Category: Southern Caucasus

  • Cultural Influences on Politics in Caspian

    Cultural Influences on Politics in Caspian

    Brenda Shaffer who is an American thinker works to define cultural domination on foreign or domestic affairs of states in the “Is there a Muslim Foreign Policy?”article. Shaffer is explaining this event via some sharp examples. Firstly, Shaffer begin the article with Huntigton’s thesis: “The Clash of Civilizations”. Samuel Huntigton’s thesis follows an idea that culture has a main role in defining of policy. Also Brenda Shaffer agrees thesis of Huntington and creates new approaches about conducts of civilizations and state actions. Shaffer says that culture was a main mechanism to diplomatic relations. Also she interprets culture as specific subject of country’s within religion, history and civilization.

    Western scholars researched about strong Islamic effection in Muslim countries after 11 September terrorist act and looked at Muslim scholars, historians, diplomats and generals who have an extraordinary situation over the people. As a result they understood Islamic effection as strong as nuclear weapons against to the world. But this is not a physical danger, this is an ideological spread. Their speeches to newspapers and political journals which had a title as “Do Muslim countries have a different outlook against Non-Muslim States?”

    On the other hand Shaffer interests about this subject under the psychological perspective. Human beings are often driven by culture according to Shaffer. Also human behavior effects on to state affairs. But state acts partly different from human behaviors. We can give example from philosophical history: Some philosophers think that the state is a thing like human. But it is systematically human as a big organism. State actions have similarities with people actions. State is a big form of human and human is a small form of the state. As behavioral psychological meaning has different dimensions.[1]

    Shaffer gives an example about different state decision-making; some Muslim countries have an anti-American approach as behavioral. But these are making alliance with the USA like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt. Commonly we can see inharmonious dimensions between state policies and people behaviors. Caspian perspective of Shaffer has a common beliefs. According to Shaffer, all Caspian countries have been influenced by Islamic effection after from the Soviet Union. Shaffer judges all Caspian and Middle Asian people as Islamic effected nations but it is not totally true if we looked at historical and contemporary situations. Also today these countries are secular except Iran.

    Iran – Politics with Islamic Style

    The Islamic Republic of Iran is an important country in this area as ideological mechanism according to idea of western scholars. After the collapse of the USSR, Iran wanted to export their Islamic regime for other neighbor states via some absolute ways. In Central Asia and Caucasus territory Iran plays to export their Persian Islamic mind as a regime under the title as “Islamic Solidarity” with economic and security events. Western idea is true about activities of this country. But common outlook to Islamic countries of American or Western scholars is different. They agree Islam as a common political tool among all Muslims. Example, Iran works to create an Islamic governing system for all Muslim countries. But Islamic mind of Iran is very different from normal Islamic idea. Persian Islamic system bases on fundamentalist movement. If we look at Turkey, Egypt or Tunis, we could see normal or laic Islamic behavior. Also Shaffer says their false point in next sentence. “Poor Muslim countries have an effective circumstance about this issue but secular Muslim countries challenges to Iran like Turkmenistan.” But Tehran has faced three regional disputes :

    – The Nagorno-Karabagh conflict (Christian Armenia versus Muslim Azerbaijan)

    – The Chechen conflict (Chechen Muslims versus Moscow)

    – The Tajik civil war (The Islamic Renaissance Party versus Moscow)

    In these mix circumstances Iranian fundamentalist approach transformed to self-interest system. An interesting point about is that Iran supports Armenia instead of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.[2] With these events, Iran state security was challenged in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia since Iran was a multiethnic state. We give information about Iran’s population: Half of Iran’s population is comprised of non Persian ethnic minorities; Turkmens, Kurds and Azerbaijani groups. Largest minority Azerbaijanis live in northwestern provinces of Iran which bordered with Azerbaijan. Relations of Iran bogged down with Baku because of Iranian self interests.

    Shaffer shows her ideas that Iranian diversity of opinion is a good example to explain Iranian foreign policy. There are some different points as historical legacies and religious differences in policies.

    “On the other hand Turkey attempted to conduct a balanced policy toward both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Also Turkey helped for Karabagh conflict to Baku.”

    Turkey changed its policy when Karabagh became a conflict. It can be an example for cultural combines if western scholars wanted to define their issue. But it cannot be an absolute example about regional cultural alliences subject.

