Category: Southern Caucasus

The recent war in the Caucasus has shifted Turkish geopolitical priorities. Given that the United States is in no position to counter Russian moves, Ankara is unilaterally trying to deal with the Russian resurgence and the threat it poses to Turkish interests in the region.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Aug. 20 made a one-day trip to Azerbaijan, where he met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to discuss regional security issues in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian war. Erdogan’s trip to Baku is the latest in a series of Turkish initiatives in the wake of the Russian resurgence. Ankara mooted the idea of a Caucasian Union on Aug. 11 to achieve regional stability. Separately, Turkey is reaching out to its (and Azerbaijan’s) regional foe, Armenia; talks reportedly are under way to get Yerevan on board with the Caucasian Union project.

The recent war in the Caucasus has shifted Turkish geopolitical priorities. After Turkey’s failure to secure entry into the European Union, the Turks decided to emerge as a player in the Middle East. The most significant manifestation of this has been its role as mediator in the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations. The brief but extremely significant war in Georgia dramatically changed the Turkish calculus, however, and, in a matter of days, Turkey went from playing minor league in the Middle East to having to deal with what is essentially a new Cold War between Washington and Moscow.

Turkey cannot afford to view the resurgence of Russia in purely Cold War terms. It wants to emerge as a major player in what is essentially its front yard. But it cannot count on help from the United States, which is preoccupied with Iraqi-Iranian and Afghan-Pakistani issues and therefore is not in any position to counter Russian moves in the Caucasus at present. Unlike Washington, which has the luxury of addressing the situation in the longer term, Ankara must, in the short term, deal with the Russian invasion of the Caucasus — an area of core national security interest to the Turks.

The Russians have a deep interest in reconfiguring the energy infrastructure that bypasses their territory and supplies European energy needs through Turkey. From the Kremlin’s point of view, this is the key to ensuring European — and Turkish — dependence on Moscow for the continent’s energy requirements. Therefore, Turkey must deal with the Russian stranglehold of Georgia and Moscow’s moves to force the hand of Azerbaijan regarding Baku’s energy export options..

Judging from their behavior, the Turks are in no mood to confront the Russians and instead have chosen the diplomatic route (for their part, the Russians are not itching for a fight with Turkey either). Turkey knows it cannot succeed diplomatically with Russia by simply behaving as a U.S./NATO ally in the Caucasus, which would explain its efforts to distinguish its position from that of the United States. Under Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party, Ankara has in general been trying to craft a more independent foreign policy.

A recent example is President Abdullah Gul’s statement that the conflict in Georgia showed that the United States could no longer shape global politics on its own and should begin sharing power with other countries. In an interview with the British daily The Guardian published Aug. 17, Gul called for common decisions rather than unilateral action, saying “a new world order, if I can say it, should emerge.”

The transformation of Turkish foreign policy notwithstanding, it is difficult for Russia to ignore Turkey’s reality as a NATO member state and hence not look at Turkish moves as part of a U.S. plan to counter Moscow. The Kremlin can afford not to seek a negotiated settlement with Turkey. After all, Russia controls the situation on the ground. Therefore, Turkish diplomacy could run into problems. Turkey must try the diplomatic work anyway, as the alternative raises specters of dark times long past.

Should diplomacy fail, Turkey’s only other option would be to confront Russia militarily. Turkey is well-positioned to deal with Russia; for example, its navy is in a good position to defend the Bosporus from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

But the critical missing element from the military option is the political will that would enable the Turks to return to their historic mode of dealing with Russians with force. Ankara is thus unlikely to readopt a course of action in a matter of weeks that it has not engaged in within some 90 years. Russia and Turkey (then known as the Ottoman Empire) fought several wars between the mid-16th century to the early 20th century, with the last one being fought in the Caucasus in 1917-1918.

Facing a choice between unsuccessful diplomacy and reluctance toward military option, Turkey is pretty much in the same situation the United States finds itself in with regards to the Russians. The critical difference between Washington and Ankara, however, is that Ankara must deal with the situation now.

Source : Stratfor

In some Western nations an utterly one-sided picture has been painted of the recent crisis in the Georgia-South Ossetia conflict. The statements of American officials would lead one to conclude that the crisis began when Russia sent in its troops to support its peacekeepers there.

