Turkish Forum

Category: Georgia

  • The EU, Turkey and Russia: An Unlikely Troika

    The EU, Turkey and Russia: An Unlikely Troika

    Michael Werbowski (minou)

    Published 2008-09-06 04:57 (KST)

    Russia’s strategic comeback, or the Georgian crisis in the Caucasus, might be a blessing in disguise for Turkey, as a realignment of power in Russia’s favor could hasten accession negotiations between Ankara and Brussels. Why? Because the European Union, for obvious trade and energy reasons (aside from defense ones), needs Turkey as a solid strategic partner now more than ever.

    NATO’s Demise and the EU’s Rise

    The multilateral Ordungsmacht, or stabilizing power, that was NATO in the 20th century’s bipolar world, today looks crippled by transatlantic divisions, partly stemming from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additional fractures over Georgia’s and Ukraine’s status (with the United Kingdom and the United States pushing for further NATO expansion into former Soviet space, while France, Germany and Italy remain very frosty to the idea) have split the cohesiveness of the erstwhile defensive military organization. Overall, NATO looks overstretched, overcommitted, and underequipped. It has so far skillfully concealed these divisions and shortcomings.

    Furthermore, NATO is always on the offensive against its perceived enemies (oil-rich Russia, and radical Islam — also in oil-rich regions). In the 21stcentruy, NATO clearly seeks to play the role of the global cop, with station headquarters in Washington. This is unacceptable to the Russians.

    In Munich in 2007, the West seemed deaf to Moscow’s warnings about putting a missile defense system in their backyard and about NATO’s eastward push. In the summer of 2008, taking advantage of the waning months of a weak and directionless Bush presidency, Russia has made itself heard by using military force in Georgia.

    Moscow has always had legitimate security concerns in the area that stretches from the Black to the Caspian seas. However, if the EU one day begins to carry more diplomatic and military weight in the region, it will do so only with Turkey’s approbation and cooperation. A greater EU role in Europe’s underbelly to the southeast might be more palatable to the tetchy Russian bear.

    A Semipermanent Seat for Turkey at the EU Conference Table

    Russia’s Georgian blitzkrieg triggered the collapse of the post-Cold War order that began in 1989. In this new regional configuration, whereby Russia calls the shots in its “near abroad,” the EU must act as a counterweight in Eurasia to the remerging hegemon. It is for this reason that Turkey can no longer remain on the sidelines of European integration. It must be given a seat at the table of European foreign policy consultations.

    I am not suggesting full EU membership for Turkey by the end of this decade or in the distant future, for that matter. But within the context of an EFDP (European foreign and defense policy), Turkey may one day become an indispensable player. Brussels must face up to this new reality.

    The EU’s ties with Russia often overshadow its ties with Turkey. But this is a flawed policy in the long term. As Mesut Tastekin, a doctoral candidate at Gazi University, points out, areas of great geopolitical concern to the EU are also “risk areas” that include Turkey and are part of Ankara’s purview of interest. Thus, the EU and Turkey have overlapping strategic concerns when it comes to the overall stability of the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and even the Caspian Sea regions.

    As Tastekin asserts, “Turkey stands at the crossroads of the regions which are regarded in the document [the European security strategy document elaborated by Brussels in 2003] as important regions for European security such as the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the near east and the Caucasus.”

    Turkey as the Great Mediator Between East and West

    Turkey has been taken for granted for far too long, despite its growing and obvious geopolitical importance in Brussels. For instance, EU leaders gathered last week to discuss the brief war between Russia and Georgia. Next, a similar emergency EU meeting will tackle the same issue. Yet Turkey, as an “associative member” of the EU, is absent from these crucial consultations.

    This is no mere omission or oversight; it is a great diplomatic error.

    Ankara has proven its diplomatic skills playing the part of the “honest broker” between Syria and Israel. Furthermore, the country has made several good will gestures (most likely with helpful prompting from Brussels) to normalize relations with Nicosia over the issue of a divided Cyprus. And most remarkable of all, by sending the Turkish head of state to Yerevan, the country has made a grandiloquent move to heal the century-old wound between the Turks and the Armenians.

