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Category: Georgia

Armenia Hit By Fuel Shortages

By Shakeh Avoyan

Armenia was grappling with its worst fuel shortages since the early 1990s on Monday despite the reported reopening of Georgia’s east-west railway that serves as the main supply line of the two South Caucasus states.

A section of that railway close to the central Georgian town of Gori was damaged by a weekend fuel train explosion which Georgian officials said was caused by a landmine. It occurred just over a week after another, powerful explosion downed a nearby rail bridge. Russia denied Georgian accusations that it was behind the attack.

The August 16 blast left the Armenian government scrambling to restore supplies of wheat, fuel and other basic commodities from the Georgian Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi which process more than 90 percent of Armenia’s external cargo turnover. The government sent a convoy of about 40 fuel trucks to collect gasoline stranded in the ports.

Officials said on Monday that the convoy returned to Armenia at the weekend with more than 500 tons of petrol. The government does not plan to send more heavy vehicles to Georgia in view of the renewed rail communication, they said.

Meanwhile, the situation with fuel supplies only deteriorated, with the vast majority of filling stations in Yerevan resorting to severe fuel rationing on Sunday. They stopped selling petrol altogether the next morning. Only holders of prepaid corporate vouchers issued by the country’s largest station chains could buy a limited amount of petrol on Monday.

“We have run out of gas and are selling it only to company cars. This is all the information I have at this point,” said a worker at one filling station besieged by angry motorists.

“The war is in Georgia, but it’s Armenia that is in crisis,” one of them complained. “They keep saying that petrol is coming and there are no problems. But there is a problem.”

“Even in the most remote Georgian village there is no petrol shortage,” said another driver. “Why? Because there are many petrol importers in Georgia but only three of them in this country.”

The cargo company Apaven, which was assigned by the government to organize the emergency fuel imports, downplayed the crisis. “The [Georgian] railway has begun functioning at a fraction of its capacity,” Apaven’s executive director, Gagik Aghajanian, told RFE/RL. “But even that is enough. If there is any deficit, I think it will be eliminated shortly.”

Aghajanian referred to the start of rail traffic through a smaller, disused rail bridge which Georgia, helped by Armenia and Azerbaijan, has prepared for use until the damaged bridge is repaired.

According to the Armenian Ministry of Transport and Communications, the August 16 blast left a total of 178 rail cars, 108 of them loaded with wheat, stranded on Georgian railway sections west of Gori. “In all likelihood, 35 cars loaded with wheat will head to Armenia today,” a ministry spokeswoman, Susanna Tonoyan, told RFE/RL.

“Besides, we have a lot of freight in the ports of Poti and Batumi awaiting shipment,” she said. “In particular, in Poti there are two ships carrying 6,700 tons of wheat and 93 rails cars of other goods. In Batumi, we have 2,500 tons of wheat, ten cars of petrol and another one thousand tons of petrol.”

Tonoyan added that the government has also organized “intensive” fuel and wheat supplies from neighboring Iran. More than 400 tons of flour have already bee imported to Armenia through Iranian territory, she said.

August 25, 2008
Should Russia recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia?

19:00 | 25/ 08/ 2008

MOSCOW. (Fyodor Lukyanov for RIA Novosti) – The Georgian-Russian conflict has dramatically changed the position of the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The idea of recognizing their independence has been put to the vote in Moscow.

By trying to use military force to restore the country’s territorial integrity, Tbilisi has killed the last hope of a political settlement to the conflict. The return of the breakaway republics to Georgian sovereignty, unlikely before Mikheil Saakashvili’s ill-advised adventure, is now completely impossible.

But this does not mean the future is predetermined. There are two precedents that developments may follow: that of Kosovo or that of Cyprus. Russia must be very careful when choosing between them.

The Kosovo scenario seems to promise more lasting results. Judging by the sixth paragraph on the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan, or at least its Moscow version, which provides for international discussion of the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Kremlin would prefer the Kosovo scenario.

