Turkish Forum

Category: Azerbaijan

  • Debate on Caspian Sea and future of Nabucco gas pipeline project

    Debate on Caspian Sea and future of Nabucco gas pipeline project

    Nabucco gas pipeline, which emerged in the recent history of energy, can create new opportunities for the EU countries to check the monopoly of Russia over their gas supply. This project is not only important for the diversification of gas supplies of the EU countries, but also will bring new advantages and stakes to the different countries while passing them through. Some of these countries are the post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan that intend to provide the natural gas resources for the following project. As obvious, these gas providers are the littoral Caspian Sea countries that legally dispute over the demarcation of the mentioned sea. Will it create difficulties for the realization of the Nabucco project? Or intentions of these states to join Nabucco will ease the dispute and push them towards concessions? 

    KEY WORDS: Nabucco gas pipeline, the Caspian Sea, demarcation, legal status, International Court of Arbitration, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, the EU

     Introduction

    The Nabucco gas pipeline is one of the hot issues among the planned projects those are on the agenda. The main problem that has been discussing till today is the natural gas sources of the following project. The first planned gas will come from Caspian Sea sources where the legal status of the sea is not solved completely yet. For that reason, all the issue of Caspian Sea legal status which related with the Nabucco project will analyze in this research paper. In the first part will analyze potential resources of the project and their opportunity in order to join the Nabucco pipeline. In this perspective there mainly will investigate Caspian Sea resources. Then in the second part will focus on the unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea and its negotiation process. At the result of the negotiation there were signed the agreement between Caspian littoral states which also will analyze in second part. Later, in the third part will investigate sectoral dispute between two costal states of Caspian Sea –Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan around the same oil and gas fields in the sea border of the two countries. Moreover, Ashgabat decide to send the issue to International Court of Arbitration which it can influence the realization of the Nabucco gas pipeline project. On the other hand, there are also will examine the intentions of Baku and Ashgabat toward the Nabucco project.

    The thesis of this paper is that the realizing of Nabucco project mainly depends on the Central Asian gas resources. To active this project, Trans-Caspian pipeline must not be forgotten. Since, there is a strong relationship between these two lines. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan could not be realized it due to possible Russian influence. Thus, they need at least one of the Western countries or US guarantee to realize it. Because of the construction of these pipelines can influence to Russian gas monopoly all over the Europe. However, problem is that today EU counters could not construct a union energy policy which they try to make it individually with Russia or others.

    In order to analyze every part of the issue, firstly it was used traditional method in which historical development is based on. Additionally, there were online resources which including official statements, and other reliable academic papers.

    Potential resources and problem overview of Nabucco project

    The Nabucco project represents a new gas pipeline connecting the Caspian region, Central Asia, Middle East via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary with Austria and further on with the Central and Western European gas markets[1]. In order to realize the project, the Caspian Sea gas resources are very essential, as the first stage of the project gas will come from Azerbaijan, which there is only Azerbaijan gas guarantee until now. Moreover, staying of the instability in the Middle East decreases the opportunity of this region in order to join the project and increases the importance of the Caspian Sea resources. On the other hand, for connecting the Iraq gas to Nabucco gas pipeline there is a need for a new pipeline between Turkey and Iraq which is a part of the Arab Gas pipeline. Besides, Iran is one of the alternative gas providers to Nabucco project with its enormous reserves but there is a problem about its underdevelopment gas infrastructure that needs huge investment. Also, the US is against the participation of Iran in the Nabucco project until solving the nuclear problems in this country. Because of all these reasons the Caspian Sea reserves are fundamental for realizing this project.

    Despite of the expectations of the European Union, there is a problem of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, which from 1991 till today could not be solved by the littoral states in this region. There is another problem as well. The Trans-Caspian pipeline that is planned to transport Turkmen and Kazakh gas to Baku has not been constructed yet, which will be joined Nabucco gas pipeline. Additionally, on July 2009 increasing dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan around the Caspian Sea oil and gas fields, where Turkmenistan has decided to send the issue to International Arbitrage, could create another difficulty for realization of the Nabucco project. This dispute stems from the unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea that will be discussed bellow.

    The unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea 

    The Caspian region is one of the main energy bases and one of the major economic assets in the world. There are huge oil and gas reserves here, which are currently attempted to be fully improved and be transported to the world markets. Its oil reserves estimated to be 18-35 billion barrels that near to the United States (22 billion) and the North Sea (17 billion barrels) oil reserves.[2] Additionally, the region has a huge capacity of gas reserves as well, which is approximately 236-337 trillion cubic feet[3].   

    After the establishment of the USSR, the legal status of the Caspian Sea is defined by the agreement between the Soviet Russia and Iran (Persia) without participation of the other Caspian littoral states. This agreement was signed between these two states on 26 February 1921. Another agreement on Trade and Navigation between the USSR and Iran was signed on 25 March 1940[4]. Later, in 1949, the Soviet Union began to use the Caspian Sea hydrocarbon resources in the offshore area centered in the costal part of the Caspian Sea of Azerbaijan. It is worthwhile to mention that before the exploration in the fields of Siberia of the USSR in 1960s, the most productive region was Azerbaijan in the Soviet Union[5].On the other hand, until 1970, the USSR part of the Caspian Sea was used as a common sea among Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan. After that in 1970 according to the new amendment, this area was divided among the Soviet littoral states[6]. According to this amendment, Kazakhstan got 29%, Azerbaijan 20%, Russia 19%, Turkmenistan 18% and Iran 14% of the Caspian Sea[7].

