Turkish Forum English

Category: Azerbaijan

Armenia engagement derailing Turkey’s energy policy

by Ferruh Demirmen

Türksam, December 9, 2009

(Turkish Center for International Relations & Strategic Analysis)

A misconceived engagement with Armenia has boomeranged beyond diplomacy to impact Turkey’s energy policy. The developments so far are already worrying, and further negative consequences may follow. Turkey’s energy policy is held hostage, and the culprit is a short-sighted Armenia rapprochement that has ignored Azerbaijan’s legitimate concerns on Nagorno-Karabakh.

While some may view the energy “fallout” as a case of “unintended consequences” for Turkey, the effects could have been foreseen easily.

Background

The secret, Switzerland-based Turkish-Armenian normalization process that surfaced in April 2009 in the aftermath of President Obama’s visit to Turkey, albeit launched with good intentions, turned out to be a disappointment for the Turkish side. The “road map” that was announced had a glaring omission: trustworthy preconditions or commitments requisite for normalization of bilateral relations.

In particular, there was no assurance that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, vital for Azerbaijan, would be resolved before opening the Turkey-Armenia border. Baku was concerned, and Turkish-Azerbaijani relations soured.

The two Turkish-Armenian protocols later initialed on August 31 and signed on October 10 confirmed the absence of any caveat on Nagorno-Karabakh, and further alienated Azerbaijan.

For the better part of 2009 Turkey has been trying to placate Azerbaijan, with promises that it will not open the Turkey-Armenia border unless the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is first resolved.

The promise is like a double-edged sword. If Turkey reneges on its promise to Azerbaijan, Turkish-Azerbaijani relations will receive a serious, possibly fatal blow. If Turkey keeps its promise, and Turkish-Armenian normalization fails as a result, Turkey will be criticized in the West for being insincere or manipulative on Armenia “opening.” Armenian “genocide” allegations in the US Congress will come to the forefront again. April 24, 2010 is not too far ahead.

In either case, unless the Armenian parliament refuses to ratify the normalization protocols before the Turkish parliament does, Turkey will be the loser.

That will be the price paid for an ill-conceived political process. Armenia has made it clear repeatedly that it sees no linkage between the normalization process and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. So, Turkey is facing a major quandary.

At present, neither Turkey nor Armenia has submitted the protocols to their respective parliaments for ratification. The fate of the normalization process will hang heavily on the actions of the two parliaments. But for Turkey, and the West in general, some energy projects are at stake.

The fallout on energy

From energy point of view, worsening Turkish-Azerbaijani relations, if not stemmed, will come at a heavy price for Turkey. Alarmed at the Turkish-Armenian normalization talks conducted behind his back, an angry and resentful Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, announced in May that, if forced, Azerbaijan would resort to military force to recapture the Azeri Nagorno-Karabakh territory it lost to Armenia in 1994. (See also recent analysis, ref. 1)

Aliyev had the sympathy of Turkey and a host of other nations and several UN resolutions to back him up, but that was not enough. Peace talks mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group were also not producing palpable results. (Armenian-Azeri talks in Munich in late November were also inconclusive, ref. 1).

To give credibility to his warning, or threat, Aliyev decided to play the gas card as a strategic tool. Partnership with Russia, at least on energy initially, was the strategy he had in mind. And Russia, given the opportunity to exploit the South Caucuses conflict, was more than willing to appear cooperative.

The gas card Aliyev was mulling over was the Shah Deniz gas lying below the bed of the Caspian Sea. Aliyev was already unhappy over the prolonged, yet unresolved, dispute with Turkey over the price of Shah Deniz-1 gas that Turkey had been importing since July 2007. The price of gas was up for negotiation in April 2008, but discussions had reached a deadlock. Aliyev complained that Turkey was paying, at $120/1000 m3, one-third of the market price for gas, and Turkey’s counter offers were not high enough.

On June 29, Russia’s Gazprom and Azerbaijan’s state-owned company Socor signed a gas agreement in Baku in the presence of respective presidents. The agreement stipulated that, starting in 2010, Gazprom would buy Azeri gaz, including, apparently, Shah Deniz-2 gas when it becomes available (currently in 2015). This would be the first time in Azerbaijan’s history that Azeri gas would be exported to Russia.

