Category: Azerbaijan

  • Turkish Minister Due In Yerevan

    Turkish Minister Due In Yerevan

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    Turkey — Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, 19Apr2008

    15.04.2009
    Ruben Meloyan

    Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan was expected to arrive in Yerevan to participate in Thursday’s high-level meeting of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organization and possibly hold fresh fence-mending talks with his Armenian counterpart.

    The visit was still not officially confirmed by the Armenian and Turkish governments as of Wednesday evening. “We don’t have any information about that so far,” a spokeswoman for the Turkish Foreign Ministry told RFE/RL from Ankara.

    Armenian officials seemed confident that Babacan will make what would be his second trip to Armenia in eight months. “The likelihood of his arrival is high,” a diplomatic source in Yerevan told RFE/RL.

    Babacan and Armenia’s Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandian held a group meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama in Istanbul on April 7. Reports in Turkish and Western media had said that they might announce an agreement on a gradual normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations on the sidelines of the BSEC ministerial meeting in Yerevan.

    However, Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has poured cold water on the speculation, repeatedly stating this month that Ankara will not establish diplomatic relations with Yerevan and reopen the Turkish-Armenian border before a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh. Erdogan’s statements came amid an uproar in Azerbaijan over the possible lifting of the 16-year Turkish economic blockade of Armenia.

    That a breakthrough in Turkish-Armenian relations is not on the cards was reportedly confirmed by Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze late Tuesday. “The opening of the Turkish-Armenian border is not expected,” the Azerbaijani APA news agency quoted Vashadze as saying after talks with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Washington.

    The BSEC meeting in Yerevan is also due to be attended by Azerbaijan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Mamedguliev. Azerbaijan will assume the organization’s rotating presidency from Armenia at the meeting.

    https://www.azatutyun.am/a/1609211.html

  • War, Oil and Gas Pipelines: Turkey is Washington’s Geopolitical Pivot

    War, Oil and Gas Pipelines: Turkey is Washington’s Geopolitical Pivot

     by F. William Engdahl

     

     

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    Global Research, April 14, 2009

      

    The recent visit of US President Obama to Turkey was far more significant than the President’s speech would suggest. For Washington Turkey today has become a geopolitical “pivot state” which is in the position to tilt the Eurasian power equation towards Washington or significantly away from it depending on how Turkey develops its ties with Moscow and its role regarding key energy pipelines. 

     

    If Ankara decides to collaborate more closely with Russia, Georgia’s position is precarious and Azerbaijan’s natural gas pipeline route to Europe, the so-called Nabucco Pipeline, is blocked. If it cooperates with the United States and manages to reach a stable treaty with Armenia under US auspices, the Russian position in the Caucasus is weakened and an alternative route for natural gas to Europe opens up, decreasing Russian leverage against Europe.

    For Washington the key to bringing Germany into closer cooperation with the US is to weaken German dependence on Russian energy flows. Twice in the past three winters Washington has covertly incited its hand-picked President in Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko to arrange an arbitrary cut off of Russian gas flows to Germany and other EU destinations. The only purpose of the actions was to convince EU governments that Russia was not a reliable energy partner. Now, with the Obama visit to Ankara, Washington is attempting to win Turkish support for its troubled Nabucco alternative gas pipeline through Turkey from Azerbaijan which would theoretically at least lessen EU dependence on Russian gas.

    The Turkish-EU problem

    However willing Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan might be to accommodate Obama, the question of Turkish relations with the EU is inextricably linked with the troublesome issue of Turkish membership to the EU, a move vehemently opposed by France and also less openly by Germany.

    Turkey is one of the only routes energy from new sources can cross to Europe from the Middle East, Central Asia or the Caucasus. If Turkey — which has considerable influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Ukraine, the Middle East and the Balkans — is prepared to ally with the United States, Russia is on the defensive and German ties to Russia weaken considerably. If Turkey decides to cooperate with Russia instead, Russia retains the initiative and Germany is dependent  on Russian energy. Since it became clear in Moscow that US strategy was to extend NATO to Russia’s front door via Ukraine and Georgia, Russia has moved to use its economic “carrot” its vast natural gas resources, to at the very least neutralize Western Europe, especially Germany, towards Russia. It is notable in that regard that the man chosen as Russia’s President in December 1999 had spent a significant part of his KGB career in Germany.   

