Category: Azerbaijan

  • NORMALIZING TUKISH-ARMENIAN TIES: WILL DAVUTOGLU’S GAMBLE PAY OFF?

    NORMALIZING TUKISH-ARMENIAN TIES: WILL DAVUTOGLU’S GAMBLE PAY OFF?

    Svante E. Cornell and M. K. Kaya

    14 September 2009 issue of the Turkey Analyst at http://www.turkeyanalyst.org

    In its laudable attempts to reduce tensions with its neighbors and to gain a greater influence in the South Caucasus, the AKP government has made itself dependent on forces that it cannot control. Unless Armenia and Azerbaijan strike a deal rapidly, Turkey will inevitably be forced to choose between reneging on its commitment to normalize relations with Armenia or risk a breakdown in its relations with Azerbaijan. In either situation, Moscow will be the geopolitical winner. Western, in particular American, activity to support an agreement on principle between Armenia and Azerbaijan is urgently called for.

    BACKGROUND: On August 31, the Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers announced they had agreed to sign two protocols on establishing diplomatic relations and on broader bilateral ties. This breathed new life into the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process, which had been ongoing for months, mediated by the Swiss Foreign Ministry. But it also opened wounds from last spring, when hard opposition both from Turkish public opinion and the Azerbaijani government and public forced the AKP government to halt the rapprochement. As was the case then, the main issue that Turkish opposition political parties and the Azerbaijani government oppose is the planned opening of the Turkish-Armenian border. Last spring, the timing of the first protocol for April 2009 was planned to fall before April 24, Armenian Remembrance Day in the United States, but after the Turkish local elections of March 29. But as it happened, the electoral setback the AKP suffered in those elections made it more, not less vulnerable to tough opposition coming from the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and Republican People’s Party (CHP), and in fact contributed to the postponement of the announcement of the concrete protocols. The campaign initiated in Turkey by the Azerbaijani government was the other reason that forced the AKP to step back. Indeed, Azerbaijani parliamentarians visited Turkey to argue their case, appealing to Turkey not to open the border as long as Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijani territories continued. In a spectacular move, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev canceled a planned trip to Istanbul during the summit of the Alliance for Civilizations, in spite of repeated pleas for his attendance by U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. In an act of damage control, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan then visited Baku and made clear in his address to the Azerbaijani Parliament that the Turkish-Armenian border will remain closed until a mutually acceptable solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is found. In effect, Turkey had reverted to its long-standing policy of linking its relationship to Armenia with the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. During the summer of 2009, three important developments contributed to changing the regional atmosphere. Following the electoral setback, the AKP in May announced a broad cabinet shakeup. (See May 8 issue of the Turkey Analyst) The long-time architect of the AKP’s foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoğlu, was appointed Foreign Minister. His elevation from being Erdoğan’s chief foreign policy advisor cemented his influence over Turkish foreign policy. (See June 5 issue of the Turkey Analyst) Second, partly as a result of the same cabinet shakeup that included the appointment of a new Minister of Energy, Ankara became much more constructive on the Nabucco pipeline negotiations. (See May 22 issue of the Turkey Analyst). This contributed to the signing on July 13 of an Inter-Governmental Agreement on the Nabucco pipeline, in which Azerbaijani President Aliyev, significantly, did not participate, sending instead his energy minister. Almost immediately, Moscow went on a counter-offensive to this move, with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visiting Ankara on August 6, where he managed to get a Turkish signature to a Protocol on the rival South Stream pipeline. (See August 17 issue of the Turkey Analyst) It is in this complex and rapidly shifting geopolitical environment that the Protocols were announced on August 31, and introduced to the respective publics of the region. The plan appeared to be to allow for public debate of the Protocols, and to present them for ratification by parliament at the end of September. This again raised the political temperature, with acrimony concerning not so much the prospect of establishing diplomatic relations, but of opening the Turkish-Armenian border without progress on the Karabakh conflict.

