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Category: Georgia

  • Georgia Awards $150 Million Hydro Project to Turkey’s Kolin Construction – Bloomberg

    Georgia Awards $150 Million Hydro Project to Turkey’s Kolin Construction – Bloomberg

    The Georgian government awarded a $150 million hydropower project to Turkey’s Kolin Construction, Tourism Industry and Trading Co. Inc., the Energy Ministry said.

    Kolin will build a cascade of four hydropower plants with a minimum total capacity of 105.7 megawatts on the Tekhuri River in the Samegrelo region of western Georgia, the ministry said in an e-mailed statement today. Construction will take four years, the ministry said.

    Under ministry rules, investors given hydropower plant concessions agree for 10 years to sell power for domestic consumption only during three months each winter, when the former Soviet republic often experiences shortages, and are free to sell to any customer in Georgia or abroad for the rest of the year.

    President Mikheil Saakashvili said on Nov. 8 that Georgia may receive as much as $5 billion of investment in hydropower over the next seven years.

    To contact the reporter on this story: Helena Bedwell in Tbilisi at hbedwell@bloomberg.net

    To contact the editor responsible for this story: James Gomez in Prague at jagomez@bloomberg.net

  • Armenia-Georgia-Iran vs. Ankara-Tbilisi-Baku

    Armenia-Georgia-Iran vs. Ankara-Tbilisi-Baku

    IranGeorgiaArmeniaArmenia must not be idle. Deepening Georgia-Armenia-Iran cooperation may – if not counterbalance – at least exist simultaneously with the Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan axis, writes the Azg newspaper, commenting on Iranian FM Manouchehr Mottaki’s recent visit to Tbilisi, as well as the establishment of visa-free regime and opening of an Iranian consulate on Batumi.

    According to the author of the article entitled “Iran-Georgia-Armenia relations”, Georgia will only enhance its role if it is involved in both alliances. For Armenia to become a land link between Iran and Georgia, it has first of all to ensure minimum conditions for transit. “In this respect, the North-South highway is of high importance to both Armenia and the region. The construction is to be launched soon. A highway to run through Armenia – from the Georgian-Armenian border to the Armenian-Iranian border – will be constructed in conformity with international standards,” the newspaper writes.

    Why are deeper Iranian-Georgian relations of importance for Armenia? Armenia has a land border both with Iran and with Georgia. Also, Iran and Georgia, in contrast to Turkey and Azerbaijan, are in good relations with Armenia.

    Russia tried to counterbalance the West’s expansion policy with the North-South corridor, which would connect Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Iran. However, the project failed for a number of reasons, Russia’s faults being among them. First, Moscow and Tbilisi are aggressive and even hostile to each other. After the August war the two states severed their relations. In fact, a new dividing line, closed Russian-Georgian border, appeared in addition to the Turkish-Armenian and Armenian-Azeri borders. Viewing Armenia as its strategic ally, Russia has never attached importance to Georgian-Armenian relations or to deep Georgia-Armenia-Iran cooperation.

    Moreover, in its communication with Iran, Russia prefers Azerbaijan rather than Armenia. It was Russia that prevented the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline from reaching Georgia – it considered the project as posing a threat to its gas interests.

    “Turkey and Azerbaijan are hostile to Georgian-Armenian and Georgian-Armenian-Iranian cooperation, which eases the situation for Armenia, whereas Baku and Ankara aim at bringing Armenia to its knees,” the newspaper writes.

    https://news.am/eng/news/37228.html, November 06, 2010

  • The Genocide of the Armenian Monuments in Georgia

    The Genocide of the Armenian Monuments in Georgia

    “Happy, though unaware of it, are those nations of the world who do not have
    civilization-destroying neighbours”.*

    The purpose of this current paper is to determine the issue of the Armenian monuments in the territory of Georgia, which are under a complete and intentional neglect by the Georgian Government. We will mainly touch upon the vulnerable condition of the Armenian Churches in Tbilisi the “owners of which are still disputed”.

