Category: Azerbaijan

Azerbaijani-Turkish holding to build petrochemical enterprise in Iran

Azerbaijan, Baku, April 23 Trend Capital

The Turkish petrochemical holding Petkim whose 51 percent of stakes belong to the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) in alliance with Turcas will build a petrochemical plant in Iran which will produce methanol and polyethylene. Turcas Board of Directors Chairman Erdal Aksoy said, Petkim’s official Web site reported.

The Turkish Petkim company and the National Petrochemical Company of Iran signed a contract to construct the plant. A joint enterprise with 50/50 stakes will be formed with this purpose.

Capacity of methanol producing plant is 1.6 million tons per year and polyethylene – 300,000 tons.

Aksoy said the holding is interested in implementing projects in other countries. The negotiations are being held with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Forming the enterprise in Iran is explained with low cost of raw material (gas) in the Persian gukf countries and low cost of power.

Earlier, SOCAR in alliance with Turcas Petrol and Injaz Projects possesses 51 percent participation share in Petkim. Turkey currently imports 70-75% of the necessary chemical products, but developing Petkim, the investment alliance SOCAR/Turcas/Injaz will provide an opportunity to increase the import up to 30%.

Petkim Petrokimya Holding is specialized in the production of plastic packages, fabric, detergents and is the only producer of these goods in Turkey exporting the fourth part of the output.

SOCAR intends to by 2015 increase the volume of the incomes of this enterprise to $4 billion from $1.9 billion today. Now the production capacity of this holding is 3.2 million tons. By 2015 this index will grow to 6.3 million tons. Today the needs of Turkey for the petrochemical production equal $6.1 billion, and this demand will annually grow 11-12 percent. Today the production of Petkim covers nearly 25 percent of the market of Turkey.

As a result of the measures planned to be taken, the production of Petkim will cover 40 percent of the Turkish market. SOCAR invested approximately $2 billion in the development of petrochemical complex.

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Source: capital-en.trend.az, April 23 2009

April 24, 2009
Turkish Lira fourth most popular currency as holidaymakers shun eurozone

The Turkish Lira has become the fourth most popular currency at the country’s leading bureaux de change, as British holidaymakers start to desert the increasingly-expensive Eurozone.

By Harry Wallop, Consumer Affairs Editor
Last Updated: 5:51PM BST 21 Apr 2009

The Lira was the fourth most popular currency last year, behind the euro, dollar and Australian dollar Photo: GETTY

According to the Post Office, which changes £1 in every £3 that holidaymakers take overseas, the demand for Turkish Lira increased by 21 per cent last year and is on course to grow again this year.

Last year it overtook the Canadian Dollar to become the fourth most popular currency and if its current popularity continues it could overtake the Australian dollar to reach the third spot by the end of this year.

The popularity of the currency is the latest evidence to suggest destinations in the Eurozone, such as Spain and Italy, have fallen out of favour with holidaymakers because of the collapse in the value of the pound.

A year ago £1 would have bought €1.27. Though it has improved greatly over the last month from a low of €1.03, it only buys €1.13 this week.

In contrast the Lira has remained stable at about £1 to 2.40 Turkish Lira over the course of the last 12 months.

OAG, a research company which monitors passenger numbers around the world, indicated that the number of passengers leaving the UK in the first three months of this year fell by 10.5 per cent, with 5.28 million fewer seats filled than a year ago.

Most of this slump has been driven by a sharp fall in trips to Europe. The Civil Aviation Authority said traffic between Heathrow and the Eurozone had fallen by 8.7 per cent, while traffic to other destinations was up by 1.8 per cent.

Turkey has emerged as one of the winners, offering holidaymakers a range of cheap hotel rooms, combined with the promise of low priced meals, drink and trips.

Sarah Munro, head of travel at the Post Office, said: “We have seen unprecedented demand for lira over the past year. Turkey is still cheaper than anywhere in the eurozone.