The gas volume initially involved was small (annually 500 million m3), but it was announced that the volume would increase in future. Gazprom would have the right of first refusal on additional supplies of gas when available. The agreement paved the way for a broad Russian-Azerbaijani cooperation that could possibly extend beyond gas.

The June 29 deal received further endorsement in Baku on October 14.

The Russian-Azerbaijani accord was a clear message to Turkey, and the West in general, from Aliyev that Azerbaijan would keep its options open as far as exporting its gas from the planned Shah Deniz Phase-2 development. This cast doubt not only on future Shah Deniz-2 gas supplies to Turkey, but also on Azeri gas supplies to the planned west-bound Nabucco project that Turkey had boastfully committed itself to in Ankara on July 13 (ref. 2).

To export its gas, Azerbaijan is now pursuing other options that circumvent Turkish territory: a subsea line in the Black Sea running from Georgia to Romania (White Stream project), tanker transport of compressed gas from Georgia to Bulgaria, and a swap or direct gas sale deal with Iran. Preliminary agreements have been signed on all of these. The existing pipeline connections with Iran and Russia would facilitate Russia and Iran options.

Broader implications

Turkey’s ill-founded Armenia engagement process, lacking any meaningful preconditions, is derailing Turkey’s energy policy. A distrustful Azerbaijan has now moved closer to Russia, and Shah Deniz-2 gas exports to Turkey for its domestic needs, as well as for onward transit to Europe via the planned Nabucco pipeline, are put in jeopardy.

Import of Turkmen gas via a future Trans-Caspian pipeline, that could also feed the Nabucco pipeline, is also at risk. For Turkmen gas to reach Turkey via the Trans-Caspian pipeline, Azerbaijan’s cooperation is essential.

Turkey needs Azeri gas in excess of the currently imported Shah Deniz-1 gas to diversify its gas supply sources and routes. Currently there is excessive (some 60%) dependence on Russian gas supplies for Turkey’s domestic needs.

Despite its shortcomings,Nabucco project is still a vital project for Turkey both from energy and political point of view (ref. 2). If Nabucco does not receive throughput from Azeri or Turkmen sources, Turkey’s long-avowed strategic position as an energy corridor to the West will be seriously compromised.

Public outcry stemming from alienation from the brotherly Azeri nation is also a price that Turkish policy makers must consider.

The above considerations leave no doubt that the Ankara-Baku rift should be mended. The sooner the better. The onus of this burden rests mainly on Turkey, not Azerbaijan. Otherwise Azerbaijan will move even closer to Russia, and Turkey may have to do without new Azeri (Shah Deniz-2) gas supplies. That would be rather unfortunate.

While it would entail a higher cost, Azerbaijan has options to export its gas without transiting Turkish territory.

Aliyev has indicated a number of times that Azerbaijan is interested in the Nabucco project, but unless Turkey is more accommodating, that interest may go nowhere.

All indications are that Turkey has overplayed its hand as far as its geographic position as an energy conduit, and has also stonewalled too long to meet reasonable Azeri requests for a gas price that closely reflects market conditions.

Turkey should not be seen as being obstructionist for the implementation of the Nabucco project. In this connection, the possible ramifications of Turkey’s support for the rival South Stream project during the August 6 Russia-Turkey-Italy energy summit in Ankara were not lost on the EU, and may dampen the EU’s interest in Nabucco.

It is telling that Austrian OMV (the flag-bearer for Nabucco), Italian ENI and French EDF have signed preliminary agreements with Gazprom recently about joint implementation of the South Stream project. In the light of these developments, one wonders whether the EU’s support for Nabucco is as good as before, and whether Turkey’s apparent wavering on Nabucco is playing a role. The financing problem of Nabucco is also at a standstill.

Another fallout from strained Turkish-Azerbaijani relations could be the curtailment of the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) throughput, with some of the crude diverted to the Russian and Georgian ports of Novorossiysk and Supsa, respectively. Lukoil, ExxonMobil and Devon, shareholders of AIOC (Azerbaijan International Oil Company) but not the BTC consortium, are already using these routes to export their entitlements from the ACG (Azeri-Chirag-Gunesli) field in Azerbaijan.

