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Category: Azerbaijan

  • Energy at Root of Karabakh Accord

    Energy at Root of Karabakh Accord

    By Nikolaus von Twickel / Staff Writer

    The presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan have signed a declaration on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict at a meeting with President Dmitry Medvedev in a sign of the Kremlin’s growing role and the importance of energy politics in the South Caucasus.

    Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan and Azeri President Ilham Aliyev signed the largely symbolic document at Medvedev’s Maiendorf residence, just outside Moscow on Saturday.

    Armenia has traditionally been a staunch ally of Russia, while energy-rich Azerbaijan has maintained friendly ties with Georgia, but Moscow has been looking for greater cooperation with Azerbaijan on energy issues.

    The five-point document, published on the Kremlin’s web site, says both countries will step up efforts to find a peaceful solution over Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnic Armenian enclave inside Azerbaijan that broke away after a bloody conflict in the early 1990s that killed more than 30,000 and displaced more than 1 million.

    The declaration is the first such document signed by the heads of the two states since Russia mediated a cease-fire agreement in 1994.

    While it stresses the need for a political settlement based on international law, the document does not contain any significant commitments, such as to forego the use of force, nor does it mention the conflicting issues at the heart of the conflict, territorial integrity and national self-determination.

    The outcome of the meeting was not as significant as some may have hoped.

    “This was not much different than dozens of meetings before,” Svante Cornell, research director at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, a joint U.S.-Swedish think tank, said Tuesday by telephone from Tbilisi, Georgia. “All we have seen is basically two leaders committing themselves to solving the conflict.”

    Alexei Malashenko, an analyst with the Moscow Carnegie Center, said the declaration was largely ceremonial.

    “The fact that Medvedev [presided over the talks) just means that both sides accept Russia as mediator,” Malashenko said Tuesday. “Russia needed an urgent rehabilitation as peacekeeper in the region.”

    Moscow’s relations with the West worsened dramatically after it sent soldiers and tanks deep into Georgia to repel a Georgian military attack to reclaim its breakaway region of South Ossetia in August.

    The declaration also says negotiations should continue within the framework of the so-called Minsk Group, a 12-member body headed jointly by Russia, France and the United States, and overseen by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

    U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza and French Ambassador Bernard Fassier were at Maiendorf, an OSCE spokesman said by telephone from Vienna.

    Bryza, the senior U.S. diplomat overseeing the South Caucasus region, praised the result.

    “My country fully supports this document. The declaration shows that both presidents can work seriously towards solving this conflict,” he said, Interfax reported Monday.

    Cornell said the declaration was a show of force by the Kremlin capitalizing on the weakness of the West, as the Georgian war in August, the global financial crisis and the leadership change in the United States would all work to cripple Western influence in the region.

    “There is a new geopolitical situation now,” he said.

    Russia, he said, was offering a solution that would mean a loss of independence for Azerbaijan, possibly through the deployment of a Moscow-sponsored peacekeeping force on its territory.

    Cornell said Moscow was probably eyeing a “common state” solution, something that had been on the negotiating table back in the 1990s.

    This proposal, which had been rejected by Baku, focuses on bringing Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh together in a confederation.

    Carnegie’s Malashenko said that while its influence in the region has grown, Russia would not go it alone.

    “To solve this conflict, you need more than one mediator; you need a group of mediators,” he said. “Moscow won’t act outside the format of the Minsk Group.”

    Malashenko also denied that the talks might herald a weakening of Moscow’s traditional support for Armenia.

    “I cannot imagine that one country will give one-sided support to one party, because this is impossible,” he said.

    Both Azerbaijan and Armenia depend on trade routes through Georgia.

    Moscow has recently been courting Azerbaijan, which wants to sell more gas to Russia.

    Medvedev signed a cooperation agreement with Aliyev in Baku in July, and in Moscow this September both leaders discussed direct talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.

    Europe has also been making overtures to Azerbaijan as a vital supplier to a proposed new gas pipeline, which would reduce Western dependence on Russian energy.

