Turkish Forum

Category: Georgia

  • Azerbaijani view of Gul’s visit to Yerevan

    Azerbaijani view of Gul’s visit to Yerevan

    Turkish Journal California Representative Isil Oz talked to Azerbaijani-American Council (AAC) – Javid Huseynov to get some information about their feelings for Gul’s visit to Yerevan.

    September 6th 2008

    Isil Oz (Turkish Journal)

    Today a World Cup qualifying game between the Turkish and Armenian national football teams will take place in Yerevan. Armenian President Serge Sarkisian invited his Turkish counterpart to “watch the game together” in an article he wrote for the Wall Street Journal, July 9. After this article, President Abdullah Gul decided to go to Yerevan… Some have said Gul showed “the foresight and the courage” needed to act. Some have questioned why Gul should visit a country they refer to as Turkey’s enemy.

    What about Azerbaijani side?

    President Gul’s visit to Yerevan has come under a heavy criticism of Azerbaijani mainstream media, some officials and independent analysts. So I talked to Azerbaijani-American Council (AAC) – Javid Huseynov to get some information about their feelings for Gul’s visit to Yerevan.

    “President Gul’s landmark visit to Yerevan today may open a new chapter in Turkey’s relations with its troublesome neighbor. Media and analysts in Turkey, Armenia and other countries attempt to provide a variety of analyses citing primarily positive sides of this symbolic gesture.

    In Azerbaijan, Mr. Gul’s Yerevan visit has come under substantial criticism of the media, various officials and independent analysts. Certainly, the government of Azerbaijan has its own views in this regard, which may have been conveyed to Prime Minister Erdogan upon his recent visit to Baku. Azerbaijani position in this regard is naturally shaped by the unresolved Karabagh conflict. Speaking from a moral standpoint, Mr. Gul accepted this invitation from a man who participated in Karabagh war atrocities, namely, gave orders during the brutal Khojaly massacre against Azeri Turks in 1992. In fact, Mr. Sarkissian, now President of Armenia, is also the author of the following words:

    “before Khojali, the Azerbaijanis thought that they were joking with us, they thought that the Armenians were people who could not raise their hand against the civilian population. We were able to break that [stereotype].” (Thomas De Waal. “Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War”, NYU Press,2004

    From Azerbaijani perspective?

    A trip by President Gul would be seen similar to a hypothetical visit by a Turkish head of state to Bosnia upon an invitation from Radovan Karadzic or a hypothetical visit by Azerbaijani head of state to Turkey upon an invitation from Abdullah Ocalan. In legal terms, there is no difference between the actions of Karadzic in Bosnia, Ocalan in Turkey, and those of Sarkissian in Azerbaijan.

    However, let’s put aside Azerbaijani position as one-sided, and look at this visit from a position of an independent observer.

    First of all, Turkey severed its relations with Armenia in 1993, as a result of Armenian occupation of Karabagh and 7 surrounding districts, all internationally recognized parts of Azerbaijan. I shall remind that Karabagh war resulted in 30,000 civilian deaths, out of which 25,000 were Azeri Turks, an ethnic cleansing and exodus of close to 1 million Azeris from their homes. The Turkish condition for the restoration of those relations was simple – Armenia must respect international law, withdraw forces, allow refugees to return to their homes and start negotiations about the future of Karabagh region.

    There is nothing ambiguous in this Turkish condition, in fact, there are 4 UN Security Council resolutions from 1993, calling upon Armenian forces to withdraw from Azerbaijan proper and allow for the return of civilians. Yet Armenia up to date has not fulfilled this international demand. In fact, over the last 15 years, Armenia has actively dragged the peace process, while reinforcing and resettling the occupied territories, destroying any Azeri trace on them. Furthermore, Armenia established an unrecognized separatist regime of “Nagorno-Karabagh Republic”, and two recent Armenian presidents, Robert Kocharyan and Serge Sarkissian, are products of this regime. Armenian side claims the right of “self-determination of people Karabagh”, with a little deviation: this right is only for Armenian population. As a reminder, prior to Karabagh war, third of Karabagh’s population were Azeri Turks.