“The strength of the euro compared with the weakness of the Turkish lira against sterling is obviously having an impact and 2009 sales to date suggest another growth year for Turkey. That is why we are extending our over the counter service for Turkish lira from 1,400 to 4,000 Post Office branches.”

Previously customers needed to order Lira in advance if they wanted to change money at the great majority of Post Offices.

The Lira was the fourth most popular currency last year, behind the euro, dollar and Australian dollar.

So far this year, demand has increased by 9 per cent, compared with last year. The Lira is expected to overtake the Australian dollar to become the third most popular currency.

Source: www.telegraph.co.uk, England, 21 Apr 2009

[2]

Cash boost for Turkish sunseekers

THE Post Office has more than doubled the number of branches where Turkish lira can be bought over the counter.

The move comes as or holiday bookings to this summer’s most popular foreign destination continues to grow.

After seeing double-digit growth in demand for lira over the past two months compared with a year ago, 12 Post Office branches in Lanarkshire are part of 4000 Post Office bureau de change branches in the UK offering instant currency on the spot.

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Until mid-May, customers buying Turkish lira will benefit from a special deal offering an exclusive exchange rate daily without imposing any minimum spend conditions.

The move comes after the Post Office reported a 21% increase in sales of Turkish lira in 2008.

The Post Office warns people planning travel to Turkey to watch the exchange rate movements carefully as the lira has proved more volatile than most currencies.

Source: Glasgow Evening Times, Scotland, 24/04/09

April 24, 2009
Turkey’s Energy Minister Pressures Nabucco Partners

Turkey’s Energy Minister Pressures Nabucco Partners

Publication: Volume: 6 Issue: 75

April 20, 2009 02:19 PM

By: Saban Kardas

On April 17 Turkey’s Energy Minister Hilmi Guler, attended a meeting on the future of the Turkish energy sector where he highlight the need to invest in renewable energy resources and diversify its hydrocarbon supplies. In that context, Guler sent important messages to Turkey’s Nabucco partners. Asked about the current standing of the Nabucco project, he said that draft intergovernmental and host government agreements had been conveyed to Ankara’s partners. “We told them that if we receive their response this month, we are ready to sign the agreement in June…we have full confidence that we can conclude the project, provided that our partners respond to the letter promptly” (www.haberturk.com, April 17).

During the past fortnight Guler has repeatedly stressed this point. On various occasions, he expressed Turkey’s dissatisfaction with the slow pace of progress and tried to pressurize its European partners. Satisfied with the results of the Budapest Summit in January, where the EU supported the Nabucco project by earmarking 250 million Euros ($324 million) to help the consortium secure loans, Turkey wanted to fast track the process. Noting that Turkey was the driving force behind the project, Guler argued that the Europeans were preoccupied with small details and if Ankara took charge, the project would be completed within three years. He contended that the Europeans have finally realized that Turkey could not be reduced only to a “transit country” (Radikal, February 1).

By mid-March, however, the EU debated reducing funds allocated for Nabucco and removing it from its priority energy projects, before eventually deciding to maintain the project. Guler said that even if the EU were to drop its financial backing, it would not affect the scheduled progress of Nabucco:

“The Nabucco project will be concluded under any circumstances. Just as we finished the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, Shah Deniz project and the Turkey-Greece interconnector, we will also finish this project. The credit issue can be considered as a detail. There will be alternatives and we will discuss them with our partners” (www.cnnturk.com, March 19).

However, despite his powerful rhetoric, Guler failed to address how Turkey will generate the necessary funding in the midst of the global economic crisis. Guler was assuming that as long as a consensus existed on the political-strategic level, the remaining problems over financing could easily be resolved. As the subsequent developments showed, that consensus cannot be taken for granted.