    The policy of destruction and misappropriation of Armenian cultural monuments by the neighbouring peoples is a common occurrence throughout the Armenian history. But what is worrying me is the following: the “Christian Georgia”, where the Armenians have always comprised a significant part of its population, who have greatly contributed to building Georgia’s modern capital, Tbilisi, and had a very important role to play in terms of Georgia’s national self-determination, has now adopted an anti-cultural policy against Armenian cultural heritages (though in Tbilisi one will find a Greek church turned into a Georgian Orthodox Church).

    The matter is that the vandalism against the Armenian cultural monuments in Georgia is not in the best interests of the Georgian people and can result in the damaging of the good relations between the two neighbouring peoples.

    Historical Background

    According to historical materials the Armenian church in Georgia has been a recognized separate religious entity since 5th century AD. One of major Armenian medieval historians, Oukhtannes, reports that in the 5th century, in the Georgian town of Tsurtavi, there was an Armenian prelacy under the jurisdiction of the Armenian Patriarch, led by a bishop called Movses.

    Another historian, Matheos of Urkha, reports that during the reign of Georgia’s king David IV the Builder Armenian church in Georgia was officially granted status of a recognized diocese. St. George’s (Surb Kevork) Armenian Cathedral of Tbilisi was then its administrative centre.

    During fifteen centuries of Armenian ecclesiastical presence in Georgia over six hundred religious and cultural sites, namely churches, seminaries, monasteries, were created by members of the Armenian Church. A portion of these sites is now non-existent due to natural disasters, vandalism, and other factors.

    When the Caucasus was split into ethnic republics (the collapse of the Soviet Union), and Tiflis became the capital of the Georgian republic, the number of Armenians in the city slowly but irrevocably began to diminish. In the 1950s, every third resident of the city was Armenian. According to the most recent census, taken in 2002, Armenians make up 14 percent of the city’s inhabitants, and six percent of the population in all of Georgia. For the first time in centuries, there are more Azerbaijanis than Armenians in the territory of what is now Georgia.

    When Mikhail Gorbachev introduced perestroika and glasnost in the 1980s, Georgia was one of the first republics where, one after the other, churches began reopening their doors. The Armenian side insists that in Tbilisi alone, at least seven Armenian churches were reopened – but, of course, not reopened and reconstructed as Georgian Orthodox churches.

    During the last 20 years the Georgian government has been doing its best to wash off all the traces of the Armenian unique architectural style from the Armenian churches. The destruction of a whole building is not excluded either. We should be grateful to them from time to time for keeping some of the churches, having turned them into ‘dog-shelters’ (Georgian neighbors keep their dogs in the courtyard of St. Nshan Church, built in 1701, although there is a sign on the church that reads, “Protected by the state”).

    One thing is really bothering: why the number of the Azerbaijani inhabitants in Georgia has increased? Has it any ties connected with the tough and unreasonable attitude of the Georgian authorities towards the Armenian cultural monuments as well as the Armenian Diocese in Georgia?

    Accordingly I would say that the sense of nationalism (in a disapproval meaning) in Georgia is now accepted in a higher level. Georgian scientific establishment corporately with mass-media periodically launch anti-Armenian campaigns in press and television. One example of such discriminatory and illogical attitude is the reaction of press to the Armenian Diocese’s publication of the fact of existence over six hundred Armenian Christian sites in Georgia throughout the history of Armenian presence in Georgia. Georgian public was misled by media accusations of the Armenian Church of demanding six hundred temples’ rights of ownership. In fact, the Armenian Church has never demanded six hundred churches back into its domain, and it is a very much regrettable fact that the Georgian public was misled by public-financed media institutes.

    Another matter of utter importance to the Armenian Church is the issue of ownership of the Armenian temples, built by Armenian Apostolic Church, unto which the Armenian Church had full rights up to the Soviet period of Georgia’s history. Communist government of the Soviet Union has nationalized Armenian temples but after restoration of Georgian sovereignty the temples haven’t been returned to their lawful owners.

