Category: Southern Caucasus

ARMENIAN ATTROCITIES UPON OTTOMAN MOSLEMS

By Erkan Esmer, Ph.D., Prof. Engineer

Armenians prospered greatly under the protection of Ottoman Turks. They were dubbed as the “Loyal Tribe” by the Ottoman Sultans. The Ottomans were late in accepting the Industrial Revolution. They preferred to stay as soldiers, farmers, and bureaucrats as was fashionable at the feudal era. They left the services, trade, banking, and industrial production to their Christian subjects (Greeks and armenians) who were a small segment of the population in Anatolia (Asia Minor). This made them very wealthy and powerful. Russian General Maievski’s 1890 map is presented in Figure 1 in the ensuing page, clearly shows that they were a small minority. Of course, the Russians naturally would inflate the Greek and armenian populations within the empire, because they had invented the so called “Eastern Problem”. They under the pretext of protection of Christian Ottoman citizens, vied for conquest of Ottoman lands.

When Russians attacked the Ottomans in 1877, they along with concurrence of European powers established Principality of Bulgaria. They advised the armenians that they could establish their own country in Eastern Anatolia. I doubt that they would ever allow them to have their own country. They had no intensions to do so, but wanted to use the armenians. Czarist Russia along with the help of American missionaries armed the armenians all over Anatolia. These terrorist forces were stationed all over the Turkish mainland. {Fig. 2-15} These above mentioned facts are confirmed by August 23, 1895 New York Times article. They were united under the command of armenian terrorist groups Dashnaks and Hunchaks. The armenians’ barbaric atrocities and heinous crimes upon the Moslems were unspeakable. {Fig. 16-29} These massacres naturally angered the authorities and Moslem population who defended themselves. They knew that this would bring the wrath of European powers (super powers of the era), because Europeans wanted to dismember the Ottoman Empire for its fertile land, valuable mineral and oil resources (Iraq, Saudi Oil Fields). They finally achieved this goal at the end of World War I.

During World War I, all of Turkish and Moslem young men were not home, but were fighting for their homeland in many different fronts. Only Women, children, and old Men lived in Ottoman Anatolian provinces, then. All of them were unarmed!!! Many of the armenians who were inducted into Ottoman forces, ran away with their weapons. The armenian cowards butchered these unarmed civilians. They acted as scouts/vanguards for the Russian forces. They ambushed Ottoman forces, cut down the telegraph lines, which caused a lot of havoc at the time. The Ottoman government had to relocate them from the war zone to provinces where there were no fighting with the means available to them at the time. {Fig. 30-33}. Many armenians migrated to other countries such as USA, France, and England, enhancing their lives tremendously. Since this barbaric tribe of armenians left the corpses of Moslems rot in open air, since they drowned them in wells, or threw the corpses in creeks or rivers, this caused a severe cholera epidemic which took many lives, including their own. Even though armenians and Russians massacred about 2,500,000 Moslems, where as, armenian losses were between 36,000 and 125,000, this is the so-called “ARMENIAN GENOCIDE”.

“Photographs are from Turkish Armed Forces archives or my own post card collection”

May 8, 2010
Newsletter of the Embassy of Azerbaijan

N E W S L E T T E R Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan 275 Slater Street, Suite 904. Ottawa ON K1P 5H9 CanadaTel: (613) 288 0497 Fax: (613) 230 8089E-Mail: [email protected]

President Aliyev on Military Build-Up

Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan held a meeting on building-up of the army at the Defense Ministry on April. President Aliyev said that building up the armed forces has always been in spotlight. “It is a main issue for us because Azerbaijan territories have been under occupation for many years,” said the Head of State, adding that Azerbaijan’s intensively beefing up its military comes from the need. President Aliyev noted that Armenia’s and its supporters’ invasion of Azerbaijani lands was accompanied by brutalities. “Khojaly genocide is a striking example of this. Armenia grossly violates all legal norms”. Though the UN Security Council adopted four resolutions on the liberation of occupied Azerbaijani lands, Armenia did not fulfill these decisions. The Azerbaijani leader noted that the updated Madrid principles could be a basis for preparation of final proposals. President Aliyev pointed out that Armenia does not want to leave occupied lands as it drags out peace talks. “Our biggest compromise is that Azerbaijan has been committed to the peace process for 20 years,” he said. According to the President, the international community must respect its own decisions and no problem can be solved in the region without resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, as the conflict seriously affects the whole region.