    IMPLICATIONS: The rationale for the rapprochement with Armenia is as clear today as it was in April. From Armenia’s perspective, the normalization of relations with Turkey will result in the revival of the Armenian economy which has been under a heavy burden, and the reduction of the gravest perceived threat to Armenia’s security. Although the border is closed, approximately 70,000 Armenians work in Turkey. Clearly, that number would grow if relations were normalized. More importantly, Armenia would be relieved of its regional isolation. The opening with Turkey would do a lot to counter the last decade’s tendency of depopulation and isolation of Armenia. Armenian nationalist and Diaspora organizations are nevertheless hostile to the rapprochement, since it includes the recognition by Armenia of Turkey’s territorial integrity and the current Armenian-Turkish border. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation last spring left the governing coalition precisely over this issue. As for Turkey, such a rapprochement conforms with Davutoğlu’s “zero problem” approach to relations with Turkey’s neighbors. In fact, after successive rapprochements with formerly antagonistic neighbors including Greece and Syria, Turkey’s relationship with Armenia stand out as the one in need of attention. Secondly, the rapprochement with Armenia fits directly into Ankara’s relations with both the United States and the European Union, both of whom are putting pressure on the AKP government on the issue. American pressure in particular affects the AKP, since the Turkish-Armenian opening was President Barack Obama’s main justification for reneging on electoral promises to acknowledge the Ottoman-era massacres of Armenians as genocide. Finally, the AKP sees the opening to Armenia as a way to reinvigorate its presence in the South Caucasus following the Russian invasion of Georgia last year. The problem from Ankara’s vantage point, of course, is that the closure of the Turkish-Armenian border was the main concrete way in which Turkey supported Azerbaijan following the 1992-93 Armenian occupation of close to a fifth of Azerbaijan’s territory and the ensuing ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis from their homes. As such, as long as the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is unresolved and Azerbaijani internally displaced persons are unable to return to their homes, Turkish policy towards Armenia cannot be dissociated from its relations with Azerbaijan. Whether one likes it or not, this implies that Turkish moves toward Armenia cannot avoid affecting its relations with the several times larger, richer, energy-endowed, and more strategically located Azerbaijan, which on top of everything is a brotherly Turkic country. Indeed, Azerbaijani as well as Turkish leaders have adopted the phrase “one nation, two states” to indicate their closeness. In that context, an opening to Armenia that is generally perceived as detrimental to Azerbaijan is explosive stuff in Turkish domestic politics, let alone in Ankara’s relationship with Baku. This conundrum is replicated in the AKP government’s recent statements, which are contradictory. On the one hand, at least judging by the available draft text, the government in signing the protocol effectively commits to opening the Turkish-Armenian border within two months of ratification. Indeed, Davutoğlu himself publicly suggested the border could open by the end of the year. Meanwhile, Davutoğlu and other officials have stated that no move hurting the interests of Azerbaijan will be taken, including explicit references to the border opening. The only way these conflicting statements can be reconciled is if the parallel process of conflict resolution between Armenia and Azerbaijan reaches concrete goals. Indeed, the AKP’s only hope to calm both its domestic opposition and Azerbaijan lies in the anticipated conclusion of a preliminary deal between Baku and Yerevan envisaging the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the five occupied provinces of Azerbaijan outside Nagorno Karabakh itself. If that were to happen, the AKP would come off as a winner, and could take credit for contributing to this important process.

    CONCLUSIONS: In its laudable attempts to reduce tensions with its neighbors and to gain a greater influence in the South Caucasus, the AKP government appears to have made itself dependent on forces that it cannot control. Indeed, negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have gone on for a decade and a half without reaching concrete results. Even if recent months appear to have seen greater progress toward an agreement in principle on a process of resolution to the conflict, it is far too early to assume that such an agreement on principle is about to be signed. As earlier attempts have shown, there is much that could derail the process at the last minute. By apparently indexing its hopes on that prospect, Ankara is taking a significant risk. Should presidents Sarkisian and Aliyev fail to reach an agreement on principle in coming weeks, the AKP will be forced either to renege on its commitment to normalize ties with Armenia, or to fulfill them but causing a breakdown in its relations with Azerbaijan – itself hardly consistent with a zero-problem policy with its neighbors. In either situation, Ankara loses – and the sole winner in geopolitical terms would be Moscow, which has long courted Azerbaijan and seems to feel that it is on the verge of ‘capturing’ Baku from the West, just as it ‘captured’ Uzbekistan in 2005. Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is considerably more stable, but may be reaching the limits of its balancing capacity. Two conclusions can be drawn from Ankara’s delicate balancing. The first is the urgency for Western, in particular American, activity to support a possible agreement on principle between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In spite of much disillusionment in earlier negotiations, the alignment of stars appears of a different order now, more conducive to progress. And in that sense, Turkish activism could be the key ingredient to achieving success on both fronts. A second and unrelated conclusion is that the Turkish parliament’s role in this process should not be underestimated. Indeed, it is very doubtful if the AKP, despite its large majority in parliament, could get the votes for an opening of the Armenian border without progress on Nagorno Karabakh. Indeed, strong voiced within the party are in strong disagreement with the leadership. In this sense, the situation is reminiscent of the 2003 vote on the Iraq war. Back then, the party leadership allowed members to vote freely according to their conscience, thereby avoiding having to enforce party discipline on an unwilling parliamentary group – and giving itself an exit strategy. Once again, the Turkish parliament could fulfill much the same function should Davutoğlu’s gamble not pay off.