    The second condition of Turkey was for Armenia to cease its support for the international legal recognition of interethnic strife that took place in Eastern Anatolia in the course of World War I as Armenian genocide. As we know this effort is led by Armenian diaspora, which plays an important role in politics of Armenia. Yet in past decade, it became obvious that Armenian government would not be able to stop diaspora even if it officially refrained from supporting its efforts.

    The third and most important condition was for Armenia to recognize and respect the borders of neighboring countries, of course, primarily Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenia is the only country in the world, which does not recognize the borders of Azerbaijan and occupies part of its territory. Being a signatory of 1921 Kars Treaty, Armenia also does not respect the borders of Turkey, in fact, in Armenian legislature, media and press, Eastern Anatolia is referred to as Western Armenia. Moreover, there are now occasional voices in Armenia wishing to raise the issue Armenian-settled Javakheti region of Georgia, opening a way for disrespecting the integrity of yet another neighboring country.

    Do you think that the recently elected president of Armenia will make changes in their policies?

    With the bloody and undemocratic election of Serge Sarkissian in March 2008, Armenia did not seem to change its decade-old position on any of the fundamental issues of concern for Turkey. Despite the fact that its confrontational policy against neighbors resulted in locked borders, isolation from important regional projects and slow economic development, Armenia has not stepped back from its position for an inch. Sarkissian insists on reopening relations without preconditions, i.e. Armenia and diaspora will continue doing what they were doing but Turkey should eventually open the border.

    What is the benefit for Turkey?

    Perhaps, Mr. Gul and Turkish diplomats can answer this question better. But even without their opinion, this visit by Abdullah Gul can be viewed as a reward for Armenia’s aggressive policy and essential failure of Turkish principles. It’s psychological victory for Armenia and a boost to Serge Sarkissian, with little or no return for Turkey.

    Recent war between Russia and Georgia, further limited Armenia’s choices, and perhaps, after some time with now three borders closed, Armenian government would be forced to rethink its unconstructive policy in the region. President Gul’s visit, however, offers a needless incentive rather than helping Armenia to come to terms with reality and obey international law.

    What’s your view of Turkey’s position regarding recent events in Caucasus?

    As we know, in the wake of Russia’s recent aggression against Georgia, Prime Minister Erdogan came up with the initiative of a new regional security arrangement, involving Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey and Russia. I can’t comment on this proposal in detail, as not much is known about it. But the timing of this proposal and parties involved in it do not offer a very bright perspective for this idea. First of all, Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity is violated by Armenia without any desire to revert its policy. Georgia’s integrity is violated even more boldly by Russia against all letters of international law. Turkey is perceived as an enemy by Armenia and Armenians for four generations now. So I am not sure what kind of cooperation Mr. Erdogan is envisioning.

    But I also would like to comment on Turkey’s stance vis-à-vis events in Georgia. Perhaps, due to similar conditions in Kosovo and Northern Cyprus, Turkey could not be more vocal on the issue of violation of Georgia’s integrity. However, in my view, Turkish government should have responded with humanitarian aid and support to Georgia. For many years now, Georgia has courageously stood against Russian provocations to provide a path for delivering Azerbaijani hydrocarbons to Turkey. In other words, Georgia took all risks in its Western orientation and to the benefit of Turkey and its position as a new energy hub. Turkey should not have left Georgia without support at such crucial moment.

    What about the position that was taken by Turkish government?

    The action of Turkish government in this regard may raise questions about the reliability of Turkey as a regional ally for both Azerbaijan and Georgia. In other words, Turkey has demonstrated that in matters pertaining to the region of Caucasus, it cannot be an independent player, but only act in tandem with Russia or the United States. Combined with Gul’s visit to Yerevan, in my mind, these indicate the weakening of Turkey’s position in the region.