Export of Kazakh crude through the BTC could also be delayed or blocked. An ominous sign in this respect comes from the Russian-Kazakh oil transit agreement signed in Yalta on November 20. The agreement signaled support for the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline, which Russia, at Turkey’s strong urging, recently endorsed. Samsun-Ceyhan will undermine plans to export Kazakh oil through a trans-Caspian pipeline link to the BTC.

An irony for the US

As a footnote to the above, it is also worth observing an irony in Turkey’s “opening” to Armenia. It is no secret that US pressure, in particular the urging of President Obama in person, played a key role in launching the Armenia engagement process. Yet, the process has not only damaged the close Turkish-Azerbaijani partnership, it has drawn Azerbaijan into Russia’s orbit of influence. This runs counter to the long-established US policy of weaning Soviet-era Turkic republics from Russia’s sphere of influence, in particular on energy.

The maxim, “unintended consequences,” describes this situation well for the US.

Concluding remarks

An ill-conceived political normalization process undertaken with Armenia has pushed a nervous Azerbaijan closer to Russia and has driven this small nation to seek alternative gas export options that circumvent Turkish territory. Future Azeri, and in the longer term Turkmen, gas imports to Turkey are jeopardized.

Some of the throughput to the BTC may be diverted, and plans to channel Kazakh oil to the BTC may be cancelled or postponed indefinitely.

In parallel, Turkey’s role to act as an energy corridor to the West is compromised.

The energy projects impacted are all important for Turkey. If for no other reason than to safeguard these projects, it is vitally important that the Turkish-Azerbaijani relations are put back where they belong, and where they traditionally have been: good, friendly terms.

Despite rosy statements from Turkish government circles, Turkish-Azeri relations are severely strained. Rapprochement with Armenia should not come at the expense of brotherly relations with Azerbaijan.

Turkish policy makers who now claim the Turkey-Armenia border would not be opened until the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is resolved, should answer the question: If that were to be so, why did the normalization protocols signed with Armenia not contain the requisite precondition in the first place? It is no secret that the Armenia engagement started under external pressures, both from the US and the EU.

The adverse energy-related effects stemming from the ill-conceived Armenia normalization process were no surprise, and could have been foreseen in advance.

Those who are entrusted to lead the nation should be cognizant of the fact that one-sided foreign-policy initiatives that are launched without due consideration of underlying risks can have boomerang effects that may undermine national energy interests.

If the rift in energy cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan deepens, in a sense it will be a betrayal of the legacy of the late Azerbaijani President Haydar Aliyev, who, with resolute determination, championed the realization of the BTC project despite many roadblocks. Turkey will bear the lion’s share of responsibility for this state of affairs.

Separate from the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the Armenia normalization process has ignored other legitimate concerns that are important for Turkey (ref. 3).

A far-sighted national energy policy requires vision, foresight and perseverance. Whether Turkey’s policy makers have these traits, the readers should ponder.

References cited

(1)   “Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations in Munich and the possibility of war,” by Sinan Oğan, Türksam, Nov. 23, 2009.

(2)   “Nabucco: A challenge for EU and a partially fulfilled promise for Turkey,” by Ferruh Demirmen, Eurasia Critic, September 2009.

(3)   “Current Turkish ‘opening’ to Armenia cannot be supported,” by Ferruh Demirmen, Turkish Forum, October 9, 2009.

ferruh@demirmen.com

December 10, 2009
The rise of Azerbaijan

There is one development in the region of the Caucasus, that can not be ignored: the rise of Azerbaijan has changed the interest of the regional superpowers. Where Russia and Turkey were to preoccupied with their western neighbors, they are now turning eastern to the Causasus. The main reason for this is the big economic growth that Azerbaijan has gone threw in the last couple of years.

