Turkish Forum

Category: Georgia

  • Britain has ‘no financial interest’ in Armenia

    Britain has ‘no financial interest’ in Armenia

    UJGreat Britain will not recognize the ‘Armenian genocide’ in the near future.

    Turkey is an important economic, political and strategic partner for Great Britain and as long as this continues, the issue of the Armenian genocide will not be on the agenda of the British parliament or government, the former British ambassador to Armenia, David Miller, said on 9 March, according to Aykakan zhamanak newspaper.

    Miller was speaking at the screening of a film about the Armenian genocide at the London School of Economics.

    ‘Armenia is not Azerbaijan with which Britain has financial interests. Armenia is not Georgia which is of great strategic importance. Armenia is interesting for Britain only in terms of the prevention of war in the region,’ Miller said.

    News-Armenia

  • Georgian Human Rights Groups Meet Western Diplomats

    Georgian Human Rights Groups Meet Western Diplomats

    Civil Georgia, Tbilisi / 10 Mar.2010

    Georgian human rights and advocacy groups met with British, French and U.S. ambassadors in Tbilisi on March 10 to convey their concerns regarding recent cases of, as they put it, targeting human rights groups and activists.

    Representatives from Human Rights Centre (HRC), Georgian Young Lawyers Association (GYLA) and Multinational Georgia, an umbrella organization for dozens of NGOs working on ethnic and religious minority issues, participated in the meeting held in the office of HRC.

    “There have been cases of direct or indirect pressure on activists and human rights groups and we wanted to inform ambassadors about these cases,” Ucha Nanuashvili, head of Human Rights Centre, said.

    He said, among other issues, the case of Arnold Stepanian, founder of Multinational Georgia and representative of Armenian community in Georgia, was raised during the meeting.

    Some Georgian media outlets alleged recently Stepanian was working for the Russian intelligence. Posts made by anonymous users on several Russian internet discussion forums were cited as source of information.

    One of such reports was aired recently by Tbilisi-based Real TV, a station going out in Tbilisi through cable. Its 9-minute long report on the issue opens with footage from a meeting of leaders of Alliance for Georgia (Irakli Alasania, Davit Usupashvili, Davit Gamkrelidze and Sozar Subari) with representatives of Armenian community, also attended by Arnold Stepanian; the footage is accompanied by voiceover saying: “Irakli Alasania, Davit Usupashvili, Davit Gamkrelidze and Sozar Subari are sitting alongside with a presumed special agent of Russia’s Federal Security Service Arnold Stepanian.”

    In general targeting opposition politicians has become a hallmark of Real TV; but the way how the station does it has become a source of criticism from many journalist and media experts saying that the station’s reports are often mudslinging.

    After the meeting in HRC office, French Ambassador Eric Fournier told a reporter from Real TV: “Your channel has specifically targeted some members of the opposition to make a very cynical portrait of them and it has been considered as concern by many of us.”

    John Bass, the U.S. ambassador, said the meeting aimed at getting “first-hand impression, first-hand assessment” about the human rights landscape in Georgia.

    “It’s part of our broad interaction with wide range of organizations so that we can assess human rights situation as part of our broad commitment to help Georgia to realize its goals of membership in Euro-Atlantic community,” Bass said.

    Denis Keefe, the British ambassador, said work of human rights groups was “fundamental to Georgia’s democratic development.”

    “We have good cooperation with number of these NGOs… and we have very useful and serious discussion,” Keefe said.

    Ucha Nanuashvili of HRC said that another case raised with the diplomats was related to a long-time investigative journalist Vakhtang Komakhidze, who has requested asylum in Switzerland, citing pressure from the authorities.

    On February 26 eighteen human rights and advocacy groups released a joint statement expressing concern over, as they put it, smear campaign against them.

    “Information campaign against human rights organizations has intensified since December 2009. Those media outlets, which are either controlled by or have links with the authorities, have reported biased stories one after another, where some human rights groups were portrayed as the country’s enemies working against public interests,” a joint statement by 18 non-governmental organizations.