Azerbaijan Signed Protocol with Georgia on WTO Admission

Georgia and Azerbaijan signed a protocol on bilateral negotiations on admission of goods and services of two countries to the markets within the framework of Azerbaijan’s joining the World Trade Organization (WTO).The protocol was signed by Mr. Zurab Pololikashvili Georgian Economic Minister and Mr. Shahin Mustafayev Azerbaijani Minister of Economic Development. The two sides expressed confidence that working out of the protocol will give a new impetus to the intensification of trade relations between the two countries. The Georgian-Azerbaijani business forum was also held during the Azerbaijani delegation’s visit. Since 1997, Azerbaijan has been represented at the World Trade Organization as an observer. At present, negotiations have been completed and protocols signed with Turkey, the Sultanate of Oman, United Arab Emirates and Georgia. The country is on the stage of signing the protocol with Moldova and Kyrgyzstan. Azerbaijan also carries negotiations with the United States, Japan, Brazil, Ecuador, Sri Lanka, European Union, Norway, India, South Korea, and Switzerland.

Azerbaijan and Turkey Agreed on Gas

According to Mr. Natiq Aliyev, Minister of Industry and Energy the talks on gas prices between Azerbaijan and Turkey have been completed. Mr. Aliyev pointed out that an agreement between the countries will be signed soon. The Minister said that Azerbaijani companies (about 500 in Turkey) increased their investments into Turkey’s economy. The European Union welcomes Azerbaijan-Turkey agreement on gas transportation, said Mr. Guenther Oettinger, EU Energy Commissioner. “Turkey and Azerbaijan are our indispensable partners for the realization of the Southern Corridor. This agreement between such two important partners opens the way for a strategic allocation of gas that will underpin the Southern Corridor and provide energy security to Turkey and the EU”. Under the current contract, Turkey must receive 6.6 billion cubic meters of gas from Shah Deniz in the first stage of the field’s development. Shah Deniz reserves are estimated at 1.2 trillion cubic meters. The contract to develop the offshore Shah Deniz field was signed on June 4, 1996 and included: BP (operator), Statoil Hydro, NICO, Total, LukAgip, TPAO, and SOCAR.

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May 8, 2010
Ankara-Yerevan Accords Point toward Armenia’s Withdrawal from the Occupied Territories

foto -geography.about.com

Gulnara Inandzh
Director
International Online Information Analytic Center Ethnoglobus
The emotions, whipped up by commentaries which followed the signing on October 10 of the protocols between Turkey and Armenia, have prevented a logical analysis of the situation. In order to begin such an analysis, we need to recognize that at the roots of the signing of these accords lie a multi-sided game of significance far beyond the South Caucasus region.

If at the outset, the opening of the borders with Armenia was one of the conditions on Turkey’s path toward joining the European Union, then at the present time, the rapprochement of the two countries depends on the geopolitical situation and Ankara’s participation in these processes. Immediately after the signing of the Turkish-Armenian accords, as one should have expected, the EU put forward some new demands for Turkey, about which the latter could not have but known about in advance. This means that Turkey signed the agreements with Armenia not as part of its effort to join the EU, something that provides one of the points of departure for understanding why Turkey decided to reach an agreement with Armenia.

At the same time, we must not ignore the pressures on Turkey both direct and behind the scenes. And those came from more places than just the capitals of the countries which were represented at the signing ceremony. (Here, we intentionally are not touching on the role of Israel in all these complicated political games, the situation around Iran, the transportation routes for Iraqi oil and the Kurdish element in Iraq, as each of these represent a distinctive subject for discussion).

Turkey, who bear the genetic code of the Ottoman Empire as far as great power games are concerned, will not agree to play the role of a defeated country even under the pressure of world powers. Ankara is not in such a weak geopolitical situation that it has to act in ways that harm its national interests. Not long ago, we should remember, Turkey felt itself strong enough to refuse the United States the right to use the military base at Incirlik for the supply of the anti-Saddam operations of the coalition forces in Iraq.