    The ‘Disputed Churches’

    There is another issue that requires serious attention. It is very common in Georgia to hear from all sorts of officials that the Armenian churches are actually ‘disputed’ as in to which denomination they belong. What is striking of all is that they suggest that there should be a special committee which will determine historic ownership of these churches. But in fact, all Armenian churches are marked by several features, only found in Armenian ecclesiastical architecture.

    All Armenian churches, including so-called ‘disputed’ churches of Georgia, have their altars at a particular height, determined by the Armenian Church canon. Georgian church altars are at all times built at a much lower level than the Armenian altars. Also Armenian baptisteries are always found in a northern niche of any Armenian church. These features are not found in any other architecture tradition apart from Armenian. All ‘disputed’ churches are marked by these features.

    Anyways, one may see here the exact continuation of changing the history a policy that nears vandalism. A bright example of it is the idea of suggesting a special committee determined by the Georgian government concerning the origin of those Armenian churches, as if we have nothing to do but taking Georgian destroyed churches, reconstructing and making them ours.

    The Armenian Apostolic Church, more specifically the Georgian-Armenian Diocese, with its limited financial resources and staff simply cannot also take care of those “disputed” churches. The churches are legally within the Georgian government’s authority. As long as those churches are “disputed,” they are subjected to total neglect because the Georgian-Armenian Diocese is not legally allowed to take care of them and the Georgian state refuses to repair them or provide for their maintenance.

    Among the other “disputed” Armenian churches:

    • The Shamkoretsots or Red Bible Church found in the Havlabar neighborhood is almost completely destroyed. There are allegations that the church was bombed in 1989.
    • The basilica of Minas Yerevantsots is also semi-ruined, Georgian refugees from Abkhazia live in its courtyard.
    • The interior of Saint Gevorg Mughnetsi Church in the Sololag neighborhood of Tbilisi is also destroyed.
    • St. Nshan, in the center of Old Tbilisi, is in poor condition and will not last long.

    The Georgian side is not indifferent toward Norashen, which is located right beside a Greek church which by the way has been made into a Georgian church. What makes the Georgian authorities to realize their evil plans is that the number of Armenians living in the vicinity of those churches has considerably decreased. They were not only attending the churches but also were guardians.

    So the gradual destruction and misappropriation both by the Georgian state and ecclesiastical leaders is to be observed here. A few years ago, Father Tariel systematically collected Armenian tombstones from the Norashen church’s property and replaced them with Georgian ones to prove that the church was indeed Georgian. A number of representatives of the Armenian community witnessed how the tombstones of benefactors Mikhael and Lidia Tamamshyan were destroyed in broad daylight. With the intervention of the Armenian community, the destruction was halted . . . probably until the next wave of destruction.

    The fact that the Georgian intelligentsia have not opposed to the cultural genocide, planned and purposefully carried out particularly in the recent ten years, makes us believe that the authorities of that country have succeeded in contaminating the intelligentsia with unhealthy attitudes. The misappropriation of churches…What shame and vandalism! Can people of such inferior instincts govern nations and preach any religion?

    Conclusion

    I came to a conclusion that this so-called ‘Georgianization’ is witnessing the unhappy fact that the Georgian government has to solve a very important issue within its country, the freedom of conscious: there is no religious minority in Georgia to have an official status, eventually state-established churches. Whenever the Armenian Diocese in Georgia demands from the Georgian Clergy to solve this problem, they bring forward the excuse that it is the Government who must pass a proper law first of all.

    Aftermath of the Soviet Union collapse had its distracting effect on the future of the Armenian monuments. Thousands of Armenians had to leave Georgia because of bad living-conditions. They were not much concerned with the opening of the churches when they were facing survival issues.

