols, fear Ankara has a hidden agenda.

    By Naira Melkumian and Gayane Mkrtchian in Yerevan, and Karine Ohanian in Stepanakert (CRS No. 514, 16-Oct-09)

    Armenia’s diplomatic and border agreement with Turkey, signed in Zurich on October 10, comes against a background of strong misgivings at home and even stronger concerns among the powerful Armenian diaspora.

    The two protocols that were signed set a timetable for restoring diplomatic ties and reopening their joint border and are subject to approval in the two parliaments.

    The deal was mediated by Switzerland and signed in the presence of senior officials from several countries including United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

    “We believe strongly that this is in the best interests of both Armenia and Turkey. We recognise how hard it is, and what courage it takes to move forward in the face of very strong opposition in both countries,” Clinton told journalists later.

    That was an understatement. Many Armenians say the government betrayed the memories of up to 1.5 million Armenians killed in Turkey in 1915 by making peace with the successor of the Ottoman Empire.

    Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan spent the first week of October travelling around the main centres of Armenia’s ten million-strong diaspora, seeking to persuade them of the importance of the deal.

    “I am convinced that your support and your desires are directed at making our visits interesting and successful, and will give me the possibility of expressing my sincere opinion to our brothers and sisters abroad, of finding out their opinion, and of course, take into account both their opinion and the fact that the majority of Armenians live outside Armenia,” Sargsyan told the country on the eve of his trip.

    But his appeal was not successful. In Paris, the police clashed with Armenian demonstrators when they tried to clear a space so that Sargsyan could lay flowers at the memorial to the 1915 victims. There were also large protests in New York, Los Angeles and Lebanon, where protesters chanted “no to the protocols” and “president, don’t betray us”.

    The opinion of Hakob Petrosian, an Armenian living in Cyprus, was typical. He said Sargsyan might consider himself president of all Armenians, but those in the diaspora felt betrayed.

    “Sooner or later, Turkey would open its border so as to become a member of the European Union. He should have waited,” Petrosian said.
    The opinion is common inside Armenia as well, and analysts said Sargsyan’s decision to force through peace with Armenia’s large, wealthy neighbour could backfire on the president.

    “Many Armenians think these protocols are badly thought through, and contain a number of diplomatic and political time bombs. In such a situation, the opposition parties with support from a significant part of the population could become a major force. This could provoke a new political crisis in Armenia,” said Shushan Khatlamajian, a respected Armenian analyst.

    The Armenian government said the protocols did not imply that it was abandoning its demand that Turkey recognise the deaths of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey during World War One as genocide. Turkey denies that genocide is a correct description.

    “With these protocols, Armenia is not accepting any obligations, is not making any unilateral promises. Armenia is signing these protocols with the aim of creating conditions for the establishment of normal conditions between the two countries,” said Sargsyan in a television address on the eve of the ceremony.

    But Armenians, as always when the genocide question is discussed, were distrustful.

    “The genocide, which killed millions of Armenians, the mass resettlement of Armenians across the whole world as a result, and the mistrust between the two peoples created an emotional, rather than a rational assessment of these events,” said Gagik Baghdasarian, a Yerevan schoolteacher.

    Armenia’s business elite, however, had no hesitation in welcoming the move, which will give Armenian producers and importers a whole new market to trade with. Turkish goods have entered Armenia for years, but only via Georgia, meaning they have been more expensive than they need be.

    The Armenian parliament’s economics committee said that, by even a pessimistic estimate, the national economy would expand by three per cent because of the move, while exports would increase by almost a third.

    “If the border is opened, the economy of Armenia will get new possibilities, we will receive access to new markets, the possibilities of communication will improve and we will be able to integrate further into the world economy,” said Finance Minister Tigran Davtian.

    But the doubters are not convinced by the argument, saying that economic ties could undermine Armenian independence, since the country’s businessmen are in no position to compete with their counterparts in much larger Turkey.

    The opposition Dashnaktsutiun party, which has battled for recognition of the 1915 deaths as genocide for nearly a century, said Armenia lacked methods to protect its own producers, who could be swallowed up by competition from over the border.

    Dashnaktsutiun is particularly strong in the diaspora, which is an important source of financial help for Armenia and also lobbies for its interests abroad, and some opposition politicians fear the protocols could undermine global Armenian unity.

    “The Dashnaktsutiun party decisively intends to block the ratification process of the Armenian-Turkish protocols. To achieve this, it is prepared to use all possible political and constitutional methods,” said Hay Dat, head of the party’s political office.