But it can only be implemented if the UN Security Council approves a relevant resolution, similar to Resolution 1244 adopted in June 1999 after the end of NATO’s air raids on Yugoslavia.

The international community already knew then that Kosovo, which had refused to bow to the central authorities long before the Yugoslav army pulled out, would never accept the sovereignty of Belgrade. However, it was impossible to announce this publicly, as this could have provoked unpredictable developments in Serbia and would amount to the crude dismemberment of a sovereign state.

The issue was put on hold, and at Moscow’s insistence a clause was added to the resolution affirming the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.

This did not save Belgrade, but Russia and Serbia doggedly quoted that clause when contesting Kosovo’s unilateral proclamation of independence and its recognition by several Western countries.

The Russian leaders only state the facts when they say that Saakashvili has dealt a deadly blow to Georgia’s territorial integrity. Yet the Security Council cannot approve a document that does not affirm it. Not only the West, bent on supporting Tbilisi, but also most other countries, would oppose it.

It is one thing when some states act illegally, as when Kosovo’s independence was legalized. But it is quite another matter when the international community approves a resolution sanctioning the dissolution of a sovereign state. No country, including those that will never experience such problems, could approve it.

On the other hand, Moscow will find it extremely difficult for domestic reasons to tolerate any mention of Georgia’s territorial integrity in a UN resolution. It has made quite a few public statements and pledged to pay for the restoration of South Ossetia. Besides, it will be impossible to explain to the public why a military victory has not translated into a political win.

It will take refined diplomatic skills to formulate ideas in such a way that all sides can interpret them as victory. Otherwise, the danger is that developments in Georgia will follow the Cyprus scenario. Russia would unilaterally recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia according to the formula that has linked Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which only Turkey has recognized, since 1974.

This would create new problems without solving old ones.

If Russia opts for that scenario, the position of the breakaway republics will not change in terms of international law, even though many countries have lately been violating it. It should be said, for justice’s sake, that Moscow is not among the leaders in this ignoble race.

The practical situation will not improve either. The United States encouraged a score of influential countries to recognize Kosovo’s independence, but Russia is unlikely to convince even one country to follow its example. International support for Russia’s actions, or rather lack thereof, became apparent during its clash with Georgia.

Unilateral recognition of their independence will not help Abkhazia or South Ossetia to break out of international isolation, but will put powerful pressure on Russia. Moscow could not be blamed for its stance on Kosovo because it acted strictly according to international law, while Western countries appealed to expediency. The situation can be reversed this time, with Russia’s actions losing consistency and integrity.

It would be extremely difficult to follow the Kosovo scenario even if the Security Council approved a resolution on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Their new status can be formalized only if the process becomes international, whereas Moscow and the two breakaway republics would like to decide the matter without international involvement. Unfortunately, they cannot do so, because Russia lacks the political resource.

The issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s status will take some time to decide. It took nine years for Kosovo to gain independence, and even then only part of the international community recognized it. Northern Cyprus has been demanding independence for nearly 34 years.

Hasty moves motivated by a desire to score political points at home or demonstrate Russia’s ability to disregard the opinions of others would seriously damage the Kremlin’s prestige. But hard daily political and diplomatic efforts will eventually bring about the desired effect.

Fyodor Lukyanov is editor-in-chief of the Moscow-based magazine Russia in Global Affairs.

August 25, 2008
Russian military concerned by larger NATO presence in Black Sea

16:33 | 25/ 08/ 2008

MOSCOW, August 25 (RIA Novosti) – Russia has to be concerned that NATO is continuing to get a stronger foothold in the Black Sea, the deputy chief of General Staff said Monday.

“NATO’s naval deployments in the Black Sea, where nine foreign vessels have already been sent, cannot but provoke concern,” Col. Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn said.

According to a Russian military intelligence source, the NATO warships that have entered the Black Sea carry over 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles between them.