    The Nabucco pipeline project has been backed both by the European Union and the United States.

    EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs will travel to Turkey and Azerbaijan this Wednesday to show Europe’s commitment to the project, The Associated Press reported.

    Moscow has worried the EU by negotiating with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to commit to sending their Caspian Sea gas through Russia.

    It is also pushing South Stream, a rival pipeline project by state-controlled Gazprom, which is slated to cost some $13 billion.

  • EU Fights For Nabucco’s Future

    EU Fights For Nabucco’s Future

    Andris Piebalgs heads to Istanbul and Baku to make his case.

    November 05, 2008
    By Ahto Lobjakas

     

    BRUSSELS — The fate of the Nabucco pipeline project appears to be hanging by a thread. No EU official would publicly admit this, but the signs tell their own story.

    First, as a senior EU official told reporters in Brussels on November 4 on condition of anonymity, transit talks with Turkey have stalled.

    Second, Azerbaijan is dithering between competing Russian and EU bids for its gas exports, which are crucial to bringing Nabucco on line in 2012 as planned.

    Third, in the long term, Azerbaijani gas alone will not be sufficient. The EU official said that “other countries in the region” must supply most of the 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas Nabucco is expected to carry by 2020.

    But Iran, with the world’s second-largest reserves, remains off-limits as long as it continues to enrich uranium. And Turkmenistan, with its enormous export potential, has yet to decide whether to invest in a trans-Caspian pipeline linking it to Azerbaijan — and Nabucco.

    The common thread for all these countries, and the EU as the ultimate beneficiary of the 3,300-kilometer-long pipeline, is the question of intent and commitment.

    EU Makes Its Case

    On November 5-7, EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs will visit Turkey and Azerbaijan to demonstrate the bloc’s continued commitment to Nabucco.

    “The first objective of this trip is to show the political commitment of the European Commission to the Nabucco project and to reaffirm once more that we are convinced that it is going to be online according to the planned timetable,” says Piebalgs’ spokesman, Ferran Tarradellas.

    The Russian-Georgian conflict sent shock waves through the region and among potential investors. But official Brussels remains steadfast in the belief that Nabucco is safe from Moscow’s interference. “Russia would jeopardize its reputation as a reliable supplier” to the EU if it acted in any way to damage Nabucco, said one official.

    However, none of Nabucco’s essential building blocks is currently in place. Turkey continues to hold out for a better transit deal while Azerbaijan has yet to formally commit its gas exports to the project.

    Tarradellas says that while Piebalgs’ visit is a sign that the EU is upping the ante in its talks with the two countries. “We’re going to discuss also the remaining differences with the Turks and the question of the transit of the gas through Turkey,” he says, “and then we’re going to be visiting Azerbaijan, which will be probably be the first supplier of gas for the Nabucco pipeline.”

    The senior EU official who spoke on condition of anonymity said that, apart from charging a transit fee, Turkey wants to divert 15 percent of Nabucco’s gas for cheap domestic use. As Azerbaijan is insisting on selling its gas at European market rates minus transit costs, the Nabucco consortium and its subsidiaries in Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria would be left to pick up the tab.

    Piebalgs is keen to break the deadlock before the end of the year. In Turkey this week he will meet with the country’s president, prime minister, foreign minister, and economy minister.

    Where Will Gas Come From?

    Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has yet to decide to whom to sell the estimated 7-9 bcm of gas it is able to export annually in the early years of Nabucco’s operations. The senior Brussels official said EU companies are pitted against Russian competitors. There are fears in the EU that Russian political pressure could clinch the deal for Russian bidders. A decision is expected sometime in 2009.

    EU officials say that the fact that Piebalgs has secured a meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev is a sign of “interest” on the part of Baku in doing business with the EU.

    But Azerbaijan’s gas reserves, even if supplemented by the planned expansion of the Shah Deniz field, will not be sufficient to keep Nabucco in business.