When pointing to the harm the protocols between Ankara and Yerevan create for Azerbaijan in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, one must not forget that the Armenian diaspora has terrorized Turkey with the issue of the so-called “Armenian genocide.” In its turn, Turkish diplomacy, which connects this question with the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict until recently took a position absolutely the same as Azerbaijan both because of their common Turkishness and because of Turkey’s own national interests. These two issues also served as a factor which united the Azerbaijani and Turkish diaspora, which resisted recognition of “the Armenian genocide” by pointing to the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani lands.

Viewed from that perspective, it would seem that Turkey, which has little to gain economically and politically by reaching an accord with Armenia, signed the protocols in a way that both undercut its own interests and angered its fraternal and strategic relationship with Azerbaijan.

Of course, in contrast to the 1990s, Azerbaijan today is not the weak “younger brother” who needs support but an equal state that is confident in its own forces and demands respect on that basis. This cannot entirely please the current Turkish powers that be, but it is not the occasion for a break with a reliable partner. Differences in the question of the transportation of Azerbaijani gas to Turkey also cannot be the subject for speculation on such a strategic question as the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border.

During the entire period of talks with Armenia, official representatives of Turkey at various levels repeated that the relationship Ankara sought would not harm the interests of Azerbaijan and that the Turkish-Armenian borders will not be opened until the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Among those who have constantly said this are Turkish President Abdulla Gul, Prime Minister Erdogan, Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoglu, members of the parliament, opposition figures and others both before and after the signing of the protocols.

At the same time, every step of Armenian-Turkish negotiations was discussed with Baku, and talks about the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue continued in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group.

And in this context, the declaration of Turkish President Gul concerning the impact in “a short time” of the Armenian-Turkish accords on “the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” merits attention and should calm many of the concerns in Azerbaijan.

At the present time, when Azerbaijan has acquired major geopolitical importance, ignoring its interests on such an important issue is impossible. Consequently, the interests of Baku were taken into consideration. Note that immediately after the signing in Switzerland of the Armenian-Turkish agreement Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev arrived in Zurich where the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was discussed. Further, a short time after the signing of the agreement with the very same mission, Tina Kaidanow, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia arrived in Baku, and in the framework of the meetings of the foreign ministers of the Black Sea countries, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met with President Ilham Aliyev and his foreign minister, Elmar Mammadyarov. And the visit to Baku of General Ishyk Koshaner, commander of Turkish ground forces, to meet with Azerbaijani Defense Minister Col. Gen. Safar Abiyev is yet another confirmation of this.

Taken together, it is clear that this cycle of visits was not a matter of chance.

And if there were any doubt about this, the reaction both within Armenian society and also in the diaspora to the accord which should allow Armenia to escape from the blockade has been negative. Evidently, Armenian society and politicians recognize that they will have to free the occupied territories, because otherwise no one intends to save Armenia. It is not accidental that after the signing of the Zurich agreement, all sides represented at the ceremony except for Armenian Foreign Minister Edvard Nalbandyan did not hide their satisfaction with what had taken place.

In other words, everything shows that the Zurich agreement will have a positive consequence on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Judging by the presence at the signing ceremony of the representatives of the OSCE Minsk Group, it is possible to assert that all interested sides are informed about this process and about its impact on the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

If under the pressure of the diaspora Armenia will not ratify the agreement, Azerbaijan and Turkey will return to where they were before. If the Turkish and Armenian parliaments all the same give legal force to the agreement, then Armenia will have to free Azerbaijani territories in order to secure the opening of the Turkish borders. Otherwise, Ankara, responding to public pressure in Azerbaijan and in Turkey will not be able to open the borders with Armenia. In that case, Azerbaijani and Turkish public opinion will be in a position to increase international pressure on Yerevan and the Armenian diaspora regarding the liberation of the occupied territories.

If Armenia does not follow through, then Turkey will always be in a position to find reasons to close the borders. In such a case, Azerbaijan will be left with only one choice – the liberation of the occupied territories by military means; and the countries involved in the division of spheres of influence in the region will have to agree with this. Otherwise Azerbaijan, using its status as “the most reliable country for the transportation of gas,” will have every reason for refusing to allow the Nabucco project to pass through its territory.