NATO has so far deployed the USS McFaul and the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Dallas, the Polish frigate General Pulaski, the German frigate FGS Lubeck, and the Spanish navy ship Admiral Juan de Borbon.

“NATO is actually deploying a surface strike group in the Black Sea,” the unidentified source said Monday.

The McFaul unloaded 55 tons of humanitarian aid in the Georgian port of Batumi on Sunday, with two more U.S. Navy ships due in port later this week. The Polish, Spanish and German ships also entered the Black Sea on Friday.

Nogovitsyn said Russian peacekeepers, who continue to be deployed in Georgia after the country’s war with breakaway South Ossetia, would not carry out checks of foreign ships entering Georgian Black Sea ports.

But he said peacekeepers at a checkpoint near the Poti port would conduct patrols in the area. “Patrols are a civilized form of control,” he said.

The senior military official put it more colorfully on Saturday: “Poti is outside of the security zone, but that does not mean we will sit behind a fence watching them riding around in Hummers.”

Nogovitsyn promised that Russia would not exceed the numbers defined by international agreements, including a 1992 pact, when sending peacekeepers to South Ossetia.

But he warned that Georgia was planning to deploy troops in the towns of Gori and Senaki.

“The Georgian Armed Forces command is continuing to conduct acts aimed at restoring the combat readiness of its army directed at South Ossetia,” he said. “Communication systems are being restored, units are planned for deployment in the military towns of Gori and Senaki.”

Georgia is also planning acts of sabotage on infrastructure and transportation facilities, Nogovitsyn said.

“Georgian reconnaissance and sabotage groups are reinvigorating their efforts… and are preparing military actions along the routes of Russian armored columns, as well as acts of sabotage on transportation infrastructure,” he said.

August 25, 2008
Geopolitical Diary: U.S. Aid to Georgia Raises a Question for Russia

Stratfor.com
August 25, 2008

The Russians still have not completed withdrawal
from Georgia. It is clear that, at least for the
time being, the Russians intend to use the clause
in the cease-fire agreement that allows them
unspecified rights to protect their security to
maintain troops in some parts of Georgia. Moscow
obviously wants to demonstrate to the Georgians
that Russia moves at its own discretion, not at
the West’s. A train carrying fuel was blown up
outside of Gori, with the Georgians claiming that
the Russians have planted mines. Whether the
claim is true or not, the Russians are trying to
send a simple message: We are your best friends
and worst enemies. The emphasis for the moment is on the latter.

It is essential for the Russians to demonstrate
that they are not intimidated by the West in any
way. The audience for this is the other former
Soviet republics, but also the Georgian public.
It is becoming clear that the Russians are intent
on seeing Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili
removed from office. Moscow is betting that as
the crisis dies down and Russian troops remain in
Georgia, the Georgians will develop a feeling of
isolation and turn on Saakashvili for leading
them into a disaster. If that doesn’t work, and
he remains president, then the Russians have
forward positions in Georgia. Either way, full
withdrawal does not make sense for them, when the
only force against them is Western public
opinion. That alone will make the Russians more intractable.

It is interesting, therefore, that a U.S. warship
delivered humanitarian supplies to the Georgians.
The ship did not use the port of Poti, which the
Russians have effectively blocked, but Batumi, to
the south. That the ship was a destroyer is
important. It demonstrates that the Americans
have a force available that is inherently
superior to anything the Russians have: the U.S.
Navy. A Navy deployment in the Black Sea could
well be an effective counter, threatening Russian sea lanes.

While it was a warship, however, it was only a
destroyer so it is a gesture, but not a threat.
But there are rumors of other warships readying
to transit into the Black Sea. This raises an
important issue: Turkey. Turkey borders Georgia
but has very carefully stayed out of the
conflict. Any ships that pass through Turkish
straits do so under Turkish supervision guided by
the Montreux Convention, an old agreement
restricting the movement of warships through the
straits which the Russians in particular have
ignored in moving ships into the Mediterranean.
But the United States has a particular problem in
moving through the Bosporus. Whatever the
Convention says or precedent is, the United
States can’t afford to alienate Turkey not if
there is a crisis in the Caucasus.