The declining commitment of the European partners was obvious and Guler’s statements also reflected those changes. On April 12, he again criticized the attitude of the Nabucco partners, which he repeated within different platforms. According to Guler, in their initial responses to Turkey’s draft proposals, its partners raised issues which had already been agreed. To avoid such problems, and accelerate the process, Guler sent the Europeans a letter requesting that they “submit to Turkey what they all agree on and sign on to it” (Anadolu Ajansi, April 12).

Funding problems aside, questions about how to supply Nabucco are far from settled, which has a direct bearing on any evaluation of the project by investors. The declining European interest in Nabucco has already forced Azerbaijan -the only country to commit gas to the project- to reconsider exporting through Russia. A related political challenge has been posed by the tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan, caused by Baku’s discomfort surrounding Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, which might ignore its concerns. Although Guler ruled out the negative implications of the Turkish-Azeri frictions for the Nabucco project, uncertainty over Baku’s plans further complicates the investor climate, delaying a European response to Turkey’s draft proposals.

Against this background, the haste with which the Turkish government is seeking to move the process forward might be an indication of an underlying sense of nervousness about the fate of the project. Ankara appears impatient to secure European commitment to the Nabucco project and start without further delay. It has blamed its European partners for the current stalemate in the negotiations.

On the other hand, the Turkish government rarely acknowledges its own part in these delays, such as the covert threat to use the Nabucco as a bargaining chip to accelerate Turkey’s stalled EU accession process, or its insistence on privileged access to gas transiting its territory to serve domestic demand, or its futile efforts to include Russia in Nabucco. No matter how justified Turkey might be on these issues, the government might have miscalculated the potential damage caused by its bargaining tactics (Taraf, March 3). Turkey’s aggressive rhetoric about becoming an energy hub may alienate some of its Nabucco partners.

Nor has Ankara appreciated the complexity of energy geopolitics in general or the discussions taking place inside the EU. Turkey mainly acted on the assumption that given its strategic location it could dictate terms to Brussels, forgetting that Nabucco had to compete with other rival projects to receive European backing (EDM, March 4, 5, 16). Likewise, Turkey hoped that the U.S. administration might support the project. But as Obama’s European trips showed, Washington does not enjoy the leverage over major EU members ascribed to it by Ankara. It is unclear when a European response will emerge, but it could disappoint the Turkish government.

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34882

April 20, 2009
Has Turkey Traded Genocide for Karabakh?

With Turkish / Armenian negotiations reaching a peak, the focus of attention is moving from the wider debate to petty bickering over who said this and who said that, the inevitable outcome of a process in which a country’s leaders discuss fundamentals of agreements with their international counterparts then hide the truth from their domestic audience. The Armenian negotiating parties, President Sargsyan and MFA Nalbandian, have unashamedly deceived the Armenian public with respect to their year-long negotiations on Karabakh and Genocide. Today, they would have the Armenian public believe that Turkey has suddenly introduced pre-conditions for opening the border, an untrue statement and particularly alarming as it came immediately after discussions with the US President in Turkey, which surely must have led to a common understanding between Turkey, Armenia and the US. True, the Turkish side did change its position after Obama’s trip to Turkey and re-introduced Karabakh as a pre-condition. But in contrast to Armenia, Turkish reports on its position have been consistent, in Ankara, in Baku and in Yerevan.

Turkey resolutely denies that the hostilities involving the slaughter of Armenians in the early 20th century amounted to Genocide and each year it spends considerable resources to defend its position, especially in the US. This year Turkey’s leaders spent several months and went to extraordinary lengths to avoid US recognition, realizing the new US President and most of his senior administration supported Armenia’s claim of Genocide. That is understandable from a Turkish perspective. But it is disturbing that the Armenian negotiating parties have not added their voices to the Armenian lobby for the US to recognize Genocide, but understandable, as US recognition would put a stop to the plan they have been doing all they can to keep from the Armenian public. Sargsyan and Nalbandian have been ‘warming to the Turkish proposal to establish a commission of historians’ and they have said so on several occasions, not for the good of the Armenian Republic, but in pursuit of personal gain.