    But today even if there are not much Armenians left there, this issue is of a high importance both in Armenia and in Georgia. An example of it is the person of Samvel Karapetian, a scientist-hero who has dedicated his life to the struggle against the policy of destruction or appropriation of Armenian cultural monuments and the conscious Armenian Diocese in Georgia.

    Anyways, the careless and indifferent attitude of the Armenian government towards the destruction of the historical and cultural monuments of their own people is very irritating.

    If Georgia carries out all those destructions on a governmental level no Religious authority (the Armenian Diocese in Georgia) has the power to oppose it. It is an issue which has to be solved by the two Governments of Georgia and Armenia.

    *(Center for the study of national cause and genocide.
    The Armenian Genocide, Causes and Lessons, v. 2, Yerevan, 1995, p. 30)

    Karine BAGHDASARYAN / Yerevan

  • Armenia: Key Beneficiary of Russian-Georgian Border Opening

    Armenia: Key Beneficiary of Russian-Georgian Border Opening

    March 23, 2010

    By: Emil Danielyan

    Verkhny Lars checkpoint

    Russia and Georgia have reopened their main land border crossing less than 18 months after fighting their brief, but bitter war and severing diplomatic relations. Armenia appears to have been the main driving force behind the development, and will likely become the key beneficiary of renewed commerce through the Kazbegi/Upper Lars narrow pass in the Caucasus Mountains.

    Upper Lars is the only Russian-Georgian border crossing located beyond Georgia’s Russian-backed breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It served as Armenia’s sole overland commercial conduit to Russia and Europe until being controversially closed by Moscow in June 2006 at the height of a Russian-Georgian spy scandal. Armenian exporters of agricultural produce and other perishables were particularly reliant upon it, accounting for much of the cargo traffic through Upper Lars in the summer and fall each year. Its closure, ostensibly due to an upgrading of Russian border control facilities, forced them to re-route their supplies through the more expensive and time-consuming rail-ferry services between Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine.

    Hence, the Armenian government’s strong interest in seeing the border crossing re-opened as soon as possible. It has for several years pressed the Russians to complete the checkpoint repairs on their side of the frontier and repeatedly secured corresponding reassurances from them. Some pro-government Armenian lawmakers exposed Yerevan’s frustration with the apparent Russian blockade of Georgia in late 2006, when they publicly accused Moscow of disregarding the interests of Russia’s main regional ally in its escalating standoff with Tbilisi. The August 2008 war in South Ossetia served to dash Armenian hopes that the border would re-open anytime soon.

    Yet, despite remaining technically at war, Moscow and Tbilisi subsequently engaged in behind-the-scenes diplomacy on Upper Lars. Armenia is known to have arranged and mediated at least one round of the Russian-Georgian proxy negotiations reportedly held in Yerevan in October 2009. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced two months later that he saw no “particular obstacles” to re-opening Upper Lars and resuming direct flight services between Russia and Georgia, despite the Kremlin’s continued refusal to do business with the Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili (Regnum, December 9). Later in December, the Russian and Georgian governments announced that they had agreed to resume passenger and cargo traffic through the mountain pass from March 1, 2010 (RIA Novosti, December 24, 2009).

    Both sides honored that agreement, drawing praise from not only Armenia, but the United States and the European Union. The US Ambassador to Georgia, John Bass, hailed the development as “a positive step that will further the improvement of international relations and the economic status of the region’s population.” For his part, Spanish Foreign Minister, Miguel Angel Moratinos, whose country currently holds the rotating EU presidency, inspected the border crossing during his March 3 visit to Georgia (www.rferl.org, March 5).

    “I can confirm that [Russian-Georgian] negotiations indeed took place in Armenia and with Armenia’s mediation,” Armenian Foreign Minister, Edward Nalbandian, told journalists on March 2. He called the resulting agreement “a big success” for all three countries involved (www.armenialiberty.org, March 2).