Every country has its own interests and priorities, and in this case, that means that there is no chance that Turkey will sacrifice its relations with Azerbaijan for new ties with Armenia.

May 6, 2010
Why Turkey is right in demanding the end to occupation in Karabakh

VUSALA MAHİRGİZİ

In order to continue the “normalization” of Turkey-Armenia relations, it has become the major stipulation to bring the protocols signed in Zurich, Oct. 10, onto the agenda of the two parliaments.

There are reports that in the meetings held in Washington on April 12-13, Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan faced pressures to immediately bring the Zurich protocols onto the agenda of the Turkish Parliament. Some media outlets in the West and Turkey have strongly criticized Erdoğan for linking the “normalization” of Turkey-Armenia relations to the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” and thus, “blocking up” the way of the process. While assessing from several aspects the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” in the process of the “normalization” of Turkey-Armenia relations, we see that Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statement in the Azerbaijani parliament on May 13, 2009, is in line with the principles of the international law and human rights.

Armenia does not want the factor of “releasing Karabakh from occupation” to be put into circulation; because if this factor is put into circulation, Armenia will be constantly viewed as an “aggressor state” in the international arena. On the other hand, former president of Armenia Robert Kocharian and incumbent president Serge Sarkisian came to power in Yerevan with the dynamism caused by the wave of Karabakh’s occupation – having the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” on the table in the discussions with Turkey means their admitting the stain of being an aggressor. Therefore, the present authorities of Armenia will not want to hold discussions by admitting the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” – i.e. start the game with a score of 1-0.

In this respect, we should underscore that Prime Minister Erdoğan has taken the rather right step by including the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” into the process of “normalization.” This “stipulation” has been put into the agenda because of the protest against the violation of international law and human rights in the region, not because of the loyalty to the principle “one nation, two states” between Turkey and Azerbaijan as stated by Armenia and the West. What could Erdoğan cite to while putting forward the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” in Turkey-Armenia discussions, if not to the fact of the occupation of 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territories and displacement of one million Karabakh residents of Azerbaijani origin? The solution to the regional conflicts requires divine justice: conscience and justice require it before the friendship and brotherhood between the countries.

Therefore, it is impossible to understand why some in the West, Armenia and Turkey have criticized Erdoğan for this “stipulation.” Which position seems more just: to release the occupied territories and send one million refugees to their native lands, or to ignore the displacement of one million people from their native lands and switch on the green lights for 146,000 Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh to establish a monoethnic structure?

As soon as the issue on releasing the occupied Azerbaijani territories was brought into the agenda in Turkey-Armenia discussions, Armenian authorities led by Sarkisian tried to put into circulation “the right of Karabakh Armenians to self-determination.” If so, who will ensure the self-determination of one million Azerbaijanis that lost everything as a result of the occupation?

By putting into circulation “the right of Karabakh Armenians to self-determination” soon after the issue of “releasing of Karabakh” was included into the agenda in the process of “normalization,” Armenia is acting unfairly toward Azerbaijan, Turkey and the historical truths of the region.

The occupation of Azerbaijani regions adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia with the support of outside forces, posed threat to the peace processes in the region. Just after this occupation, Armenian and Azerbaijani intellectuals, who gathered to speak about peace late in the 80s and early in the 90s, were deprived of this opportunity. If we make an excursion into history we can see Azerbaijani poet Sabir, who realized that outside forces backed the misunderstanding between Armenians and Turks in 1905 in Karabakh, wrote a poem “Beynelmilel” (International).

Hovhannes Tumanyan, who did not want a contradiction between the two nations in Karabakh, visited the Armenian villages holding a white flag, explained the situation to the people and succeeded in calming down the situation. Outstanding Azerbaijani playwright Jafar Jabbarli depicted the background of those happenings in his play “1905-ci ilde” (In 1905).

Viewing the happenings from the historical perspective we see that the separatism in Nagorno Karabakh and occupation of 20 percent of Azerbaijani territories left no place for the intellectuals and politicians of the two countries to maneuver. Therefore, the Turkish prime minister’s inclusion of the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” into the process of “normalization” of Turkish-Armenian relations becomes more important.