    Svante E. Cornell is Research Director of the CACI & SRSP Joint Center and Editor-in-Chief of the Turkey Analyst. M.K. Kaya is a contributing editor.

  • Turkish FM Discusses Armenia Deal In Parliament

    Turkish FM Discusses Armenia Deal In Parliament

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    Azerbaijan — Ahmet Davutoglu, foreign minister of Turkey, in Baku, 26May2009

    11.09.2009
    Emil Danielyan, Tatevik Lazarian

    Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu opened on Friday consultations with his country’s top political leaders on the draft agreements envisaging the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations.

    Ankara and Yerevan publicized the two agreements on August 31 and pledged to sign them after six of “internal political consultations.” The two protocols have to be ratified by the parliaments of the two nations before they can come into effect.

    “We aim to brief all political parties, institutions and civic bodies on the protocols that will be signed,” AFP news agency quoted Davutoglu as telling reporters after meeting Turkish parliament speaker Mehmet Ali Sahin.

    Davutoglu added that he also asked for meetings with the leaders of Turkey’s two largest opposition parties represented in parliament. “We want to hold the briefings before parliament returns from summer recess in October,” he said.

    Both opposition parties have said that they will continue to oppose the establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey and reopening of their border before a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that would satisfy Azerbaijan. One of them, the Nationalist Movement Party, has slammed the Western-backed agreements as a Turkish “surrender” to Armenia.

    Turkey’s governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), which controls the majority of parliament seats, has yet to formulate its position on the protocol ratification. Its leader, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has repeatedly stated in recent months that Ankara will not normalize ties with Yerevan as long as the Karabakh conflict remains unresolved.

    Many politicians and pundits in Yerevan predict that Erdogan’s’ government will block or delay the parliamentary endorsement of the protocols if the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan fail to achieve a breakthrough in their peace talks in the coming months. Some Turkish commentators have likewise suggested that their ratification is contingent on a Karabakh deal.

    Both the United States and the European Union have welcomed the Turkish-Armenian agreements and stressed the need for their speedy implementation. “We urge Armenia and Turkey to proceed expeditiously, according to the agreed framework as described in today’s statement,” a U.S. State Department spokesman said last week.

    The protocols’ ratification by the Armenian parliament is widely seen as a forgone conclusion. Both the Republican Party of President Serzh Sarkisian and its two junior coalition partners, which enjoy a comfortable parliament majority, have voiced their unequivocal support for the deal.

    Even so, the deal’s most vocal Armenian opponent, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun), said on Friday it is lobbying members of the parliament majority to break ranks and vote against the ratification. Aghvan Vartanian, one of the nationalist party’s leaders, also told reporters that Dashnaktsutyun will soon draft and circulate specific amendments which it believes must be made in the documents. “I think it will be clear to every educated and thinking person whether they accept this variant,” he said.