    The deal could not have come at a better time for Armenia, whose economy has long been hamstrung by closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and still reeling from the 2009 global financial crisis. Local entrepreneurs say that the positive impact of re-opening the Upper Lars on the domestic economy and its agricultural sector, in particular, will be felt as soon as this summer.

    Arsen Ghazarian, the Chairman of the Armenian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, forecast that transportation costs incurred by exporters will fall by at least 25 percent. According to Ghazarian, who also owns a cargo shipment company, a single truck laden with Armenian agricultural products takes at least 23 days to reach Russia through a Black Sea rail-ferry link. Going through Upper Lars will reduce shipping time by almost half, he said (Kapital, March 2).

    With Russian-Georgian trade having been reduced by Moscow to a trickle in recent years, the border re-opening is of lesser economic significance to Georgia, at least in the short term. The Saakashvili administration’s willingness to restore commercial links with Georgia’s arch-enemy resulted, among other things, from its warm rapport with Armenia’s current leadership. Even after the Russian-Georgian war, the two South Caucasus neighbors managed to reconcile their differing geopolitical orientations and focus instead on common interests.

    Saakashvili said that the Georgian-Armenian relationship is as “cloudless” as ever, as he greeted his Armenian counterpart, Serzh Sargsyan, in the Georgian port of Batumi on February 27. Their two-day informal talks reportedly centered on economic issues, with both presidents pledging to foster Georgian-Armenian economic “integration.” “We are dependent upon each other and we should use this circumstance for good,” the Georgian leader told journalists (Armenian Public Television, February 28).

    The venue of the talks was also symbolic. Batumi and Georgia’s other major Black Sea port, Poti, process at least two-thirds of freight shipped to and from Armenia. Use of Georgian territory by Armenian trading companies should expand not only as a result of the Upper Lars re-opening, but also the ongoing reconstruction of roads in southern Georgia leading to the Black Sea coast. The Manila-based Asian Development Bank (ADB) agreed last September to support the project with a $500 million loan. An additional $500 million loan approved by the ADB at the time will finance the planned expansion of Armenian highways stretching from the border with Iran to southern Georgia. The funding, requested by the Armenian government, is a further indication that the landlocked country will regard Georgia and, to a lesser extent, Iran, as its most reliable supply line even in the unlikely event of the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border.

    https://jamestown.org/program/armenia-key-beneficiary-of-russian-georgian-border-opening/

  • ARMENIA AND GEORGIA IN THE CONTEXT OF TURKISH-ARMENIAN RAPPROCHEMENT

    ARMENIA AND GEORGIA IN THE CONTEXT OF TURKISH-ARMENIAN RAPPROCHEMENT

    By Vahagn Muradyan (03/17/2010 issue of the CACI Analyst)

    The Turkish-Armenian protocols signed last year in Zurich raised concerns that the perspective of Georgia’s decreased significance as a transit country for Armenia may boost nationalist demands around the Armenian minority in Georgia and cause new instability. While the protocols may not materialize in the foreseeable future, thus never inducing visible change in Yerevan’s policies, developments observed since the activation of Turkish-Armenian negotiations suggest that in case of full normalization Yerevan may attempt more assertive policies to uphold the cultural rights of Armenians in Georgia, without supporting their political demands and calls for autonomy.

    BACKGROUND: Armenian policies towards Georgia have been traditionally shaped by two factors: interest in safe transit for the Armenian and Armenia-bound goods through Georgia, and the situation with the Armenian minority in Georgia’s Samtskhe–Javakheti region with the accompanying issue of preserving the Armenian cultural heritage in Georgia. Closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, leaving Georgia as the only route to Russian and European markets, have developed a strong sense among the Armenian leadership of dependence on Georgia. This reality made Yerevan tailor its policies to the transit needs and cooperate with Tbilisi to manage the grievances of the Armenian minority in Georgia.