  • THE ARMENIANS OF GEORGIA: A NEW FLASHPOINT IN THE CAUCASUS?

    THE ARMENIANS OF GEORGIA: A NEW FLASHPOINT IN THE CAUCASUS?

    To : Members of “Caucasian Review of International Affairs”
    on Facebook
    From: Nasimi Aghayev 12 October 2009
    To : Members of “Caucasian Review of International Affairs” on Facebook
    From: Nasimi Aghayev 12 October 2009

    CRIACaucasus Update No. 50, October 12, 2009
    Caucasian Review of International Affairs
    )

    As Turkey and Armenia prepare to open their mutual border and begin a thaw in their relationship, there are fears that a recent spat between Tbilisi and Yerevan could heighten regional tensions once again.

    In early September, Armenia’s President Serzh Sarkisian set out plans to improve the situation of Georgia’s ethnic Armenians. He called for the preservation of Armenian national monuments in Georgia, registering the Armenian Apostolic Church and – most importantly – recognising Armenian as an official language in Georgia.

    The series of measures followed a visit by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to Yerevan in June, when Georgia’s Armenians formally called on President Sarkisian to raise their demands – for greater cultural and political rights – with President Saakashvili (RFE/RL, June 18). Not wishing to antagonise a vital ally when the ‘Turkish thaw’ still seemed distant, President Sarkisian quietly ignored the demands. Indeed, he actually praised the Georgian leader for his efforts at improving the social and economic welfare of Javakheti, a region mostly populated by ethnic Armenians in southern Georgia (RFE/RL, June 25).

    The package of measures which President Sarkisian proposed in September therefore came as something of a surprise to Tbilisi. Georgian officials reacted with scorn – State Minister for Reintegration Temur Iakobashvili remarked that he was “very glad that Armenian language is the only state language in Armenia”, but that it would not be adopted in Georgia (Georgia Times, September 3).

    Analysts have linked the timing of the move to the Turkish thaw. The imminent opening of the Turkish-Armenian border (if both parliaments ratify the move, which is still not certain) means that Georgia’s position as Armenia’s only easy transport corridor to the West is at risk. With the option of moving goods west through Turkey, rather than north-west to Georgia’s coast and then across the Black Sea, Tbilisi’s vital role as an economic lifeline for Yerevan will be lost.

    This increases Armenia’s bargaining position regarding Georgia, and particularly the Armenians of Javakheti. The issue has been a matter of contention for years between the two sides. The Javakheti Armenians complain that their cultural and political rights are being ignored by Tbilisi, and frequently appeal to Yerevan for aid. Unwilling to irritate Georgia, Armenia has so far been muted in its response. Tbilisi, for its part, fears that any movements towards ‘autonomy’ could turn Javakheti into another Abkhazia or South Ossetia – a rebel region outside the control of the central government. The Georgian government is fully aware that it rules over a fractured patchwork of different ethnic groups, all of which could – in theory – revolt against Tbilisi’s control.

    The Abkhazia/South Ossetia parallel is instructive for another reason. Georgia, perhaps understandably, sees the hand of Russia behind every call for autonomy in Javakheti. A large Russian military base was located in the region until 2007, and Armenia is Russia’s strongest ally in the South Caucasus. Both factors created suspicion that Russia is using its regional influence to stir up opposition to Georgian rule in Javakheti.

    There have been numerous protests against Georgia’s rule in Javakheti. In April 2005, several thousand Armenians protested against the planned closure of the Russian military base (Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, April 6 2005). The base, a Soviet legacy, brought much-needed employment and economic assistance to the region.

    Is Moscow behind protests against Georgian rule? It should not be ruled out. Georgia has sometimes arrested local Armenian activists, accusing them of stirring up separatism on behalf of foreign powers, presumably Russia, although these could also be trumped-up charges. Georgia can also dismiss demands to improve the social and economic conditions in the region, by claiming that every complaint and call for autonomy is a ‘Russian plot’.