On April 6th and 7th, Turkey was host to the US President, first in Ankara then in Istanbul, hailed as the highlight of Obama’s European tour. Several weeks prior to the Obama visit, Turkey announced that it had removed the Karabakh issue from its list of pre-conditions for opening the Turkish / Armenian border, seemingly infuriating Azerbaijan, but clearly a tactical move to demonstrate Turkish acquiescence in a ‘warming relationship’ with the Armenian administration and part of Turkey’s concerted effort to avoid what seemed to be an inevitable US Genocide recognition. The Obama trip went according to plan with the US and Turkey singing each others praise. But for Armenia, whilst Obama confirmed his personal position had not changed, he avoided using the word Genocide.

Armenia’s MFA Nalbandian decided not to travel to Ankara to meet with US President Obama on the 6th April as planned, but he eventually managed to find time on April 7th in Istanbul. He returned to Yerevan bristling with confidence of an imminent border opening and assuring the Armenian public that he and his President would do nothing to jeopardize a possible US recognition of Genocide. In fact, they had already done their damndest to jeopardize a possible US recognition of Genocide, they had announced that negotiations with Turkey were developing well and they anticipated an early opening of the Armenian / Turkish border – possibly in April. Under these circumstances it would have been confrontational for Obama to talk about Armenia’s ‘Genocide’ in Turkey and he would have been blamed for spoiling the Turkish – Armenian reconciliation process.

Nalbandian had barely finished his press conference in Yerevan, when Turkey announced in Ankara, Baku and Yerevan that it was to re-introduce Karabakh to the border-opening list of pre-conditions, a seemingly provocative move, especially after the Obama visit and only two weeks prior to a much anticipated 24th April Obama declaration on Genocide in the US. The Turkish move completely contradicted Nalbandian’s statement, plus many such Nalbandian statements in the run-up to Obama’s trip to Turkey. Sargsyan responded in Yerevan, accusing Turkey of suddenly introducing hitherto unknown pre-conditions, although pre-conditions have been known and documented throughout the nearly year-long negotiation process, and neither Sargsyan nor his Minister of Foreign Affairs had ever explained in Armenia how they had been resolved. However, the ‘newly introduced pre-condition’ did not dampen Sargsyan’s enthusiasm and he re-confirmed he would be travelling through the newly opened border on his way to watch football in Turkey this October.

From this somewhat implausible chain of events, it is presumably to be believed that President Gul had a change of heart after negotiations between President Obama and Armenia’s MFA Nalbandian; that he decided to slap the well-intentioned face of his most powerful strategic ally by revoking on this critical and most sensitive of issues. If true, that would surely invoke US recognition of Armenia’s Genocide on the 24th.

Of course not, Turkey’s President Gul would never concede on the Genocide issue, knowing that 90 percent of the Turkish population is opposed, and at a time when his ratings had plummeted in a keenly contested democratic election. The conclusion can only be that Obama left Turkey thankful and relieved that Turkey and Armenia had agreed to resolve the Genocide issue between them, through Turkey’s commission of historians, or some other such mechanism. Armenia’s President Sargsyan is on record as saying he has no ambitions with regard the historic Armenian lands in the eastern part of Turkey, so only the Karabakh issue needs to be resolved for him to travel through the border in October this year, and Bryza’s opinion is that Karabakh will soon be resolved.

Armenia’s former President Kocharian has been preparing his deal on Karabakh for several years, held back firstly by the lack of an acceptable Azerbaijani compensation package, and secondly his nerve to commit to the deal, knowing he would face the backlash from an angry Armenian public. Kocharian waited his time and supported Sargsyan as his successor on the understanding that Sargsyan, when President, would go through with the agreement he dare not sign.