    And this is where Nabucco currently hits a wall. Iran will remain untouchable  in trade terms as long as it refuses to cease uranium enrichment. Like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan can be swayed by Moscow’s cash — or outright pressure. And even if Turkmenistan’s recently confirmed reserves of 14 trillion bcm dwarf Russia’s own transit capacity, Moscow will be seeking to deny the EU a piece of the pie.

    Piebalgs is hoping to soon visit Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, his aides say.

    This leaves Iraq and Egypt as the only other viable regional suppliers for Nabucco — with one extremely unstable and the other rather remote.

    Meanwhile, EU officials reject suggestions Nabucco could eventually carry Russian gas diverted south. This, they say, would defeat the purpose of Nabucco — which is to diversify supplies. (Competing Russian projects, such as South Stream, are not seen as a problem, however. The EU’s growing demand for gas will make sure it has a market and the diversification of transport routes is a good in itself).

    If the degree of insecurity associated with the 8 billion-euro ($10.3 billion) project coupled with the global financial crisis is making potential investors nervous, officials in Brussels remain serene. When pressed, they do point out, however, that should private investors balk, public lenders such as the European Investment Bank and the World Bank stand ready to step in.

  • MOSCOW SUMMIT ON KARABAKH FALLS SHORT OF KREMLIN’S GOALS

    MOSCOW SUMMIT ON KARABAKH FALLS SHORT OF KREMLIN’S GOALS

    By Vladimir Socor

    Tuesday, November 4, 2008

     

    Presidents Dmitry Medvedev of Russia, Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, and Serge Sarkisian of Armenia met on November 2 near Moscow to discuss the current state of negotiations on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. With those negotiations moving slowly forward at several levels and on their own momentum, Medvedev initiated this summit hoping to lift Russia into the driver’s seat of the process.

    The Kremlin hoped to capitalize on the political effects of its recent invasion of Georgia and seizure of that country’s territories through military occupation and diplomatic “recognition.” The Georgia crisis served to demonstrate that Russia can and does act decisively, brutally, and with impunity in the South Caucasus, while the United States was drifting toward strategic disengagement and the European Union failed to fill the vacuum. The moment seemed ripe for Russia to display “regional leadership” by taking the initiative in negotiations to settle the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

    Moscow also hoped to display a capacity for conflict resolution through diplomacy, not just through force. One major goal of this exercise in diplomacy, however, is to deploy Russian troops in this conflict theater as “peacekeepers” or “guarantors” at some stage of the settlement.

    The summit’s only apparent result, however, was a joint declaration that fell clearly short of Moscow’s goals (www.kremlin.ru, Arminfo, www.day.az, November 3, 4). The Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents first held a two-hour, face-to-face session and were then joined by Medvedev for finalizing the declaration. Signed by the three presidents in front of TV cameras, then read out to the media by Medvedev, the five-point declaration does not commit the signatory parties to any specific approaches or actions within the continuing negotiating process. If the Kremlin wished to show “forward movement” after hosting this summit, its hopes were in vain.

    The declaration’s preamble underscores the continuity of direct dialogue between the two countries with the mediation of the three OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs (Russia, the United States, and France).

    Point 1 envisages a “political settlement of the conflict based on the principles and norms of international law.” This, however, neither resolves nor circumvents the dilemma between territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of internationally recognized borders on one hand and national self-determination on the other hand. This dilemma has been created and maintained artificially on the Armenian side as a means to freeze the post-1994 situation, with Azerbaijani territories occupied and the Azeri population forced out.

    Point 2 reaffirms support for the ongoing and future mediation by the OSCE Minsk Group’s co-chairs, “taking into consideration their meeting with the parties on November 29, 2007.” The reference is to the three co-chairs’ joint proposals presented during the OSCE’s 2007 year-end ministerial conference in Madrid. The Armenian side interprets that document as elevating the national self-determination principle to the same level as territorial integrity and inviolability of borders. Yerevan therefore prefers to cite “the Madrid principles” as a point of departure for further negotiations. Azerbaijan, however, argues for the primacy of the territorial integrity principle in OSCE and other international documents of normative character. The Moscow declaration downgrades the significance of Madrid to a mere “meeting,” not principles and not even a document for further reference. This undoubtedly comes as a disappointment for Yerevan.