    These are truly impressive and daring diplomatic maneuvers. They will likely bear fruit for Turkey and for its neighbors and serve to strengthen European stability as well. For this reason the EU must consider Turkey a serious strategic partner in its future relations with Russia. In the aftermath of the Georgian-Russian conflict, ignoring Turkey at EU foreign policy making forums is no longer viable.

    Michael Werbowski is a Prague-based journalist who pursued post-Communist studies at the University of Leeds, U.K. He would like to thank Beykent University and the staff of its journal of strategic studies for their kind support and cooperation for making this article possible.

    Source: www.ohmynews.com, 06.09.2008

  • Georgian Prime Minister to Participate in Istanbul International Conference

    Georgian Prime Minister to Participate in Istanbul International Conference

    Georgia, Tbilisi, 1 September / Trend News corr. N.Kirtskhalia/ Georgian Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze will participate in the Istanbul International Conference 5th Annual Emerging Europa. According to Georgian governmental administration, the conference will take place on 5-6 September.
    Georgian delegation will include Georgia’s Ambassador to Turkey Grigol Mgaloblishvili, Deputy Energy Minister Levan Mchedlishvili, Director of the Investment Agency Nata Kasradze, Prime Minister’s advisor Giorgi Melikidze, head of the governmental chancellery protocol department Giorgi Zurabishvili.

    Bilateral meetings between Georgian delegation and participants will take place within the conference to draw investments to Georgia.

    The correspondent can be contacted at trend@trend.az

  • Georgian, Russian FMs expected in Turkey

    Georgian, Russian FMs expected in Turkey

    ANKARA – The foreign ministers of Georgia and Russia are expected to visit Turkey separately in a few days’ time for talks on the escalating crisis in the Caucasus, a government official said Friday.Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan will host his Georgian counterpart Eka Tkeshelashvili on Sunday in Istanbul, two days before he meets Sergei Lavrov of Russia on September 2 in the same city, said the official, who requested anonymity.

    There were no plans for a three-way ministerial meeting, he added.

    Turkey was put on edge as Russia sent tanks and troops into Georgian territory on August 8, a day after a Georgian offensive to retake the rebel region of South Ossetia.

    Tensions increased on Tuesday when Russia recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia — another secessionist Georgian teritory on the Black Sea — as independent states.

    Turkey, which has developed close ties with Georgia, said at the time that it supported its northeastern neighbour’s territorial integrity, but refrained from openly condemning Russia.

    Ankara has in recent years worked hard to improve ties with Moscow, which has become an important trading partner and Turkey’s biggest supplier of natural gas.

    Russia is on the other hand angry that NATO member Turkey has allowed US and NATO warships through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits into the Black Sea.

    Moscow has accused the Atlantic alliance of building up its forces in the Black Sea and has said it was taking “measures of precaution”.

    NATO has denied Russia’s accusations while Turkey says the ships’ passage was in line with the 1936 Montreaux Convention which sets limits for the number and type of military vessels in the Black Sea.

    NATO says five ships are currently in the Black Sea for routine exercises planned before the Georgian conflict while two US warships are in Georgia to provide humanitarian aid.

    han/gk

    Source : Turkishpress

  • Russia-Georgia Conflict Puts Turkey in Vulnerable Position

    Russia-Georgia Conflict Puts Turkey in Vulnerable Position

    The Russia-Georgia conflict has put Turkey in a tight spot. Will Turkey side with the United States, its NATO ally, and let more U.S. military ships into the Black Sea to assist Georgia? Or will it choose Russia which also shares a Black Sea coast with Turkey? As Dorian Jones reports from Istanbul, ever since Turkey joined NATO in 1952, it has hoped to never have to make a choice between the alliance and its Russian neighbor to the north.