    According to many observers, religious differences have played a central role in the Caspian region. With these circumstances Azerbaijan supported Chechenya. Also some analysts have assumed that religious differences serve as a basis for conflict between Muslim Azerbaijan and Christian Armenia. Over these events, common culture serves as a basic role for alliances and coalitions and different cultures act as an obstacle to cooperation.

    Shaffer’s opinion is that there are cultural alliances are created follow by from collapsing of the USSR.

    Tehran’s main argument is Shiite background in their support system. Also Turkey and Azerbaijan shares ethnic Turkic and Muslim backgrounds. Also Russian and Armenian background is Orthodox Christian form. But Georgian-Russian conflict is different from this event. Shaffer and other western scholars can not define this reality.

    Final

    Culture may be a certain material of regime survivability. Islam can be an effective reason to influence state system and people behavior like speeches of western scholars. Some governments explain and justify their policies in cultural terms. We must analyze a country’s foreign policy on the basis of actions. We have anticipated the New Testament to Germany and Russia or Torah to Israel like Islamic system. Shaffer asks question : “What does the Koran has to say a foreign policy question?” If Islam influences them, they should act with Islamic interaction.

    The USA wants an enemy to rebuild their father emotion on the world. They forced as goodness of the world during the Cold War. They defended the world countries from dangerous communist system. Their interest was communism in that time. But they wanted a new enemy to regulate the world with themselves. After the Cold War, their White House scholars worked for a new enemy establishment. There was a “Red Dangerous” line. But today there should be “Green Dangerous” line. And its name is Islamic effection on politics.[3]

    Fans of the USA defense western style always. There shouldn’t be a religious system like Islam around the world according to them. But they don’t look at Israeli system or American Christiantic base. Main question should be about Western classification about cultural conflicts. There are too many problems about this thesis.

    Today there is a Muslim conflict. And the USA isa  patron of the world. So they are working for peace, democracy and other good things. But the world’s people will know works of the USA. All terror acts, all problems, all ethnic clashes…

     


    [1] Arnold Wolfers, Behavior of States, Dogu Bati Journal – 26, Istanbul 2003

    [2] Karabagh conflict borned in the late 1980. Armenia attacked to the legal boundaries of Azerbaijan.

    [3] Political Declaration Fikret Baskaya – Ideologies, Dogu Bati Journal 2003

    Mehmet Fatih ÖZTARSU

    Baku Qafqaz University

    International Research Club (INTERESCLUB)

  • EU too divided to solve frozen conflicts, Azerbaijan says

    EU too divided to solve frozen conflicts, Azerbaijan says

    EU too divided to solve frozen conflicts, Azerbaijan says

    VALENTINA POP

    Today @ 09:25 CET

    EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS – Oil and gas-rich rich Azerbaijan, home of another frozen conflict with its neighbouring Russian ally Armenia, does not consider the EU as a feasible peace broker in the region, Azeri deputy foreign minister Araz Azimov has said.

    “The European Union is a powerful economic and political union of states, but in terms of acting in a united way, the EU is not there yet, especially in an environment that changes rapidly. The EU it is not able to act in an instrumental way”, Mr Azimov said on his expectations of possible EU involvement in finding a solution for the frozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

    The senior official made the comment at a conference organized in Brussels by the European Policy Center on Wednesday (8 October).

    The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which still occupies the Azeri region of Nagorno-Karabakh, is currently mediated by the so-called Minsk group, created by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1992 and headed by France, Russia and the United States.

    Other members of the Minsk group include Belarus, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Turkey as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan themselves.

    “In the Minsk group there is a majority of EU countries and we do take their position into account. We need the EU’s influence as an international actor, but we don’t think the EU is a feasible partner in the Minsk group,” Mr Azimov explained.

    The EU’s special representative to Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, Peter Semneby, confirmed that the bloc “remains supportive of the work of the Minsk group” but didn’t see as probable any change in terms of the EU joining the body as a full participant in its own right.

    He dismissed the idea that the EU was unable to respond “forcefully” and “united” to crisis situations however, considering that in the recent war in Georgia it proved “very much able” to show “political will” in brokering a ceasefire agreement and in quickly deploying an observer mission on the ground.

