Category: Georgia

  • Military Relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey

    Military Relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey

    After the collapse of USSR, necessaries of new states were that economic, politic, military and educational relations with each other and other international platforms and countries. On that way all former Soviet countries created Commonwealth of Independence States union. With creation of CIS, these countries which were unificated on old Soviet map will create new relations on the new world system. Also for regulating new systems, geopolitical situation was very important. Firstly a state can create strong relations where it was near another state.

    If we describe relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, we will see influence of border factor. Strong relations of Turkey with Azerbaijan are result of near abroad condition.
    Cooperations of Turkey and Azerbaijan had been decreased sometimes. But it ended in new powerful authorities.

    Pro Russian politics of Ayaz Muttalibov influenced Turkish relations as only embassy found. In short time of Muttalibov administrative Turkey was working to make new perspective for other Turkish countries.

    Ebulfez Elchibey who came to power after Muttalibov followed new way Pro Turkish politics as opposite to Muttalibov. So many agreements had been created in economy, military, education, energy, politics and new activities started. First military cooperations between Azerbaijan and Turkey borned in that time.

    In 1992 military education agreement signed between Azerbaijani and Turkish government. In this period Azerbaijan was working to create international pressure circumstances on Armenia about Nagorno Karabakh conflict. So military agreements with Turkey, created new tensions in this region. We can say a diminish symbol with Russia as military.

    Military conventions were less than next years in new political actions to make strong authority and balanced actions period. Haydar Aliyev’s balance political way made a cooperation as pragmatist mind of Azerbaijan. We will see importance of Turkish military agreements. Because if Azerbaijan want to be important actor on this region, it should regulate new relations for the USA and NATO via Turkey.

    In 1996 between the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the government of the Republic of Turkey on base of cooperation of staff members of supporting service of Armed Forces protocol signed.

    In 1997 between the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the government of the Republic of Turkey on regulation of civil and military flying in 10 km of astride Azerbaijan-Turkey border protocol signed.

    In that time agreements of Azerbaijan with Iran and Russia were targeting only friendship situation and solve problems on bounds And agreements with the USA were not totally military cooperations. It is important to not forget that Russian embargo on Azerbaijan because of Chechen problem increased Turkish inclination on military subjects. Strong relations with Turkey of Azerbaijan will create new diplomatical positions from Cyprus to Yerevan.

    Military positions as international importance of Azerbaijan borned with agreement between the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the government of the Republic of Turkey on activities of platoon of Azerbaijan is going to the Kosovo in the staff of Turkey battalion.
    Azerbaijan will keep its soldiers untill period of independence of Kosovo. With this step Azerbaijan became an important and strategical country on extend to East policy of NATO. Azerbaijan won a good position on Caucasus region with taking some other militaryal duties via Turkey in different countries.

    In 2000 between the Ministry of defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Head of Naval Forces of Republic of Turkey about giving the attack launch of AB-34 P-134 to the Azerbaijan protocol signed and :

    – Protocol between the Ministry of defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Ministry of national security of Republic of Turkey on cooperation in the topographical area,
    – Protocol between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Turkey on forming and training of profession school of forces kind of Baku,
    – Protocol between the Ministry of defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the General Staff of the Republic of Turkey on carrying out of the material and technical purchasing,
    – Agreement between the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the government of the Republic of Turkey on military industry cooperation signed.

    In 2001 between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the General Staff of the Republic of Turkey on development of Nakhchivan 5th army protocol;

    In 2002 Ministry of defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the General Staff of the Republic of Turkey on cooperation in the area of war history, military archive and museum work and military publication protocol and in 2003 between the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the government of the Republic of on training, material and technical assistance of State Border Service of Azerbaijan by Armed Forces of Turkey and Protocol between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey on cooperation in the safety of the West-East energy corridor protocol signed.