Each potential American move has a complication
attached. However, at this moment, the decision
as to what to do is in the hands of the United
States. The strategic question is whether it has
the appetite for a naval deployment in the Black
Sea at this historical moment. After that is
answered, Washington needs to address the Turkish
position. And after a U.S. squadron deploys in
the Black Sea, the question will be what Russia,
a land power, will do in response. The Europeans
are irrelevant to the equation, even if they do
hold a summit as the French want. They can do
nothing unless the United States decides to act,
and they can’t stop the United States if it does decide to go.

The focus now is on the Americans. They can let
the Russo-Georgian war slide into history and
deal with Russia later on, or they can act. What
Washington will decide to do is the question the
arrival of the U.S.S. McFaul in Georgia posed for the Russians.

August 25, 2008
Call of the civil society representatives upon the Governments in Ankara, Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan

17:26 23/08/2008

A number of Civil Society Organizations from Armenia, Turkey, Georgia and the USA have signed a statement urging to open the Turkish-Armenian border for at least 10-15 days.

“Open up to your neighbors!”
Call of the civil society representatives upon the Governments in Ankara, Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan.

The war in Georgia has left the countries of the South Caucasus struggling with substantial risks and challenges. As a consequence of the recent crisis, which further exacerbated an impasse created by the existence of the protracted conflicts, the region is deprived of a vital vain to transport goods through the countries of the region. That is a matter of our strongest concern. The railroad running through Georgia is practically useless today because of the destruction of the bridge near Gori, whereas reconstruction is being delayed for different reasons. This situation and its consequences threaten to deprive people in our countries of their basic rights and endanger their hopes for stability, security and prosperity.

This crisis should make us assess the situation realistically and initiate a new age of cooperation. The Governments in Ankara, Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan have a unique chance to prove their credentials of good neighbors willing to contribute positively to the regional peace and stability. We request them to take a collective action and unblock immediately railroad communication networks in the region.

We made our own calculations that we would like to share with the public. Any train can reach from Samsun on the Black Sea coast of Turkey to Yerevan in 34 hours, to Tbilisi in 36 hours and to Baku in 49 hours. From Mersin, which is on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey, it will take 37, 39 and 52 hours respectively. This simple. The railroad can become functional in few hours, once a political decision is made.

Thus, we urge to open the Turkish-Armenian border at least for 10-15 days to address the urgency in the Caucasus.
For years we have been engaged in Track Two Diplomacy projects and have been able to build excellent working relations with our colleagues across those borders. Having enjoyed the positive experience of cooperation, we would like to take this opportunity to call upon the Governments in Ankara, Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan to reconsider their positions on that matter. We urge our leaders to demonstrate their statecraft in these times of turbulence and uncertainty and prevent possible escalation of distrust in this region.

Signatories:
Tevan Poghosyan, International Center for Human Development, Armenia
Noyan Soyak, Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council, Turkey
Natela Sakhokia, Strategic research Centre, Georgia
David L. Phillips, Columbia University, Visiting Scholar, Center for the Study of Human Rights
Co-Director, Study Group on U.S.-Russian and Georgian Relations, the USA
Dr. Murat Cagatay, GAYA Research Institute, Turkey
Artush Mkrtchyan, Chairman, Caucasian Center for Proposing Non-Traditional Conflict Resolution Methods, Gyumri, Armenia
Guran Abashidze, Caucasus Business and Development Network, Tbilisi, Georgia
Klara Galstyan, Director, Gyumri Development Foundation, Armenia
Levon Barseghyan, “Asparez” Journalist Club, Gyumri, Armenia
Alu Gamakharia, Caucasus Business and Development Network, Kutaisi, Georgia
Betty J. Sitka, American University, Center for Global Peace, the USA ”