    It is unclear whether the government in Yerevan would attempt to provoke Georgia on Russia’s behalf. Armenia now needs as many friends as possible, especially whilst its cold war with Azerbaijan continues, and will not actively provoke Georgia. Georgian territory remains the shortest route to Russia, particularly for vital gas pipelines, which will still be needed for years, until Armenia’s energy needs can be met by Turkey and Iran.

    The real explanation behind Armenia’s criticisms of Georgia is domestic. With the Armenian diaspora increasingly coming to view President Sarkisian as a ‘traitor’ for his rapprochement with Turkey, he urgently needs to shore up his credentials as an Armenian patriot.

    What better way to do so than to issue a low-risk criticism of Georgia? The package of measures he proposed does not contain recommendations for improving the region’s economic situation, its most urgent priority. The measures are cultural – church, history, and language, all important signifiers of Armenian identity. Javakheti is viewed by Armenian nationalists as part of ‘Greater Armenia’, which they believe should be united in a single state, so being seen to support Armenian identity there acts as ‘compensation’ for peace with Turkey.

    Nonetheless, the issue of Javakheti remains tense. It will only become more important for Armenian identity as the historical animosity towards Turkey begins to fade. It could become a lightning rod for Armenian nationalists, provoking a counter-reaction from Georgia, and creating a new flashpoint in the Caucasus.

  • GEORGIA: AFTER DECADES IN EXILE, MESKHETIAN TURKS RETURN TO LOST HOMELAND

    GEORGIA: AFTER DECADES IN EXILE, MESKHETIAN TURKS RETURN TO LOST HOMELAND

    10/09/09

    Roughly 65 years ago, Osman, a 90-year-old Meskhetian Turk, lost his home in Georgia to Stalin’s dictat. Now, after a lifetime in Central Asia, Osman, along with hundreds of other Meskhetian Turks, is trying to come home again.

    Even after Stalin’s death in 1953, Meskhetians, a Muslim people who speak a Turkish dialect, were allowed to live anywhere in the Soviet Union except for Georgia itself. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a few hundred Meskhetians started to trickle back, in search of their roots. Instead, they found problems.

    Many Christian Georgians termed the Meskhetians’ return to their native Samtskhe-Javakheti region in southern Georgia “the Turks’ second great invasion” – a reference to Ottoman Turkey’s takeover of Samtskhe-Javakheti in the 16th century. That prejudice still lingers.

    Despite it, a few thousand Meskhetians now live in Georgia. The Georgian government says that it has laid the groundwork for more to return this year.

    Osman’s village of Abastumani in Samtskhe-Javakheti is one of the few places where these exiles have returned to their truly ancestral land. The ruins of the house where Osman was born lie just a stone’s throw away from his current dwelling. But as Osman and other Meskhetians are learning, the divide that keeps Meskhetians strangers in their own land is wide, and it remains difficult to bridge the gap.

     

    Editor’s Note: Temo Bardzimashvili is a freelance photojournalist based in Tbilisi.

  • Maritime Security Weaknesses in the Black Sea

    Maritime Security Weaknesses in the Black Sea

    By: Vladimir Socor

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 171 September 18, 2009 04:34 PM Age: 8 hrs

    The Russian navy cruiser Moskva in Abkhazia, 2008 

     

    Russian naval operations in August 2008 highlighted the security deficit in the Black Sea. As a littoral country, Russia misused the territory of another littoral country, Ukraine, as a staging ground for attacking a third littoral country, Georgia, using its Black Sea Fleet based in Ukrainian territory in Sevastopol (warships from Novorossiysk also participated in the operation). The Russian fleet landed thousands of troops on the Abkhaz coast, attacked Georgian coastal guard vessels, as well as shore targets further south in Georgia, and blockaded Poti. In that port, Russian troops blew up Georgian coastal guard cutters at the pier.

    The Russian fleet’s actions violated Ukraine’s neutrality, which Russia otherwise professes to uphold vis-á-vis NATO. The naval operation also breached the 1997 basing agreements, which rule out any involvement in hostilities by the Russian fleet based in Ukraine.