    Turkey and the US Game

    It is becoming clear that Obama and Washington are playing a deeper game. A few weeks before the meetings, when it had become obvious that the Europeans were not going to bend on the issues such as troops for Afghanistan or more economic stimulus that concerned the United States, Obama scheduled the trip to Turkey.


    During the recent EU meetings in Prague Obama actively backed Turkey’s application for EU membership knowing well that that put especially France and Germany in a difficult position as EU membership would allow free migration which many EU countries fear. Obama deliberately confronted EU states with this knowing he was playing with geopolitical fire, especially as the US is no member of the EU. It was a deliberate and cheap way to score points with the Erdogan government of Turkey.

     
    During the NATO meeting, a key item on the agenda was the selection of a new alliance secretary-general. The favorite was former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Turkey opposed him because of his defense of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed published in a Danish magazine. NATO operates on consensus, so any one member can block Rasmussen. The Turks backed off the veto, and in return won two key positions in NATO, including that of deputy secretary-general.

     

    Turkey

    thereby boosted its standing in NATO, got Obama to vigorously defend the Turkish application for membership in the European Union, which of course the United States does not belong to. Obama then went to Turkey for a key international meeting that will allow him to further position the United States in relation to Islam.

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    Obama has a Grand Strategy to use Turkey to isolate Russia via Nabucco pipelines through Georgia and Armenia to the EU

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    The Obama Erdogan talks were perhaps the most strategic of the recent Obama tour

    During US-Russian talks there had been no fundamental shift by Obama from the earlier position of the Bush Administration. Russia rejects Washington’s idea of pressuring IUran on their nuclear program in return for a bargain of an undefined nature with Washington over US planned missile and radar bases in Poland and the Czech Republic. The US claimed it need not rely on Russia to bring military and other supplies into Afghanistan, claiming it had reached agreement with Ukraine to transship mililtary supplies, a move designed by Washington to increase friction between Moscow and Kiew. Moreover, the NATO communique did not abandon the idea of Ukraine and Georgia being admitted to NATO. The key geopolitical prize for Washington remains Moscow but clearly Turkey is being wooed by Obama to play a role in that game.

     
    Germany will clearly not join Obama in blocking Russia. Not only does Germany depend on Russia for energy supplies. She has no desire to confront a Russia that Berlin sees as no real immediate threat to Germany. For Berlin, at least now, they are not going to address the Russian question.

    At the same time, an extremely important event between Turkey and Armenia is shaping up. Armenians had long held Turkey responsible for the mass murder of Armenians during and after World War I, a charge the Turks have denied. The US Congress is considering a provocative resolution condeming “Turkish genocide” agianst Armenians. Turkey is highly sensitive to these charges, and Congressional passage of such a resolution would have meant a Turkish break in diplomatic relations with Washington. Now since the Obama visit Ankara has begun to discuss an agreement with Armenia including diplomatic relations which would eliminate the impact of any potential US Congress resolution.

     

    A Turkish opening to Armenia would alter the balance of power in the entire region. Since the August 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict the Caucasus, a strategically vital area to Moscow has been unstable. Russian troops remain in South Ossetia. Russia also has troops in Armenia meaning Russia has Georgia surrounded.

     

    Turkey is the key link in this complex game of geopolitical balance of power between Washington and Moscow. If Turkey decides to collaborate with Russia Georgia’s position becomes very insecure and Azerbaijan’s possible pipeline route to Europe is blocked. If Turkey decides to cooperate with Washington and at the same time reaches a stable agreement with Armenia under US guidance, Russia’s entire position in the Caucasus is weakened and an alternative route for natural gas to Europe becomes available, reducing Russian leverage against Western Europe.