However, in the same way that Turkey would never withdraw its support from Azerbaijan with regard Karabakh, Azerbaijan is equally committed to supporting Turkey on Genocide. In July 2008, seeing that Sargsyan was determined to finalize the Kocharian deal on Karabakh, the Azerbaijani / Turkish allies joined forces and threw Genocide into the equation, knowing the self-imposed illegitimate Sargsyan regime would jump at the chance of adding to the package of compensation it was demanding in return for one of Armenia’s very few state assets left after Kocharian’s eight years of pillaging – Karabakh.

In August 2008, the Georgia conflict prompted Moscow to force the pace of negotiations, so Medvedev dangled a $500 million carrot; then the World economic crisis presented the opportunity for the US to throw a billion or so more dollars into the pot, conveniently facilitated by the World Bank and the IMF. Now half the World is on tenterhooks, waiting the next episode in this most unsavory Caucuses conflict resolution saga, which is due this 24th April in New York.

The Kocharian / Sargsyan Karabakh ‘Ace’ has already been played several times with the EU and PACE to chock up the illegitimate Sargsyan Presidency. Soon it will be played for the last time, to draw massive compensation in return for a beneficial agreement for Azerbaijan on Karabakh and for a Turkish commission of historians to finally eliminate Armenia’s claims of Genocide.

Turkey and Azerbaijan will have solved their longstanding problems with Armenia, the US will have been relieved the burden of Genocide recognition, Russia will see additional political clout and economic benefits in the Caucuses, and the Sargsyan / Kocharian regime will have a compensation package worth several billion dollars.

The vast majority of Armenians will be hoping that the US president stands by his promise and formally recognizes the Armenian Genocide this 24th April; in the longer term it will be beneficial to all parties concerned. Otherwise the Kocharian / Sargsyan regime will be having to cope with the backlash in Armenia, after having sold Armenia down the river with their ‘Karabakh / Genocide Deal’.

April 20, 2009
Russia confirms April 23 for Armenian president’s visit

MOSCOW, April 18 (RIA Novosti) – Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan will visit Russia next Thursday, the Kremlin press service announced on Saturday.

Kremlin aide Sergei Prikhodko said on Friday that Sargsyan would come for a working visit next week, but could only say it was “tentatively” scheduled for April 23.

The visit is at the invitation of President Dmitry Medvedev, who on Friday met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.

After the talks, Aliyev thanked Russia for its efforts to forge a common position on a settlement to the Nagorny Karabakh problem.

Nagorny Karabakh, a region in Azerbaijan with a largely Armenian population, declared its independence from Azerbaijan in 1983. The ensuing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict claimed some 35,000 lives. A ceasefire was signed in 1994. The area technically remains part of Azerbaijan, but has its own government and is de facto independent.

Medvedev brought the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents together in Moscow in November 2008 in an attempt to jump-start stalled negotiations on the region. Aliyev and Sargsyan followed up that meeting with hour-long one-on-one talks in Switzerland in late January.

April 18, 2009
Svante Cornell on Karabakh, Turkey and Caucasus

Washington. Zaur Hasanov – APA. APA’s interview with Research Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Svante E. Cornell

– In your most recent article published by the Silk Road Studies, you touched upon a proposal which was offered back in 2002 in the Sadarak meeting of the presidents of Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan. Could you elaborate on the subject and what this had to do with the occupied territories of Azerbaijan bordering Iran?

– Of course, there were negotiations that are not entirely public. But what appears is that there was a proposal by the late president Heydar Aliyev that he would be willing to agree to opening of the rail road line to Armenia between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the case if Armenia vacated, liberated the 4 southern occupied territories that are between Karabakh and the Iranian border. The rational of cause is being that these are 4 provinces though which the Soviet time the rail roads used to go and which is to extend to Armenia and all the way to Nakchivan.
This was very novel approach on the president’s part. Because it was for a first time Azerbaijan removed the linkage between the discussion of the status of Karabakh and the restoration some type of economic relationships between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In that sense, you even can find that many Armenian observers such as Gerard Libaridian who criticized the Armenian government for refusing without any discussion this opening. Because the argument that Libaridian and others make is that this was a positive force for the Armenia side giving to the fact that it would effectively have been able Armenia to come out of its regional isolation and still hang on to its control over Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast as well Lachin, Kalbacar and even perhaps Aghdam. I think it was unclear how Aghdam would be affected by this deal. Still it would be able to improve its economic situation.