    According to Russian media accounts from naval sources in the war’s aftermath, the Russian naval group moved slowly from Sevastopol in the direction of Georgia, four or five days before the August 8 assault. Yet, no littoral or non-littoral country or organization reacted at the political level, before or afterward, to Russia’s naval operation.

    In the war’s aftermath, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko issued a decree requiring the Russian Black Sea Fleet command to provide advanced notification to Ukrainian authorities in each case when its ships and personnel exit and re-enter Ukrainian territory. The decree cites international law and the 1997 basing agreements as the basis for this requirement. Ukraine’s foreign ministry has repeatedly taken up the issue with its Russian government counterparts. Yet the Russian government and naval command have largely ignored it.

    As part of its naval modernization program, Moscow hopes to buy a Mistral-class helicopter carrier from France. Announcing that intention, the Russian Navy’s Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, said: “In the conflict in August last year [against Georgia], a ship like that would have allowed the Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its mission in 40 minutes, not 26 hours which is how long it took us [to land the troops ashore].” The navy also hopes to acquire the license to build three or four Mistral-class ships in Russia. Moscow is preparing an international tender for France, the Netherlands, and Spain – states which also build helicopter carriers of this class- to compete for selling the ship and the technology to Russia (Interfax, September 11, 15).

    According to Vysotskiy, the negotiations are in progress. Moscow apparently expects these NATO countries to enhance Russia’s military capabilities in order to intimidate its neighbors, after the same countries helped block Ukraine’s and Georgia’s membership action plans with the Alliance.

    Moscow has recently introduced adjustments to the command arrangements for its Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine. The fleet shall be subordinated to the Russian North Caucasus Military District (ground forces), headquartered in Rostov-on-the-Don, in the event of “operational missions in the southern and southwestern directions.” Prior to this change, the Russian Fleet in Ukraine was subordinated to the naval command at all times. The change is designed to integrate these naval forces with Russia’s ground forces for operations in the Black Sea region. By the same token this change erodes the provisions of the 1997 Russia-Ukraine agreements that ensure this fleet’s separation from the Russian ground forces and precludes the fleet’s involvement in hostilities (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 3; Interfax, September 11).

    Russia openly questions Ukraine’s sovereignty in the Crimea while signaling that it will try to prolong the stationing of its fleet beyond the 2017 deadline. For that deadline to be observed, the fleet would have to begin the process of withdrawal by 2011-2012. However, Moscow is unwilling and international attention is also lacking. Even some leading Ukrainian proponents of the orientation toward NATO believe that the Alliance and the United States lack a strategy for securing Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity, particularly in the case of escalating Russian pressures in the Crimea (Volodymyr Horbulin and Valentyn Badrak, Defense Express [Kyiv], September 11).

    The existing arrangements for confidence-building and security in the Black Sea are proving inadequate to these challenges. The naval confidence-building undertaking BlackSeaFor and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) are consensus-based groups, unable even to discuss officially, let alone deal with, hard-security challenges such as those relating to the territorial integrity of littoral countries.

    Those groupings and arrangements were not designed to cope with those hard-security challenges; indeed such challenges were not initially anticipated, and went unaddressed after becoming manifest. In terms of naval security, the current situation in the Black Sea amounts to a Russian-Turkish naval condominium, with Turkey probably being the stronger side. The Turkish-led exercise Black Sea Harmony, held periodically with Russia in the southern Black Sea, also has no restraining impact on Russian behavior in the eastern and northern Black Sea.

    https://jamestown.org/program/maritime-security-weaknesses-in-the-black-sea/

  • Black Sea Crisis Deepens As US-NATO Threat To Iran Grows

    Black Sea Crisis Deepens As US-NATO Threat To Iran Grows

    by Rick Rozoff

    15239

    Global Research, September 16, 2009

    Tensions are mounting in the Black Sea with the threat of another conflict between U.S. and NATO client state Georgia and Russia as Washington is manifesting plans for possible military strikes against Iran in both word and deed.