    Point 3 stipulates that the “peaceful resolution should be accompanied by legally binding international guarantees in all aspects and stages of settlement.” Russia and Armenia insist on such guarantees: Yerevan refers to the security of the Armenian population of Upper Karabakh while Moscow needs an excuse for deploying Russian “peacekeeping” or “guarantor” troops. For its part, Azerbaijan does not oppose international guarantees but does insist that any such guarantees be in line with Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.

    Point 4 records Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s intention to continue their efforts for a political settlement of the conflict, at the level of the presidents and ministries of foreign affairs, and through cooperation with the OSCE Minsk Group’s co-chairs.

    Point 5 “emphasize[s] the importance of creating conditions that will contribute to the consolidation of trust, within the framework of efforts aimed at settling the conflict.” However vague, this point clearly does not imply that Azerbaijan ought to agree to Armenia’s inclusion in regional energy and transport projects in order to facilitate the resolution of the conflict.

    During the last few years, the European Union and even the United States have attempted to persuade Azerbaijan to include Armenia in regional projects before the Armenian forces withdraw from occupied territories, presumably in order to advance efforts for peace. Ideologically, this argument is a late legacy of the classical liberal belief that trade in and of itself promotes peace (“pipelines for peace” is a latter-day incarnation of that belief). On a more mundane level, that argument reflects the influence of political lobbies in Brussels and Washington, which has resulted in withholding funds from projects of Western interest in Western-oriented Azerbaijan. For its part, Azerbaijan is open to such cooperation with Armenia after the Armenian forces vacate the occupied territories and the refugees are free to return home.

  • Karabakh Peace Agreement Impossible Without U.S. Involvement

    Karabakh Peace Agreement Impossible Without U.S. Involvement

    By Harry Tamrazian

     

    Meeting in Moscow on November 2, the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia signed a document pledging their continued commitment to resolving the Karabakh conflict peacefully. It was the first time that officials from Armenia and Azerbaijan had signed such a joint document since Russia mediated a cease-fire agreement in 1994, putting an end to one of the deadliest wars in the former USSR.

    The so-called Moscow Declaration of Intent on Nagorno-Karabakh was an important diplomatic event in the 15-year long negotiating process. But it was much more important for Moscow, which thus reminded everyone that it holds the key to a solution to this conflict. The joint declaration was co-signed only by Russia, despite the fact that other two Minsk Group co-chairs, the United States and France, were also present.

    A closer look at the declaration leaves no doubt that much of what was discussed during the closed-door talks was not reflected on paper. The declaration is just another expression of intent by the two leaders that they are serious about seeking a peaceful solution and that the military option can no longer be considered an alternative to peaceful diplomacy.

    In short, both sides agreed on paper to tone down harsh military rhetoric and expedite the peace process. However, taking the text at face value would be overly optimistic.

    Questions Arise

    Every time Russia steps up its mediation efforts, questions arise about its motives for doing so. The simple answer in this case would probably be that it wants at least to preserve the level of influence that it had in Armenia, and more importantly in Azerbaijan, which has long been suspicious about its real intentions in the region.

    Now that Georgia is out of the Russian sphere of influence, at least for the foreseeable future, Moscow will do all in its power to keep the two remaining South Caucasus countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan, under its control.

    The only way to do that is to act as an honest broker to bring about a settlement of the frozen, and potentially deadly, Karabakh conflict. Moscow’s mediation could also be seen as an attempt to restore its credibility in the region following the war with Georgia, which further eroded its relations with the United States.