    After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when the Caspian Sea littoral states got their independence, they intended to determine the new status of Caspian Sea. In this period every littoral state’s perspective was different from others and they couldn’t achieve an agreement. Because, this process took place without pre-planning and, obviously, the littoral states were not ready for that in 1991-1992.  From the beginning, Azerbaijan was an only state that proposed the sectoral division via the median line method of the Caspian Sea, which now is accepted by the all other littoral states of the Caspian Sea but only except Iran.[8]

    Despite of the disagreement between the coastal states, Azerbaijan signed the “Contract of Century” in 1994 with the largest oil companies in the world in order to corporate and explore the Caspian Sea off shore fields in the Azerbaijan sector. With this event, the Caspian Sea became one of the major geo-strategic areas and energy sources of the world. However, in this period the Caspian Sea was not a part of the economic plans of Iran and Tehran considered the fact of the occurrence of the western oil companies in the Caspian Basin as a political danger to its national security. Moreover, Russia also could not accept this agreement because of the old imperialistic ambitions in the South Caucasus[9].

    After, singeing of the “Contract of Century” the Caspian littoral states could make an agreement and it was the first phase of the negotiations period. Russia and Kazakhstan could come to the agreement on the division of the northern part of the Caspian Sea to realize sovereign rights on subsoil use from July 6, 1998[10]. Later than, Azerbaijan also joined the contract, where at the beginning of the negations process her propose was the same. The signing of this agreement was very important, because the Caspian Sea costal states found a solution to the main legal problem of the Caspian Sea about its status and ways of the using it. The basin’s sectional division was admitted by all littoral states, except Iran.  Additionally, this agreement put a quota on the fishery and bioresearches in the Caspian Sea because of the threat of extinction[11].

    With the signing of the agreement, a dispute occurred between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan because of the distribution of the Caspian three oil and gas fields – Kapaz (Turkmenistan calls it Serdar), Azeri (Omar) and Chirag (Osman).  Even, in 2001 the Embassy of Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan was closed. Nevertheless, the relationship of two states began to normalize in the time of new and current President of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, and there were signed some good intention documents[12]. Then, bilateral negotiations constantly started between the two sides in order to solve the problem in the sea borders of the two states.   

    The bases of the bilateral negotiations have been constructed in the middle line principle and it was taken as a basis, which is also accepted in the international practice. The middle line concludes from the last costal point of territory of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. However, the problem is that, Ashgabat suggests that “Absheron peninsula and Chilov Island should not be taken into consideration while delimitating the Caspian Sea between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.[13]” If the two states border are delimitated from the Absheron peninsula and Chilov Island, there are two oil and gas fields – Azeri (Omar) and Chirag (Osman), which should be included into Azerbaijani territory of the Caspian Sea. Conversely, if these territories should not be taken into consideration while delimitating the Caspian Sea borders between these two states, these two oil and gas fields will be included into Turkmenistan area of the Caspian Sea.

    Despite of these expectations of Ashgabat, there is no any international practice like this, which one territory should not be taken into consideration while delimitating the sea borders between two or more states. Besides, Absheron peninsula is not a small territory in the Caspian Sea that can be ignored while measurement. It lies down nearly 60 km towards the Caspian Sea, in which approximately 1/3 population of Azerbaijan lives. Additionally, the capital city of Azerbaijan is placed at the same area[14].

    Moreover, there is another dispute around the field of Kapaz (Turkmenistan calls it Serdar), where, according to Ashgabat, belonged to Turkmenistan sector of the Caspian Sea during the Soviet period. However, according to Baku- after the 1970 amendment in the USSR’s Caspian Sea law, the border line passed through from the center of Kapaz (Serdar) field. Furthermore, this filed is revealed by Azerbaijani oilman in the Soviet time and today Baku wants to extract it from Turkmenistan.

             The International Court of Arbitration and the intentions of Baku and Ashgabat

    On the other hand, the bilateral negotiations has been continuing from 1999 till today between two parts and last meeting was realized in Baku on July 15-17 2009. After the last meeting, President of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow ordered to address the international experts and high-degree lawyers to learn the Azerbaijan’s claims over the disputed fields in the Caspian Sea and legality of the foreign oil-gas companies operating in those fields, and then, intent to send the documents to the International Court of Arbitration.  It should be also mentioned that before this statement, in the meeting of governments on July 10, Berdimuhamedow stressed that they (Turkmenistan) want to participate in Nabucco project[15], where there is seemed a contradiction between his two statements. Because, sending the dispute issue to an international court can cause a problem for realization of Nabucco project[16] from the point of view prestige. Since, may be an investments would not want to put investment to the project which its source in the International court.