    Dashnaktsutyun is especially opposed to the planned formation of a Turkish-Armenian panel of historians tasked with looking into the 1915 mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. It says that the very existence of such a body would seriously hamper greater international recognition of the massacres as genocide.

    https://www.azatutyun.am/a/1820599.html

  • Turkish Press Reacts to Turkish-Armenian Normalization

    Turkish Press Reacts to Turkish-Armenian Normalization

    Turkish Press Reacts to Turkish-Armenian Normalization

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 163
    September 8, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
     
    On August 31 a joint statement issued by Turkey and Armenia announced that both had agreed to start talks on the establishment of diplomatic ties and the development of bilateral relations. The parties initialed two protocols to regulate these issues, and the consultations on these will be finalized within six weeks before being forwarded to their national parliaments for ratification (www.mfa.gov.tr, August 31). The announcement generated a heated debate on the future of Turkish-Armenian relations as well as its implications for Azerbaijan and the involvement of other international actors.

    The content of the protocols show that the parties built on the progress they had achieved by April, which was interrupted by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s intervention to allay the concerns of Azerbaijan. Following intense bilateral contacts, secret diplomacy and pressure from the United States and European countries, Turkey and Armenia announced a roadmap for normalization in April, the contents of which remained undisclosed. Due to mounting domestic opposition and protests from Azerbaijan, Erdogan reiterated unequivocally that the progress of Turkish-Armenian relations would be contingent upon Armenia’s constructive attitude in its dispute with Azerbaijan. To relieve Azeri concerns, Erdogan emphasized that Turkey would not proceed with normalization, without an end to the Armenian occupation of Karabakh (EDM, May 14). Although there were concerns that the normalization process might have come to a premature end, the parties maintained their secret dialogue facilitated by Switzerland (EDM, June 30).

    By reiterating their commitment to the peaceful resolution of regional disputes, the parties implicitly recognize the Karabakh issue, but the protocols make no mention of it, nor set it as a precondition for opening the Turkish-Armenian border. In taking this step despite this “missing element,” the Turkish government again raised concerns as to whether it might accelerate the rapprochement with Armenia by decoupling it from the Karabakh issue. Consequently, opposition both domestically and in Azerbaijan expressed discomfort with these developments. In response, Erdogan reconnected the two processes politically, by arguing that the ratification of the protocols would depend on the resolution of Karabakh issue, reflecting Ankara’s concern to keep Baku on board (Vatan, September 2).

    The leverage Azerbaijan exerts over Turkish foreign policy led to different interpretations from the Turkish press. The nationalist media continued to express their unconditional support for Azerbaijan’s position and criticized the government’s recent initiatives (Ortadogu, September 3)

    Many mainstream commentators, however, maintain that returning to the status quo ante might be difficult, and that instead of seeking to restore Karabakh through military means, Baku should focus on diplomatic measures to free the occupied Azeri territories, and in return grant greater autonomy to the area and open a corridor between Armenia and Karabakh (Milliyet, September 3). Although Erdogan might ideally prefer a maximalist position on the return of Karabakh, other actors within the Turkish government also seem to be ready to settle for such an arrangement recognizing the new reality in the region. In fact, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and President Abdullah Gul are interested in seeing the process through and opening the border by the end of the year (Radikal, September 2), despite Erdogan’s occasional nationalistic outbursts.

    Other commentators view the rapprochement as a partly American project and believe that both Turkey and Azerbaijan are urged, if not pressured, by the Obama administration to solve their problems with Armenia. They even suggest that the mediation services provided by Swiss diplomats might only represent a cover for American facilitation between the Turkish and Armenian delegations, which is partly shared by the opposition parties, mainly the Republican People’s Party (Milliyet, September 4; Hurriyet, September 2). The pro-government press, in contrast, challenges these arguments and maintains that searching for foreign actors behind such initiatives reflects a problematic attitude on the part of the Turkish opposition. It presents these recent developments as an achievement of the AKP government and treats them as affirmation of Turkey’s expanding role in regional diplomacy (Star, September 4).

    Explaining the normalization with reference to the involvement of outside actors inevitably raises questions about the motivations of “outsiders.” At this juncture, the role of energy issues is emphasized by the Turkish media. There is a perception that the process is promoted by the West as part of its energy policies. They speculate that Turkish-Armenian normalization is promoted in order that Armenia might emerge as an alternative route to Georgia for the future transportation of Caspian basin resources (Milliyet, September 3).