Actually, the foundation of the future national conflict was laid when a referendum was held by Stalin on July 7, 1923, for Armenian autonomy in Karabakh. The plebiscite was scheduled the same day for the Turks in Armenia’s Zengezur region to “realize their self-determination,” but the plebiscite was not held, and in 1948-1952 approximately 500,000 Azerbaijani Turks were deported from Armenia.

The process of Azerbaijanis’ deportation from Armenia took place in the Soviet Union, the “example of peoples’ friendship and brotherhood.” The last of the Azerbaijani Turks in Armenia was deported in March-June, 1988 – again during Soviet times. It was the last ring in Armenia’s turning into a monoethnic country.

The autonomy given to Nagorno-Karabakh in 1923 contained the maximal rights that the present autonomous regimes in the world may envy. They managed themselves; headed their parliament, the great majority of the state agencies were led by Armenians; they had representatives in Azerbaijani government; the persons, who represented them in the Soviet parliament, were Armenian; they had school, university, radio, TV channels, newspapers and magazines in their language; even the labels of the products made there were in Armenian.

With the rights of which autonomy can you compare the large rights of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh that was 120,000 approximately 25 years ago? We can see that “the right of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to self-determination” was the biggest injustice against Azerbaijan.

A question arises: if as claimed by Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, they were indeed oppressed by Azerbaijan’s pressure in the autonomous province and passed a decision to unite with Armenia, can they show an example that during the 65-year autonomy an Armenian was injured on an ethnic basis?

It is inadmissible that in the international discussions Armenia showing “Nagorno-Karabakh’s right to self-determination” tries to force Azerbaijan to the referendum in the monoethnic Nagorno Karabakh region with a population of 146,000.

The question is not the “right of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to self-determination,” but the unification of a part of Azerbaijan to Armenia by occupation. Therefore, Prime Minister Erdogan’s inclusion of the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” into the process of “normalization” of Turkey-Armenia relations is an initiative serving to establish fair peace in the region, and should be necessarily supported in terms of international law and human rights.

Armenian leaders, who are carrying on propaganda among the world community for opening the border with Turkey, constantly reiterate the following:

“It is not normal that in the 21st century the border with the neighbor is closed.”

If this remark is admitted, then how would the world community answer Azerbaijan’s right question: “Is it normal in the 21st century to occupy the territories of the neighbor, displace 1 million people, unite a part of the neighbor’s territories to its lands?”

Assessing the matter in terms of the inactivity of the UN Security Council and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, it becomes more important that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan included the factor of “releasing Karabakh from occupation” into the “normalization” of the relations between Turkey and Armenia, while the international organizations are paralyzed concerning the occupation of Azerbaijani territories.

* Vusala Mahirgizi is the director general of Azeri-Press Agency, or APA.

Hurriyet Daily news

May 6, 2010
Azerbaijan, Turkey round off gas talks

Azerbaijan and Turkey rounded off gas talks, Azerbaijani Industry and Energy Minister Natik Aliyev said at the 13th Eurasian Economic Summit in Istanbul.

The Minister stated that both countries will sign a relevant agreement in the near future, Azertag news agency reports.

Aliyev noted that Azerbaijani companies have increased investments in Turkey’s economy, adding that over 500 Azeri companies invested in various sectors.

He also stressed that after SOCAR purchased a 51% share of Turkish petrochemical giant Petkim, it plans to invest additional $3-5 bn in the company.

A.G.

News

May 6, 2010
US Conflict Resolution Policy Backfires in Yerevan

April 27, 2010 05:00

By: Vladimir Socor

The US State Department seems disappointed, but not entirely surprised, by Yerevan’s April 22 suspension of Armenian-Turkish “normalization.” Assistant Secretary of State, Philip Gordon, in charge of this policy, finds solace in Armenian President, Serzh Sargsyan’s decision to suspend, rather than terminate the effort; and hopes that Yerevan would continue to cooperate with the US-driven process goal. Gordon as well as State Department Spokesman, Philip Crowley, argued that such normalization meets the interests of Armenia, Turkey, and other [unnamed] countries in the region (press releases cited by News.Az and Arminfo, April 23).

These statements, however, seem to ignore Azerbaijan’s view and the change in Turkey’s view. Inasmuch as the normalization focuses on opening the Turkish-Armenian border unconditionally, or no longer linked to a withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan’s interior –Baku deemed it to be against its interests all along. Ankara had rallied to Baku’s view last December already.