    Since 1999 Azerbaijan took steps quickly. As opposite to Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia and Greece signed an agreement as “Send Armenian soldiers to Kosovo via Greek army”. Armenian parliament agreed this on 13 December 2003. According to this agreement 30 Armenian soldiers had gone to Kosovo with ratification of Ministry of Defence of Armenia. It had been explained as to support European-Atlantic integration on South Caucasus. Against to modernization of Azerbaijan by Turkish Military Forces, Greece take a decision to support to Armenian army. Also military cooperations created influences on political problems. In that time mix circumstances about these events will share a balance of situations on energy and trade agreements.

    After the September 11 terrorist acts, Azerbaijan supported the decision of counter attack to terrorism of the USA. So it sent some peacekeepers to Afghanistan and opened air space for American forces. These actions share Turkish support and modernisation to Azerbaijani army. Azerbaijan use this experiment to be main actor in the region.

    In 2004 and 2005 between the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the government of the Republic of Turkey on long-term economical and military cooperation and between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the General Staff of the Republic of Turkey on application of the financial aid protocol signed.

    And in 2006 between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the General Staff of the Republic of Turkey on application of material and technical provision protocol shared new improvements of new actor.

    Since 2006 new approaches regulated cooperations with other states :
    – Supports of Azerbaijan to Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,
    – Turkey purchases rockets from the USA,
    – New relations of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey as result of alternative energy way against to Russia.

    Same year new circumstances created balance regulations for Azerbaijan with agreement of natural gas project with Greece. It was political and militaryal goal of Azerbaijan because Yerevan loosed its good militaryal and political relations with Greece. So it must choose a new way as balance politics.

    There is a balance activities with military cooperations of Azerbaijani relations from the independence time. Pro Turkish military activities regulated international perspective on problems of Azerbaijan. Example, mainly Azerbaijan use Cyprus card about Greek support to Armenia. And also it used totally the USA and NATO supports and created new politics as alternative to Russia. We can say thay experiments of Elchibey’s totally Pro Turkish politics and Aliyev’s balance politics which agree all region as a whole will regulate positions of Caucasus region.

    Mehmet Fatih ÖZTARSU / Baku Qafqaz University

  • Russian defense minister warns of another, worse Georgian war

    Russian defense minister warns of another, worse Georgian war

     
       

    ANKARA, November 18 (RIA Novosti) – The Russian defense minister warned on Tuesday that Georgia’s military buildup and drive to join NATO could cause a conflict worse than the five-day war over South Ossetia in August.

    Russia and Georgia fought a brief war in August after Tbilisi launched an offensive in an attempt to regain control of breakaway South Ossetia. Moscow subsequently recognized the republic and Abkhazia, another separatist Georgian region, as independent states.

    “We are worried by the military buildup being conducted by the Georgian authorities and the country’s drive toward NATO. These moves could cause a conflict worse than the August events,” Anatoly Serdyukov said after talks in Ankara with Turkish Defense Minister Mehmet Gonul.

    At a summit in April, NATO member states decided to put off a decision on whether to grant Membership Action Plans to Georgia and Ukraine until December. Their bids have received strong U.S. backing, but ran into opposition from some European alliance members, including Germany and France, who said that opening the path to membership for the two former Soviet republics would unnecessarily antagonize Moscow.

    Russian President Dmitry Medvedev told journalists on Tuesday that Russia would have no contacts with Georgia’s current government but expressed the hope that despite the August armed conflict relations between Russian and Georgian people would not deteriorate.

    “We will have no contacts at all with the current regime and we view their policies as criminal,” Medvedev said.

  • CAUCASUS UPDATE, November 10, 2008

    CAUCASUS UPDATE, November 10, 2008

    Note from the Editor-in-Chief, Nasimi Aghayev 

    The election of Barack Obama to the presidency of the United States last week was welcomed around the world as an end to the unpopular Bush presidency and the chance to rebuild America ’s standing in the world. Expectations are, of course, going to be disappointed, both domestically and internationally. For all the significance of a US president with a Kenyan heritage and a Muslim middle name, President Obama will still have to face tough and unpopular decisions in the world. 