    Referring to Georgia having recently impounded several vessels off the Black Sea coast of Abkhazia, reportedly 23 in total this year, the New York Times wrote on September 9 that “Rising tensions between Russia and Georgia over shipping rights to a breakaway Georgian region have opened a potential new theater for conflict between the countries, a little more than a year after they went to war.” [1]

    Abkhazian President Sergei Bagapsh ordered his nation’s navy to respond to Georgia’s forceful seizure of civilian ships in neutral waters, calling such actions what they are – piracy – by confronting and if need be sinking Georgian navy and coast guard vessels. The Georgian and navy and coast guard are trained by the United States and NATO.

    The spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry addressed the dangers inherent in Georgia’s latest provocations by warning “They risk aggravating the military and political situation in the region and could result in serious armed incidents.” [2]

    On September 15 Russia announced that its “border guards will detain all vessels that violate Abkhazia’s maritime border….” [3]

    Russia would be not only entitled but obligated to provide such assistance to neighboring Abkhazia as “Under mutual assistance treaties signed last November, Russia pledged to help Abkhazia and South Ossetia protect their borders, and the signatories granted each other the right to set up military bases in their respective territories.” [4]

    In attempting to enforce a naval blockade – the International Criminal Court plans to include blockades against coasts and ports in its list of acts of war this year [5] – against Abkhazia, the current Georgian regime of Mikheil Saakashvili is fully aware that Russia is compelled by treaty and national interests alike to respond. Having been roundly defeated in its last skirmish with Russia, the five-day war in August of last year, Tbilisi would never risk actions like its current ones without a guarantee of backing from the U.S. and NATO.

    Days after last year’s war ended then U.S. Senator and now Vice President Joseph Biden flew into the Georgian capital to pledge $1 billion in assistance to the nation, making Georgia the third largest recipient of American foreign aid after Egypt and Israel.

    U.S. and NATO warships poured into the Black Sea in August of 2008 and American ships visited the Georgia port cities of Batumi and Poti to deliver what Washington described as civilian aid but which Russian sources suspected contained replacements for military equipment lost in the conflict.

    Less than a month after the war ended NATO sent a delegation to Georgia to “evaluate damage to military infrastructure following a five-day war between Moscow and Tbilisi….” [6]

    In December a meeting of NATO foreign ministers agreed upon a special Annual National Program for Georgia and in the same month Washington announced the creation of the United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership.

    In the past week a top-level delegation of NATO defense and logistics experts visited Georgia on September 9 “to promote the development of the Georgian Armed Forces” [7] and on September 14 high-ranking officials of the U.S. George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies arrived at the headquarters of the Georgian Ministry of Defense “to review issues of interdepartmental coordination in the course of security sector management and national security revision.” [8]

    The ongoing military integration of Georgia and neighboring Azerbaijan, which also borders Iran – Washington’s Georgetown University is holding a conference on Strategic Partnership between U.S. and Azerbaijan: Bilateral and Regional Criteria on September 18 – by the Pentagon and NATO is integrally connected with general military plans in the Black Sea and the Caucasus regions as a whole and, even more ominously, with joint war plans against Iran.

    As early as January of 2007 reports on that score surfaced in Bulgarian and Romanian news sources. Novinite (Sofia News Agency) reported that the Pentagon “could be using its two air force bases in Bulgaria and one on Romania’s Black Sea coast to launch an attack on Iran….” [9]

    The bases are the Bezmer and Graf Ignitievo airbases in Bulgaria and the Mihail Kogalniceanu counterpart near the Romanian city of Constanza on the Black Sea.

    The Pentagon has seven new bases altogether in Bulgaria and Romania and in addition to stationing warplanes – F-15s, F-16s and A-10 Thunderbolts – has 3,000-5,000 troops deployed in the two nations at any given time, and Washington established its Joint Task Force-East (JTF-East) permanent headquarters at the Mihail Kogalniceanu airbase in Romania.