     
    Therefore, having sat through fruitless meetings with the Europeans, Obama chose not to cause a pointless confrontation with a Europe that is out of options. Instead, Obama completed his trip by going to Turkey to discuss what the treaty with Armenia means and to try to convince the Turks to play for high stakes by challenging Russia in the Caucasus, rather than playing Russia’s junior partner.

     

    The most important Obama speech in his European tour came after Turkey won key posts in the NATO political structure with US backing. In his speech Obama sided with Turkey against the EU and in effect showed Turkey Washington was behind her. Obama’s speech addressed Turkey as an emerging regional power, which was well received in Ankara. The sweet words will cost Turkey dearly if it acts on them.

     

    Moscow is not sitting passively by as Washington woos Turkey. Turkish President Abdullah Gul paid a four-day visit to the Russian Federation this February, where he met with President Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister Putin, and also traveled to Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, where he discussed joint investments. Gul was accompanied by his minister for foreign trade and minister of energy, as well as a large delegation of Turkish businessmen. The stakes in this complex three-way Great Game for domination of Eurasia have been raised significantly following the Obama trip to Ankara. Turkey imports 65 percent of its natural gas and 25 percent of its oil from Russia. Therefore, Turkey is also developing a growing dependency on Russian energy resources, including coal.

     

    On March 27, 2009, a memorandum was signed between the Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR and Russia’s Gazprom. The memorandum includes a statement of deliveries, beginning in January 2010, of Azerbaijani natural gas to Russia.

     

    Gazprom was particularly interested in signing such an agreement with Azerbaijan, not the least because Azerbaijan is the only state outside Iran or Turkmenistan, both of which are problematic, that could supply gas to the planned EU Nabucco pipeline, for transporting natural gas from Azerbaijan and the Central Asia states through Turkey to south-eastern Europe. In reality, gas may come only from Azerbaijan. Russia has proposed an alternative to Nabucco project, South Stream, also in need of Azerbaijani gas, so in effect Russia weakens the chances of realization of Nabucco. Obama strategy is clearly not less confrontational with Russia. It is merely playing with a slightly different deck of cards than did Cheney and Bush.

     

     

     

     

    F. William Engdahl is a frequent contributor to Global Research.

    https://www.globalresearch.ca/war-oil-and-gas-pipelines-turkey-is-washington-s-geopolitical-pivot/13171

    The Russian Dimension

  • Novruz Mammadov on opening of borders

    Novruz Mammadov on opening of borders

    Baku. Lachin Sultanova – APA. “There is principally no problem in holding of negotiations for the opening of borders between Turkey and Armenia.

    We expressed our position. I think turkey also understands our position. These processes concern us because it is going on in the South Caucasus”, Chief of the International Relations Department of the President’s Office Novruz Mammadov exclusively told APA.

    Mammadov noted that it would be better if the process was carried out by other means. “It would be within the interests of both Turkey and Azerbaijan and would assist the establishing of peace, stability and cooperation in the South Caucasus. The last statements of Turkish authorities showed that they also understand the issue and are taking the Azerbaijan’s position into consideration. They are stating, and we are also considering that Turkey and Armenia have to establish relationship. We are not against the opening of borders, but we demand the issue to be solved more correctly, within the conditions postulated by the Turkish authorities in the early days of our independence. These conditions were made by Turgut Ozal, Suleyman Demirel, Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the Turkey’s present leadership. The issue must be solved within these conditions (Armenia must leave its territorial and “genocide” claims against Turkey and must withdraw its forces from the occupied Azerbaijani lands- editor’s comment). The question is about that”.

    The department chief said no one could damage the friendship, brotherhood and strategic partnership relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
    “These peoples are brothers, fraternal states. The relations between our countries were formed for centuries,” he said.
    Asked whether the issue would be discussed during President Ilham Aliyev’s visit to Moscow on April 16, Novruz Mammadov said as it was a working visit, it was impossible to express concrete opinion.
    “Azerbaijan and Russia will exchange views on the issues of mutual interest, prospects of bilateral cooperation,” he said.

    Novruz Mammadov said Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev had not made up his mind yet to accept the offer of OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs to meet with Armenian president Serzh Sarkisian in Prague.