Ever since the disastrous war against Armenia back in 1992, Azerbaijan has invested largely in their rich oil and gas fields. This has led to the findings of many new oil en gas sources; the excavations and export of these sources has made Azerbaijan without doubt the richest country in the Causasus. Unfortunately for Armenia all the oil and gas pipes are build to go around Armenia (see map 1). So rich that Azerbaijan has found the confidence to tighten the diplomatic relations with other upcoming countries such as Polen , Belarus , Japan , İran , Romania , Russia and their historical and cultural ally Turkey . This is a big difference with Azerbaijan’s biggest rival in the Causasus: Armenia. Ever since Armenia occupied approximately 24% of Azerbaijan’s territory in 1992 (see map 2), it has been regarded as the outlaw of the region. Turkey and Azerbaijan have boycotted Armenia ever since the occupation, an occupation which has led to almost 30.000 dead Azeri civilians and another one million Azeri refugees who were forced to leave the areas occupied by Armenian forces due to Armenia’s policy of ethnic cleansing.

Now Armenia has to spend a big amount of their budget to consolidate the occupation of Azerbaijan, while almost al their neighbors are boycotting Armenian trade. The only lifeline that holds Armenia alive is the Russian-Armenian agreement. But this has started to change, since Russia has realized that Azerbaijan has a lot more to offer them than Armenia. While Armenia is almost bankrupt due to the heavy strain the occupation has provided them, Azerbaijan is among the richest countries in the region. Smart investments has led to a great increase in military technology, which is to be used to recover their lost lands. According to Azerbaijan president İlham Aliyev this can be achieved by diplomatic means or in the worst case by arms. Seeing that they are in a situation without a positive end, Armenia has come to terms with their underdog position. It has recently agreed to re-establish international relations with Turkey and is now talking with Azerbaijan to ensure that it won’t be swept of the map by the upcoming rich state of Azerbaijan. It was Turkish member of parliament Şenol Bal who described the situation accordingly:

“Currently, there is no production in Armenia. People head to other countries to earn money. Nearly 50,000-60,000 Armenian migrants work in Turkey. They support their families with their income back in Armenia. Today Armenia has to make concessions to Turkey, but not Turkey to Armenia. In fact, Armenia should ask us to open borders not to starve to death and abandon its claims.”

According to various diplomats, such as Aladdin Büyükkaya , Armenia has even informally agreed to leave to lands they have occupied for so many years. This has been confirmed by Azerbaijan president Aliyev who stated:

“Armenia has agreed to leave five Azeri regions it has occupied for 15 years. After doing so, we will agree to sign a peace agreement concerning the largest occupied region Karabağ [where fierce fighting between Armenian and Azeri forces continues on and off]. But Karabağ will not be an independent state, like Armenia wishes to realize, nor will their be a corridor between Karabağ and Armenia. It can at most be a autonomous province of Azerbaijan. After redrawing their forces from five Azeri regions, Armenia will have five years to withdraw from the other two regions Kelbeçer and Leçin.”

This would mean that the most disputed province of Karabağ (which is located at the hart of Azerbaijan but has a quite large Armenian minority), would be an autonomous province as a part of Azerbaijan. This would of course be good news for the approximately one million Azeri refugees who can at last return to their homes and not in the least for Armenia which can now start to trade with their neighboring states and in doing so, recover their economy.

There is one development in the region of the Caucasus, that can not be ignored: the rise of Azerbaijan has changed the interest of the regional superpowers. Where Russia and Turkey were to preoccupied with their western neighbors, they are now turning eastern to the Causasus. The main reason for this is the big economic growth that Azerbaijan has gone threw in the last couple of years.

Ever since the disastrous war against Armenia back in 1992, Azerbaijan has invested largely in their rich oil and gas fields. This has led to the findings of many new oil en gas sources; the excavations and export of these sources has made Azerbaijan without doubt the richest country in the Causasus. Unfortunately for Armenia all the oil and gas pipes are build to go around Armenia (see map 1). So rich that Azerbaijan has found the confidence to tighten the diplomatic relations with other upcoming countries such as Polen, Belarus, Japan, İran, Romania, Russia and their historical and cultural ally Turkey. This is a big difference with Azerbaijan’s biggest rival in the Causasus: Armenia. Ever since Armenia occupied approximately 24% of Azerbaijan’s territory in 1992 (see map 2), it has been regarded as the outlaw of the region. Turkey and Azerbaijan have boycotted Armenia ever since the occupation, an occupation which has led to almost 30.000 dead Azeri civilians and another one million Azeri refugees who were forced to leave the areas occupied by Armenian forces due to Armenia’s policy of ethnic cleansing.