    On November 5, the day after election day, Moscow announced that it would deploy a number of short-range missiles in Kaliningrad , the Russian exclave between Lithuania and Poland , as a means to ‘neutralise – if necessary – the planned US missile defence system in eastern Europe. The decision was announced by President Dimitri Medvedev in his first state of the nation address, and was a clear warning that the Kremlin will not be appeased by a mere change of occupant in the White House. 

    Is it viable to expect a significant shift in policy towards Russia and the Caucasus once Obama is inaugurated? It is unlikely. Much has been made of John McCain’s hard-line policy approach to dealing with Moscow , and Obama’s relative inexperience in the area, and it is true that domestic opinion in the region tended to favour McCain, especially in states nervous about Russian adventurism such as Georgia and Ukraine . But in reality the room for maneuver will not allow a radical departure from the Bush administration, for both a general reason and a number of specific ones. The exception might seem to be Nagorno-Karabakh. 

    The general reason is that, for all the talk after the Georgian war of a new (albeit ‘19th-century’) geopolitical order in Eurasia, the relationship with Russia is not the incoming administration’s top priority. The economy is a far more pressing concern. And even within the sphere of foreign affairs, negotiations with European and Chinese leaders on the world financial crisis will take up a lot more time than Russia and the Caucasus . Much will of course depend on President Obama’s personnel selection, in particular the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs, but for a while at least we are likely to see policy towards Eurasia as a secondary concern. 

    The specific reasons vary, but boil down to the fact that there is only so much that the US can do without breaking its prior commitments or undertaking a major volte-face on its whole foreign policy front which Mr Obama has neither the experience nor the desire (despite his commitment to multilateralism) to countenance. Firstly, the missile defence shield. By November 7, Mr. Obama had spoken to Lech Kaczynski, the Polish President, affirming his commitment to the project, which includes interceptor missiles based in Poland . A telephone call whilst President-elect, of course, does not equate to a policy whilst President. But it is nonetheless difficult to imagine Mr. Obama withdrawing from the missile shield project during his tenure, although it may be modified to make it less unpalatable to the Kremlin. 

    Secondly, Georgia . Mr Obama criticized Russia ’s invasion of the country in August and called Russia ’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia “deeply troubling”. He has warned Moscow that a failure to abide by the ceasefire will lead to difficulties in its attempts to gain membership to the World Trade Organisation, as well as dialogue frameworks such as the NATO-Russia Council. So far, so orthodox. He has expressed support for Georgia and Ukraine in their NATO aspirations, and declared in September that Tbilisi was ready for a Membership Action Plan, although it will be interesting to see how far he is willing to push it. He may be less willing to antagonize European leaders by insisting on this explosive issue than President Bush (or indeed Mr. McCain), especially if he has been cooperating closely with them over the financial crisis. 

    Thirdly, Nagorno-Karabakh. The clearest sign of a presumed change here could be Mr. Obama’s relationship with the huge Armenian diaspora in the United States : during his election campaign he welcomed their support and promised to find a resolution to the Karabakh conflict that is based upon “principles of democracy and self determination”. He has also expressed strong support for formally recognizing the so-called “Armenian genocide” of 1915, a notoriously controversial issue, and has stated that he will seek an end to the Turkish and Azerbaijani blockades of Armenia (imposed on Armenia by the latter after the Armenian forces occupied the territories of Azerbaijan in 1992-1993). Vice President-elect Joe Biden is also known for his strong support of Yerevan . However,it is now to be watched how far Obama as a president will be able to go to keep his promises in this regard. 