Meticulously avoided in those statements: The decision of Tbilisi to use crude military force against South Ossetia in the early hours of Aug. 8. The Georgian army used multiple rocket launchers, artillery and air force to attack the sleeping city of Tskhinvali.

Some honest independent observers acknowledge that a surprised Russia didn’t respond immediately. We started moving our troops in support of peacekeepers only on the second day of Georgia’s ruthless military assault. Yes, our military struck sites outside of South Ossetia. When the positions of your peacekeepers and the civilian population they have been mandated to protect are shelled, the sources of such attacks are legitimate targets.

Our military acted efficiently and professionally. It was an able ground operation that quickly achieved its very clear and legitimate objectives. It was very different, for example, from the U.S./NATO operation against Serbia over Kosovo in 1999, when an air bombardment campaign ran out of military targets and degenerated into attacks on bridges, TV towers, passenger trains and other civilian sites, even hitting an embassy.

In this instance, Russia used force in full conformity with international law, its right of self-defense, and its obligations under the agreements with regard to this particular conflict. Russia could not allow its peacekeepers to watch acts of genocide committed in front of their eyes, as happened in the Bosnian city of Srebrenica in 1995.

But what of the U.S.’s role leading up to this conflict? U.S. involvement with the Tbilisi regime—past and future—must be addressed to fully understand the conflict. When the mantra of the “Georgian democratic government” is repeated time and time again, does it mean that by U.S. standards, a democratic government is allowed to act in brutal fashion against a civilian population it claims to be its own, simply because it is “democratic”?

Another real issue is U.S. military involvement with the government of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Did Washington purposely encourage an irresponsible and unpredictable regime in this misadventure? If the U.S. couldn’t control Tbilisi’s behavior before, why do some in the U.S. seek to rush to rearm the Georgian military now?

Russia, by contrast, remains committed to a peaceful resolution in the Caucasus.

We’ll continue to seek to deprive the present Georgian regime of the potential and resources to do more mischief. An embargo on arms supplies to the current Tbilisi regime would be a start.

We will make sure that the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan endorsed in Moscow on Aug. 12 is implemented, provided the parties to the conflict cooperate in good faith. So far we are not sure at all that Tbilisi is ready. President Saakashvili keeps trying to persuade the world that the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali was destroyed not by the Georgian attack but by the Russian forces who, according to Mr. Saakashvili, bombed the city after they entered it.

Russia is committed to the ongoing positive development of relations with the U.S. That kind of agenda is set forth in the Foreign Policy Concept—the framework document that sets out the basic directions of Russia’s foreign policy—recently approved by President Dmitry Medvedev.

However, it must be remembered that, as between any other major world powers, our bilateral relationship can only advance upon the basis of reciprocity. And that is exactly what has been missing over the past 16 years. I meant precisely that when I said that the U.S. will have to choose between its virtual Georgia project and its much broader partnership with Russia.

The signs are ominous. Several joint military exercises have been cancelled by the Americans. Now Washington suggests our Navy ships are no longer welcome to take part in the Active Endeavour counterterrorism and counterproliferation operation in the Mediterranean. Washington also threatens to freeze our bilateral strategic stability dialogue.

Of course, that strategic dialogue has not led us too far since last fall, including on the issue of U.S. missile defense sites in Eastern Europe and the future of the strategic arms reduction regime. But the threat itself to drop these issues from our bilateral agenda is very indicative of the cost of the choice being made in Washington in favor of the discredited regime in Tbilisi. The U.S. seems to be eager to punish Russia to save the face of a failed “democratic” leader at the expense of solving the problems that are much more important to the entire world.

It is up to the American side to decide whether it wants a relationship with Russia that our two peoples deserve. The geopolitical reality we’ll have to deal with at the end of the day will inevitably force us to cooperate.

To begin down the road of cooperation, it would not be a bad idea to do a very simple thing: Just admit for a moment that the course of history must not depend entirely on what the Georgian president is saying. Just admit that a democratically elected leader can lie. Just admit that you have other sources of information—and other objectives—that shape your foreign policy.

Mr. Lavrov is the foreign minister of the Russian Federation.

19/08/2008 22:01 MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political observer Andrei Fedyashin) – The emergency NATO Council session held in Brussels on August 19 at America’s request to give Russia its “comeuppance” did not go smoothly. It took the ministers several hours to hammer out the final communique.