    A U.S. government website provides these details about Joint Task Force-East:

    “All U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force training operations in Romania and Bulgaria will fall under the command of JTF–East, which in turn is under the command of USEUCOM [United States European Command]. Physically located in Romania and Bulgaria, JTF East will include a small permanent headquarters (in Romania) consisting of approximately 100-300 personnel who will oversee rotations of U.S. Army brigade-sized units and U.S. Air Force Weapons Training Deployments (WTD). Access to Romanian and Bulgarian air and ground training facilities will provide JTF-East forces the opportunity to train and interact with military forces throughout the entire 92-country USEUCOM area of responsibility. U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and U.S Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) are actively involved in establishing JTF-East.” [10]

    The four military bases in Romania and three in Bulgaria that the Pentagon and NATO have gained indefinite access to since the two nations were incorporated into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2004 allow for full spectrum operations: Infantry deployments in the area and downrange to Afghanistan and Iraq, runways for bombers and fighter jets, docking facilities for American and NATO warships including Aegis class interceptor missile vessels, training grounds for Western special forces and for foreign armed forces being integrated into NATO.

    Added to bases and troops provided by Turkey and Georgia – and in the future Ukraine – the Bulgarian and Romanian sites are an integral component of plans by the U.S. and its allies to transform the Black Sea into NATO territory with only the Russian coastline not controlled by the Alliance. And that of newly independent Abkhazia, which makes control of that country so vital.

    Last week the Romanian defense ministry announced the intention to acquire between 48 and 54 new generation fighter jets – American F-16s and F-35s have been mentioned – as part of “a new strategy for buying multi-role aircraft, which means to first buy aircraft to make the transition to fifth generation equipment, over the coming 10-12 years.” [11]

    With the recent change in government in the former Soviet republic of Moldova – the aftermath of this April’s violent “Twitter Revolution” – the new parliamentary speaker, Mihai Ghimpu, has openly spoken of the nation merging with, which is to say being absorbed by, neighboring Romania. Transdniester [the Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic] broke away from Moldova in 1990 exactly because of the threat of being pulled into Romania and fighting ensued which cost the lives of some 1,500 persons.

    Romania is now a member of NATO and should civil war erupt in Moldova and/or fighting flare up between Moldova and Transdniester and Romania sends troops – all but a certainty – NATO can activate its Article 5 military clause to intervene. There are 1,200 Russian peacekeepers in Transdniester.

    Transdniester’s neighbor to its east is Ukraine, linked with Moldova through the U.S.-concocted GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) bloc, which has been collaborating in enforcing a land blockade against Transdniester. Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko, whose poll ratings are currently in the low single digits, is hellbent on dragging his nation into NATO against overwhelming domestic opposition and can be counted on to attack Transdniester from the eastern end if a conflict breaks out.

    A Moldovan news source last week quoted an opposition leader issuing this dire warning:

    “Moldova’s ethnic minorities are categorically against unification with Romania.

    “If we, those who are not ethnic Moldovans, will have to defend Moldova’s
    statehood, then we will find powerful allies outside Moldova, including in Russia. Along with it, Ukraine, Turkey and Bulgaria would be involved in this fighting. Last year we all witnessed how Russia defended the interests of its nationals in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Why does somebody believe that in case of a civil war in Moldova Russia will simply watch how its nationals are dying? Our task is to prevent such developments.” [12]

    Indeed, the entire Black Sea and Caucasus regions could go up in flames if Western proxies in GUAM attack any of the so-called frozen conflict nations – Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Georgia, Nagorno Karabakh by Azerbaijan and Transdniester by Moldova and Ukraine. A likely possibility is that all four would be attacked simultaneously and in unison.

    An opportunity for that happening would be a concentrated attack on Iran, which borders Azerbaijan and Armenia. The latter, being the protector of Nagorno Karabakh, would immediately become a belligerent if Azerbaijan began military hostilities against Karabakh.