     Nevertheless, Ashgabat decide to send issue to the International Arbitration may be there is different intention of Berdimuhamedow. Because, Turkmenistan is one of the largest global reserves and it is the largest producer of gas in the region with production of 2.0 tcf/yr, it accounts for almost two-thirds gas output of the region[17]. When Berdimuhamedow came to power, one of his priorities in the foreign policy was the diversification of energy transport roots to the world market. There is an attractive opportunity- is the Nabucco project, which completely depends on Turkmen gas to be realized at the end, because, Azerbaijani gas is not enough to fulfill the Nabucco gas pipeline.

    There is one of the main obstacles for Ashgabat to join Nabucco project is the unconstructed Trans-Caspian gas pipeline that aims to transfer Turkmen gas to Baku. Moreover, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan could not realize it together, because there are needs the Western encouragements to the both sides[18]. One can assume that the unexpected Turkmen move at this time aimed “specifically at attaining some more concessions from the West, especially given the current huge interest of the latter to get the Nabucco project swiftly implemented”[19].

    Meanwhile, there is a similarity between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in energy transportation policy toward the Nabucco project. It is a very important project for these two countries, because, both sides want to transport energy reserves to the world market without the bypassing Russia. Despite of those two Caspian littoral states’ intentions to this project, there is European Union diminished policy to realize the Nabucco project. As every EU country has its own national energy policy, as a result, they cannot construct a common and harmonized EU energy policy. At the result of inattention of EU, Baku singed the gas agreement with Gasport for selling Shah- Deniz II field’s gas to Russia .The amount of gas agreement was not huge, just 500 mil but it was the signal of Baku to the EU for to be more active. 

    On the other hand, four months ago, there was an explosion in the natural gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and Russia, where the natural gas flow has failed to resume yet[20]. Besides, as a result of the global financial crisis, there is a decrease in the natural gas demand in Europe. Thus, Russia wants to re-negotiate the volume-and-dollar terms for its gas. However, Turkmen has protested that a contract is a contract and Turkmenistan is losing $1 billion in a month in revenue[21].

    Meanwhile, the unbearable Russian position to Turkmen gas export still is in progress. In addition, there is imperceptible European Union view to Nabucco project which both of them speed up the construction of China Turkmenistan gas pipeline. The pipeline 1,833-kilometer gas pipeline starts at the gas plant near this border town in Turkmenistan and runs through central Uzbekistan and southern Kazakhstan before entering China at the border pass of Horgos in the northwest region of Xinjiang.  The pipeline, starting near a Chinese-developed gas field in eastern Turkmenistan, is expected to reach full annual capacity of 40 billion cubic metres by 2012-13 and help Beijing propel its explosive economic growth[22].

    Then again, the both of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan want to create a center of attention of the United State’s interest to this gas pipeline project. Because, the Nabucco project is the one of the big project in the world that there need full politically and financially supporting for the supplier counters and European counters. It’s too hard for European Union countries to realize the Nabucco project without the US supporting. Moreover, the “Nabucco is an integral part of a US strategy of total energy control over both the EU and all Eurasia”[23]. On the other hand, the role of the US lobbying for successfully realizing of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline which it began from Azerbaijan to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast, which opened in 2005[24] also be a magnet for Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.

    Eventually, the legal status of the sea should solve according to International Law and International practices with the providing of costal states interests because, the Caspian Sea is one of the major geo-strategic areas and energy sources of the world but not only for littoral states. On the other hand, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan should compromise each other in order to realizing of the Nabucco project because the both states are interest with this project.

    Conclusion

    The potential resources of the Nabucco project are under the question. There are some problems in the Middle East also Caspian Sea as well which it can influence the realization of project. On the other hand, there is unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea that it began after the collapse of the Soviet Union until today. Moreover, at the result of negotiation process there was signed the agreement between Caspian Sea littoral states about the sartorial division of sea according to middle line principle. Nevertheless, signed agreement for sartorial division of Caspian Sea, there is no fully solution of the problem. Additionally, increasing dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan around the Caspian Sea oil and gas fields, where Turkmenistan has decided to send the issue to International Arbitrage, could create another difficulty for realization of the Nabucco project.

    [1] Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH, “Project Description ,Pipeline Route,” (accessed August 15,2009)

    [2]CaspEcoProject Management and Coordination Unit, Caspian Sea Environment Program  “General background”   http://www.caspianenvironment.org/NewSite/Caspian-Background.htm /  (accessed 27 August 2009)

    [3] Bernard A. Gelb, Terry Rayno Twyman, The Caspian Sea Region and energy resources (New York: Hauppauge, 2004)

    [4] Kepbanov A. Yolbar,” The New Legal Status of the Caspian Sea Is The Basis of Regional Co-Operation and Stability ,” Journal  of International Affairs, Vol.2 Num. 4  (December 1997-February 1998)

    [5] Kamyar Mehdiyoun” International Law and the Dispute Over Ownership of Oil and Gas Resources in Caspian Sea”  The American Society of International Law. (2000)

    [6] Kepbanov A ..” The New Legal Status of the Caspian Sea …”

    [7] Meftun Metin”HAZAR Politik ve Bölgesel Güç”( İstanbul: IQ kültür sanat yayıncılıq 2004) 148

    [8] Yusifzade B. Khoshbakht, “The Status of the Caspian Sea Dividing Natural Resources between Five Countries,” Azerbaijan International, vol.8:3 (2000) (accessed September 10, 2009).