Source: Panorama.am

August 25, 2008
ANKARA AND YEREVAN – Waiting and watching

Turkey and the Caucasus

Waiting and watching

Aug 21st 2008 | ANKARA AND YEREVAN
From The Economist print edition

A large NATO country ponders a bigger role in the Caucasus

APErdogan plays the Georgian flag

AT THE Hrazdan stadium in Yerevan, workers are furiously preparing for a special visitor: Turkey’s president, Abdullah Gul. Armenia’s president, Serzh Sarkisian, has invited Mr Gul to a football World Cup qualifier between Turkey and its traditional foe, Armenia, on September 6th.
If he comes, Mr Gul may pave the way for a new era in the Caucasus. Turkey is the only NATO member in the area, and after the war in Georgia it would like a bigger role. It is the main outlet for westbound Azeri oil and gas and it controls the Bosporus and Dardanelles, through which Russia and other Black Sea countries ship most of their trade. And it has vocal if small minorities from all over the region, including Abkhaz and Ossetians.
Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has just been to Moscow and Tbilisi to promote a ‘Caucasus Stability and Co-operation Platform’, a scheme that calls for new methods of crisis management and conflict resolution. The Russians and Georgians made a show of embracing the idea, as have Armenia and Azerbaijan, but few believe that it will go anywhere. That is chiefly because Turkey does not have formal ties with Armenia. In 1993 Turkey sealed its border (though not its air links) with its tiny neighbour after Armenia occupied a chunk of Azerbaijan in a war over Nagorno-Karabakh. But the war in Georgia raises new questions over the wisdom of maintaining a frozen border.
Landlocked and poor, Armenia looks highly vulnerable. Most of its fuel and much of its grain comes through Georgia’s Black Sea ports, which have been paralysed by the war. Russia blew up a key rail bridge this week, wrecking Georgia’s main rail network that also runs to Armenia and Azerbaijan. This disrupted Azerbaijan’s oil exports, already hit by an explosion earlier this month in the Turkish part of the pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan, in Turkey.
‘All of this should point in one direction,’ says a Western diplomat in Yerevan: ‘peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.’ Reconciliation with Armenia would give Azerbaijan an alternative export route for its oil and Armenia the promise of a new lifeline via Turkey. Some Armenians gloat that Russia’s invasion of Georgia kyboshes the chances of Azerbaijan ever retaking Nagorno-Karabakh by force, though others say the two cases are quite different. Russia is not contiguous with Nagorno-Karabakh, nor does it have ‘peacekeepers’ or nationals there.
Even before the Georgian war, Turkey seemed to understand that isolating Armenia is not making it give up the parts of Azerbaijan that it occupies outside Nagorno-Karabakh. But talking to it might. Indeed, that is what Turkish and Armenian diplomats have secretly done for some months, until news of the talks leaked (probably from an angry Azerbaijan).
Turkey’s ethnic and religious ties with its Azeri cousins have long weighed heavily in its Caucasus policy. But there is a new worry that a resolution calling the mass slaughter of Armenians by the Ottoman Turks in the 1915 genocide may be passed by America’s Congress after this November’s American elections. This would wreck Turkey’s relations with the United States. If Turkey and Armenia could only become friendlier beforehand, the resolution might then be struck down for good.
In exchange for better relations, Turkey wants Armenia to stop backing a campaign by its diaspora for genocide recognition and allow a commission of historians to establish ‘the truth’. Mr Sarkisian has hinted that he is open to this idea, triggering howls of treason from the opposition. The biggest obstacle remains Azerbaijan and its allies in the Turkish army. Mr Erdogan was expected to try to square Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliev, in a visit to Baku this week. Should he fail, Mr Gul may not attend the football match—and a chance for reconciliation may be lost.

August 25, 2008