    Mr Semneby noted that it is the first European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission deployed on former Soviet union territory, designed to “stabilize the situation” after an “acute war.”

    EU role unclear

    The status of the EUobservers remains unclear if Russians are to pull back by 10 October from the security zones and not granting them access into the two separatist enclaves, Azerbaijan’s Mr Azimov countered.

    “I think Russians will withdraw from the buffer zones, because they have no interest to stay. The six points [of the 8 September ceasefire agreement] will be implemented more or less, but then what will happen with South Ossetia and Abkhazia?” he asked.

    “The main lesson of 08/09 is that the stability of the region is put under a big question mark, while separatist movements are being further promoted,” the Azeri diplomat said, adding that it will be important what happens in Geneva on 15 October, when diplomatic talks are scheduled on the status of the two Georgian breakaway regions, whose independence has been only recognized by Russia and Nicaragua.

    Mr Azimov spoke of the need for the EU to reconfigure its approach to Azerbaijan and start implementing the existing mechanisms from a 2006 energy partnership, not just talk about how important his country is for the bloc’s energy security.

    Azerbaijan is not aiming, like Ukraine or Georgia, to become a member of the EU, but could very well imagine “common areas for trade, economy, transport,” he explained, “as far as is procedurally possible without entering the membership discussion.”

    West loses influence in Caucasus

    While the Azeri minister talked about his country’s ability to “balance” between its close ally US, but also Russia and Iran, emphasising “stability” and “political responsibility,” Mustafa Aydın from the University of Ankara bluntly said that the region has dropped the whole idea of democratisation and Euro-Atlantic integration following the Russian invasion of Georgia.

    “There is no talk of democratisation in the Caucasus any more. If authoritarianism worked in Russia, why not in the Caucasus as well? All the countries, including Turkey, have adopted a careful rhetoric towards Moscow, with ‘stabilisation’ being the key-word,” Mr Aydin said.

     

    Vladimir Socor from the NGO the Jamestown Foundation and a long time expert on the region said the “EU is by far not matching Russia in soft power in Azerbaijan” and the wider region.

    The conflict in Georgia damaged the confidence of investors in the Caucasus energy corridor – the only direct link the EU has with the oil and gas-rich Caspian countries without passing through Russia – he explained.

    He talked of the need for the EU and US to subsidise pipelines such as the planned Nabucco gas pipeline, which would bring Caspian gas to the European markets.

    Nabucco sweetener criticised

    Mr Socor criticised the incipient idea in the outgoing Bush administration to re-route Nabucco through Armenia instead of Georgia as a “sweetener” for getting an agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh.

    Mr Azimov reassured the audience that such plans are not realistic, since a part of the project passing through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey is already built.

    He stressed that the government in Baku still supports the project, “but it shouldn’t be the only one caring about Nabucco,” calling on the EU to step up efforts to build the pipe.

  • Georgia’s conflict and Iran and Turkey

    Georgia’s conflict and Iran and Turkey

    Georgia’s conflict and Iran and Turkey
    By Rayyan al-Shawaf
    Commentary by
    Tuesday, September 09, 2008

    Although the Russo-Georgian military clash is over, its ramifications will be felt for a long time, especially as the political crisis between the two countries remains unresolved. In the Middle East, two major countries, Turkey and Iran, have been directly affected by the recent events. While Turkey stands to lose should Russia and Georgia fail to resolve their differences, Iran stands to win.

    An embattled Russia cornered by the West would never forgive NATO member Turkey; as a result, Russian-Turkish relations would plummet and Russia might even stop providing Turkey with natural gas. In casting about for allies, Russia would find a similarly isolated Iran to be amenable to giving the two countries’ ties a strategic dimension, but only in return for political and economic concessions. Thus, the Russo-Georgian crisis may ironically change the balance of power in the Middle East.

    Both Russia and Iran have become increasingly alarmed with the West’s attempts to bypass them in the quest for oil. Moscow wanted the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, the world’s second longest, to pass through Russia. That way, Russia would not only benefit financially, but also be able to exert some control over the supply of oil to the West, much as it does with the longest pipeline in the world, the Druzhba, which flows from southeast Russia to Europe. During its invasion of Georgia, Russia pointedly demonstrated that it can threaten the BTC pipeline, and that, as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev recently put it, “Russia is a nation to be reckoned with.”