    [9] Rustam Mamedov “International Legal Status of the Caspian Sea: Issues of Theory and Practice” (working paper, Ankara University journals database, 32 DOI: 10.1501/Intrel_0000000041,2001)

    [10] Kazakhstan Today, “Russia ratified Russian-Kazakhstan Caspian sea division agreement” March 11.2007,   (accessed September 19, 2009).

    [11] Mamedov “International Legal Status of the Caspian Sea…

    [12] Michael P. Croissant, Bülent Aras, “Oil and geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region‎” ( Peaeger Publisher,  Westport USA, 1999) 34.

    [13] APA , “Turkmenistan Foreign Ministry: Absheron peninsula and Chilov island should not be taken into consideration while delimitating the Caspian Sea”  August  04, 2009 (accessed September 20, 2009)

    [14]  Gennadiĭ Illarionovich Chufrin , The security of the Caspian Sea Region ,( Stockholm International Peace Research Institute OXFORD 2001) 64

    [15] APA , “Turkmenistan Foreign Ministry: Absheron peninsula and Chilov island….

    [16] Jackson Alexander, “The Implications of the Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan Dispute”, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, vol. 42, August 10, 2009 (accessed September 19.2009)

    [17] Hooman Peimani , The Caspian pipeline dilemma: political games and economic losses, (Peaeger Publisher, Westport USA, 2001) 15

    [18] Ibrahimov Rovshen, “Turkmenistan need Western encouragement”( Qafqaz University lessons  Baku, Azerbaijan August 27,/2009 )

    [19] Jackson “The Implications of the Turkmenistan…..

    [20] David Trilling” Turkmenistan: Pipeline Spat With The Kremlin Turns Into A Political Test Of Strength” EURASIA INSIGHT 4/15/09  (accessed Dismember  25, 2009).

    [21]Steve Le Vine “Nabucco and Trans-Caspian: Times Change, Pipeline Politics Goes On” JULY 30, 2009, (accessed September 23, 2009).

    [22] Xinhua reports “Chinese, Turkmen, Kazakh, Uzbek presidents unveil gas pipeline”

    [23]Hearing, Energy supplies in Eurasia and implications for U.S. energy security (Washington USA: DIANE Publishing, 2007) 60

    [24] Brenda Shaffer, Energy Politics (Pennsylvania USA: University of Pen… Press, 2009) 53

     Famil QURBANOV – Baku Qafqaz University

  • U.S. Intelligence Chief Warns Of Karabakh War

    U.S. Intelligence Chief Warns Of Karabakh War

    EB32266F 5F5E 4F47 A0AE 203E15688B8D w527 sU.S. — U.S. National Intelligence Director Dennis Blair testifies during a hearing before the Senate (Select) Intelligence Committee February 2, 2010 on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC.

    03.02.2010

    The likelihood of another Armenian-Azerbaijani war for Nagorno-Karabakh has increased as a result of the U.S.-backed rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey, according to America’s top intelligence official.

    “Although there has been progress in the past year toward Turkey-Armenia rapprochement, this has affected the delicate relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and increases the risk of a renewed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh,” Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair warned late Tuesday in written testimony to a U.S. Senate committee.

    Blair also warned of broader security and stability threats persisting in the South Caucasus. “The unresolved conflicts of the Caucasus provide the most likely flashpoints in the Eurasia region,” he said. “Moscow’s expanded military presence in and political-economic ties to Georgia’s separatist regions of South Ossetia and sporadic low-level violence increase the risk of miscalculation or overreaction leading to renewed fighting.”

    The United States has strongly supported and at times mediated in the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement that began nearly two years ago and led to the signing last October of two “protocols” envisaging the normalization of relations between the two historical foes.

    Azerbaijan has condemned the agreements, saying that an open border with Turkey would only discourage Armenia from seeking a compromise solution to the dispute. Azerbaijani leaders have also continued to threaten to win back Karabakh and surrounding Armenian-occupied territories by force.

    The authorities in Armenia and Karabakh have dismissed the war threats. International mediators have also disapproved of them, repeatedly urging the conflicting parties to refrain from bellicose rhetoric.

    U.S. diplomats have seemed confident, at least until recently, that chances for renewed large-scale fighting in Karabakh are slim. Speaking to RFE/RL in October 2008, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried said the danger of another war “has somewhat receded because the [August 2008] war in Georgia reminded everyone in this region how terrible war is.” “War is no joke,” Fried said. “It’s a bad option.”

    https://www.azatutyun.am/a/1947893.html
  • TURNING POINT IN TURKISH AMERICAN PUBLIC ADVOCACY

    TURNING POINT IN TURKISH AMERICAN PUBLIC ADVOCACY

    ATAA’s Statement on H.Res. 252

    Dear Turkish Americans and Friends of Türkiye:

    House Resolution 252 passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) by a vote of 23-22 after HFAC Chairman Howard Berman extended the voting period thrice and forced reluctant legislators to show up and vote in favor of the resolution.