    Of course, Turkey has to uphold its own interests above all, yet it’s not quite visible what benefits would Turkey gain from Armenia while losing Azerbaijan and Georgia. Aside from ethnic affinities between Azeri and Anatolian Turks, the Turkish energy interests shall be considered as well.

    Couldn’t we think Turkey is searching for new opportunities?

    What sort of opportunities? Armenia’s purpose is to open the border, reinforce its stance vis-à-vis Azerbaijan. Armenia does not plan to step back from any of its positions, and it’s naïve to imagine that Armenian troops will leave Karabagh region and allow refugees to return to their homes or will stop supporting the historical blackmail of Turkey after border is opened.

    The public in Turkey as well as Turkish diaspora is being constantly brainwashed via various media outlets that opening of borders will bring benefits to Turkey too. If so – what are they? Armenia is economically dependent on border opening, Turkey is not. But opening of borders without compromise is a meaningless retraction from Turkish position, which will only strengthen and embolden the non-constructive position of Sarkissian’s regime vis-à-vis both Azerbaijan and Turkey.

    Do you think this visit will affect the fraternal relations Azeri and Anatolian Turks in the U.S.?

    I want to reiterate that from the position of diaspora, a visit by President Gul won’t affect the fraternal relations of Azeri and Anatolian Turks in the U.S. Our brotherhood is shaped not by political establishment but by centuries of common Turkic ethnic roots, language, identity, and culture, and no one is in power to change these. 

    Javid Huseynov, PhD is the current president of Azerbaijani-American Council (AAC) established in 2006, and currently operating in California and Texas. AAC is a community organization of Azeri-Americans, working also closely with ATA-SC and its local chapters, American Jewish Committee (AJC) and other community grassroots organizations in California and nation-wide. AAC website is available at .

    In professional career, Dr. Huseynov is a senior software engineer and scientist, working in Orange County. Since 1995, he actively participated in grassroots activities of Azerbaijani and Turkish diaspora in the United States. 

  • Turkey and Armenia Friends and neighbours

    Turkey and Armenia Friends and neighbours

     

    Sep 25th 2008 | ANKARA AND YEREVAN
    From The Economist print edition
    Rising hopes of better relations between two historic enemies

     
    KEMAL ATATURK , father of modern Turkey, rescued hundreds of Armenian women and children from mass slaughter by Ottoman forces during and after the first world war. This untold story, which is sure to surprise many of today’s Turks, is one of many collected by the Armenian genocide museum in Yerevan that “will soon be brought to light on our website,” promises Hayk Demoyan, its director.
    His project is one more example of shifting relations between Turkey and Armenia. On September 6th President Abdullah Gul became the first Turkish leader to visit Armenia when he attended a football match. Mr Gul’s decision to accept an invitation from Armenia’s president, Serzh Sarkisian, has raised expectations that Turkey may establish diplomatic ties and open the border it closed during the 1990s fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. The two foreign ministers were planning to meet in New York this week. Armenia promises to recognise Turkey’s borders and to allow a commission of historians to investigate the fate of the Ottoman Armenians.
    Reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia could tilt the balance of power in the Caucasus. Russia is Armenia’s closest regional ally. It has two bases and around 2,000 troops there. The war in Georgia has forced Armenia to rethink its position. Some 70% of its supplies flow through Georgia, and these were disrupted by Russian bombing. Peace with Turkey would give Armenia a new outside link. Some think Russia would be happy too. “It would allow Russia to marginalise and lean harder on Georgia,” argues Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the Caucasus Media Institute.
    Mending fences with Armenia would bolster Turkey’s regional clout. And it might also help to kill a resolution proposed by the American Congress to call the slaughter of the Armenians in 1915 genocide. That makes the Armenian diaspora, which is campaigning for genocide recognition, unhappy. Some speak of a “Turkish trap” aimed at rewriting history to absolve Turkey of wrongdoing. Indeed, hawks in Turkey are pressing Armenia to drop all talk of genocide.
    Even more ambitiously, the hawks want better ties with Armenia to be tied anew to progress over Nagorno-Karabakh. But at least Mr Gul seems determined to press ahead. “If we allow the dynamics that were set in motion by the Yerevan match to slip away, we may have to wait another 15-20 years for a similar chance to arise,” he has said.