Now Armenia has to spend a big amount of their budget to consolidate the occupation of Azerbaijan, while almost al their neighbors are boycotting Armenian trade. The only lifeline that holds Armenia alive is the Russian-Armenian agreement. But this has started to change, since Russia has realized that Azerbaijan has a lot more to offer them than Armenia. While Armenia is almost bankrupt due to the heavy strain the occupation has provided them, Azerbaijan is among the richest countries in the region. Smart investments has led to a great increase in military technology, which is to be used to recover their lost lands. According to Azerbaijan president İlham Aliyev this can be achieved by diplomatic means or in the worst case by arms. Seeing that they are in a situation without a positive end, Armenia has come to terms with their underdog position. It has recently agreed to re-establish international relations with Turkey and is now talking with Azerbaijan to ensure that it won’t be swept of the map by the upcoming rich state of Azerbaijan. It was Turkish member of parliament Şenol Bal who described the situation accordingly:

“Currently, there is no production in Armenia. People head to other countries to earn money. Nearly 50,000-60,000 Armenian migrants work in Turkey. They support their families with their income back in Armenia. Today Armenia has to make concessions to Turkey, but not Turkey to Armenia. In fact, Armenia should ask us to open borders not to starve to death and abandon its claims.”

According to various diplomats, such as Aladdin Büyükkaya, Armenia has even informally agreed to leave to lands they have occupied for so many years. This has been confirmed by Azerbaijan president Aliyev who stated:

“Armenia has agreed to leave five Azeri regions it has occupied for 15 years. After doing so, we will agree to sign a peace agreement concerning the largest occupied region Karabağ [where fierce fighting between Armenian and Azeri forces continues on and off]. But Karabağ will not be an independent state, like Armenia wishes to realize, nor will their be a corridor between Karabağ and Armenia. It can at most be a autonomous province of Azerbaijan. After redrawing their forces from five Azeri regions, Armenia will have five years to withdraw from the other two regions Kelbeçer and Leçin.”

This would mean that the most disputed province of Karabağ (which is located at the hart of Azerbaijan but has a quite large Armenian minority), would be an autonomous province as a part of Azerbaijan. This would of course be good news for the approximately one million Azeri refugees who can at last return to their homes and not in the least for Armenia which can now start to trade with their neighboring states and in doing so, recover their economy.

Drs. Armand Sag

December 8, 2009
Turkey’s Erdogan Stands By Karabakh Linkage

U.S. — President Barack Obama (R) meets with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Washington, DC, 07Dec2009

08.12.2009

Armen Koloyan

Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan remained adamant in linking the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations with a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict after meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington on Monday.

The U.S.-backed rapprochement between the two historical foes was among the issues of mutual interest discussed by the two men. Obama urged Ankara to press ahead with establishing diplomatic relations with Yerevan and reopening the Turkish-Armenian border.

“I also congratulated the Prime Minister on some courageous steps that he has taken around the issue of normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations, and encouraged him to continue to move forward along this path,” he told journalists after the talks.

In a recent letter to a prominent Armenian-American leader, Obama reiterated Washington’s position that the normalization process should be completed “without preconditions and within a reasonable timeframe.”

Erdogan made clear, however, that a Karabakh settlement remains “important in the context of Turkish-Armenian relations” and indicated that he and Obama looked at their future through the prism of the Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute. “We have discussed the Minsk Group and what the Minsk Group can do — the United States, Russia, and France — to add more impetus to that [Karabakh] process,” he said.

Turkey — US President Barack Obama meets with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, 06Apr2009

“I can say that to have more impetus in the Minsk process is going to have a very positive impact on the overall process, because the normalization process between Turkey and Armenia is very much related to these issues,” added Erdogan.

The Turkish premier was even more explicit about the Karabakh linkage in an interview with Azerbaijan’s ANS television given ahead of his visit to the United States. “We have declared to U.S. representatives right from the beginning that if you want to resolve the Turkish Armenian issue you should also resolve the Karabakh conflict,” he said. “Otherwise, you will fail to resolve either.”