    The passage of H.Res. 252 represented ethnic politics at its worst, and made a mockery of the U.S. legislative, judicial and foreign policy processes. Indeed, United States foreign policy regarding Turkey, Armenia and the broader region was hijacked by ultra-nationalist Armenian politics in a few Congressional districts.

    The recalling of Turkish Ambassador Namık Tan was an expression of Turkey’s disappointment in what now appears to be a contradiction in the United States’ position on Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. It was also an expression in defense of the dignity of the Turkish people to whom the U.S. now appears to have denied fair and just treatment by this prejudicial resolution plagued with blatantly libelous falsifications.

    At this stage it is difficult to expect the Turkish people to support the ratification of the Turkey – Armenia protocols, as the people’s interest now turns to whether U.S. President Obama will attempt to rehabilitate U.S. credibility in Turkey and among Turkish Americans, or permit further deterioration in a Proclamation on April 24. Furthermore, an alleged agreement between the White House and HFAC not to bring H.Res. 252 to a floor vote appears empty, if not also deceptive, as confidence in the ability of the Resolution to actually pass Congress is meager.

    House Resolution 252 signals a turning point in Turkish American public advocacy. The 23-22 vote reflects the growing efficacy of the Turkish American public advocacy network, including its infrastructure, technical abilities, critical mass, cooperation, solidarity, and resolve. In 2007, H.Res. 106 passed the HFAC 27-21, after the late Congressman Tom Lantos voted in favor of the motion, and was followed by three standby members. In 2005, H.Res. 316 and 195 passed overwhelmingly 42-7 and 35-11, respectively. This is just the beginning, as an awakening Turkish American community and a resurging Turkish Republic take command of their destiny for “Peace at Home, Peace in the World.”

    I thank the Turkish American community, particularly YOU – the individual Turkish American and friend of Türkiye — for your tremendous efforts. In solidarity within diversity, over 5000 letters were submitted through the ATAA-FTAA-TCA campaign. ATAA visited most of the HFAC members at least once at the local level and three times on Capitol Hill. On March 3, 2010, the ATAA and FTAA joined in solidarity on Capitol Hill, as we visited each HFAC member one final time.

    I also thank the Azerbaijani, Crimean, Turkmen, Turcoman, Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Uighur American communities for their support. The Azerbaijan Society of America in New York – PaxTurcica in Los Angeles – USAN in Washington, DC supported the ATAA-FTAA-TCA letter campaign and Congressional visits. In addition, the Azerbaijanian American Cultural Alliance traveled from Texas to show its support at the March 4 HFAC Hearing.

    I thank the Turkish Coalition of America (TCA) for their invaluable support and guidance.

    Finally, I thank the ATAA Executive Committee, Board of Directors and Board of Trustees, and ATAA’s dedicated staff for their excellence in representing the Turkish American community in opposition to H.Res. 252 and in support of U.S.-Turkish relations. They have done this in parallel with four major ATAA projects, including Census 2010, SayTurk, Turkish American Broad Advocacy Network (TABAN) grassroots program, Turkish Student Outreach, and www.MediaWatchNow.com.

    Our task is not finished, though. In fact, it might be said that it is just starting now. First, we should build on this momentum to maintain our contact with our representatives to educate them on matters concerning Turkey USA relations, so that such “ill-informed” resolutions will not be supported in Congress. We should establish lasting bonds of friendship for future. Next, we should revive, reinvigorate, and grow our component organizations to reach out and touch every Turkish American in 50 states, to deter future misguided attacks on our heritage.

    Together we can do it and ATAA is here for you.

    Gunay Evinch
    President
    Assembly of Turkish American Associations

    ***

    Sevgili Türk Amerikalı’lar ve Türkiye’nin dostları:

    Sözde Ermeni soykırımı ilgili yasa tasarısı (H.Res. 252) Meclis Dı İlikiler Komitesi (HFAC) den 22 hayır ve 23 evet oyu alarak geçti. HFAC Bakanı Howard Berman oylama süresini 3 kez uzatıp oy vermekte isteksiz gözüken üyeleri zorlayarak tasarı lehine oy vermelerini sağladı.

    Etnik siyasetin en kötü ekilde temsil edildiği H.Res. 252 oylaması, Amerikan, yasama, yargı ve dı ilikiler süreçlerini maskaralık haline getirmitir. Nitekim, Amerika Birleik Devletleri’nin, Türkiye, Ermenistan ve bölge ülkelerle olan dı politikası aırı milliyetçi Ermenilerin Kongre seçim bölgelerindeki politikaları yüzünden gasp edilmitir.

    Bir hayal kırıklığı ifadesi olarak, Türk Büyükelçisi Namık Tan’ın geri çağrılması, Türk-Ermeni yakınlamasını destekleyen ABD için bir çeliki gibi görünüyor. Bu aynı zamanda, Türk insanının onurunu savunmanın da bir göstergesi olarak da algılanabilir. Bu sakıncalı karar tasarısı ile A.B.D adil tavrından uzaklamı duruyor.