    On the regional level, a lack of relations with Turkey has always been an important, although a non-active variable in Yerevan’s interactions with Tbilisi. Animosity between Georgia and Russia, Armenia’s strategic ally, on the other hand, has had a direct impact, which in recent years created at least two situations that tested Yerevan’s commitment to stability in Georgia.

    In 2005, the stated policy of non-interference in Georgia’s domestic affairs amid the crisis over the Russian military base in Akhalkalaki was an important occasion for President Robert Kocharyan, a hard-liner with a nationalist agenda, to demonstrate adherence to the already established line. The base was a source of employment for many and was also perceived as a security guarantee for the Armenian community populating a region bordering Turkey. The protests of Javakheti Armenians in March 2005 against the removal of the base triggered a visit of President Kocharyan to Georgia on April 1, 2005, at the invitation of Georgian President Saakashvili, and was widely perceived as a contribution on Armenia’s part to stabilize the situation.

    The August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, and Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent was yet another predicament. It put Armenia under pressure, prompting President Serzh Sargsyan to publicly pose the question of recognition of the two entities and elaborate a position that would both find understanding in Russia and reassure Georgia. In his annual speech to the diplomatic corps delivered on September 3, 2008, Sargsyan stated it was impossible to consider the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while Nagorno-Karabakh – an entity in a similar situation – remained unrecognized by Armenia.

    Cautious policies of the political leadership have always been in sharp contrast to public demands for adopting a harder line on problems in Javakheti, especially frequently voiced by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation – Dashnaktsutiun Party as well as many Yerevan-based Javakheti Armenians who have successfully organized themselves around this idea in Armenia’s political system.

    IMPLICATIONS: How would possible Turkish-Armenian reconciliation influence Armenia’s policies towards Georgia? The generally skeptical outlook for full and rapid normalization does not allow any definite conclusions. However, certain new features displayed after the activation of the process, as well as societal expectations in Armenia, imply that a potential opening of the border could make Yerevan more responsive to the cultural demands of Armenians in Georgia.

    President Sargsyan’s understanding of Turkey’s role has already marked a departure from his predecessor’s policies that sought to isolate Turkey from regional affairs.

    The first and so far most serious sign that reconciliation with Turkey may impact the usual format of Georgian-Armenian relations came on September 1, 2009, the day after the Turkish-Armenian protocols were made public. In an unprecedented statement, President Sargsyan mentioned the protection of Armenian monuments, registration of the Armenian Church in Georgia and recognition of Armenian as a regional language in Javakheti as cornerstones for strengthening Armenia’s friendship with Georgia. While the speech announced aspiration for a more assertive role in advocating the rights of Georgia’s Armenians, the exhaustive nature of the three principles – strictly confined to cultural demands – also implied a delimitation of the areas where Yerevan felt it could legitimately intervene and by default underscored Armenia’s attention to Tbilisi’s concerns about political objectives advanced by national minorities.

    The speech also signaled a significant shift from Kocharyan’s vision for the region, where Turkey was perceived as a security threat and maintaining unproblematic ties with Georgia outranked initiatives with Ankara. Consistent with this line, Kocharyan, while upholding non-interference in Georgia’s internal affairs, showed sympathy for the security concerns of Javakheti Armenians vis-à-vis Turkey. In contrast, cultural demands were given less prominence, and Armenians were urged to learn Georgian instead of seeking an official status for the language.

    On the societal level, the expectation that the rapprochement will bring about a harder line resonated well with the organizations advocating the cause of Javakheti Armenians. Shirak Torosyan, an MP from President Sargsyan’s Republican Party and chairman of “Javakhq [Javakheti] Compatriot Association” stated that after alternative routes are opened, Armenia will toughen its stance on problems in Javakheti.

    Divisions over the protocols in Armenian society were also replicated in discussions about Georgia, indicating opposition to sharp policy revisions. The Civilitas Foundation – established by Vartan Oskanyan, Foreign Minister in Kocharyan’s administration and an opponent of the protocols – cautioned in its 2009 report against “complacency” regarding Georgia, even after opening of the border. This understanding was adequately grasped in Tbilisi too. Georgian Prime Minister Nika Gilauri pointed out that the opening will not affect transit prices for Armenia while visiting Yerevan in January 2010.