    Kiro Manoian, head of the party’s office for political issues, pointed to a statement made by Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that Turkey would not open the border until there was a resolution to the conflict over Nagorny Karabakh. Karabakh, which is ruled by Armenians but internationally considered part of Turkey’s ally Azerbaijan, has long been a block to relations between Ankara and Yerevan.

    “Turkey does not intend to open the border with Armenia, and is using all its force to avoid recognition of the genocide,” Manoian said.
    A number of Armenian analysts agree with him, and point to press reports that a three-hour delay in the Zurich signing ceremony was caused by Armenia’s insistence that the Turkish foreign minister remove a veiled reference to Karabakh in a speech he was due to make.

    “The delay in the signing of the protocols revealed Turkey’s strategy, to play with Armenia and to create new conditions before every issue can be resolved. This causes me concern, although the Armenian side is holding to its positions,” said Ruben Safrastian, director of the Oriental Institute at the Armenian National Academy of Sciences.

    Movses Hakobian, defence minister in the government that rules Nagorny Karabakh, said he was not concerned.

    “I have an Armenian education and reading these protocols I have no fears for the Nagorny Karabakh republic. As defence minister, I do not want to comment on the actions of the president of Armenia. I can just say that the Nagorny Karabakh problem cannot be resolved without Karabakh’s participation,” he told A1+ television.

    However, ordinary residents of the unrecognised state were not so confident.

    “Today it is clear that the Turkish authorities are linking the protocols’ ratification in parliament with the Karabakh question, and are aiming to gain territorial and political concessions from the Armenians… There is no doubt that the Turks are trying to focus their interest on territorial concessions in Karabakh. This is a real threat for us,” said Masis Mayilian, chairman of Nagorny Karabakh’s public council for foreign politics and security.

    Naira Melkumian is freelance journalist in Yerevan. Karine Ohanian and Gayane Mkrtchian are members of IWPR’s Cross Caucasus Journalism Network.

  • ATAA’s analysis of Turkish-Armenian protocols gives no comfort

    ATAA’s analysis of Turkish-Armenian protocols gives no comfort

    by Ferruh Demirmen


    After the signing of Turkish-Armenian normalization protocols in Zurich on October 10, the Washington-based ATAA (Assembly of Turkish American Associations) issued an analysis of the protocols to clarify the reasons for its earlier endorsement of the normalization process. The announcement was issued by President Gunay Evinch.

    Relying on the language in the protocols that refer to “territorial integrity,” “inviolability of frontiers,” “foreign sovereignty,” “refrain from the use of force,” and “recognition of the existing border,” the ATAA analysis draws the conclusion that, once the protocols take effect, Armenia would no longer have territorial claims against Turkey.

    It further infers that Armenia would withdraw from the occupied Azeri territory of Nagorno-Karabagh, account for its human violations in the territory, and allow the return of over one million Azeri refugees.

    Based on another clause that condemns terrorism, it is argued that ASALA-type terrorism and other acts of violence against Turks and Turkish interests would henceforth come to an end.

    ATAA believes that the establishment of historical commission as envisioned in the protocols would prevent US Congressional resolutions on genocide allegations.

    After making cross linkages between several clauses, the ATAA analysis further concludes, in a quasi-legal manner, that the opening of the common border between Turkey and Armenia should logically lead to the realization of goals embraced by the Turkish side noted above.

    But the ATAA’s analysis is far from convincing. The conclusions reached are not based on any concrete steps that the protocols call for Armenia to implement. Rather, the analysis relies on the goodwill of Armenia, on expectations that a well-intentioned Armenia would deliver.

    And herein lies the problem: counting on the sincerity and goodwill of Armenia. Considering Armenia’s past hostility toward Turkey, the instruments contained in its Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, and the Armenian officials’ public pronouncements, e.g., on the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and genocide allegations, prior to the signing of the protocols, it is naive to rely on the goodwill of Armenia.

    The fact that the Armenian side objected to Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s prepared statement to be delivered after the signing of the protocols in Zurich, says much about the supposed goodwill of Armenia. Without naming the conflict, Davutoğlu was going to make only an indirect reference to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, expressing the hope that the signing of protocols would lead to the resolution of the conflict. The Armenian side demurred, arguing behind doors that the statement would unnecessarily draw linkage between the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and the normalization process.

    So much about good intentions!

    Judging from the language in the protocols, there are also serious reservations as to the usefulness of a historical commission to resolve, once and for all, the thorny issue of genocide allegations.(1)

    If Armenia is to be believed in its good intentions, the protocols would contain unambiguous clauses as to the steps Armenia would take, e.g., amend its Constitution, withdraw from Nagorno-Karabagh, in return for the opening of the border. The protocols contain no such quid pro quo.