    Bu aamada, Türk halkından Türkiye ve Ermenistan arasındaki protokolleri deskteklemesini beklemek oldukça zor görünmektedir. imdi merakla beklenen, Bakan Obama’nın, Amerika’nın Türkiye ve Türk Amerikalılar için güvenirliliği yeniden sağlamak için çaba gösterip göstermemesi ya da 24 Nisan resmi açıklamasını yaparak ilikileri daha da zor bir hale getirip getirmemesidir. Ayrıca, H.Res. 252 tasarısının oylamaya getirilmemesi konusunda Beyaz Saray ve HFAC arasında bir karar sağlanamamakla birlikte bu tasarının Kongre’ den geçip geçmemesi u an için belirsiz gözükmektedir.

    H.Res. 252, Türk-Amerikan ortak savunmasında dönüm noktasının sinyallerini vermektedir. 23-22’lik oy sonucu, altyapı, teknik becerileri, kritik kütle, ibirliği ve dayanıma da dahil olmak üzere Türk-Amerikan ortak savunma ağının artan etkinliğini yansıtmaktadır. 2007 yılında, H. Res. 106, Kongre üyesi Tom Lantosun lehte geç oyuyla HFAC de 27-21 oyla geçmiti. 2005 yılında H. Res. 316 ve 195 sırasıyla 42-7 ve 35-11 lik ezici bir çoğunlukla geçti. Bu sadece bir balangıç, aynı zamanda Türk Amerikan toplumu için büyük bir uyanı ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin Yurt ta ve Dünya da Barı” için komutayı ele almasıdır.

    Türk Amerikan toplumuna, özellikle de “Siz” değerli Türk Amerikalılara ve Türkiye’nin dostlarına göstermi olduğunuz muazzam gayretten dolayı teekkür ediyorum. Farklılıklar içinde dayanıma ilkesinden yola çıkarak, ATAA-FTAA-TCA olarak yürüttüğümüz mektup kampanyası kapsamında 5000’in üzerinde mektup Kongre’ye gönderildi. ATAA, ABD Temsilciler Meclisi Dı İlikiler Komisyonu’ndaki üyelerin ofisleri yerel düzeyde en az bir kere ve Capital Hill’de birkaç kez ziyaret edildi. 3 Mart 2010’da ATAA ve FTAA birlik olup tüm Komisyon üyelerinin ofislerini ziyaret ettik.

    Azeri, Kırımlı, Türkmen, Özbek, Kazak, Kırgız ve Uygur toplumlarına bizden desteklerini esirgemedikleri için teekkürlerimi iletiyorum. New York’taki Azerbaycan-Amerikan Toplumu, Los Angeles’daki Pax Turcica, Washington DC’deki Amerikan-Azeri Network ATAA-FTAA-TCA mektup kampanyasında ve Kongre ziyaretlerinde bize hep destek oldular. Bunun yanı sıra, Azerbaycan Amerikan Kültür Birliği 4 Mart’ta Dı İlikiler Komisyonu’ndaki oturumda Teksas’tan gelerek bizi yalnız bırakmadılar.

    Ayrıca, Amerika Türk Koalisyonu’na çok kıymetli destek ve katkılarından ötürü ükranlarımı sunuyorum.

    Son olarak, ATAA İcra Kuruluna, Yönetim Kuruluna ve Mütevelli Heyetine ve kendini iine adamı olan profesyonel ekibine, Türk Amerikan toplumunu 252 yasa tasarısına karı en iyi ekilde temsil ettikleri için ve Türk Amerikan ilikilerine yaptıkları katkılardan dolayı teekkür ediyorum. Ayrıca bir diğer önemli nokta, ATAA ekibinin bütün bu çalımaları dört büyük ATAA projesi ile birlikte yürütmü olmasıdır. Bunlar sırasıyla, Nüfus Sayımı için balattığımız Saytürk kampanyası, TABAN projesi, Türk Öğrenci Eriim programı ve medyada Türkiye hakkında çıkan yazıları takip ettiğimiz www.MediaWatchNow.com’ dur.

    Daha görevimiz bitmedi. Hala iin baında sayılırız. Bu gibi temelsiz tasarıların Kongre’de destek bulmasını önlemek için, öncelikle yapmamız gereken; mecliste temsilcilerimizle ilikilerimizi sürdürmek ve onları Türk Amerikan ilikilerini ilgilendiren meseleler üzerinde eğitmek olmalıdır. Gelecek için sağlam temelli ilikiler kurmamız gerekir. Bundan sonra, mirasımıza yapılan asılsız saldırıları engellemek; canlanma, yenilenme ve yerel derneklerimize ve 50 farklı eyalette yaayan her Türk Amerikalıya ulamakla mümkün olacaktır.

    Beraber baarabiliriz ve ATAA her konuda sizin yanınızda.