    Meanwhile, Iran, most of whose oil flows to Asia, has long sought to lay oil pipelines to the West, a desire more often than not frustrated by Western sanctions. By supporting Russia in its current confrontation with the West, Tehran may have secured a future economic and political payoff. This would be especially true should Iran have extracted from Russia a commitment to devise a common oil strategy vis-a-vis the West.

    However, even without this possibility, there are several indicators of the benefits that may accrue to Iran as a result of its pro-Russian policy. For example, Iranian (and Syrian) requests for a sophisticated missile defense system are being taken seriously in Moscow, much to the chagrin of the United States and Israel. When one remembers that Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant – built with Russian support – is slated to begin operation in 2009, it becomes apparent that Iran may be on the verge of radically enhancing its regional and international position.

    Even as Iran makes a bid for regional power status, Turkey has almost by accident emerged as the country that could hold the key to solving the Russo-Georgian crisis. Indeed, Turkey is exceptionally well-positioned to be mediator, a role it is already playing with some success between Syria and Israel, and to a lesser extent between Iran and the West. Russia is Turkey’s biggest trading partner, and Turkey is dependant on Russian natural gas. At the same time, Turkey maintains strong economic and military ties with Georgia, which aspires to join NATO, of which Turkey is a strategic member. Turkey cannot afford to allow its relations with Russia to deteriorate – they have already been strained by the passage of American ships through the Bosphorus on their way to the Georgian port of Batumi – but neither can it shun the West’s call for supporting Georgia. As a result, mediating the current conflict is not only a role that could propel Turkey into the limelight as a major regional player, but also a necessity insofar as Turkish politico-economic imperatives are concerned.

    If Turkey meets the challenge, there may even be added benefits. Turkish-Armenian relations could thaw, which would be of great significance to the oil and natural gas industry. The most direct overland route for an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to Turkey would begin in Azerbaijan and pass through Armenia. Yet no such pipeline has ever been constructed due to political instability: Azerbaijan and Armenia fought a war over Nagorno-Karabakh and remain at loggerheads, while Turkey’s border with Armenia has been closed since 1993 in solidarity with Azerbaijan.

    With the Russo-Georgian clash illustrating the vulnerability of Georgia, through which the BTC pipeline passes, Armenia’s importance has increased. Turkish President Abdullah Gul, on a groundbreaking visit to Yerevan last week for a Turkish-Armenian soccer match, spoke about the need for the countries of the Caucasus to work together to enhance stability. To that end, Turkey has called for the creation of a regional cooperation group comprising Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

    The trajectory of the Russo-Georgian conflict during the next few months could be critical in determining what happens in the Middle East. If mediation succeeds in bringing the two sides together and defusing the crisis, Russia will not find it necessary to turn to Iran. If the successful mediation is Turkish, then Turkey will have demonstrated a unique ability to bring stability to the Caucasus, broker Syrian-Israeli peace talks, and mediate between Iran and the West.

    On the other hand, if the conflict drags on, Russia’s ties to the West and Turkey will inevitably deteriorate. Facing diplomatic isolation and possibly even sanctions, Russia may forge a strategic alliance with Iran, thereby drastically increasing Iranian influence in the Middle East.

     

    \\\ a freelance writer and reviewer based in Beirut. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.is

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  • Armenian Soccer Body Changes Logo After Uproar

    Armenian Soccer Body Changes Logo After Uproar

     

     

     

     

     

    By Ruben Meloyan

    The Football Federation of Armenia (FFA) said on Wednesday that it has decided to change its new emblem widely criticized for not depicting a biblical mountain in what is now eastern Turkey.

    The FFA’s previous logo, which carried a picture of Mount Ararat, was dropped ahead of last month’s match in Yerevan between Armenia’s and Turkey’s national soccer teams that was watched by the presidents of the two neighboring states.

    The move prompted strong criticism from domestic political groups, notably the pro-government Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun), that suggested that it was designed to please the Turks. Dashnaktsutyun leaders cast doubt on the credibility of FFA assurances that there were no political motives behind the change of the logo emblazoned on the jerseys of national and youth team players.