    By Dorian Jones
    Istanbul

    The U.S. Navy coast guard cutter Dallas passes through Bosporus Strait, Istanbul, Turkey, 24 Aug 2008

    Turkey has been playing the role of mediator between various parties in the region: the United States and Iran; Israel and Syria; Pakistan and Afghanistan. But as more U.S. warships pass through the narrow Turkish-controlled strait into the Black Sea to deliver aid to Georgia, a time for choosing sides may have arrived.

    Last weekend, U.S. warships used the Turkish straits to deliver aid to Georgia. A Russian official condemned the move and warned Turkey it was obliged to enforce the rules of an agreement that gives a 21 day limit on any warship from a country that does not border the Black Sea.

    The Turkish government is responsible for policing the 32-kilometer Bosporus, the only route for ships traveling to the Black Sea, under the Montreux agreement of 1936. The Bosporus provides sole access for ships to Georgia’s Black Sea ports.

    International relations expert Soli Ozel of Istanbul’s Bilgi University said this has put Turkey in a precarious position.

    “Turkey is a NATO member and is also a neighbor of Georgia’s and great supporter of Georgia both economically and militarily,” he said. “And Turkey controls the passage from and to the Black Sea. Therefore whatever happens next Turkey is going to find itself impacted by the developments.”

    Also at stake is Turkey’s trade relations with Russia. Turkey’s trades more goods with Russia than any other country, mostly because of Turkey’s dependence on Russian gas.

    “We have very good economic relations with Russia,” said Ozel. “Our trade is over $10 billion and we are overly dependent on Russian gas at 64 percent and 40 percent for Russia oil.”

    Turkey has been trying to boost trade with Moscow as it struggles with a current account deficit that’s growing as energy costs soar.

    But Russia has introduced new custom regulations which, according to the Turkish trade minister Kursad Tuzmen, could cost Turkey as much as $3 billion. Tuzmen attacked the regulations as political, saying Moscow may be punishing it for allowing the U.S. ships to pass through the Bosporus.

    Tuzman said that on September 1 Turkey will impose curbs on Russian exports and withdraw support for its membership of the World Trade Organization.

    But a Turkish diplomatic source said that Ankara is determined not to be drawn into the conflict. Much of the Turkish media is also calling for a neutral stance.

    With the Turkish prime minister visiting Moscow and Tbilisi, Ankara is now working hard to secure peace. Soli Ozel doesn’t believe such efforts have much chance of success, but still thinks they are important.

    “For the moment I see it as an empty shell and as a good will gesture. If anything comes out of it will be good, and if nothing comes out of it no one will blame Turkey,” said Ozel. “It is better than what the Europeans can and would do anyway.”

    This weekend Georgia’s foreign minister, Eka Tkeshelashvili, is due to visit Turkey, while his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, is expected next week. While few people give little chance of any breakthrough, experts say the real motive behind such efforts is for Turkey to balance its relations between Russia and the West. But with another U.S. warship headed to the Black Sea this weekend, those efforts are predicted to get increasingly difficult.

    Source : Voice of America

  • TURKEY’S DELICATE ACT OF BALANCING IN THE BLACK SEA

    TURKEY’S DELICATE ACT OF BALANCING IN THE BLACK SEA

    EURASIA DAILY MONITOR, THE JAMESTWON FOUNDATION
    August 27, 2008, Volume 5, Issue 164
    Saban KardasThe aftershocks of the conflict in Georgia continue to dominate regional politics, highlighting the difficulties Turkey encounters in conducting its foreign policy in dangerous neighborhoods.

    The latest U.S. move to utilize military vessels to provide humanitarian aid to the war-torn areas of Georgia demonstrated starkly how Turkey has been forced to engage in a delicate act of balancing to preserve its interests. By maintaining strict adherence to the 1936 Montreux Convention regulating the rules of transit through Turkish straits, Turkey had a powerful legal backing for its cautious policy of balancing the demands of its long-term ally, the United States, and its increasingly assertive neighbor, Russia. Turkish policy experts, however, believe that an escalation of tensions, forcing Turkey to choose sides, is quite likely. Moreover, Turkey should be prepared to discuss the revision of Montreux, which it has jealously guarded.