Of course, there was an understanding at that point and I think that Turkish government was making it clear that it would at the same time, if should this happen, open its border with Armenia. Because, if Azerbaijan opens its border with Armenia then there will be no rational reason for Turkey to continue to have border be closed. In that sense there was a will to solve the problem in the package deal.

Recently, there have been a sign that the Turkish government is considering de-linking completely the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution issue with its border with Armenia. That seems to be the premise under which the normalization process is going on for the several months between Turkey and Armenia. However, in the last couple of days, we have had pretty clear statements to the fact that Turkey is backed to the position that it has held for decade.

– None of the previous governments in Turkey de-linked the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from the border reopening with Armenia but AKP did it. What has changed since the time when border was closed down and what has changed in the Turkish political establishment that they had an intention to do that?

– I think that there are several things. First, there is a relationship with Turkish policy and the Armenian genocide issue in the Congress of the USA. And I think very much at the beginning the “football diplomacy” in the summer time, there was a feeling that Turkey should do something in dealing with geopolitical changes in the region because of the Georgia war. Another reality is the way how Turkey was looking at the Obama victory was the presidential election and if you remember how genocide resolution was close to pass last year, I think that general assumption was that this year it would pass very easily. Therefore, in the order to prevent that what you could do. If you have the Congress which is going to pass the resolution, if you have the president which has a clear position then a rapprochement with Armenia was correctly understood to be one of ways in which Turkey could prevent the genocide resolution. I think, in that sense, they succeeded. After Obama’s speech in the Turkish parliament it will be very difficult for him this year say “G” word.

Second, you have to understand that even in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs most people are Atlantics, if you want. They are people who are specialists in Europe, EU issue, the USA and so on, but not are people specializing in the Eastern issues like the Caucasus and Central Asia issues. It is still the secondary issue for Turkey. And also in the AK party government there are no people who have a close relationship with the Caucasus. Partly it is because they understand themselves from the Islamic identity rather than Turkic identity, and you also have to see a lot of people were saying in Turkey that: “Look, for the 15 years this policy brought nothing. Let’s bring something new”

– How it can be that the country which has three neighbors in its eastern border doesn’t have enough specialists dealing with the Caucasus?

– One of the explanations is the political one. AKP is a kind of strange alliance of Islamists and liberals. Islamists mainly interested in the ties with the Islamic Middle East, not post Soviet Muslims and where liberals are more focused entirely on the European relationship of Turkey. Plus, you have a political reality too. If you look back last five years, EU, US and Cyprus issues where top issues in the Turkish foreign policy. These are such big issues that it can take up so much Turkey time and because so less energy left for other issues.

– As I understood from your article is that Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a key element of the security and cooperation in the region. Your other point is that president Obama should appoint a special envoy dealing with the conflict.

– It is right. What this latest few weeks have shown us that people are trying to put aside NK conflict because it is such difficult issue and say that “let do something else”. For example, let start economic relations. But the realities of the region proved that NK conflict is the biggest problem for the region. Without solving this problem you can’t solve the broader problems in the Caucasus. Therefore, when Turks are realizing now implicitly that they can’t go forward in the normalization with Armenia in the way intended to do, a logical conclusion shouldn’t be “let forget about it” but should be “if the Karabakh issue is really is the central issue let then see if there way how to utilize the positive momentum in Turkish Armenian relations”. Take into account that Obama administration interested in this issue, and getting Obama administration much more actively interested in resolving the Karabakh conflict are the right path to walk.

April 18, 2009