  • Armenia Strives to Maintain Balanced Foreign Policy

    Armenia Strives to Maintain Balanced Foreign Policy

    Yerevan to host NATO exercises as it chairs Russian-backed security body.

    By Ara Tadevosian in Yerevan (CRS 461 25-Sep-08)

    The August war between Armenia’s close ally Russia and close neighbour Georgia rocked its foreign policy of “complementarity”, but analysts say President Serzh Sarkisian is working hard on maintaining a balance between Russia and the West.

    Following Moscow’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on August 26, the Russian leadership sought the support of its allies in the Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Security Pact, of which Armenia is now the chairman, signalling that it wanted them to follow the Russian lead over the two territories.

    But two days before the members of the security pact were due to meet in Moscow, Sarkisian made it clear that he would not be recognising the two breakaway territories.

    On September 3, Sarkisian told foreign diplomats in Yerevan, “Armenia cannot recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, not having recognised the independence of Nagorny Karabakh.”

    The Nagorny Karabakh Republic, which declared independence in December 1991, is strongly supported by Armenia but not recognised as an independent state by it, or any other country.

    One senior western diplomat in Yerevan described Sarkisian’s statement as an “elegant move”, to get himself out of a serious dilemma.

    Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of the journal Russia in Global Politics, told IWPR, “They understand in the Kremlin that this is a very serious issue. Armenia is in an especially delicate position because of the problem of Karabakh. I don’t believe Moscow will put pressure on Yerevan.”

    Analysts say that Armenia was put in a tricky position by the crisis but is hoping to manoeuvre out of it and not alienate any of the country’s partners.

    “Armenia will not have to make a decisive choice and to ‘swear on its blood’ its loyalty to one or other partner,” said Lukyanov.

    “On the other hand Russia of course demonstrated a new kind of behaviour [during the August crisis] and will try to consolidate its sphere of influence, something which will objectively lead to greater rivalry for the post-Soviet space and for the Caucasus.

    “Russia has never concealed that it thinks of politics in this part of the world as highly competitive. Basically, the United States has thrown off appearances and adopted the same position.”

    From the American side, Ron Asmus, director of the Transatlantic Centre of the German Marshall Fund in Brussels, said, “It may well become harder for Armenia to maintain the balance it seeks to achieve in its policy of complementarity.

    “But it won’t be the US that will pressure Armenia to make any choice. We will respect the choice of Armenia and defend its right to decide where it wants to belong.”

    Armenia relies on both Russia, its main trading partner, and Georgia, its main transit route to the outside world, for economic survival and the war hit the Armenian economy very hard.

    The blowing up of a railway bridge in central Georgia on August 16 disrupted trade to Armenia and caused two weeks of fuel shortages.

    Around 70 per cent of imports to Armenia come through the Georgian port of Poti, which was occupied by Russian forces during the conflict, while land connections to Russia via Georgia have been severely restricted for almost two years.

    In mid-August, in the midst of the Georgia crisis, Sarkisian told his security council that Russia is a “strategic ally” of Armenia, while Georgia is a “friendly country”, indicating his strategic preference while aiming not to offend either.

    Interestingly, Armenian opposition leader and former president Levon Ter-Petrosian has taken an openly pro-Russian position during the crisis.

    “No one can dispute that it was Georgia who unleashed the war and did it with the aim of liquidating the Republic of South Ossetia,” said Ter-Petrosian in an interview to the A1+ internet news site. “No one can also dispute that by its decisive intervention, Russia saved the South Ossetian people from genocide. If Russia had delayed its assistance even by six hours, South Ossetia would not exist today.”

    Alexander Iskandarian, director of the Caucasus Media Institute, said that he did not expect Georgian-Armenian relations to suffer, despite the identification of Armenia with Russia. He said that the tensions between the two countries were typical of neighbours and the leaders on both sides were able to stop them deteriorating.