  • The Turkish-Armenian Thaw and Azerbaijan

    The Turkish-Armenian Thaw and Azerbaijan

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    Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has criticized the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement

    April 14, 2009
    By Abbas Djavadi

    U.S. President Barack Obama’s recent visit was a big boost for Turkey. But a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement was in the works even before Obama was elected president.

    Now Baku is upset that Ankara and Yerevan are about to formalize a deal sidelining Azerbaijanis’ main concern: restoring sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding regions of Azerbaijan that have been occupied by Armenian forces since early the 1990s. Are the days when both Turks and Azeris used to say they were “one nation with two state” gone for ever?

    Ankara and Yerevan intensified their negotiations in August 2007 when their diplomats started to regularly meet in Geneva to discuss the details of establishing “good-neighborly” relations. Once the “technical preparation” was almost complete, President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Yerevan in September last year to attend a Turkish-Armenian soccer match, and the meeting between Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian and Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan in January 2009 on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos signaled the political will of both sides to proceed.

    Diplomats have confirmed to the Turkish media that Baku was not only fully informed about the progress and details of those talks, but even “in agreement” with the way Ankara has been approaching the rapprochement issue.

    Dozens of rounds of talks between the Turkish and Azerbaijani presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers preceded this climax in the Turkish-Armenian thaw. Cengiz Candar, a Turkish journalist who accompanied President Gul to Tehran on March 11, reports that Gul and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, met in the Iranian capital specifically to discuss the issue.

    What an irony of history that now a Turkish government with an Islamic background and an Armenian government led by a former nationalist fighter from Nagorno-Karabakh are close to a breakthrough

    Turkish leaders seem to be surprised by the outrage with which President Aliyev, other Azerbaijani officials, and the Azerbaijani media have responded to the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. Some Turkish analysts maintain that Baku’s “demonstrative dismay” is meant primarily for internal consumption, while others speculate that the intention is to make clear to Moscow, Yerevan’s main supporter, Baku’s readiness to include it in all political processes in the southern Caucasus.

    Whatever the reason for Baku’s anger, the Turkish leadership seems to have concluded that having no diplomatic relations with one of its neighbors and keeping its border closed have not produced, and will not produce, any positive movement on three key issues that have frozen the status quo for nearly 17 years.

    The first of those is Yerevan’s insistence that the mass killings of Ottoman Armenians in 1915 should be recognized as “genocide.”

    The second is Ankara’s demand that Yerevan clearly recognize the current Turkish-Armenian border, and refrain in future from referring to eastern Turkey as “western Armenia.”

    And the third is concluding an agreement between Baku and Yerevan on Nagorno-Karabakh and other Azerbaijani  territories occupied by Armenian forces.

    Referring to serious disputes on all these three points, Turkey “acknowledged” Armenia’s independence in 1991 but declined to extend formal diplomatic recognition. And following the occupation of Azerbaijani territories by Armenian forces, Ankara closed its borders with Armenia in 1993.

    For the past 15 or more years, Yerevan has been demanding the opening of the border and the establishment of diplomatic relations “without any precondition.” Ankara, on the other hand, has made both those demands contingent on the resolution of the three main disputed issues. Endless and exhausting talks have been held between all parties involved: Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the “Minsk Group,” consisting of Russia, the United States, and France, to mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

    But those talks yielded no concrete results. What an irony of history that now a Turkish government with an Islamic background and an Armenian government led by a former nationalist fighter from Nagorno-Karabakh are close to a breakthrough in what was long enough considered a “frozen conflict.”

    With technical details reportedly worked out and political will evident in both Ankara and Yerevan, the next few weeks may bring breaking news about the beginning of a historical rapprochement between Turks and Armenians. There are also reports that the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict may be “very close to a settlement,” although the players in each of these two distinct but intertwined dramas apparently don’t want to wait for the other game to be played out first.

    The public, however, still doesn’t know much about what the agreements would produce, either with regard to the “genocide,” or the recognition of the Turkish-Armenian border, or how the Armenian-Azerbaijani territorial dispute will be resolved. “Having good relations with Armenia is very good,” said Tulin Kanik, a student of political sciences from Ankara. “But what will happen with their claims on eastern Turkey or with the districts of Azerbaijan still occupied by Armenian forces?”