    The U.S. State Department announced on August 20 that the United States obtained Turkey’s approval for the passage of two U.S. Navy destroyers and one Coast Guard cutter to the Black Sea, which would transport humanitarian aid, subject to Montreux regulations. The week preceding this announcement was full of speculation concerning U.S. demands from Turkey for the passage of larger ships, to which Turkey responded negatively because their tonnage well exceeded the limitations set by Montreux. Despite denials by both parties of any pending negotiations, it was later understood that the American side dropped its original plan for sending two large military hospital ships and agreed for smaller ships in compliance with Montreux terms. Moreover, although Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matt Bryza said the United States wanted to use military cargo ships (Zaman, August 21), the shipment was eventually made by destroyers. The episode led many to draw parallels with the notorious March 1, 2003, decision of the Turkish Parliament, indicating a crisis between the two allies. News reports claimed that U.S. pressed for requests in violation of Montreux provisions, and that American officials criticized Turkey’s “irresponsible” resistance to such simple demands. In Turkey, opposition parties called on the government not to bow to these pressures nor deviate from Montreux Convention (Referans, August 20).

    The ability to reach a compromise without escalating this situation was a significant reflection of the maturity of both parties. It was, nonetheless, unclear whether the United States fully complied with the Montreux, which requires an eight-day advance notification from non-littoral countries before sending their warships through the Straits. Since U.S. and Turkish officials denied such a request until August 19, the State Department’s announcement of ‘Turkey’s approval’ on August 20 seemed dubious (Radikal, August 21). As a matter of fact, Montreux does not require the same condition for humanitarian aid, which is, however, subject to different tonnage limitations. Given that the supplies are carried with military vessels, the controversy still remains. The Deputy Chair of Republican People’s Party, Onur Oymen, who is a retired senior diplomat, initiated a parliamentary inquiry asking Foreign Minister Ali Babacan to clarify exactly what provisions of the Montreux applied to these ships (ANKA, August 22). The Prime Minister Erdogan slammed the opposition and the media for their ignorance but did not address these criticisms (Anatolian Agency, August 23).

    The U.S.S. destroyer McFaul eventually arrived at Batumi port on August 24, carrying the first shipment of humanitarian relief supplies. The implications of this development for Turkey remain a matter of contention. Russian diplomats in Ankara seem to be pleased with Turkey’s sensitivity in enforcing compliance with Montreux and are keen on preserving the status quo (Murat Yetkin, Radikal, August 26). However, they question the authenticity of U.S. claims for providing humanitarian aid, and believe that it will increase tensions and undermine the stability. If the intention was genuine, the U.S. should not have insisted on carrying aid by military ships; civilian vessels or other transportation means would have served the same purpose (Radikal, August 23). The same argument is shared by many Turkish analysts who increasingly view American policy as a mere show of strength in the Black Sea as part of a growing confrontation, or a new ‘Cold War’ of sorts (for instance: Fikret Bila, Milliyet, August 24; also see reference to Onur Oymen).

    Further increasing Turkish observers’ skepticism, coincidentally, Spanish, German and Polish warships also transited the Straits around the same time. The Turkish Foreign Ministry clarified the situation by announcing that they were part of Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 and their activities were scheduled for transit through the Straits in October 2007. They will be visiting ports in NATO members Bulgaria and Romania (August 22, www.mfa.gov.tr). Nonetheless, many see the two developments intertwined and believe that the escalation between the United States and Russia already started. Moscow’s decision to recognize the independence of the two breakaway regions of Georgia and Medvedev’s announcement of severing ties with NATO are viewed as reactions to U.S. policies (Zaman, August 26). Strategist Sinan Ogan drew attention to increased risks generated by the presence of NATO warships in the Black Sea: an accidental exchange between U.S. and Russian ships may spark a fight between the two powers, destabilizing the whole region. Fearing that the U.S. expression of support through this move may lead Georgia to act more belligerently, and underlining that Turkey is the only neutral country bordering the Black Sea, he calls on Ankara to maintain its neutral position and avoid confrontation with Russia (Zaman, August 27). Sharing similar concerns, the opposition RPP invited the PM to report to Parliament as to who assumed the political responsibility for the risks involved in this decision (ANKA, August 23).