    Concerns about “complacency”, however, may have been exaggerated. As the reopening on March 1 of the Upper Larsi checkpoint between Russia and Georgia showed, President Sargsyan, while seeking relations with Turkey and probing a new tone on Javakheti, continued to prioritize relations with Tbilisi and worked on restoring communications through Georgia. This became evident with Sargsyan’s February 27 trip to Georgia to discuss the reopening with Mikheil Saakashvili, and was confirmed by statements that since October 2009 Armenia played a key mediating role, alongside with the Swiss, to secure the opening. This effectively showed that even in the fall of 2009, when a rapid ratification of the protocols was widely expected, Armenia did not regard Turkey as an alternative to Georgia.

    This attitude seems to have been reciprocated by the Georgian side. Georgian officials announced that the checkpoint was opened at the request of Armenia, the main beneficiary of the overland link with Russia. However, against the backdrop of Turkish-Armenian talks, the opening also revealed Georgia’s interest in buttressing its position as a transit route for Armenia, besides demonstrating Tbilisi’s commitment to neighborly relations.

    CONCLUSIONS: A possible opening with Turkey would enhance Armenia’s regional role and offer a better bargaining position with Georgia. However, serious policy revisions that may endanger relations with Tbilisi are unlikely. The low level of trust between Armenia and Turkey will sustain Armenia’s sense of dependence on Tbilisi even in the event of an actual opening of the border. Avoiding adventurous policies towards Georgia has been the hallmark of all successive governments in Armenia, and any policy shifts introduced as a result of normalization with Turkey would likely be limited to more emphasis on cultural demands with continued consideration of Tbilisi’s concerns and expectations. A failure of the reconciliation process, on the other hand, will likely result in backtracking to Kocharyan’s vision of the region and discourage Yerevan to attempt a more active role in advocating the cultural rights of Javakheti Armenians.

    AUTHOR’S BIO: Vahagn Muradyan is a freelance researcher based in Yerevan.

    http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5287

  • Killing Two Birds With One Stone?

    Killing Two Birds With One Stone?

    676px Georgia, Ossetia, Russia and Abkhazia %28en%29.svg

    Gulnara Inandzh
    Director
    International Online Information Analytic Center Ethnoglobus

    mete62@inbox.ru

    RELATED INFO

    https://www.turkishnews.com/ru/content/

    Russia’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia complicated the ethnic situation in the entire Caucasus by creating favorable conditions for the exacerbation of ethnic self-consciousness among many groups and for the manipulation of some of these groups by various countries both in the region and beyond.

    The activities of the Circassians who hope to unite the members of their ethnos into a single republic have attracted a great deal of attention, but developments in Samtskhe-Javakhetia, a Georgian region populated largely by ethnic Armenians have not, although for many reasons, what is going on there may have even greater immediate consequences.

    At the start of this year, the Georgian authorities – as they have in the past sought to prevent the situation in Samtskhe-Javakhetia from getting out of hand – arrested several activists, who Armenians said are completely “innocent.”  But almost at the same moment this exchange occurred, an unusual declaration by Dashgyn Gulmammadov, the president of the National Assembly of Azerbaijanis of Georgia, was released.

    That declaration [1] called for Georgia to be transformed into a confederation of Georgians, Abkhazians and Ossetians.  But despite its Azerbaijani origin, it did not call for ethnic Azerbaijanis to gain autonomy, limiting itself to the demand that in this new state, Azerbaijani should be one of the state languages.  A similar idea surfaced during the Russian-Georgian war of last August.  At that time, its authors were citizens of the Russian Federation and an ethnic Azerbaijani from Iran now living in Sweden.