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu similarly stressed the importance of Karabakh peace for Turkish-Armenian reconciliation when he addressed a high-level meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Athens last week. Armenian leaders have implicitly threatened to walk away from the recently signed fence-mending agreements between the two nations if Ankara fails to implement them by next spring.

In the days leading up to Erdogan’s trip to Washington, the leading Armenian-American advocacy groups called on Obama to make good on his campaign pledges to recognize the Armenian genocide and press the Turkish government to do the same. The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) urged members and supporters to petition the White House through phone calls, letters, and social networking websites.

In a weekend statement, the ANCA, which is highly critical of the Turkish-Armenian agreements, said Ankara is successfully exploiting the rapprochement process to keep Obama from describing the 1915 mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as genocide. “It’s patently clear that Turkey has in fact imposed preconditions, will not act in a reasonable time-frame, and, more broadly, views this entire process as simply a way to extend U.S. complicity in Turkey’s denials from one April 24th to the next,” the group’s executive director, Aram Hamparian, was quoted as saying.

The more moderate Armenian Assembly of America, which has largely endorsed the Turkish-Armenian “protocols,” also appealed to Obama over the weekend. The Assembly said his upcoming meeting with Erdogan “represents an important opportunity to hold the Turkish government accountable with respect to its international obligations to lift its blockade of Armenia and normalize relations without preconditions, as well as come to terms with its genocidal past.”

Speaking in Washington on Monday, Erdogan stuck to the official Turkish line that the World War One-era killings of Ottoman Armenian did not constitute genocide. According to the official Anatolia news agency, he also pointed to his 2005 proposal to set up a Turkish-Armenian commission of historians that would look into the events of 1915.

One of the two “protocols” signed in Zurich in October is understood to envisage the establishment of such a panel.

https://www.azatutyun.am/a/1898200.html

December 8, 2009
Obama Vows ‘Vigorous Support’ For Turkish-Armenian Normalization

U.S. – US President Barack Obama addresses the nation on Afghanistan at the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 01Dec2009

04.12.2009

U.S. President Barack Obama has pledged to continue to press for an unconditional normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations which he believes should be completed within a “reasonable timeframe.”

Obama hailed the U.S.-backed dialogue between the two nations as “historic,” in a letter to Hirair Hovnanian, chairman of the Armenian Assembly of America, that was publicized by the influential advocacy group late on Thursday.

“I agree that normalization between Armenia and Turkey should move forward without preconditions and within a reasonable timeframe,” he said, echoing statements by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other U.S. officials.

“We will continue to vigorously support the normalization effort in the months ahead,” added Obama.

The letter dated November 20 came in response to a September 9 joint appeal to Obama from Hovnanian and the leaders of the Armenian General Benevolent Union and two U.S dioceses of the Armenian Apostolic Church. The signatories voiced support for the fence-mending Turkish-Armenian agreements and said Washington should get Ankara to stop linking their implementation with a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict favored by Azerbaijan.

The Armenian-American leaders also urged Obama to honor his campaign pledges to recognize the 1915 massacres of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as genocide once in office. “If this normalization process is used as a smokescreen for not reaffirming the Armenian Genocide and the U.S. record, it will be a blow to the rapprochement process and the expectations of people of goodwill everywhere,” they said, highlighting concerns among many Armenians in the United States and elsewhere in the world.

In his reply, Obama again stopped short using the word “genocide” with respect to “one of the great atrocities of the 20^th century,” even if he made clear that he stands by his past pronouncements on the subject. “My interest remains the achievement of a full, frank and just acknowledgement of the facts,” he wrote. “I believe that the best way to advance that goal is for the Armenian and Turkish people to address the facts of the past as part of their efforts to move forward.”

https://www.azatutyun.am/a/1894711.html

December 4, 2009
Hugh Pope on the Armenia-Turkey Rapprochment

Wednesday, December 2, 2009

In October, Armenia and Turkey signed protocols that — if ratified by their respective parliaments — will open their shared border and in multiple ways normalize relations between the two traditional antagonists. Given the region’s numerous nationalist rivalries, the move has triggered much thinking on what it means, and what else is possible. Hugh Pope, a friend and former colleague at The Wall Street Journal and now director of the Turkish project for the International Crisis Group, is one of the best authorities on the greater Turkic world. Hugh has a new book coming out — Dining With al-Qaeda — that sounds like a keeper. In exchange for dinner at my home last week, he kindly agreed to address some of the burning questions on the Armenia-Turkey accord.