    Gunay Evinch
    Bakan
    Türk Amerikan Dernekleri Kurulu

    ***

    Assembly of Turkish American Associations
    1526 18th St., NW Washington, DC 20036
    Ph: 202.483.9090 Fx: 202.483.9092
    www.ataa.org, [email protected]

  • How Gorbachev Contributed to the ‘Karabakhization’ of Azerbaijani Politics

    How Gorbachev Contributed to the ‘Karabakhization’ of Azerbaijani Politics

    Paul Goble

    Vienna, January 19 – Twenty years ago this week, Mikhail Gorbachev sent troops into Azerbaijan to crush the popular front there, but what the Soviet president achieved by his actions was the further radicalization of Azerbaijan and the “Karabakhization” of Azerbaijani politics, a situation that continues to this day, according to a leading Moscow commentator.
    In an article posted on the “Novaya politika” site yesterday, Sergey Markedonov says that the unwillingness of the Soviet government to force Armenia to return Karabakh to Azerbaijan and its dispatch of Soviet forces to Baku “became a transforming moment in the process of the national self-determination of Azerbaijan” (novopol.ru/text80474.html).
    Both Moscow’s failure to defend the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan SSR and the brutality of its forces in the Azerbaijani capital changed everything, Markedonov continues. Until then, Azerbaijan “had lacked a powerful dissident movement,” unlike Georgia or the Baltic states.
    However, “the striving of the Kremlin to refrain from the adoption of a one-sided resolution of the ‘Karabakh question’ and the refusal of Moscow to fulfill its political contract to guarantee Azerbaijani territorial integrity pushed Baku onto the path of the search for national independence and sovereignty.”
    And that drive, one based on a near universal popular consensus that Karabakh must be reintegrated into Azerbaijan, meant that nationalism rather than communism became the republic’s dominant ideology. Indeed, Markedonov says, it is possible to speak of “Karabakhization” as “the foundation” for Azerbaijan’s statehood.
    In response to the Soviet invasion, 45,000 Azerbaijanis quit the ranks of the CPSU, and Heidar Aliyev, who had been forced from the Politburo, reemerged as a national leader by speaking to a meeting of Azerbaijanis and others at the permanent representation of his republic in Moscow,
    For him and for all Azerbaijanis, Markedonov continues, “problem number one for independent Azerbaijan” was the question of the restoration of the territorial integrity of the country, because its military defeat by the Armenians had had such “a serious influence on the self-identification of Azerbaijanis.”
    In the judgment of the Moscow analyst, “Heidar Aliyev’s return to Azerbaijani politics” allowed the country to overcome ethnic separatism at home from the Talysh, Lezgins, and Avars) and “also to minimize the threat [to predominantly Shiite Azerbaijan] from the side of radical Islam.”
    After 1993, Markedonov says, “Baku easily dealt with both military risings and ‘rose revolutions,’ but “the main thing that Aliyev was able to achieve is an adequate assessment of the military and foreign policy resources of an independent Azerbaijan and on the basis of this assessment to form a sensible strategy.”
    Aliyev recognized that using military force to resolve the problem was not a promising strategy and thus was willing to reach a ceasefire accord with Armenia, and he also understood, Markedonov says, that Baku needed to “overcome the unique diplomatic vacuum around the republic” by reaching out to all major powers and portraying Azerbaijan as “a civilized state.”
    In recent years, many people have asked how long this “breathing space” and “concentration” can continue, Markedonov notes, but he argues that however emotionally powerful appeals to recover Karabakh may be, Azerbaijan would not profit from any use of military power anytime soon.
    First of all, the Moscow specialist on the Caucasus says, “both Armenia and unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh are serious competitors,” something that dashes any hopes for “a blitzkrieg.” Second, the unsuccessful use of force could threaten the stability of political arrangements in Azerbaijan, as the case of Elchibey in the early 1990s shows.
    And third, any military campaign “would create problems not only of a military but also of an informational-political character.” Overnight, such actions would “destroy the image of Azerbaijan, which has been carefully cultivated over the years, as a victim of ‘Armenian aggression.’”
    Even if Baku were successful, it would not be forgiven, Markedonov argues, saying that Azerbaijanis should not see the Russian moves in Chechnya as a precedent. That is because, he continues, “what the world forgave Moscow for is something it would not forgive Baku.” Consequently, Azerbaijan’s only option, he concludes is to “wait and ‘concentrate.’”
    But the passions ignited by the events of Black January and the centrality of the fate of Karabakh and the other occupied territories remain so great that it is perhaps no surprise that on this “round” anniversary, many Azerbaijanis are hoping against hope that the negotiations will lead to the recovery of their lands or seeking alternatives.
    And one of the most interesting – and, following Markedonov’s argument, instructive — is the call by the Sheikh ul-Islam Pasha-Zade, the head of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate in Azerbaijan, for Gorbachev to be brought to trial in the Hague for his crimes against the Azerbaijani nation (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=33786).
    That won’t happen, of course, but it is a reminder of the continuing sensitivity of the events of a generation ago in the Caucasus now, an impact that any who are seeking to address the problems there must not only acknowledge but also face up to, all the more now because these feelings have been allowed to fester so long.

    http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2010/01/window-on-eurasia-how-gorbachev.html

  • Azerbaijan and Iran to sign gas agreement next week

    Azerbaijan and Iran to sign gas agreement next week

    Date: Sunday, December 13, 2009
    The State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) is due to sign an agreement with the National Iranian Gas Company to sell natural gas to Iran, said SOCAR President Rovnag Abdullayev.

    According to him, the agreement will be signed in Tehran next week during the visit of Azerbaijani delegation led by foreign minister to Tehran.

    According to the memorandum signed between the two countries on November 14, SOCAR will deliver at least 500 million cubic meters of gas to Iran a year from 2010 at the initial stage, and the volume will be gradually increased later.