Since April 2009, US President, Barack Obama’s administration has pressed for opening Turkey’s border with Armenia unconditionally Thus, the October 2009 Zurich protocols, strongly backed by the US, required Turkey to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia and open the mutual border “without preconditions.”

Washington’s policy seems driven primarily by domestic politics. The administration hopes to remove the annual drama of Armenian genocide recognition from the center-stage of US politics. It seeks its way out of the dilemma of losing Turkey versus any loss of the US Armenian vote. “Normalization” of Turkish-Armenian relations, centered on the re-opening of that border, was offered as a substitute for the unfulfilled electoral-campaign promises to recognize an Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey.

Washington’s normalization concept, however, has also turned out to be unfulfilled. Tilting sharply in Armenia’s favor at Azerbaijan’s expense, it backfired first in Azerbaijan and shortly afterward in Turkey. Instead of de-aligning Ankara from Baku, as seemed briefly possible, it led Turkey and Azerbaijan to close ranks against an unconditional “normalization” of Turkish-Armenian relations, prior to a first-stage withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan.

The US initiative seemed unrelated to any regional strategy in the South Caucasus. It actually coincided with an overall reduction of US engagement in that region, downgrading the earlier goals of conflict-resolution and promotion of energy projects. Moreover, it risked splitting its strategic partner Azerbaijan from Turkey, compromising the basis for a subsequent return to an active US policy in the region.

Previous US administrations had also proposed to open the Turkish-Armenian border, but never as a goal in itself, unconditionally, or by some deadline in the political calendar, as has most recently been the case. Moreover, those earlier discussions considered opening both the Turkish and Azeri borders with Armenia, as part of an overall settlement, without dividing Ankara and Baku from each other on that account. Those border-opening proposals were being discussed as one element in comprehensive negotiations toward stage-by-stage resolution of the Armenian-Azeri conflict, and in conditional linkage with Armenian troop withdrawal from inner-Azeri districts, again in contrast to Washington’s recent proposals.

Yet, there is an element of continuity between those earlier border-opening proposals and the latest one. That common element is the optimistic belief that open borders and freedom to trade are a prerequisite to resolution of conflict and durable peace. This carryover from Manchesterianism often colored US political debates about the possibility of opening the Azeri and Turkish borders with Armenia. Yet, the diplomatic process integrated this issue within the broader negotiations. It did not single it out from that context or allow it to become a currency of exchange in US domestic politics.

The logic of the administration’s initiative from 2009 to date has implied that Washington would “deliver” the re-opening of Turkey’s border with Armenia; while Turkey would in turn “deliver” Azerbaijan by opening the Turkish-Armenian border, without insisting on the withdrawal of Armenian troops from inner-Azeri territories. That conditionality is a long-established one in these negotiations. However, Washington currently insists that the two processes be separated and that Turkey opens that border unconditionally as per the October 2009 Zurich protocols.

Breaking that linkage would irreparably compromise the chances of a peaceful, stage-by-stage settlement of the Armenian-Azeri conflict. It would indefinitely prolong the Armenian military presence inside Azerbaijan, placing Russia in a commanding position to arbitrate the conflict, with unprecedented leverage on an Azerbaijan alienated from its strategic allies.

Washington had persuaded Ankara to break that conditionality in the October 2009 protocols, which came close to splitting Turkey from Azerbaijan. However, Turkey reinstated that conditionality unambiguously from December 2009 onward. Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, declared this repeatedly and publicly, contradicting Obama and the US State Department on this account at the December 2009 and April 2010 Washington summits and afterward. Following the latter event, Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, flew to Baku with reassurances that Turkey would only open the border with Armenia if Armenian troops withdrew from inner-Azeri districts. The assurances were the more significant after the US White House had demonstratively excluded Azerbaijan from the Washington summit (Anatolia News Agency, April 14, 18-20).

The US administration’s policy has now backfired on all sides, Yerevan being the last to abandon it after the policy had failed to “deliver” Ankara and Baku. The Obama administration can now be expected to revert to a balanced approach by taking Azeri and Turkish views more carefully into account.

https://jamestown.org/program/us-conflict-resolution-policy-backfires-in-yerevan/

April 29, 2010