    Such analyses inevitably ignore the issue of the Russian position. There is already a process underway between Azerbaijan and Armenia toward the resolution of the Karabakh dispute, facilitated by Russia and supported by the United States. Although the Russian side claims that it is playing a constructive role, the Turkish media maintains some skepticism toward Moscow’s intentions. There are media reports maintaining that Russian intelligence found out about the secret talks between Ankara and Yerevan and passed this information to Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, which led him to distance himself from Turkey in April (Milliyet, September 3). If such reports are correct, they might indicate Russian efforts to sow seeds of distrust between Baku and Ankara, and undermine policies to integrate Yerevan into a Western orbit.

    It is unclear whether Aliyev was aware in advance of the signing of the recent protocols, but Ankara apparently made efforts to inform Baku. Indeed, it has been a growing concern for Ankara to comfort Baku about the secret talks with Yerevan, and regain Azeri confidence since the bitter episode in April. A few days before the recent announcement to sign the protocols, Erdogan spoke to Aliyev on the telephone and sent two special envoys to Baku to brief him on the progress in Turkish-Armenian talks (Zaman, August 28). Azerbaijan’s Ambassador in Ankara Zakir Hashimov said that Davutoglu reassured his Azeri counterpart that the border would not be opened before the resolution of the Karabakh issue (Hurriyet Daily News, September 6).

    In the days ahead, a new domestic and foreign policy challenge will confront the AKP government, as it seeks to refine the details of the normalization with Armenia. A breakthrough in Azeri-Armenian talks might untie the knot, but it remains to be seen whether the international and regional pressures on Baku and Yerevan will produce such an outcome.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-press-reacts-to-turkish-armenian-normalization/
  • Interview with Elchin Guliyev

    Interview with Elchin Guliyev

    “State Border Service will carry out large-scale exercises in September”

    Baku. Rashad Suleymanov – APA. Chief of Azerbaijani State Border Service, commander of Border Troops, Lieutenant-General Elchin Guliyev interviewed by APA

    -Please, give information about the reforms carried out in Azerbaijan Border Security.

    -Azerbaijan Border Security has developed and has a great potential to fulfill any task in ensuring border security. This development is based on Azerbaijan’s border security strategy initiated by national leader Heydar Aliyev and extension of this strategy by Supreme Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev. Due to the State Program on “Technical development of Azerbaijan’s state border security for 2006-2010” confirmed by President on December 27, 2005, strong border security infrastructure meeting modern standards was established. Border units system meeting modern standards was established along the border, it was supplied with modern weapons, border aviation was formed, radar systems, modern observation and detecting devices were applied. Security of the state border by operation was strengthened, Academy of State Border Service was established. Important steps were taken shift from physical protection of state border to operation and technical security, border checkpoints and border guard ships were staffed. Some days ago Supreme Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev participated in the opening ceremony of “Serhedchi” Sport Olympic Center established in Baku. President appreciated the state of Azerbaijan State Security. Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s praise inspirited all border guards to gain new achievements.

    -What can you say about the operation conditions in Azerbaijan’s state borders and near our borders?

    -The situation in the state border is stable. I want to note that we are following the developments near our state borders and they are taken into consideration in organizing the service.

    -State Border Service has been commissioned to ensure security in Azerbaijan-section of the Caspian Sea, security of infrastructure of production and transportation of hydrocarbon resources. Please, give information about these tasks.

    – We give special importance to fulfillment of above-mentioned duties. The Coast Guard was established within the State Border Service by presidential order in 2005. The Coast Guard’s new base was built in Turkan district of Baku within the State Program on “Technical development of security of state borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan in 2006-2010”. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief attended the inauguration of the base on November 8 last year and was familiarized with the service conditions there and made special recommendations on allocation of diving equipments, creation of opportunities for fulfillment of special duties, strengthening of border patrol boats and technical observation posts and extension of disclosure opportunities. The patrol boats were equipped with modern radiolocation systems and weapons, as well as provided with additional maneuver opportunities. The State Border Service will receive special vessels floating in hard weather conditions in the days coming. The annual tactic exercises on “Combat and rescue operations for prevention of threats against coastal areas, islands, oil pipelines and platforms” have great importance for training of coast guards and strengthening of ties between different border units. According to the annual plan of actions, the SBS will hold large-scale exercises in September. Our achievements are the results of government’s care for border security issues. It enabled us to create modern and perfect infrastructure of the Coast Guard to secure national interests and to provide security on the sea. This work will be continued in future.