    That both Ankara and Yerevan look confident indicates that people on both sides of Mount Ararat will probably soon hear something they can not only live, but also be happy with. Both Erdogan and Sarkisian know that they have to present their respective populations with a win-win deal. And they also know that, however enthusiastic and supportive the West may be or Russia may become, their own constituencies must accept that deal if they want to survive as national leaders.

    Abbas Djavadi is associate director of broadcasting with RFE/RL. The views expressed in this commentary are his own, and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL.

    http://www.rferl.org/content/The_TurkishArmenian_Thaw_and_Azerbaijan/1608216.html 
  • Turkish-Armenian Dialogue on the Verge of Collapse

    Turkish-Armenian Dialogue on the Verge of Collapse

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 71
    April 14, 2009 12:55 PM Age: 38 min
    Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Turkey, Armenia, Home Page, Foreign Policy
    By: Emil Danielyan

    Abdullah Gul (left) and Serzh Sarkisian

    The nearly year-long negotiations between Armenia and Turkey look set to prove fruitless after Ankara has revived its long-standing linkage between the normalization of bilateral ties and a resolution of the Karabakh conflict. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly made clear this month that his government will not establish diplomatic relations with Yerevan and re-open the Turkish-Armenian border without Azerbaijan’s consent. In Armenia and especially amongst its worldwide diaspora, meanwhile, there are growing calls for President Serzh Sarkisian to abandon the Western-backed talks.

    The success of those talks seemed a foregone conclusion in the weeks leading up to President Barack Obama’s visit on April 6-7. According to reports in both the Turkish and Western media, Armenia and Turkey have finalized an agreement on gradually normalizing their strained relations and setting up inter-governmental commissions dealing with various issues of mutual interest. Some of those reports quoted unnamed Turkish officials as saying that the agreement could be signed during or shortly after Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian’s trip to Istanbul on April 6. The resulting outcry in Azerbaijan (EDM, April 10) suggested that Ankara and Yerevan were indeed very close to cutting a far-reaching deal. 

    Erdogan called into question the possibility of such a deal when he told a news conference in London on April 3 that Turkey cannot reach a “healthy solution concerning Armenia” as long as the Karabakh dispute remains unresolved (Today’s Zaman, April 4). He reaffirmed the linkage on April 8, two days after Obama stated in Ankara that the Turkish-Armenian negotiations were “moving forward and could bear fruit very quickly, very soon.” The Turkish premier went as far as demanding that the U.N. Security Council denounce Armenia as an “occupier” and called for Karabakh’s return under Azeri rule (Hurriyet Daily News, April 9).

    Any doubts about the practical implications of these statements were dispelled by Erdogan during his holiday in southern Turkey on April 10: “We will not sign a final deal with Armenia unless there is agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia on Karabakh,” he told journalists (Anatolia news agency, April 10). In an interview with the Azerbaijani newspaper Zerkalo published the following day, the deputy chairman of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, Haluk Ipek, said the Turkish-Armenian border will remain closed for at least ten more years. Ipek dismissed speculation over its impending re-opening as “dishonest” Armenian propaganda aimed at driving a wedge between the two Turkic nations. Turkey’s more dovish President Abdullah Gul likewise underscored the importance of Karabakh’s peace when he commented on Turkish-Armenian reconciliation in an interview with The Financial Times on April 8.

    That the Turkish-Armenian dialogue is reaching an impasse was effectively acknowledged by Sarkisian at an April 10 news conference: “Is it possible that we were mistaken in our calculations and that the Turks will now adopt a different position and try to set preconditions? Of course it is possible,” he said (Armenian Public Television, April 10). The Armenian leader insisted that Karabakh has not been on the agenda of that dialogue. Indeed, Ankara was clearly ready to stop linking Turkish-Armenian relations with a Karabakh settlement acceptable to Baku when it embarked on a dramatic rapprochement with Yerevan last summer. The two countries’ foreign ministers would have hardly held numerous face-to-face meetings since if it was not.