    And this declaration, by a strange coincidence appearing at the time of the Javakhetia events but one not strange at all if these groups are being manipulated by Moscow and Yerevan, also called for giving the ethnic minorities of Azerbaijan, in particular the Talysh, Avars and Lazgis, similar rights.  By putting out such statements, those who issue them and even more the people who are orchestrating this hope to weaken and fragment Georgia and Azerbaijan and to limit the options of both Tbilisi and Baku.

    Confirmation of this is provided by the following: During the most recent arrests in Samtskhe-Javakhetia, Armenian commentators hurried to accuse Azerbaijan of being behind events there.  In this way, Yerevan sought to take steps to give it greater freedom of action in the future.  First of all, since Javakhetia organizations, in the opinion of Georgian experts, are directed by the Armenian special services and Russia, then the shift in rhetoric toward Georgia regarding its citizens of Azerbaijani nationality beyond any doubt indicates who compiled the “Azerbaijani” declaration.

    Moscow is interested in the further dismemberment of Georgia and consequently views the efforts of the Javakhetia Armenians as a completely logical next step.  Azerbaijanis, on the other hand and as Georgians recognize, do not have separatist ambitions and remain loyal to the Georgian government.  Changing that by a few declarations of the type cited above won’t shift them from that.

    Consequently, it should be obvious that claims to the contrary are simply intended to provide cover for Armenian plans.  Equally indicative of what is going on is that the exacerbating of the ethnic situation in Georgia has slowed the process of the return of Meskhetian Turks to their historical lands in Samtskhe-Javakhetia, a return that Armenians of that region oppose.

    And the sponsors of this exploitation of ethnic minority aspirations have promoted their ideas via scholarly conferences about these communities, propaganda about the dangers of Pan-Turanism and the assimilation of peoples living in Azerbaijan, and the creation of websites which speak out in defense of the rights of ethnic communities living there, to name just a few.  Lazgis, Udins, Tats, Jews, and Kurds who alongside Azerbaijanis and Turks at the beginning of the 20th century were killed by the thousand by Dashnaks have suddenly been transformed into the brothers of the Armenians.  Indeed, Armenian websites are ready to post materials about the interrelationships of the indigenous peoples of Azerbaijan with the power structure which exists in this republic and about the means of expanding relations between them and the Armenian people. [2]

    The latest and especially gratuitous example of this involves the dissemination by the Armenian information agency Panarmenian.net of reports about “Jewish pogroms” in Sumgait this month, events which someone at the agency or somewhere else invented out of whole cloth.  There were no such “pogroms.”  But reports that they were, however false, may help the Armenian lobby in the United States to push through a Congressional resolution about the Armenian genocide.  And it is possible that they were directed at complicating relations between Israel and Turkey.

    Armenia, even as it remains in occupation of Azerbaijani territory, has always sought to convince the world that the rights of ethnic minorities are not protected in Azerbaijan and consequently that it would be unthinkable to return the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh to a position in which they would be threatened by discrimination and destruction.  The ethnic minorities of Azerbaijan and “the defense of their rights” thus remain under the constant control of political operatives in Armenia.

    Unfortunately, this effort is often supplemented by the dispatch of Islamic groups and even criminal elements into Azerbaijan where they pose as “defenders” of the interests of ethnic Daghestanis.  Indeed, the appearance in Daghestan of the youth movement Anti-Turan, the goal of which is the struggle with the spread of Turkish throughout the Caucasus, is a measure of the lengths Armenia and its Russian backers are prepared to go to promote anti-Azerbaijani attitudes. [3]

    Notes
    [1]  Regnum (2009), ‘Настало время добиваться своих национальных целей: президент Национальной ассамблеи азербайджанцев Грузии’, January 30, available at (accessed February 12, 2009).

    [2]  E.g. explore .

    [3]  Khabal.info (2009) ‘Заявление молодежного патриотического движения “Анти-Туран”’, January 18, available at (accessed February 12, 2009).

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