    In contrast, the language in the protocols on the opening of the common border is clear and unmistakable: Once the protocols are ratified, the common border would be opened within two months.

    The open border, of course, would overwhelmingly benefit Armenia.

    For all it cares, Armenia can easily stonewall for years the implementation of steps it is expected to take, prevaricating on its acts, while in the meantime the Turkey-Armenia border remains open. It can maintain, for example, that it is not making (overt) territorial claims on Turkey while at the same time refusing to amend its Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, or change the design of its national flag.

    Or it can claim it is not actively pursuing “genocide” claims while winking at, and even secretly encouraging, genocide recognition efforts by the Armenian diaspora.

    Or it can make a cosmetic withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabagh, arguing that it has fulfilled its obligations as far as “promoting peace in the region.”

    And should Turkey contemplate re-closing the border because Armenia has not “delivered,” volleys of criticism from the American and European sympathizers of Armenia would surely follow.

    Further, should the Turkish Parliament refuse to ratify the protocols for lack of progress on the Nagorno-Karabagh issue, as Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan has inexplicably suggested recently, Turkey would surely be singled out for having bad faith in the Turkish-Armenian normalization process.

    (Diplomatically, Erdoğan’s suggestion is a major faux pas, because there is no linkage in the protocols between the Nagorno-Karabagh issue and the normalization process. After giving repeated assurances to the Azeris on Nagorno-Karabagh, yet without any backing from the protocols, the PM has forced himself into a corner. Now he is expecting the Turkish Parliament to bail him out).

    In conclusion, ATAA’s analysis, no doubt reflecting an idealistic outlook, is based on presumptive logic, or wishful thinking, and cannot be supported. ATAA says the normalization protocols are based on the concept of “constructive ambiguity” by which each side interprets the language as it sees fit. This is an interesting approach, but offers no comfort for the Turkish side – or, for that matter, the Azeri side.

    ATAA should ponder: Would it ever sign a binding contract based pre-eminently on “constructive ambiguity,” wherein the only expressed certainty is for the advantage of the other side, but everything else is predicated on goodwill?

    Nations signing intergovernmental agreements should be held to the same standards of credibility and accountability as persons who conclude private or business transactions.

    ATAA issued its analysis on behalf of its Board of Directors. But ATAA also claimed in its announcement that it spoke on behalf of the Turkish-American community. A relevant question is: Has ATAA polled its members on the issue?

    It is worth noting that almost all opposition parties in Turkey, certainly the major ones, are opposed to the Turkish-Armenian normalization process in its present form. They remember what happened in Cyprus.

    (1) Current Turkish “opening” to Armenia cannot be supported: by Ferruh Demirmen, “Turkish Forum,” October 9, 2009.

    [email protected]

    Note to Turkish Forum readers: On October 10, the Azeri news outlet Trend News (http://en.trend.az)/ published on its website excerpts from my article cited above. The excerpted article, “Normalization of Ankara -Yerevan relations cannot be supported: Turkish expert,” was also published on the same day in Turkish Forum. The article contained a photo, purportedly depicting me. Turkish Forum readers are advised that the person depicted in that photo is not me. F. Demirmen.


  • AZERBAIJAN-RUSSIA GAS AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

    AZERBAIJAN-RUSSIA GAS AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

    October 15, 2009—Volume 6, Issue 189


    by Vladimir Socor

    On October 14 in Baku, Azerbaijan’s State Oil Company president Rovnag Abdullayev and Gazprom CEO Aleksei Miller signed an agreement on Azerbaijani gas exports to Russia. The move is a logical follow-up to the June 29 agreement, signed by the same company chiefsin the presence of Presidents Ilham Alyiev and Dmitry Medvedev in Baku on that occasion–about the main principles of the gas trade between the two countries (see EDM, July 2, 17).

    This agreement turns Azerbaijan for the first time in history from an importer of Russian gas into an exporter of gas to Russiaalbeit with small initial volumesthanks to growing internal production in Azerbaijan. If understood and handled appropriately by the European Union and Turkey, this event can lend impetus to the E.U.and U.S.backed Nabucco pipeline project, notwithstanding European media speculation about Russia pre-empting Nabucco’s Azerbaijani gas supplies.

    The documents just signed involve a framework agreement for the years 2010 to 2014 and a sale-and-purchase contract for 2010. During this first year Azerbaijan shall export at least 500 million cubic meters (mcm) of gas to Russia through the Baku-Novo Filya pipeline, for use in Russia’s North Caucasus territories. Azerbaijan may increase that export volume during 2010, at its discretion. The gas may originate in any of Azerbaijan’s fields (Trend Capital, Day.Az, October 14).