    On taking on the chairmanship of the CIS Collective Security Pact, Sarkisian also hinted at unhappiness with other members of the organisation. Without naming them, he appeared to be referring to Kazakstan and Uzbekistan which have given support to Azerbaijan.

    The word complementarity was coined in 1998 when Sarkisian’s predecessor, Robert Kocharian, was elected president to describe the country’s policy of staying friends with its military ally, Russia, and the United States, which has a large Armenian diaspora as well as Europe and Iran.

    One of the main aims of the policy of complementarity is to avoid “putting all your eggs in one basket”. One consequence of this is that, despite the downturn in relations between Russia and the West and the virtual suspension of the Russia-NATO council, Armenia is pressing ahead with NATO exercises later this month as part of the Partnership for Peace programme.

    The Cooperative Longbow/Lancer exercises will take place in Armenia from September 26 to October 21 and will be the biggest ever such NATO exercise to be held in the South Caucasus.

    Around 1,100 soldiers will take part from 21 countries from NATO, its partners and also the United Arab Emirates.

    Western officials and analysts say that it is unfair to force Armenia to make a choice in its foreign policy.

    US deputy assistant secretary of state Matt Bryza told the Armenian news agency Mediamax, “Armenia is an independent country with a sovereign government elected by its citizens. It can pursue any path it wishes. The United States is a close friend of Armenia’s, and remains committed to helping Armenia achieve the goals of its complementarity foreign policy.”

    Ruben Safrastian, director of Armenia’s Institute of Oriental Studies, noted that one consequence of the American-Russian stand-off in the Caucasus was Turkey’s new initiative for a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, currently being presented at the United Nations General Assembly, which Moscow had endorsed more enthusiastically than Washington.

    Safrastian said that because it saw itself as having a stronger position in the South Caucasus, Moscow did not see the possible normalisation of Armenian-Turkish relations as a threat and would be supporting this process.

    Ara Tadevosian is director of Mediamax news agency in Yerevan.

  • Russia engages in ‘gangland’ diplomacy as it sends warship to the Caribbean

    Russia engages in ‘gangland’ diplomacy as it sends warship to the Caribbean

    Russia flexed its muscles in America’s backyard yesterday as it sent one of its largest warships to join military exercises in the Caribbean. The nuclear-powered flagship Peter the Great set off for Venezuela with the submarine destroyer Admiral Chabanenko and two support vessels in the first Russian naval mission in Latin America since the end of the Cold War.

    “The St Andrew flag, the flag of the Russian Navy, is confidently returning to the world oceans,” Igor Dygalo, a spokesman for the Russian Navy, said. He declined to comment on Russian newspaper reports that nuclear submarines were also part of the expedition.

    The voyage to join the Venezuelan Navy for manoeuvres came only days after Russian strategic nuclear bombers made their first visit to the country. Hugo Chávez, the President, said then that the arrival of the strike force was a warning to the US. The vehemently antiAmerican Venezuelan leader is due to visit Dmitri Medvedev, the Russian President, in Moscow this week as part of a tour that includes visits to Cuba and China.

    Peter the Great is armed with 20 nuclear cruise missiles and up to 500 surface-to-air missiles, making it one of the most formidable warships in the world. The Kremlin has courted Venezuela and Cuba as tensions with the West soared over the proposed US missile shield in Eastern Europe and the Russian invasion of Georgia last month. Vladimir Putin, the Prime Minister, said recently that Russia should “restore its position in Cuba” – the nation where deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in 1962 brought Russia and the United States to the brink of nuclear war.

    Igor Sechin, the Deputy Prime Minister, made clear that Russia would challenge the US for influence in Latin America after visits to Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba last week. He said: “It would be wrong to talk about one nation having exclusive rights to this zone.”

    Moscow was infuriated when Washington sent US warships into the Black Sea to deliver aid to Georgia after the war. Analysts said that the Kremlin was engaging in gunboat diplomacy over the encroachment of Nato into the former Soviet satellites of Georgia and Ukraine.