    Depending on who wins the U.S. presidential election, Moscow will try to showcase its good behavior to the new leadership in Washington. There is one important line in the joint declaration, which shows that Moscow will not mediate the potential peace deal alone, bypassing its American and French partners in the OSCE Minsk Group. The declaration clearly states that the peace process will proceed within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group based on the “Madrid Principles” endorsed by the OSCE Ministerial Council, which envisage the return of occupied Azerbaijani territories and the possibility of holding a referendum on the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

    High Expectations

    It is hard to imagine that a Karabakh peace deal could be achieved without the United States, one of the major players in the OSCE Minsk Group. Azerbaijan and Armenia will not easily bow to Moscow’s pressure without the approval of the new administration in Washington. It would therefore be premature to expect a breakthrough in the talks before January 2009, when the next U.S. president is sworn in.

    Armenians have high expectations for Democratic Senator Barack Obama, hoping that, if he is elected president, he will support their cause.

    “I will promote Armenian security by seeking an end to the Turkish and Azerbaijani blockades, and by working for a lasting and durable settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that is agreeable to all parties,” Obama said in one of his campaign promises to Armenian-Americans.

    The Armenian government will seek help from the United States if it is pressured to give up Azerbaijani territories without obtaining guarantees that the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians will be able to hold a referendum on their future status. 

    Some experts in Azerbaijan and Armenia believe that Russia might try to secure a substantial military presence in the conflict zone as part of the future peacekeeping force that is to be deployed once a peace agreement is signed. Azerbaijan will most probably seek support from the United States in ensuring that Russian troops do not return to Azerbaijan.

    The Georgian experience has demonstrated that once they come, they are unlikely to leave peacefully.

    Haryy Tamrazian is director of RFE/RL’s Armenian Service. The views expressed in this commentary are the author’s own, and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL.

  • Tehran — with Moscow’s Backing — Seeks to Expand its Role in the Caucasus

    Tehran — with Moscow’s Backing — Seeks to Expand its Role in the Caucasus

    Paul Goble

    Vienna, November 3 – The big winner at the summit among the presidents of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan yesterday may be a country was not there: Iran, whose return to an active role in the Caucasus, something the US opposes and the Minsk Group was organized to prevent, now appears to enjoy the active support of both Moscow and Yerevan.
    Yesterday, following their meeting in Moscow, Presidents Dmitry Medvedev, Serzh Sarksyan, and Ilham Aliyev signed a joint declaration on their commitment to continuing to pursue “a peaceful regulation” of the Karabakh conflict by means of talks, including within the framework of the Minsk Group (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1232473.html).
    While Russian commentators celebrated this document not only as a major contribution to the peace in the Caucasus and a confirmation of Russia’s newly expanded role there, in fact, neither that declaration nor the meetings of the foreign ministers on Friday or their joint session with the Minsk Group on Saturday broke much if any new ground.
    But a statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on Friday suggests that the diplomatic landscape in the Caucasus may be changing quickly, albeit in ways that may not lead to any resolution of the conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan or between Georgia and the Russian Federation.
    Lavrov said that Iran had expressed an interest in creating a security zone in the Caucasus, a step that would appear to challenge both the Minsk Group which was created to exclude Iran from having a role in the region and Turkey which has proposed creating a Platform of Security and Stability in the Caucasus (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1232455.html).
    The Russian foreign minister said that he had spoken with Iranian officials about their desire to be included “in discussions” about the Caucasus, a move that appears to be the product of both Moscow’s own desire to promote a north-south axis through the Caucasus and two developments earlier this fall.
    On the one hand, Yerevan indicated that it was not prepared to talk about Turkey’s proposal for security unless Iran was involved (kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1229327.html). And on the other, Tehran offered itself as an intermediary for possible talks between Moscow and Tbilisi (kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1089720.html).
    The Russian foreign minister said that Moscow has still not received any concrete proposals from Tehran in this regard, but earlier last week, the Iranian news agency IRNA quoted an Iranian deputy foreign minister to the effect that Tehran is currently “completing” work on them.
    It is, of course, entirely possible that Iran’s proposals, even if they do find support in Moscow and Yerevan, will go no further than Turkey’s have in resolving some of the neuralgic disputes of the South Caucasus. But just like the Moscow meeting itself, Iran’s new involvement represents a kind of tectonic shift there.
    Since the end of the Soviet Union, the United States has taken the lead in trying to keep Iran from having any role in the region. That is of course why Washington promoted the creation of the Minsk Group, a product of the only international organization in which all the regional players were members except Iran.
    But that group has not succeeded in squaring the circle on Karabakh, a dispute in which the positions of the two sides are not really any closer than they were a decade or more ago. And consequently, those immediately involved have become increasingly frustrated and are willing to explore different venues and negotiating partners.
    Such frustrations have given an opening to Iran. And as Lavrov’s remarks in Moscow on Friday indicate, Tehran is ready and willing to get involved, a development that the Russian government gives every indication of welcoming whatever its Minsk Group and American “partners” may think.