O&G: Will the Turkish and Armenian parliaments ratify the agreement?



Pope: The parliaments will ratify the agreement on the protocols (normalization of diplomatic relations and opening the border) if Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and Armenian President Sargsyan recommend them to. The most interesting aspect of the protocols is in fact how little dispute there is between the two governments about the actual contents. The main problem is domestic, mainly from political opposition (on both sides to different extents), the diaspora reaction (for Armenia) and the Azerbaijani factor (for Turkey, which has a shared ethnic relationship with Azeris and cheap gas from Baku). All these three problems can be overcome if the two leaders can demonstrate the same firm political will that they have done in the past.

Turkey must also look to its own needs, delinking its policy from full association with Azerbaijan’s own perception of its short-term interests. In fact, the protocols are a good way to help spread stability in the region, which will be in Azerbaijan’s long term interest, and Turkey’s keeping the border closed since 1993 has done nothing to solve Nagorno-Karabakh. Similarly, Armenia must distance itself from the nostalgic desires of members of the diaspora and some of its own population, who seek to keep alive territorial claims on Turkey by not recognizing the international border. Outside support is also vital, and continues, and this is also a source of hope that ratification will go ahead.



Q: Step back, Hugh. What is the significance of the agreement regionally, historically and so on, whether or not it is ratified? Are you surprised?

A: The protocols represent the best chance for two traumatized peoples to achieve closure on the politicized debate whether to recognize as genocide the destruction of much of the Ottoman Armenian population and the trauma of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and its accompanying displacement and massacres. Both sides have tried the all-out nationalist narrative, and it has not healed the wounds of history.



The second significance is the positive example being set by the Turkish government since 2002 to grapple with subjects that until recently were completely taboo and to overcome historical problems. They’ve gone a long way to fixing their problems with Syria, Iraq and the Iraqi Kurds, and are also working on an opening to Turkey’s own Kurds and on finding a settlement for the divided island of Cyprus.



The dynamics supporting Turkey-Armenia convergence are strong, I believe. The agreement on the protocols is the latest and broadest indication of a process that started in 2000 with the first meeting of Turkish and Armenian academics in the US. This was followed by meetings by retired officials and senior academics in the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission, and then in years of secret talks between Turkish and Armenian diplomats.

In Turkey, this bilateral process has been accompanied and even led by the great 2005 meeting of Turkish academics rejecting the old denialist narrative about the Ottoman-era massacres of Armenians in the First World War, and the wave of regret and awareness in Turkey that followed the murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007. In Armenia and the diaspora, there has been some reaching out to Turkey too, as increasingly more people believe that dialogue can bring greater Turkish appreciation of the pain suffered by Ottoman Armenians during the World War I, an apology, and perhaps some compensation.



Opening the issues of the pre-1923 period is a Pandora’s box for Turkey, however. A significant portion of the population of modern Turkey is descended from Muslims driven bloodily out of the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East as the Ottoman Empire collapsed, resulting in family dramas that up to now have rarely been discussed. Although often only tangentially related to the Armenian question, it make some Turks ask, what about our own traumas?



Q: Does the agreement say anything about the times in which we live? For instance, could we expect other stubborn animosities to cool for the sake of pragmatism?

A: The agreement on the protocols do show unfortunately that it takes a long time to heal the wounds of conflict and massacre, especially when one side is much weaker, when territory is contested and when the two sides have no joint project with which to help the healing process (impossible between Turkey and Armenia as states during the Soviet period, of course).

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the agreement was the beneficial effect of Russia, France and the U.S. working together. Of course, Moscow and Washington have different objectives, but they both support Turkey-Armenian normalization, and if their foreign ministers hadn’t been in Zurich on Aug. 30, the signing of the protocols may never have happened.