    Although the United States did not express any intention of pressing for a revision to the terms of Montreux, Turkish analysts increasingly see such a forthcoming possibility. Veteran commentators maintain their commitment to preserving the Montreux in its current form, both as the best guarantee of Turkey’s sovereignty over the Straits and as a geopolitical asset (Hasan Celal Guzel, Radikal, August 26). Nonetheless, Turkish analysts sense a persistent U.S. determination to revise the Montreux regime (Oktay Eksi, Hurriyet, August 22). A senior expert from Ankara-based think-tank ASAM, Hasan Kanbolat sparked a discussion on the subject. He argues that given drastic changes in naval technology, U.S. strategy to establish a presence in the Black Sea, and Romania and Bulgaria’s decision to join NATO, Ankara should be prepared to receive such demands from the United States to amend the Montreux in the foreseeable future (www.avsam.org.tr, August 20). Mensur Akgun, however, believes that such a demand is more likely to come from Black Sea littoral states, other than Russia. As these countries increasingly have adopted pro-Western policies and drifted away from Russia, they tend to view the Montreux regime as the major barrier before their security (Referans, August 23). As signatories to the convention, they may initiate such a process. Overall, despite many of its shortcomings, especially regarding the rules concerning commercial vessels, Turkey so far has avoided opening an international debate on Montreux because it is viewed as the optimal arrangement to protect its interests. Turkey remains committed to resisting any changes being made to any of the loopholes, as it has demonstrated in this episode.

    Given its flourishing economic relations with Russia and its dependence on Russian gas, Turkey so far has avoided taking any steps in this crisis that will sever its relations with Russia and provoke further Russian aggression in the region. Accordingly, it acted with caution and followed a restrained policy vis-à-vis American demands, acting in concert with European powers. To its credit, the United States also showed restraint in its demands on Turkey and respected Ankara’s sensibilities to the Montreux Convention. As veteran analyst Sami Kohen argues, however, “the new developments in the Georgia crisis will probably challenge Turkish diplomacy and make balancing increasingly difficult” (Milliyet, August 21).

  • The Montreux Convention and energy — outdated or essential?

    The Montreux Convention and energy — outdated or essential?

    By JOHN C.K. DALY
    UPI International Correspondent
    Published: Aug. 27, 2008 at 4:57 PM
    WASHINGTON, Aug. 27 (UPI) — The five-day military conflict between Russia and Georgia over the disputed enclave of South Ossetia has thrown into the spotlight a nearly forgotten 72-year-old treaty governing the passage of both merchantmen and warships between the Mediterranean and Black seas through the Bosporus and Dardanelles, collectively known as the Turkish Straits.

    The 1936 Montreux Convention roiled relations between Washington, which wanted to send humanitarian aid on massive vessels through the Turkish Straits, and Ankara, which has steadfastly insisted on the terms of the treaty being respected. The incident is a reminder, if any is needed, that despite Turkey and the United States being close allies and NATO compatriots, the two nations’ strategic interests do not always run in tandem. While America and its NATO allies attempt to cram as many warships as legally allowed up the Turkish Straits, thoughtful analysts should remember that the passage is also a conduit for massive tankers of up to 200,000 tons or more. In 2006, tankers carrying more than 140 million tons of Azeri, Kazakh and Russian oil used the Turkish Straits. Washington’s increasingly aggressive stance with the Kremlin over South Ossetia could have a direct impact on these oil shipments, something that hawks both inside the Beltway and the Kremlin should consider.

    The Turkish Straits consist of two waterways connected by the landlocked Sea of Marmara. The 17-mile-long Bosporus, which debouches into the Black Sea, bisects Istanbul with its 11 million inhabitants, and its sinuous passage is only a half-mile wide at its narrowest point at Kandilli and has a convoluted morphological structure that requires ships to change course at least 12 times, including four separate bends that require turns greater than 45 degrees. At its southern end the Bosporus empties into the Sea of Marmara, which in turn connects to the 38-mile-long Dardanelles. Under good conditions merchant vessels currently canpass the 200 miles of the Turkish Straits in about 16 hours.