  • No Karabakh Deal Announced After Moscow Summit

    No Karabakh Deal Announced After Moscow Summit

     

     

     

     

     

    By Aza Babayan in Moscow and Tigran Avetisian

    The presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan pledged to step up the prolonged search for a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict but did not announce any concrete agreements after weekend talks hosted by their Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev.

    Serzh Sarkisian and Ilham Aliev met in a tête-à-tête format and were later joined by Medvedev at the Meiendorf Castle outside Moscow on Sunday amid fresh international hopes for a breakthrough in Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks mediated by Russia, the United States and France

    “The presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed to continue work, including during further contacts on the highest level, on agreeing a political resolution of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and ordered their foreign ministers to intensify further steps in the negotiating process in coordination with the co-chairs of the OSCE’s Minsk Group,” the three leaders said in a joint declaration read out by Medvedev.

    The declaration stressed the importance of continued efforts by the group’s American, French and Russian co-chairs to work out the basic principles of a Karabakh settlement acceptable to the conflicting parties. But it only vaguely alluded to a framework peace accord that was formally put forward by the co-chairs in November 2007.

    Armenia and Azerbaijani are understood to have agreed to most of the key points of the proposed settlement. The mediators hoped before the Moscow talks that the two sides will overcome their remaining differences before the end of this year.

    The mediating troika, including U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza, held separate talks with Aliev and Sarkisian at Meiendorf later on Sunday. No details of those talks were made public and the mediators issued no joint statements afterwards.

    Speaking to RFE/RL just before those talks, Yuri Merzlyakov, the Minsk Group’s Russian co-chair, described the trilateral declaration as a “historic” document that will speed up the peace process. He noted that Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders have jointly put pen to paper for the first time since the signing in May 1994 of a Russian-mediated truce that stopped the war in Karabakh.

    The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry appeared to downplay the document’s significance, though. “One should not look for anything new in the signing of the document,” a ministry spokesman, Khazar Ibrahim, told journalists in Baku on Monday, according to the Trend news agency. “Negotiations are still going on and their significance is reflected by the declaration. The groundwork needs to be laid for the transition to the next phase of the negotiations.”

    A senior official in Yerevan seemed in a more buoyant mood. Eduard Sharmazanov, a spokesman for the governing Republican Party of Armenia, pointed to the declaration’s emphasis on a “political settlement” of the Karabakh conflict. “This runs counter to bellicose statements that were made by Azerbaijani officials,” he told RFE/RL.

    Sharmazanov also pointed out that the declaration makes clear that the Minsk Group will remain the main mediating body in Karabakh talks. He said this disproved opposition allegations that Sarkisian is ready to let Armenia’s arch-rival Turkey take on a mediating role in the peace process.

    Armenia’s main opposition alliance, meanwhile, declined to comment on the Moscow talks on Monday. Levon Zurabian, a senior member of the Armenian National Congress, told RFE/RL that the top leader of the alliance, Levon Ter-Petrosian, will issue a special statement on Tuesday.