    Pavel Felgengauer, a leading Russian defence expert, told The Times: “It’s to show the flag and the finger to the United States. They are offering a sort of gangland deal – if you get into our territory, then we will get into yours. You leave Georgia and Ukraine to us and we won’t go into the Caribbean, OK?” He described the visit as “first and foremost a propaganda deployment”, pointing out that one of the support vessels was a tug in case either of the warships broke down.

    Latin America was one of the arenas of the Cold War in which the US and the Soviet Union battled for ideological dominance. Russia has agreed to sell more than $4 billion (£2 billion) worth of armaments to Venezuela since 2005 and disclosed last week that Mr Chávez wanted new antiaircraft systems and more fighter jets.

    Mr Dygalo denied any link with Georgia and said that Mr Chávez and Mr Medvedev had agreed on the exercises in July.

    Sea power

    — In the Battle of Tsushima in 1905 – the largest naval battle since Trafalgar – the Russian fleet sailed 18,000 miles (33,000km) to Port Arthur in the Pacific, where it was outmanoeuvred and destroyed by Japanese forces

    — During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Navy conducted 180 voyages on 86 ships to transfer weapons to Cuba

    Sources: Times Archive; russojapanesewar.com

     

    The Times  23 September 2008

  • US urges EU to diversify energy supplies

    US urges EU to diversify energy supplies

    BRUSSELS, Belgium: Russia’s fight with Georgia has added new urgency to the Europe Union’s need to find alternatives to Russian oil and gas imports, the new U.S. ambassador to the EU said Monday.

    “Russia’s willingness to defy the international community, act in violation of international law, (and) be threatening in its neighborhood is a reminder of why progress on this issue is so important,” ambassador Kristen Silverberg said.

    At an emergency summit on the Georgia conflict early this month, EU leaders called for a study into how the 27-nation body can find alternative energy sources to diminish growing dependence on Russia, which currently supplies a third of EU oil imports and more than 40 percent of the natural gas European Union countries buy from abroad.

    Silverberg told reporters the EU should work with Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and other nations to diversify sources of energy and supply routes for oil and gas from the Caspian and Central Asian regions.

    “We hope that Europe will engage with active outreach with some of the supplier countries, the Azeris for example,” she said. “We have always thought that it was in Europe’s interest to diversify its supply routes generally.”

    In particular, the EU should work closely with Turkey to develop pipelines and other infrastructure to ensure oil and gas can flow westward through routes not controlled by Moscow, she told reporters Monday.

    “We hope that Europe will work closely with Turkey to help make sure that Turkey is a viable and active transit route for Caspian gas,” Silverberg added.

    “That involves negotiating with Turkey over reasonable terms for a transit agreement. It means working with Turkey on helping to improve its infrastructure so helping to make sure its an efficient transit route.”

    One project under consideration is the so-called Nabucco pipeline, which would deliver gas from Turkmenistan and other Central Asian and Caspian countries westward through Turkey while bypassing Russia.

    The project, however, has been slowed by high costs and uncertainty over sources of supply, and Russia is promoting rival routes through its territory as a cheaper and safer alternative.

     

    International Herald Tribune  22 September 2008

  • No Caucasian Ceasefire until Russia Achieves its Aims

    No Caucasian Ceasefire until Russia Achieves its Aims

     

    DEBKAfile Special Report and Analysis

    August 11, 2008

    Prime minister Vladimir Putin toys defiant Georgia

    By Monday, Aug. 11, the fourth day of the Caucasian conflict, which first erupted over the breakaway province of South Ossetia, the pro-American Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili sounded hopeless in the face of overwhelming Russian might.

    International condemnation of Russian behavior as “unacceptable and disproportionate” did not ease his country’s plight or stop the continuing violence.

    Saakashvili’s third commitment to a ceasefire, signed in the presence of the French and Finnish foreign ministers, was brusquely rejected by the Kremlin before the would-be mediators had a chance to present it later that day. The Russian NATO ambassador said his government would not deal with the “war criminal” Georgian president, confirming Saakashvili’s charge that one of Moscow’s objects was to oust him as president.