    On the ground, Turkey ’s recent moves to thaw relations with Armenia will be looked on favorably by the Obama White House, which must try and keep the momentum going. However, if Obama’s administration chooses to lean on Armenia , it could prove detrimental to the détente process currently taking place in the Caucasus ( Turkey has already warned Obama of breaking off the  rapprochement process with Armenia in case if the US recognizes the “Armenian genocide”) and grant Russia a perfect opportunity to gather disaffected players to itself. In particular, in case of obvious US support for Armenia, Baku could find the warm relationship it has fostered with the Bush Administration cooling somewhat and find that its interests are better served by Moscow. Russia has already started taking important steps in that direction making use of the “lame-duck situation” in Washington . By holding a trilateral meeting of presidents of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan last week in Moscow as a result of which a declaration on the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process (first time since the cease-fire agreement of 1994) was signed by the presidents, Russia, frequently accused of wishing the continuation of frozen conflicts in the region, has intended to send a signal of its “good will” in the Caucasus, thus aiming on the one hand to rectify its damaged image after its invasion of Georgia, and on the other hand to have an upper hand in case of an ultimate settlement of the conflict. It is noteworthy that the only international mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – the OSCE Minsk Group (including beyond Russia , US and France as well), paralyzed after the Georgia war, was totally excluded from the above-mentioned meeting. Russia ’s attempts to pose itself as a mediator being capable to produce “tangible results” (e.g. the above-said declaration) cannot but cause great suspicions and concerns in Washington . 

    If Moscow exploits the opportunity further and begins to push for a resolution which emphasizes territorial integrity above all others (as unlikely as this may be), and if President Obama keeps his above-mentioned promises, we could begin to see a serious alteration of the Baku-Washington relationship which could potentially introduce significant changes to the present geopolitical order in the region. So if the new administration wants to avoid heightened tensions, it must try to balance regional interests and avoid alienating key players as the Bush Administration has repeatedly done. President Obama must attempt to find a solution to the problem that satisfies Turkey , accommodates Azerbaijan and Armenia , and circumscribes Russia . 

    We should not expect a new era under Obama. The Russian bear is not about to abandon its suspicion of the American eagle just because of a new face, and the feeling is mutual. The Georgian conflict was a significant rupture in relations and has created a potential for the emergence of a new geopolitical situation in the region. Despite his pre-electoral calls for a Russia policy based on “cooperation instead of confrontation”, Obama will have to continue the US support for the pro-American government in Tbilisi , no matter how much Saakashvili might have bothered him. It is obvious that if Georgia is gone, it will not last much till the region will be gone as well. 

    In the Caucasus , as elsewhere, it looks as if President Obama will have to start lowering expectations.

     

    www.cria-online.org

  • Mountain megalomaniacs

    Mountain megalomaniacs

    Norman Stone

    Published 06 November 2008

    Between Russia and the Middle East, the Caucasus is one of the world’s most diverse regions – and as recent fighting in South Ossetia and Abkhazia showed, still boiling with ethnic tensions. Norman Stone reviews a history which makes sense of this complexity

    The surrender of the Circassian leader Sheikh Shamil to the tsarist forces in 1859

    The Ghost of Freedom: a History of the Caucasus

    Charles King

    OUP, 219pp, £17.99

    A Georgian professor came to my (Turkish) university a few years ago and said: “People who live in mountains are stupid.” You probably hear such things often enough in the Caucasus, but it is not the sort of remark that you expect professors to pass. However, there is maybe something in it, a point made by the crazy loyalism of the Jacobite Highlanders of the Forty-Five, or for that matter of the Navarrese Carlists: brave and romantic, certainly, with their own codes of honour, but not very bright.

    A French sociologist, André Siegfried, developed this theme a century ago, because he had noticed that voting patterns depended on altitude; in the valleys, people got on with normal lives, but, the further up you went, the less this was true. The diet was very poor, the economy was sheep-stealing or smuggling, resentment simmered against the valley settlers, and religion of a wild sort reigned. The Caucasus also fits Siegfried’s pattern, with the difference that, the further uphill you went, the more weird languages you hit on. In Charles King’s words, “the north-east harbours the Nakh languages . . . as well as a mixed bag of disparate languages that includes Avar, Dargin and Lezgin”.