    For his part, Sarkisian signaled his acceptance, in principle, of a Turkish proposal to form a joint commission of historians tasked with examining the 1915-1918 mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. One of the Turkish-Armenian commissions which the governments reportedly agreed to form would conduct such a study. The idea was floated by Erdogan in 2005 and rejected by then Armenian President Robert Kocharian as a Turkish ploy designed to scuttle greater international recognition of what many historians consider the first genocide of the twentieth century. Turkish leaders have made no secret of using the fence-mending negotiations with the Sarkisian administration to discourage Obama from making good on his election campaign promise to describe the slaughter of more than one million Ottoman Armenians as genocide.

    The almost certain collapse of the talks has left Armenian politicians and pundits questioning the wisdom of further Armenian overtures to the Turks. “If Turkey suddenly succumbs to Azerbaijan’s threats and these negotiations yield no results soon, then I think the Armenian side will not carry on with them,” said Giro Manoyan, a senior member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, a nationalist party represented in Sarkisian’s coalition government (Hayots Ashkhar, April 10). Former Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian likewise advocated, in an April 7 interview with RFE/RL, Yerevan’s pullout from the reconciliation process if the sixteen year Turkish blockade of Armenia is not lifted.

    Such views are indicative of the dominant mood in the Armenian diaspora and, in particular, the influential Armenian community within the United States. Harut Sassounian, a prominent community activist and commentator, criticized Armenia’s policy on Turkey, effectively blaming it for Obama’s failure to publicly use the word “genocide” during his visit to Turkey. “In view of these developments, it is imperative that the Armenian government terminates at once all negotiations with the Turkish leaders in order to limit the damage caused by the continued exploitation of the illusion of productive negotiations,” Sassounian wrote in an April 9 editorial by his Los Angeles-based newspaper California Courier.

    Sarkisian insisted on April 10 that the dialogue with Turkey can be deemed beneficial for the Armenian side even if it produces no tangible results. He said Armenia will “emerge from this process stronger” in any case because the international community will have no doubts that “we are really ready to establish relations [with Turkey] without preconditions.”

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-armenian-dialogue-on-the-verge-of-collapse/

  • Nabucco Hucksterism, Iran Pollyanishness, and a $5 Billion Bribe. The Oil and Glory Interview: Steven Mann

    Nabucco Hucksterism, Iran Pollyanishness, and a $5 Billion Bribe. The Oil and Glory Interview: Steven Mann

    A Blog on Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus

    Saturday, April 11, 2009

    On Thursday, a ceremony in the State Department will mark the retirement of Steven Mann, Coordinator for Eurasian Energy Diplomacy, after 32 years with the U.S. diplomatic service. The 58-year-old Mann served most of the last 17 years in senior positions in the Caucasus and Central Asia: He opened the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan in 1992, was ambassador to Turkmenistan, and tried to negotiate a deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh. For the last several years, Mann was America’s man on the spot in the New Great Game on the Caspian Sea.

    I visited Mann at his Chevy Chase home. Amid stacked up magazines and books, Mann told me that Europe’s “energy security” is not necessarily at peril. And, for O&G readers, he broke one bit of historical news: Remember the demise of the trans-Caspian pipeline in the chapter An Army for Oil? The one in which then-Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov persisted in demanding a $500 million bribe of the Bechtel-General Electric consortium? It turns out that Niyazov originally requested $5 billion. The edited interview:

    Q – Does the U.S. need a high-level ambassador on Eurasian energy? And what is your advice going forward?

    A – Yes it is helpful. But we also have to get away from Nabucco hucksterism.

    Q – What is that?

    A – In terms of the wrong lessons learned from [the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline], the wrong lesson learned is to adopt a project and attempt to bring it about through political will. I think so much of the governmental activism on both sides of the Atlantic the last few years has been devoid of a commercial context. There have been quite a number of officials who know very little about energy who have been charging into the pipeline debate. Nabucco is a highly desirable project, don’t get me wrong. But there are other highly desirable projects besides Nabucco. And the overriding question for all these projects is, Where’s the gas?