    – What about the cooperation and relations between your organization and border services of other countries?

    – There is a dynamic development of cooperation and relations between the border services of neighboring countries. We established and developed valuable mutual relations with border services and officials of Russian Federation, Georgia, Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The important achievements were reached on delimitation of state border with Russian Federation and Georgia and important part of common border line was agreed. The bilateral and multilateral relations with the border services of Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran on the sea are developed. We organized joint sea exercises together with Russia and Kazakhstan. Chiefs of the borders services of Caspian littoral states held bilateral meetings. Baku hosted trilateral working meetings between Azerbaijan-Russia-Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan-Russia-Iran. The situation of security on the Caspian Sea and tendencies of its future development were discussed at the meetings. Chiefs of the Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan border services will be invited to the next working meetings, which are planned to be held in five–sided format.

    APA – Rashad Suleymanov  

  • Thaw Praised in Enclave

    Thaw Praised in Enclave

    By Karine Ohanian in Stepanakert (CRS No. 509, 04-Sep-09)

    Politicians in Nagorny-Karabakh have given a cautious welcome to the thaw in Armenian-Turkish relations, especially since the status of their own self-declared state was not included in the published “protocols”.

    Ankara and Yerevan announced on the last day of August that, with two protocols, they had agreed the terms under which diplomatic relations between them could be restored, and the border opened, although the precise details of the agreement have not been released.

    “We are closely following Armenian-Turkish relations, or more accurately, the true desire of Armenia to create these relations,” said Bako Sahakian, president of Nagorny-Karabakh.

    Turkish politicians had previously linked a restoration of ties to a resolution of the status of Nagorny-Karabakh, which has declared independence but is internationally considered a part of Azerbaijan, a close ally of Turkey. Karabakh’s Armenian inhabitants have governed themselves independently since Baku’s troops were driven out in the early 1990s, and Sahakian said he was still concerned by Turkey’s position.

    “This cannot inspire much hope for the creation of honest and true relations,” he said.

    Other figures believed the thaw could mean Ankara had abandoned its insistence on Karabakh being handed back to Baku’s control.

    “An important positive element of the protocol is the lack of a direct connection between the normalisation of Armenian-Turkish relations and the regulation of the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict, and the clear separation of these two conflicts,” Masis Mailian, a former candidate for the presidency and the current chairman of the Civic Council for Foreign Policy and Security, told IWPR.

    “Azerbaijan, as a result of the Armenian-Turkish process, will become more compliant in the Karabakh talks process, which will allow a peace deal to be reached more quickly.”

    Karabakh’s leaders will be closely watching the next six weeks, when the protocols will be discussed in the two countries, then submitted to the parliaments for approval. The removal of Karabakh from the discussions, as well as the lack of a mention of the Armenian genocide question has made the documents more likely to be accepted. At least half a million Armenians died when they were driven out of their homes in Ottoman Turkey in 1915 but Turkey denies it was genocide.

    “It is currently too early to say what this possible Armenia-Turkey agreement could give to the Karabakh regulation process; it all depends on geopolitical developments. I welcome this thaw, but stress that attempts to connect Armenian-Turkish relations with regulating Karabakh-Azerbaijan are unacceptable. This cannot be done at the cost of Karabakh or the genocide,” said David Babaian, head of the president’s information service.

    Karine Ohanian is a freelance journalist and a member of IWPR’s EU-funded Cross Caucasus Journalism Network.
    The terminology used in this report was chosen by the editors.

  • Khojaly genocide victims were presented as victims of so-called Armenian “genocide…”

    Khojaly genocide victims were presented as victims of so-called Armenian “genocide…”

    Nobert Yevdayev, editor-in-chief of New York-based Russian language newspaper “Noviy Rubezh” (‘New Frontier’) and chairman Azerbaijani Friendly Association AZEM spoke in an interview with Day.Az.

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    Nobert Yevdayev, born in Baku in 1929, is a truly unique and more than a versatile person. Jazz musician, poet, painter, journalist, author of numerous scientific papers – this is not the whole list of his hobbies and achievements.