    On September 15 news stories revealed that the Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington, DC, founded in 2007 by former Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Tom Daschle, Bob Dole and George Mitchell, had released a report which in part stated, “If biting sanctions do not persuade the Islamic Republic to demonstrate sincerity in negotiations and give up its enrichment activities, the White House will have to begin serious consideration of the option of a U.S.-led military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.” [13]

    The report was authored by Charles Robb, a former Democratic senator from
    Virginia, Daniel Coats, former Republican senator from Indiana, and retired General Charles Wald, a former deputy commander of the U.S. European Command.

    Iran is to be given 60 days to in essence abandon its civilian nuclear power program and if it doesn’t capitulate the Obama administration should “prepare overtly for any military option” which would include “deploying an additional aircraft carrier battle group to the waters off Iran and conducting joint exercises with U.S. allies.” [14]

    The main Iranian nuclear reactor is being constructed at Bushehr and would be a main target of any U.S. and Israeli bombing and missile attacks. As of 2006 there were 3,700 Russian experts and technicians – and their families – living in the environs of the facility.

    It has been assumed for the past eight years that a military attack on Iran would be launched by the United States from aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf and by long-range Israeli bombers flying over Iraq and Turkey.

    During that period the U.S. and its NATO allies have also acquired access to airbases in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan (in Baluchistan, bordering Iran), Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in addition to those they already have in Turkey.

    Washington and Brussels have also expanded their military presence into Bulgaria, Georgia and Romania on the Black Sea and into Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea bordering northeastern Iran.

    Plans for massive military aggression against Iran, then, might include air and missile strikes from locations much nearer the nation than previously suspected.

    The American Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced plans last week to supply Turkey, the only NATO member state bordering Iran, with almost $8 billion dollars worth of theater interceptor missiles, of the upgraded and longer-range PAC-3 (Patriot Advance Capability-3) model. The project includes delivering almost 300 Patriots for deployment at twelve command posts inside Turkey.

    In June the Turkish government confirmed that NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) planes would be deployed in its Konya province.

    The last time AWACS and Patriot missiles were sent to Turkey was in late 2002 and early 2003 in preparation for the invasion of Iraq.

    On September 15 the newspaper of the U.S. armed forces, Stars and Stripes, ran an article titled “U.S., Israeli forces to test missile defense while Iran simmers,” which included these details on the biannual Juniper Cobra war games:

    “Some 1,000 U.S. European Command troops will soon deploy to Israel for a large-scale missile defense exercise with Israeli forces.

    “This year’s Juniper Cobra comes at a time of continued concern about Iran’s nuclear program, which will be the subject of talks in October.

    “The U.S. troops, from all four branches of service, will work alongside an equal number of Israel Defense Force personnel, taking part in computer-simulated war games….Juniper Cobra will test a variety of air and missile defense technology during next month’s exercise, including the U.S.-controlled X-Band.” [15]

    The same feature documented that this month’s exercise is the culmination of months of buildup.

    “In April, about 100 Europe-based personnel took part in a missile defense exercise that for the first time incorporated a U.S.-owned radar system, which was deployed to the country in October 2008. The U.S. X-Band radar is intended to give Israel early warning in the event of a missile launch from Iran.

    “For nearly a year, a mix of troops and U.S. Defense Department contractors have been managing the day-to-day operation of the X-Band, which is situated at Nevatim air base in the Negev Desert.” [16]

    The same publication revealed two days earlier that the Pentagon conducted a large-scale counterinsurgency exercise with the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade last week in Germany, “the largest such exercise ever held by the U.S. military outside of the United States….” [17] The two units are scheduled for deployment to Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, but could be diverted to Iran, which has borders with both nations, should need arise.

    What the role of Black Sea NATO states and clients could be in a multinational, multi-vectored assault on Iran was indicated in the aftermath of last year’s Georgian-Russian war.

    At a news conference at NATO headquarters in Brussels a year ago, Russian ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin “said that Russian intelligence had obtained information indicating that the Georgian military infrastructure could be used for logistical support of U.S. troops if they launched an attack on Iran.” [18]

    Rogozin was further quoted as saying, “What NATO is doing now in Georgia is restoring its ability to monitor its airspace, in other words restoring the whole locator system and an anti-missile defence system which were destroyed by Russian artillery.