    Q – South Stream was Putin’s response to Nabucco. Did the U.S. blunder by promoting Nabucco before having the commercial context?

    A – In terms of whether we are talking EU or US diplomacy, I think you have to be credible. All too often we’ve gotten out ahead of the commercial realities of Nabucco. You have to be able to point to an upstream supply. You have to have a commercial champion. And governments don’t build successful pipelines. Consortia do. The object of any envoy should be to get all those stars aligned before you give the full embrace to any project.

    I think Secretary Clinton will bring a more unified focus to the U.S. effort. In the previous administration, we had six special envoys on energy in the State Department, and three deputy national security advisers on the [National Security Council] staff.

    Q – Is that too many?

    A – It’s four too many in State. And three too many at NSC.

    Q – The stated reason for Nabucco is to diversify Europe’s energy supply. Is that a valid enough reason for U.S. involvement? And is European energy security a genuine issue?

    A – Anyone who makes that argument knows very little about energy. And I often heard those arguments in the White House Situation Room. Diversification is an objective good. But it can be achieved in ways other than pipelines. The best thing Europe could do for its security is to link its energy grid, which it’s already doing.

    Q – Is there alarmism on the subject?

    A – The January cutoff of gas through Ukraine only affected 2-3% of European consumers.

    Q – So it is overplayed.

    A – Yea, I think it was overplayed. What also was underplayed was how successful the Europeans were in shifting gas, linking grids. That’s the untold story of [the January cutoff].

    Q – The corollary – that Russian domination of supply equals a political threat in Europe – is that also alarmist?

    A – With the EU, I think it’s hard to make that case. That’s the kind of argument that has to be dissected on a country-by-country basis. But Gazprom has been an extremely reliable supplier for 25 years. And I think Gazprom will continue to be an extremely reliable supplier to Europe.

    Q – So really one should not be vexed if and when Nord Stream and South Stream are built? And if it takes some time for the ducks to be lined in a row for Nabucco, so be it?

    A – Basically, yes. I think Nabucco is far more important to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan than it is to the EU.

    Q – In the late 1990s, there was the initial effort by Bechtel and GE Capital to build a trans-Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan to Baku.

    A – What happened was that Niyazov, with his Soviet mentality, demanded so-called preliminary financing. That is, an upfront payment to do the project. [The consortium] already paid a signing bonus of $10 million. But then Niyazov demanded in the range of $5 billion. Then it came down to $3 billion. And the consortium said, ‘This is utterly unrealistic.’ Niyazov thought they were bargaining. So he dropped the demand to $1 billion; then it came down to $500 million. The consortium said, You have until March 2000 or we walk. And at that time, they walked.

    The fundamental problem, and it’s relevant today, is that a foreign investor cannot rely on a governmental entity [in Turkmenistan] to supply the upstream, to supply the product.

    Q – Was it ever realistic that Niyazov was going to hook up with the East-West Corridor?

    A – It was and it is realistic. Without alternatives to the Gazprom monopoly, Turkmenistan has to accept the price that Gazprom is willing to pay. There is a powerful commercial logic to a trans-Caspian pipeline.

    Q – What is the best way today for a Caspian republic to get along in the region?

    A – Kazakhstan is a good model of how to develop a Eurasian energy sector. You’re good partners with Russia, but you take advantage of foreign technology and capital.

    Q – Does Russia have a role in helping to create a thaw between the U.S. and Iran?

    A – Every time there is a substantial political change in the U.S., the oil and gas industry gets up on its tip-toes and says, ‘Aren’t we about to have a change in policy?’ You saw this with the Bush-Cheney election in 2000; the industry thought now was the time it would happen. You saw it after the [2001] invasion of Afghanistan, with certain cooperation and contact between the U.S. and Iran. You’re seeing it now with the advent of the Obama administration. So this is something that the oil and gas industry is always waiting for – that change.

    Q – You are saying that this is nothing new.

    A – It is nothing new.

    Labels: Azerbaijan, Caspian, Kazakhstan, Nabucco, nord stream, oil, south stream

    http://oilandglory.com/