    Under Montreux, Turkish sovereignty is recognized over the entire channel, but while the agreement guarantees merchantmen unhindered passage, the passage of warships of non-Black Sea nations is tightly regulated, which has led to the current friction between Washington and Ankara. Disputes over the waterway date back to the dawn of European history. Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey recount the struggles of the Trojan War, which is assumed to have occurred in the 13th or 12th century B.C.; modern archaeology has placed Troy at the entrance to the Dardanelles.

    The Turkish Straits now carry 50,000 vessels annually, making the passage the world’s second-busiest maritime strait, whose volume of traffic is exceeded only by the Straits of Malacca, and the only channel transiting a major city. The development of the former Soviet Caspian states’ energy riches has led to an explosion of tanker traffic through the Turkish Straits; in 1996, 4,248 tankers passed the Bosporus; a decade later 10,154 tankers made the voyage, a development that Ankara, worried about a possible environmental catastrophe, views with growing concern as the Turkish Straits have become a tanker superhighway. The tankers transport Russian, Kazakh and, until the 2006 opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, Azeri crude to increasingly ravenous foreign markets.

    Under the terms of Montreux, Turkey cannot even charge tankers transit fees or require them to take on pilots to traverse the treacherous waterway.

    Montreux is quite explicit on the passage of foreign warships through the Turkish Straits, however, limiting non-riverain Black Sea forces to a maximum of 45,000 tons of naval vessels, with no single warship exceeding 30,000 tons.

    Washington originally proposed to send to Georgia two U.S. Navy hospital ships, the USNS Comfort and the USNS Mercy, but both are converted oil tankers displacing 69,360 tons apiece, and the Turks demurred.

    Four ships belonging to the Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 — Spain’s SPS Almirante Don Juan de Borbon, Germany’s FGS Luebeck, Poland’s ORP General Kazimierz Pulaski and the USS Taylor — last week passed into the Black Sea to Romania’s Constanza and Bulgaria’s Varna ports to participate in a NATO maritime exercise scheduled in October 2007 to conduct joint operations with the Bulgarian and Romanian navies. The Bulgarian navy currently has one Koni-class, one Wielingen-class and three Riga-class frigates, one Tarantul and two Pauk-class corvettes, three Osa-class missile boats and a Romeo-class submarine, while Romania has three frigates, four light frigates, three Molniya-class corvettes, three torpedo boats, one minelayer, four minesweepers and 16 auxiliary ships. In contrast, the Russian Black Sea Fleet has 40 warships; its flagship is the guided missile cruiser Moskva. According to the Russian General Staff, these soon will be joined by an additional eight NATO warships, even as the Moskva dropped anchor in Abkhazian waters.

    The Pentagon finally got its chance to fly the flag when on Aug. 22 the USS McFaul (DDG-74, 8,915 tons) guided-missile destroyer loaded with humanitarian aid passed the Bosporus headed for Georgia with supplies such as blankets, hygiene kits and baby food, to be followed two days later by the USCGC Dallas (WHEC-716, 3,250 tons) cutter passing the Dardanelles, which eventually will be joined by the USS Mount Whitney (LCC/JCC 20, 18,400 tons), now loading supplies in Italy.

    The Kremlin is not pleased by the foreign show of naval force; Russian General Staff Deputy Chief Anatoly Nogovitsyn observed of the NATO exercise, “From the Russian point of view … the usefulness of this operation is extremely dubious,” later labeling the deployment “devilish.”

    The Turkish press is now full of speculation that Washington will pressure Turkey to revise Montreux, but is it really in America’s and its allies’ interests to be provocatively flying the flag in waters through which pass a number of tankers fueling European and Asian needs? As Turkey is allowed under Montreux to shut the Turkish Straits completely in the event of conflict, it is a question to which hawks in Europe and Washington ought to give more consideration.