    “[The restoration of surveillance systems and airbases in Georgia is being] done for logistic support of some air operations either of the Alliance as a whole or of the United States in particular in this region. The swift reconstruction of the airfields and all the systems proves that some air operation is being planned against another country which is located not far from Georgia….” [19]

    Early last October Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Russian Security
    Council “described the U.S. and NATO policy of increasing their military presence in Eastern Europe as seeking strategic military superiority over Russia.

    “The official added that the United States would need allies in the region if the country decided to attack Iran.” [20]

    Patrushev stated, “If it decides to carry out missile and bomb attacks
    against Iran, the US will need loyal allies. And if Georgia is involved in this war, this will pose additional threats to Russia’s national security.” [21]

    Later last October an Azerbaijani website reported that 100 Iranian Air Force jets were exercising near the nation’s border and that “military sources from the United States reported that territories in Azerbaijan and in Georgia may be used for attacking Iran….” [22]

    Writing in The Hindu the same month Indian journalist Atul Aneja wrote of the effects of the Georgian-Russian war of the preceding August and offered this information:

    “Russia’s military assertion in Georgia and a show of strength in parts of West Asia [Middle East], combined with domestic political and economic preoccupations in Washington, appear to have forestalled the chances of an immediate strike against Iran.

    “Following Russia’s movement into South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev acknowledged that Moscow was aware that serious plans to attack Iran had been laid out. ‘We know that certain players are planning an attack against Iran. But we oppose any unilateral step and [a] military solution to the nuclear crisis.’

    “Russia seized control of two airfields in Georgia from where air strikes against Iran were being planned. The Russian forces also apparently recovered weapons and Israeli spy drones that would have been useful for the surveillance of possible Iranian targets.” [23]

    The same newspaper, in quoting Dmitry Rogozin asserting that Russian military intelligence had captured documents proving Washington had launched “active military preparations on Georgia’s territory” for air strikes against Iran, added information on Israeli involvement:

    “Israel had supplied Georgia with sophisticated Hermes 450 UAV spy drones, multiple rocket launchers and other military equipment that Georgia, as well as modernised Georgia’s Soviet-made tanks that were used in the attack against South Ossetia. Israeli instructors had also helped train Georgia troops.” [24]

    Rather than viewing the wars of the past decade – against Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq – and the concomitant expansion of U.S. and NATO military presence inside all three countries and in several others on their peripheries as an unrelated series of events, the trend must be seen for what it is: A consistent and calculated strategy of employing each successive war zone as a launching pad for new aggression.

    The Pentagon has major military bases in Kosovo, in Afghanistan and in Iraq that it never intends to abandon. The U.S. and its NATO allies have bases in Bulgaria, Romania, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait, Bahrain (where the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet is headquartered) and other nations in the vicinity of the last ten years’ wars which can be used for the next ten – or twenty or thirty – years’ conflicts.

    1) New York Times, September 9, 2009
    2) Ibid
    3) Russian Information Agency Novosti, September 15, 2009
    4) Ibid
    5) Wikipedia
    6) Agence France-Presse, September 8, 2009
    7) Trend News Agency, September 9, 2009
    8) Georgia Ministry of Defence, September 14, 2009
    9) Turkish Daily News, January 30, 2007
    10) U.S. Department of State
    11) The Financiarul, September 9, 2009
    12) Infotag, September 11, 2009
    13) Bloomberg News, September 15, 2009
    14) Ibid
    15) Stars and Stripes, September 15, 2009
    16) Ibid
    17) Stars and Stripes, September 13, 2009
    18) Russian Information Agency Novosti, September 17, 2008
    19) Russia Today, September 17, 2008
    20) Russian Information Agency Novosti, October 1, 2008
    21) Fars News Agency, October 2, 2008
    22) Today.AZ, October 20, 2008
    23) The Hindu, October 13, 2008
    24) The Hindu, September 19, 2008

    https://www.globalresearch.ca/black-sea-crisis-deepens-as-us-nato-threat-to-iran-grows/15239