    Located in northeastern Turkey and visible from Yerevan and much of southern Armenia, Ararat is considered by many Armenians a national symbol. The snow-capped peak, the supposed resting place of Noah’s Ark, is depicted in the center Armenia’s national coat-in-arms.

    Ruben Hayrapetian, the FFA chairman who has previously dismissed the Dashnaktsutyun criticism, said on Wednesday that the decision to leave Ararat out of the current logo was a mistake. “I apologize to the entire public for this real mistake,” he told reporters.

    “We did not think that there will be such an uproar,” Hayrapetian said, adding that the FFA has already commissioned graphic designers to develop another Armenian football emblem. He said it will definitely carry an outline of Ararat.

    “In the meantime, our national football teams will wear jerseys with the emblem of the Republic of Armenia,” the FFA’s executive director, Armen Minasian, told RFE/RL.

    Both he and Hayrapetian insisted that the logo change had nothing to do with the Armenia-Turkey World Cup qualifier played in Yerevan on September 6. “We began the process of logo change last year before we knew that are going to play Turkey,” said Minasian. “There was never any deliberate effort to remove Ararat.”

    (Photolur photos: The current, left, and former emblems of the FFA.)

  • Russia Says Karabakh Peace In Sight

    Russia Says Karabakh Peace In Sight

     

     

     

     

     

    By Emil Danielyan

    Russia expects the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to meet again shortly after next week’s Azerbaijani presidential election and reach a framework peace agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in a newspaper interview published on Tuesday.

    He stressed the importance of a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement and the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations for Armenia’s security and economic development.

    “There remain two or three unresolved issues which need to be agreed upon at the next meetings of the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan,” Lavrov told the “Rossiiskaya Gazeta” daily. “Our understanding is that such meetings will take place shortly after the forthcoming [October 15] presidential elections in Azerbaijan.”

    “As one of three mediators, we have a sense that a denouement is quite real,” he said, adding that the two other mediating powers, the United States and France, also see a “very real chance” of a resolution of the Karabakh conflict.

    The mediators have been trying to get the conflicting parties to accept the basic principles of Karabakh peace that were formally put forward by them in November 2007. Senior French, Russian and U.S. diplomats co-chairing the OSCE Minsk Group discussed the possibility of another Armenian-Azerbaijani summit during the most recent talks with the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers held in New York late last month.

    Lavrov said the future of the so-called Lachin corridor, which provides for the shortest overland link between Armenia and Karabakh, is now the main stumbling block in the peace talks. He did not elaborate.

    The Russian minister was interviewed by a “Rossiiskaya Gazeta” reporter late last week as he flew to Yerevan to meet with Armenia’s President Serzh Sarkisian and Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandian. After the talks with Nalbandian he sounded cautiously optimistic about prospects for a breakthrough in the Karabakh peace process.

    However, a top aide to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev, struck a cautious note as he commented on Lavrov’s upbeat statements in Yerevan. “Major issues have not been agreed upon,” Novruz Mammadov told the Azerbaijani Trend news agency.

    According to Lavrov, Armenia should be keenly interested in a Karabakh settlement in the wake of the crisis in neighboring Georgia which he said exposed “the vulnerability of its position” and highlighted the importance of having an open border with Turkey. “Armenia has huge difficulties communicating with the outside world,” he said. “It is in the fundamental interests of the Armenian people to unblock this situation as soon as possible.

    “It really has few geographic and political options. As soon as the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement becomes a fact, Turkey will be ready to help Armenia forge normal links with the outside world, naturally through the establishment of diplomatic relations between Ankara and Yerevan.”

    The remarks ran counter to a widely held belief in the West that Moscow is disinterested in the normalization of Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey for fear of losing geopolitical leverage against Yerevan.

  • 18th Annual Houston Turkish Festival held in US

    18th Annual Houston Turkish Festival held in US

     

     
     

    [ 07 Oct 2008 17:57 ]

    Baku – APA. 18th Annual Houston Turkish Festival was held in the US. Press service of State Committee on Work with Azerbaijanis Living Abroad told APA that dance group of Houston Azerbaijanis’ Society also participated in the festival. 4000 people attended the festival. Our countrymen performed national dances “Chichekler”, “Uzum”, “Naz-naz” and “Arzu”.
    Houston-Azerbaijan Organization was established in 2004.