    He has missed out the Tats, who are mountain Jews, and he has mercifully missed out a great deal else, because the whole region is a kaleidoscope, and the ancient history is very complicated, with an Iberia and an Albania in shadowy existence; the Ossetians, of whom the world recently heard so much, are apparently what is left of the Alans, one of the barbarian tribes that swept through the later Roman Empire (and ended up in North Africa).

    Charles King’s great virtue is that he is a very proficient simplifier and misser-out; he writes well, and can read the languages that matter (for some reason, quite a number of the important sources are in German; Germans were especially interested in the Caucasus, and in 1918 even had plans to shift U-boats overland to the Caspian). All the important themes are here, with some interesting additions.

    King concentrates on the modern history of the Caucasus, roughly from 1700, when Russia began to take over the overlordship from Persia and the Ottoman Empire. In 1801, she annexed much of Georgia. This was relatively easy, since it is a very divided country (and the language – so difficult that even Robert Conquest, writing his biography of Stalin, found it impossible – itself sub-divides). It was also Christian, the nobility on the whole glad to come to terms with the tsar, and it could easily be reached from the sea, whereas other parts of the Caucasus, given the very mountainous and forested terrain, were much more difficult. The various Muslim natives of the northern Caucasus were then generally known as “Circassians” (the present-day Chechens are related) and they put up an extraordinary resistance to Russian penetration.

    Cossacks came in, as the 19th century went ahead, and a line of forts was established; but a ferocious tribal-religious resistance grew up, under a legendary figure, Sheikh Shamil. Combining mystical-religious inspiration with an extraordinary astuteness as to guerrilla tactics, Shamil kept the Russians pinned down for a whole generation. (King’s bibliography is very solid and useful, but he might have mentioned a classic book about this, Sabres of Paradise, by Lesley Blanch, who went on to write The Wilder Shores of Love about the erotic Orient.)

    In the event, the Russians “solved” the problem of the Circassians by mass-deportation. About 1,250,000 of them were forced out, and King is very good at describing their fate, as a third of the deportees died of disease or starvation or massacre, and the rest scattered over the Near and Middle East. Settling in eastern Anatolia, they encountered the Armenians, and bitter conflict resulted. A generation later much the same fate occurred to the Armenians of eastern Turkey. King quite rightly makes the parallel.

    Shamil was at long last captured, but the Russians treated him well, and part of his family faded into the tsarist aristocracy. This is incidentally a dimension of matters that King could have explored: the relations of Russia and Islam. He has a good chapter about the image of the Caucasus in Russian literature (Lermontov and Tolstoy especially) but both Pushkin and Dostoyevsky were fascinated by Islam, and the Russians, whether tsarist or communist (and even nowadays) were quite adept at dealing with Muslims. The Tatars have turned into rather a plus: Nureyev and Baryshnikov, whose names mean “light” and “peace” in Turkish, being a case in point.

    In fact, as the 19th century went ahead, the Caucasus was opened up, and many of the Muslims became loyal subjects of the tsar. Tiflis, the Georgian capital (why must we use these wretched “Tbilisis” and “Vilniuses” for places so well marked on the historic map?), was the seat of a viceroyalty that stretched from Kars in eastern Anatolia to the Caspian, and the railways, or the military roads, snaked ahead. Oil was struck on the Caspian side, and Baku, the capital of today’s Azerbaijan, grew up as a boom town, much of the architecture rather distinguished in late- Victorian style. One of the great mansions has been spectacularly restored as a historical museum.