    Since 1989, the former from Baku resident lives in the United States and since 2003 publishes the newspaper “Noviy Rubezh”. In an interview Day.Az Yevda tells how the newspaper began publishing, about Azerbaijanis and migrants from Azerbaijan living in the States and the intrigues of the Armenian diaspora.

    Day.Az: How did you decide to publish a newspaper? What is the aim of “Noviy Rubezh”?

    Nobert Yevdayev: In 2003, upon the recommendation of one of my friends, I was invited by leaders of Mountain Jewish Community with a request to publish a newspaper. My conditions were as follows –  not to be confined to narrow communal interests and to publish a newspaper with general information of world political and cultural international events.

    The newspaper is published since May 2003. It has 32 pages. It appears once a month and does not contain news. The newspaper publishes articles in English, Russian, Azerbaijani and Gorski Jewish languages. A total 3,000 are released. In addition New York City, the newspaper is circulated in mountain Jewish communities abroad including Moscow, Baku, Tel Aviv, Berlin and Toronto.

    Q: How many Azerbaijanis and migrants from Azerbaijan live in New York according to your own estimations?

    A: We do not have statistics. But the most active part of people from Azerbaijan meet every year to celebrate Novruz. This festival is celebrated by several organizations, in particular, the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the UN in New York restaurant ‘Baku Palace’, Association of Azerbaijanis living in the United States and the Association of Azerbaijanis living in New York. Each of the events unite at most 300 people.

    As the most prominent representatives of Azerbaijani people living in the U.S. I can note Nargiz Shakynskaya – a well-known observer and presenter in the American TV channel, Azim Sadykhov – filmmaker and Award Winner of film festivals in the United States, Telman Jalilov – Honored Artist of Azerbaijan and the head of the Azerbaijani national dance, Chingiz Sadikhov – well-known pianist and the accompanist of Rashid Behbudov and Muslim Magomayev in the past, Anna Toporovski – a well-known radio commentator which broadcasts the events taking place in the White House and many others. Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of known great Azerbaijanis. However, many migrants from Azerbaijan live in the U.S. whom we do not know.

    Q: Resistance of young but already quite strong and influential Azerbaijani diaspora against famous Armenian diaspora in the United States in the past few years has been very active. What is the superiority and inferiorty of Azerbaijani diaspora over and to the Armenian diaspora?

    A: Armenian Diaspora, particularly in New York, is not an organized force that could confront us. It does not have its media, it does not hold public events, in any case, like we do. We follow mainly Russian-language press which sometimes publishes forgeries related to the confrontation.

    We find this kind of fakes and expose them and publish stories of exposure in our newspaper. For example, articles in the newspaper ‘In a New light’ which published photos of victims of Khojaly genocide allegedly to be victims of so-called “genocide” of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. We contacted the editor, invited him to the Mission of Azerbaijan to the UN where he had to apologize for the correspondent who resorted to such provocation. In our paper we very much emphasize positive developments in Azerbaijan where tolerance towards different nationalities and confessions triumphs.

    Neither Russian-language nor English-language press stages anti-Azerbaijani propaganda in New York. There are no Armenian newspapers here. Mostly, propaganda goes on internet which is full of misinformation. I think there are enough skilled forces in Azerbaijan that can confront this tool.

    Azerbaijan Association of New York also publishes its own newspaper ‘Azerbaijan Review’ in Azerbaijani, English and Russian languages. This paper pays much attention to the Karabakh conflict. I helped to create this newspaper and I am a member of its editorial board. We believe that this topic is not wide-spread in New York press. This topic should be widely covered in the Los Angeles newspapers where a very large Armenian community resides.

    Moreover, we believe that today the main work should be done by politicians to win over the field of lobbying in Congress where Armenians have a very strong position We, on our part, are making  efforts to communicate with important Jewish organizations to create a positive image of Azerbaijan for them. One of the results of our work is that for the second consecutive year, representatives of Azerbaijan are invited to the so-called breakfast with congressmen, where lawmakers talk about their work in Congress. Except representatives of Azerbaijan, no representatives from any other participate in the meeting.

    http://www.today.az/news/politics/55306.html