    DEBKAfile’s military analysts reported Sunday, Aug. 10:

    Russian president Dimitry Medvedev said Sunday, Aug. 10, the war would go on until Tbilisi withdrew its forces unconditionally from South Ossetia and pledged never to attack the region again. This would mean Georgia’s acceptance of its truncation and its surrender to Russian hegemony.

    The gap between the claims of both sides attested to the war of words accompanying the battles on the ground. While the Georgians claimed to have killed “several hundred” Russian troops and downed “80 planes,” Moscow admitted to the loss of 18 soldiers and four warplanes.

    Civilians, especially in South Ossetia and at least three Georgian towns pummeled by Russian jets, are bearing the brunt of this conflict. Saturday and Sunday, they pounded Gori, the Black Sea naval, military and oil port of Poti, and Zugdidi on the Abkhazian border.

    The Red Cross reports that the conflict has displaced at least 40,000 people from their homes. The South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali, now a ghost town, is controlled by Russian forces.

    That the Georgian town of Gori was pounded from the air for three days is attested to by witnesses. The numbers of the city’s dead and displaced certainly run into hundreds.

    DEBKAfile reports that the Russians pulverized Gori to punish Georgia for invading the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali last Thursday, Aug. 7.

    Sunday night, Russian planes dropped bombs near Tbilisi’s international airport and a nearby military air installation shortly after the US began flying hundreds of Georgian troops home from Iraq. The intention appeared to be to leave the Georgian reinforcements nowhere to land.

    During the day, too, the Russian navy imposed a sea blockade on Georgian’s Black Sea ports and later claimed to have sunk a Georgian vessel during an attack.

    In the face of President George W. Bush’s demand for an immediate withdrawal of Russian troops and support for international mediation, Moscow poured an additional 10,000 men and armor into South Ossetia Sunday as well.

    DEBKAfile’s military analysts: By flouting US demands to accept mediation, Moscow highlighted America’s lack of leverage for helping its embattled Georgian ally.

    The Bush administration finds itself trapped in its foreign policy commitment to dialogue and international diplomacy for solving world disputes, but short of willing opposite numbers.

    Russia is following Iran’s example in exploiting Washington’s inhibition to advance its goals by force. Therefore, the Caucasian standoff has profound ramifications for the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Moscow’s disdain for Washington’s lack of muscle will further encourage Tehran and its terrorist proxies to defy the international community and the United States in particular.

    DEBKAfile’s military analysts reported Saturday, Aug. 9:

    Tiny Georgia with an army of less than 18,000, having been roundly defeated in South Ossetia, cannot hope to withstand the mighty Russian army in Abkhazia.

    Therefore, President Saakashvili, whose bid to join NATO and the European Union infuriated Moscow, will have to write off both breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as lost to Russia.

    This is Moscow’s payback for the US-NATO action to detach Kosovo from Serbia and launch it on the way to independence. It is also a warning to former Soviet bloc nations, Ukraine, the Caucasian and Central Asian peoples against opting to join up with the United States and the NATO bloc in areas which Moscow deems part of its strategic sphere of influence

    After severing South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia, four follow-up Russian steps may be postulated:

    1. The two separatist provinces will proclaim their independence, just like Kosovo.

    2. Russia will continue to exercise its overwhelming military and air might to reduce the pro-American Saakashvili to capitulation.

    3. The Georgian president will not be able to face his own nation after losing two regions of his country and causing its humiliation. Moscow will then make Washington swallow a pro-Russian successor.

    4. Moscow’s trampling of Georgia will serve as an object lesson for Russia’s own secessionist provinces, such as Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, and a warning not to risk defying Russian armed might.

    4. Western plans to develop more oil and gas pipelines to bypass the Russian network to the West, in addition to the Caspian line which carries one million barrels a day from Baku through Georgia to Turkey and out to the West, will be held in abeyance pending an accommodation with the rulers of the Kremlin.