    To this day, the solid architecture of Kars, now in eastern Turkey, is impressive, and though the town went through a very bad period, when the Cold War was going on, it is doing much better now, as the oil pipeline to Baku pumps away, and the old railway links are restored. Even now, despite the gruesome climate, the inhabitants of Kars are notably sharper and better-educated than those of Trabzon or Erzurum, which remained under Ottoman rule. According to Orhan Pamuk’s novel on the town, Snow, its theatre was very good, but if you needed Islamic female costumes you had to send off to Erzurum, which was (and is: the calls to prayer are frequent and deafening) very provincial-pious. In its way, Kars shows in miniature that pre-1914 period which is the great might-have-been of Russian history: 1914 aborted a period of growing prosperity even, if you like, a bourgeois revolution. The revolution of 1917 finished all of that.

    There was a pathetic episode, as the three nations of Transcaucasia – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – established a shadowy independence, even though the peoples of each were (and to some extent still are) intermingled. Baku and Tiflis had large Armenian populations, and Yerevan, the territory of today’s Armenia, was roughly half Muslim, whether Azeri or Kurdish. “Ethnic cleansing” then went ahead, the Armenians especially becoming megalomaniac, and even, as a first act on independence at Christmas 1918, invading Georgia. To this day, much of the Armenian diaspora seems never to have forgiven the west for failing to support their cause: hence these strange and persistent demands for the tragedy to be recognised as genocide. Perhaps it was, but as King shows, Armenians were not the only victims – not by any means – and it is rather to the credit of the Circassians’ (and others’) descendants that they are not demanding similar recognition of genocide from Congress or the Assemblée Nationale or Cardiff City Council or the Edinburgh City Fathers etc.

    Sovietisation of the Caucasus then happened, and it was the communists’ turn to find out just how difficult the national question was going to be: eventually, it destroyed them. Communism had a very strong appeal to begin with when it came to the national question: who, looking at the Caucasus (as with Yugoslavia) would not be desperate for anything that would stop the rise of vicious tinpot nationalism? Many stout communists, beginning with Stalin himself, came from the Caucasus, and Stalin in the end had recourse to deportation (of the Chechens and many, many other peoples) as the only solution. That created the counter-hatreds that have made post-Soviet life so difficult. The Armenians repeated their fantasy of 1918 and invaded a neighbour – Azerbaijan – in pursuit of a fantasy. They victoriously set their standards afluttering over Karabakh, with much swelling of diaspora bosoms. The effort, and the isolation it brought them, caused nothing but economic trouble to what was already a poor, land-locked little place, and the original population, three million, is now, from emigration, below two: independence, in other words, having done more damage than ever the Turks did. The Georgians had an 18th-century ruler who described himself as “The Most High King, by the Will of Our Lord King of Kings of the Abkhaz, Kartvelians, Kakhetians and Armenians and Master of All the East and the West”: more megalomania with a contemporary ring, in other words. Charles King has written a very instructive and interesting book about it all.

    Norman Stone’s most recent book is “World War One: a Short History”, now available as a Penguin paperback (£7.99)

    Source: www.newstatesman.com, 06 November 2008

  • Georgia, Russia: Moscow’s Troop Checkmate

    Georgia, Russia: Moscow’s Troop Checkmate

    Stratfor.com

    Summary

    Russia has ratified treaties with the Georgian breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that will see 3,800 Russian troops stationed in the two territories. The decision puts the Georgian military in checkmate, and it sends a clear message to the West as Russia consolidates control of its periphery.

    Analysis

    The Russian Duma ratified treaties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia on Oct. 29 that provide for the stationing of 3,800 troops in both Georgian breakaway provinces. The deployment places Russian troops in key strategic positions, giving Moscow decisive control over the two regions and the ability to put Georgia at permanent risk.

    The troops will be stationed at Russian bases. In South Ossetia, they will be located in Tskhinvali and Java, and in Abkhazia they will be stationed in Gudauta (a former Russian base) and Ochamchira. These bases are situated on strategic supply lines that run from Russia to the heart of Georgian territory.