    Azerbaijan will charge Iran a price “close to the world market prices” calculated on the basis of an agreed formula, said officials.

    Azerbaijan has natural gas agreements with Georgia, Turkey and Russia at present.

    —
    Yusif Babanly
    Board of Directors
    Azerbaijani American Council (AAC)

  • Lessons Learned About Turkey and Azerbaijan After Erdogan’s Washington Visit

    Lessons Learned About Turkey and Azerbaijan After Erdogan’s Washington Visit

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 228 December 11, 2009

    By: Vladimir Socor

      Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan (L) with US President Barack Obama in Washington, DC

     

    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s December 7-8 visit to Washington (EDM, December 9) underscored the decline in Washington’s ability to influence Turkish foreign policy decisions. It is within this broader context, Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu turned down Washington’s demands for Turkey to normalize relations with Armenia swiftly and unconditionally. This would have broken the linkage between the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations and withdrawal of Armenian troops from certain Azerbaijani districts, as part of the Karabakh conflict resolution process.

    That withdrawal and linkage are top national priorities for Azerbaijan –a fact that the US administration apparently discounted, amid pressures from Armenian advocacy groups and parts of Congress. Breaking that linkage would have undermined Azerbaijan’s position severely, with potentially lasting effects.

    By asking Turkey to undercut Azerbaijan in that way, Washington jeopardized its de facto strategic partnership with Baku and put long-term US policy goals in the South Caucasus at risk. The Turkish government’s disagreement with Washington on this issue, however, has opened a fresh opportunity for the U.S.-Azerbaijan relationship to continue on a lessons-learned basis and develop further.

    This turn of events is not without irony, given that Ankara is distancing itself strategically from Washington on a number of issues that the United States regards as its top policy priorities. This process gained added momentum in the run-up to Erdogan’s Washington visit.

    Thus, Ankara turned down US requests to increase the Turkish troop presence in Afghanistan beyond the 1,600 currently deployed (a strikingly low ratio for NATO’s second-largest army after that of the United States). Ankara, moreover, reaffirmed its caveats against military operations and combat missions, confining Turkish troops instead to training and reconstruction projects, even as Washington urged support for its military “surge” on December 1.

    Demonstratively, Turkey abstained from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) November 27 resolution censuring Iran (while Russia and China voted in favor alongside the United States). Erdogan had visited Tehran in October for the signing of economic agreements that could boost bilateral trade from $11 billion to $30 billion annually within this decade. The agreements of intent include exploration, production, and transportation of Iranian natural gas, notwithstanding U.S. sanctions in that sector. Ankara differs with Washington’s threat assessment regarding the Iranian nuclear program and is reaching out politically to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Hurriyet, December 6; Zaman, December 6, 7).

    Ankara is also distancing itself markedly from Israel, Washington’s closest Middle Eastern ally. Following Erdogan’s war-crimes accusations against Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Turkish public television produced an inflammatory serial in which performers impersonating Israeli soldiers enacted killings of Arab children. In October, Turkey revoked its invitation to Israel in the Anatolia Eagle air force exercise, prompting the United States to cancel its participation, and thus the event as such. Meanwhile, Ankara conducts a rapprochement with Hamas and other politically defined Muslim anti-Western forces (Jerusalem Post, December 7).

    The Turkish government relies heavily on Russia to turn Turkey into an “energy hub” –an ambition that tends to work against Western energy security interests and US-backed projects. In the Black Sea, Turkey pursues a de facto condominium with Russia, sidelining NATO allies and partners and frustrating the United States in the process.

    Without and beyond any value judgments, however, these trends demonstrate Turkey’s capacity to pursue policies contradicting those of Washington, when Ankara’s views and perceived interests so dictate. Common US-Turkish interests –most saliently on Iraq and the Kurdish problem– persist despite the multiple disagreements elsewhere. In the South Caucasus, meanwhile, Washington and Ankara both lost their former strategic focus and clear definition of common interests. Course corrections are possible, however.

    Ankara’s decision to rally to Azerbaijan’s support in the negotiating process, despite US calls for a premature agreement with Armenia, is a case in point. On the eve of the Erdogan-Davutoglu visit to Washington, Davutoglu summed up bilateral relations as: “The United States always wants something from us” (Zaman, December 6). Such a situation inherently provides Turkey with ample bargaining power and even counter-leverage, which it has employed in this case with regard to Azerbaijan.

    At least for now, Ankara’s move has prevented Azerbaijan’s isolation in the Karabakh conflict-resolution process. Isolation could have forced Baku to turn toward Moscow as arbiter of last resort in the Karabakh conflict, which ranks as Azerbaijan’s uppermost national priority. And such an about-turn could have compromised the energy security and regional security agendas for Europe and the South Caucasus-Caspian region. Washington and Brussels discounted the danger signals from Baku and underestimated the mounting sentiment of alienation there.

    The problem can soon return, if Washington and Brussels renew pressure on Turkey to open the border with Armenia unconditionally, at Azerbaijan’s expense, before next April’s climactic debate on an Armenian genocide resolution in the US Congress.

    https://jamestown.org/program/lessons-learned-about-turkey-and-azerbaijan-after-erdogans-washington-visit/