Q: What type of reaction do you expect from Azerbaijan? If a military one, would its performance on the battlefield be better than in the early 1990s? And whatever the case, wouldn’t such an Azeri reaction scuttle the deal?

A: Great powers must make it very clear to all sides that any renewal of hostilities to try to derail the ratification of the protocols is unacceptable. Azerbaijan is currently working hard to legitimize its right to territorial integrity, while its president is frequently talking about the use of force to regain lost territories. Clearly, the Azerbaijani army is better armed and better trained than in the early 1990s, when it only had barely-coordinated militias. But Armenian and Karabakh Armenian forces control the high ground, they have had nearly two decades to dig in, and have everything to lose.

Any military offensive would be risky for the Azerbaijani government. Firstly, it might not succeed, and any reversal would be politically disastrous. Any attempt to reclaim territory by force is likely to be met by a massive military response and lead to a rapid extension of the conflict throughout the region. Secondly, the world would identify Azerbaijan as the initiator of hostilities, whereas it currently has some sympathy as the loser from the 1992-1994 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict — that is, defending its territory integrity according to international law.

The worst problem is that a military flare-up could happen without anyone actually deliberately choosing the time. Some 3,000 people have been killed in and around Nagorno-Karabakh since the 1994 ceasefire. Bored, armed young men are within 20 meters of each other in places, snipers are active, and the international observer mission is tiny and weak. Bellicose rhetoric influences people’s minds, and raises the risk of a renewed outbreak of violence.



Q: Do you expect a deal settling Nagorno-Karabakh, and if so what will it look like? If not, why not?



A: The Madrid principles laid down by the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, co-chaired by the U.S., Russia and France, are still the best roadmap anyone has for settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These foresee the return of occupied territories around Nagorno-Karabakh; interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh itself; a mechanism to decide the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh; a secure corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh; the return of displaced persons; and international peacekeepers and security guarantees.

The Turkish activism of this year has energized the Minsk process somewhat, and at times it seemed as though a deal might be possible. Unfortunately, the core issue – the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the procedure leading up to that final status, and whether it will have the right to secede from Azerbaijan even in a distant future – has proved just too raw and political a subject for either government to make compromises on.

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December 4, 2009
Nagorno Karabakh is Armenian land, claims Turkish journalist

[ 16 Nov 2009 15:34 ]
Yerevan – APA. Correspondent of the Aksam newspaper of Turkey Nagehan Alci visited Nagorno Karabakh, the occupied territory of Azerbaijan, APA reports.

Nagehan Alci, who visited Nagorno Karabakh through Armenia, claimed that these territories are Armenian lands. Giving interview to Armenia’s Public Television the journalist said:
“We, people living in Turkey, made a mistake. Karabakh is one hundred percent the Armenian territory and we have understood that you are persistent enough in not ceding these lands,” he said.

The journalist said he intended to see Nagorno Karabakh his own eyes and make a report about the life of “Karabakh people”.
“I offered the editor-in-chief to send me to Karabakh and received a positive reply. Turkey is also interested in the territorial dispute around Nagorno Karabakh. What I saw here dispelled my doubts about the past and future of Karabakh. Stepanakert made a great impression on us and we intend to come here again,” he said.

Commenting on Turkey-Armenia relations, Nagehan Alci said they want the borders to open.
“But Nagorno Karabakh problem is one of the major obstacles for the this process. Our government has stated that the borders will not be opened, unless Karabakh conflict is solved. Time will show,” he said.

Asked whether his visit to Nagorno Karabakh will cause dissatisfaction in Azerbaijan, Nagehan Alci said he supposes so.
“We try to be unbiased, characterize the region and write about the real situation. Maybe, we will be announced persona non grata, but I do not want to hurt anybody in Azerbaijan. This is my work, I am a journalist and my profession requires being everywhere,” he said.
Nagehan Alci said he will also visit Shusha and make a report there.

Spokesman for Foreign Ministry Elkhan Polukhov told APA that Azerbaijani embassy in Turkey is carrying out investigation concerning the visit of the Aksam correspondent to the occupied territories.

November 16, 2009