    From its position in South Ossetia, which juts halfway into the heart of Georgia, Russia will have rapid access to Georgia’s main transportation corridors and the strategic city of Gori. Russian proximity means Moscow can shut down the main road and rail routes through the country at will. The occupation of Gori and the transit corridor would isolate the Georgian capital of Tbilisi from ports on the Black Sea as well as from any meaningful transportation route to Turkey and Armenia, as Russia demonstrated briefly during the Russian-Georgian war. Gori also straddles Georgia’s three major pipelines, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa oil pipeline and the Shah Deniz natural gas pipeline. All three ship Azerbaijani energy resources to world markets via Georgia.

    Russian logistical links in South Ossetia are entirely reliant on the vulnerable two-lane Roki Tunnel, but from Abkhazia, the Russians have a direct line of transport on the railway along the Black Sea. From here, Russian troops are poised to again sever Georgian connections to the outside world, this time from its Black Sea ports and from Western-oriented Turkey.

    The Russian military is the undisputed power in the region. The Georgian military by contrast is small, weak and underprepared for substantial action. With a total of 7,600 Russian troops stationed on former Georgian territory (about 2,400 fewer than were used during the 2008 invasion), there is little the Georgian military can do to counter Russia. In short, Moscow is poised to permanently station a combined military force that is every bit as large as the active-duty Georgian ground forces, which number around 7,000 and are largely conscripted. Georgia’s small navy and air force (each numbering under 1,500) are supplemented by a comparably sized national guard and some 11,000 border guards and Interior Ministry troops. Although the U.S. military has actively trained the Georgian military over the past four years, Tbilisi is ill-trained and ill-equipped to stave off military aggression from even one of the 3,800-strong Russian contingents ­ much less move offe nsively against both of them.

    With this treaty, Russia effectively has finished positioning enough forces in key locations to crush the Georgian military should the need arise. These troops will suffice to deter or block Georgian maneuvers at a moment’s notice in the near term.

    But the decision to fully occupy South Ossetia is more than just a way to control Georgia. Russia has now made sure that no amount of Western financial aid or rhetorical support will be able to alter the military reality on the ground for Georgia. This is a well-crafted message, both to the West and to neighbors like Ukraine that are flirting with notions of aligning with the West, that Russia is not to be messed with ­ especially not on its periphery.

  • Saakashvili sacks Georgian PM, ambassador to Turkey to replace

    Saakashvili sacks Georgian PM, ambassador to Turkey to replace

    Georgia’s Saakashvili dismisses PM

    Mon 27 Oct 2008, 13:40 GMT

    By Margarita Antidze

    TBILISI (Reuters) – Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has dismissed reformist Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze, a senior government source said on Monday, under a government overhaul following war with Russia in August.

    The announcement will be made at 6.00 p.m. (2 p.m. British time), the source told Reuters, adding that Saakashvili would name Grigol Mgaloblishvili, Georgia’s 35-year-old ambassador to Turkey, as his choice for the post.

    Gurgenidze, a 37-year-old pro-Western technocrat and former banker, became prime minister of the former Soviet republic in November 2007 with the chief task of attracting foreign investment and keeping the country’s economic growth rates high.

    A five-day war in August, when Moscow sent troops and tanks into its southern neighbour to halt a Georgian offensive to retake breakaway South Ossetia, has hit investor confidence and reined in otherwise healthy growth forecasts.

    Georgia’s pro-Western president, who came to power in the 2003 “Rose Revolution,” is facing increasing criticism from opposition leaders. They accuse Saakashvili of walking into a war Georgia could not possibly win.

    Some opposition factions have announced a protest for November 7, the first anniversary of a police crackdown against opposition demonstrators.

    (Reporting by Margarita Antidze; Writing by Matt Robinson; Editing by Dominic Evans)

    Source: www.reuters.com, 27 Oct 2008