In the end it turned out to be utterly predictable: the bloc’s 26 members decided that they would, after all, live with Russia, but they should talk to it in a tactful, but tough way. They heard the Georgian Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili (who, addressing the bloc’s headquarters, pressed for all thinkable punishments, including Russia’s expulsion from many international organizations), but refused to give a hearing to our Ambassador, Dmitry Rogozin.

The latter had sought a meeting with NATO ministers and ambassadors every day since August 8 to explain the Russian position and actions. Rogozin threatened to spoil the party so much that he was barred from the meeting and was not even allowed to hold a press conference on the heels of the emergency meeting. Still, NATO officials have never tried to conceal the fact that their task was to protect the interests of the bloc and its members rather than to provide information and political objectivity.

Speaking of the outcome of the meeting, Russia knew all along what NATO’s political response would be.

At U.S. insistence, the bloc agreed to form a NATO-Georgia Commission (similar to the one it already has with Ukraine) to coordinate the strengthening of military ties with Tbilisi, and confirmed it was ready to admit Georgia to NATO at an unspecified future date. But NATO failed to back George Bush and curtail military cooperation and high-level meetings with Russia.

The U.S. was counting on much more. U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, upon arrival in Brussels confirmed Greater Europe’s fears that the Americans had fallen prey to another bout of “diplomatic frenzy” which happens each time after major setbacks. Europe is not happy when America behaves like this because it is prone to get carried away and opens all the cards. The Old World prefers the slowly-slowly, softly-softly approach. Rice, however, declared that NATO would not allow Moscow to win a “strategic victory”. “We have to deny Russian strategic objectives, which are clearly to undermine Georgia’s democracy… We are not going to allow Russia to draw a new line at those states that are not yet integrated into the Transatlantic structures.”

If one strips away the usual “democratic litany” what Condie said was that the U.S. and NATO must not allow Russia to prevent a new enlargement of the bloc by taking in Ukraine and Georgia. This is Washington’s long-term strategic objective: to close the NATO ring in the region where Russia is most vulnerable.

“Russia’s strategic victory” was meant to come as a horrible revelation to European ears. True, Russia has never concealed that not allowing Georgia and Ukraine, especially under their present regimes, to join NATO was its “strategic objective.” The Europeans do not mind admitting them, but not all of them are quite sure that it is necessary and worthwhile to quarrel with and break relations with Moscow over Yushchenko’s Ukraine and Saakashvili’s Georgia. What is the point? NATO has moved up to Russia’s borders already.

The European ministers in Brussels were faced with a classic conundrum: “punish or pardon.” Some NATO members formed “interest groups” even before the meeting on this issue. For example, Old Europe (Germany, France and Italy) was loath to continue rocking the “Transatlantic foundations.” But it was being pressed to go further than it wanted.

The Europeans had, in fact, wondered for some time whether Bush would depart calmly or try to make his mark in history by springing yet another surprise. Much to Greater Europe’s chagrin, “friend George” is not someone who goes quietly. He had to bring Saakashvili’s Georgia into NATO through the slaughter of civilians in Tskhinvali. Now that it has turned into an indisputable disaster for Saakashvili, Washington is trying to bring pressure to bear on NATO allies and prevail over the Kremlin which refused to have another puppet government controlled by NATO, or rather Washington, on its doorstep. Washington is genuinely surprised as to why Moscow disagrees with such an elementary thing…

NATO’s political response, as expected, boiled down to mere symbolism because NATO’s European old-timers were not ready to curtail links with Russia. Against this background, one finds some of NATO’s actions perplexing. According to our General Staff information unveiled during the meeting, U.S., Polish and Canadian naval ships would enter the Black Sea by the end of August. An encounter between Russian and NATO ships in times of crisis is not conducive to an early settlement of the “Caucasus conflict.”

However, despite some disagreements between the Europeans and Washington, no one should have the slightest doubt that America, be it the America of George Bush or Barak Obama, will cease to be the Old World’s main ally. Illusions about a Transatlantic rift are no more than illusions. Russia should not kid itself about “Europe’s growing dependence” on its gas, oil, timber and other commodities. That will never be a prize “for good behavior”.

There is nothing wrong with somebody in Europe, the European Union, NATO, the UN, the OSCE and so on giving Moscow bad marks for behavior. Instead of feeling outrage, we should long have done the same. We can even give marks on the European scale, although clearly, we have not yet adapted it to our way of thinking.