    The Russian purchase price is not publicly specified. According to Abdullayev at the signing ceremony, the price-setting formula “suits the Azerbaijani side” – apparently a hint that the price is in line with the anticipated European netback prices for 2010. This had been Baku’s objective all along in the negotiations on its gas priceUnder this agreement, the price is said to be adjustable every quarter, pegged to the price of the basket of oil products (APA, Turan, October 14). Miller had proposed to buy Azerbaijani gas at $350 per one thousand cubic meters in the lead-up to the June 29 preliminary agreement.

    Azerbaijan used to import Russian gas until as recently as 2006 through the old Baku-Novo Filya pipeline, which runs for approximately 200 kilometers along the Caspian Sea coast from the Russian border to Baku. This line will now be used in the reverse mode to carry Azerbaijani gas to Russia. The volume envisaged for 2010 will use only a fraction of this pipeline’s Soviet-era capacity. In addition, Azerbaijan is preparing its own section of the old Mozdok (Russia)-Gazimahomed pipeline, for possible reverse-use as a gas export outlet to Russia (Trend Capital, October 1).

    Gas extraction in Azerbaijan is set to reach 27 bcm for 2009 (Day.Az, October 8). The rate of increase could have been faster, but has been affected by slowed-down development at the giant Shah Deniz offshore field. That slowdown in turn reflects delays on the Nabucco pipeline project and Turkish government obstructions to a gas agreement with Azerbaijan. These two factors have postponed the opening of Azerbaijan’s gas export route to the West. In this situation, Azerbaijan can only open an export route to Russia while awaiting progress on Nabucco and with Turkey.

    Meanwhile, Azerbaijan remains committed to the Nabucco project. The government and the State Oil Company are consistently reaffirming Baku’s readiness to supply 7 bcm per year for that pipeline’s first phase. Construction work on Nabucco is now expected to start in 2011, for the first gas to flow by 2015 from Azerbaijan to Europe.

    Consequently, Baku has set the time-frame of the agreement just signed with Gazprom to expire in 2014, so as to release Azerbaijan from obligations to Gazprom after that year. Miller, however, declared at the signing ceremony explicitly that Russia wants to prolong this agreement after 2015, and for larger volumes of Azerbaijani gas (Interfax, October 14). That would pose risks for Nabucco. The October 14 agreement does not.

    This agreement, however, reiterates and amplifies certain lessons for the E.U., Turkey, and U.S. that were already implicit in the June 29 preliminary agreement. Azerbaijan’s move can actually help concentrate minds all-around on the Nabucco project, bearing the following considerations in mind.

    First, the volumes committed to Gazprom are meager and the time-frame does not impinge on the Nabucco project, assuming that Azerbaijan retains the necessary Western support to pursue Azerbaijan’s own Western choice. Awaiting Nabucco’s commissioning, it makes sense for Azerbaijan to use the existing pipeline(s) to Russia for exporting Azerbaijan’s growing surplus of gas during the interim period until 2014.

    Second, this agreement does not allow Gazprom to compete against Nabucco for Azerbaijani gas. But the situation could change in Russia’s favor, if Turkey’s AKP government insists on its extortionate terms for the purchase of Azerbaijani gas and its transportation through Nabucco. By the same token, Washington and the reshuffled European Commission, now entering a new term of office in Brussels, are being reminded that they need to lift that logjam in Ankara.

    Third, Baku’s agreement with Gazprom is a reminder to Ankara that Azerbaijan does not totally depend on the Turkish gas market or the Turkish gas transmission route. From Azerbaijan’s standpoint, adding a Russian export outletalbeit a small one–is an export diversification move, away from Turkey’s perceived monopoly on transportation, which the AKP government seeks to abuse. Azerbaijan can also use the Baku-Astara pipeline to Iran, or swap arrangements with that neighbor country, during the interim period until 2014.

    Fourth, Baku is successfully resisting Gazprom’s wish to re-export Caspian gas to third countries, at a profit to Russia and at the expense of Caspian producers. Baku has stipulated that its gas shall be used in Russia’s North Caucasus. And if the Russian purchase price is consistent with European netback pricesas envisaged at the time of the June 29 preliminary agreement and, apparently, in the October 14 agreement-Baku will have achieved a strategic gain. Turkey’s AKP government would place itself in an embarrassing position by insisting on worse terms than Russia has now consented to Azerbaijan. Across the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan will have set a useful precedent for Turkmenistan to also demand European netback prices from Gazprom. If the cash-strapped Gazprom fails to meet that benchmark, then a part of Turkmen export volumes would become available for the proposed trans-Caspian link to the Nabucco project.

    –Vladimir Socor