Category: Azerbaijan

  • U.S. Intelligence Chief Warns Of Karabakh War

    U.S. Intelligence Chief Warns Of Karabakh War

    EB32266F 5F5E 4F47 A0AE 203E15688B8D w527 sU.S. — U.S. National Intelligence Director Dennis Blair testifies during a hearing before the Senate (Select) Intelligence Committee February 2, 2010 on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC.

    03.02.2010

    The likelihood of another Armenian-Azerbaijani war for Nagorno-Karabakh has increased as a result of the U.S.-backed rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey, according to America’s top intelligence official.

    “Although there has been progress in the past year toward Turkey-Armenia rapprochement, this has affected the delicate relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and increases the risk of a renewed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh,” Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair warned late Tuesday in written testimony to a U.S. Senate committee.

    Blair also warned of broader security and stability threats persisting in the South Caucasus. “The unresolved conflicts of the Caucasus provide the most likely flashpoints in the Eurasia region,” he said. “Moscow’s expanded military presence in and political-economic ties to Georgia’s separatist regions of South Ossetia and sporadic low-level violence increase the risk of miscalculation or overreaction leading to renewed fighting.”

    The United States has strongly supported and at times mediated in the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement that began nearly two years ago and led to the signing last October of two “protocols” envisaging the normalization of relations between the two historical foes.

    Azerbaijan has condemned the agreements, saying that an open border with Turkey would only discourage Armenia from seeking a compromise solution to the dispute. Azerbaijani leaders have also continued to threaten to win back Karabakh and surrounding Armenian-occupied territories by force.

    The authorities in Armenia and Karabakh have dismissed the war threats. International mediators have also disapproved of them, repeatedly urging the conflicting parties to refrain from bellicose rhetoric.

    U.S. diplomats have seemed confident, at least until recently, that chances for renewed large-scale fighting in Karabakh are slim. Speaking to RFE/RL in October 2008, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried said the danger of another war “has somewhat receded because the [August 2008] war in Georgia reminded everyone in this region how terrible war is.” “War is no joke,” Fried said. “It’s a bad option.”

    https://www.azatutyun.am/a/1947893.html
  • TURNING POINT IN TURKISH AMERICAN PUBLIC ADVOCACY

    TURNING POINT IN TURKISH AMERICAN PUBLIC ADVOCACY

    ATAA’s Statement on H.Res. 252

    Dear Turkish Americans and Friends of Türkiye:

    House Resolution 252 passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) by a vote of 23-22 after HFAC Chairman Howard Berman extended the voting period thrice and forced reluctant legislators to show up and vote in favor of the resolution.

    The passage of H.Res. 252 represented ethnic politics at its worst, and made a mockery of the U.S. legislative, judicial and foreign policy processes. Indeed, United States foreign policy regarding Turkey, Armenia and the broader region was hijacked by ultra-nationalist Armenian politics in a few Congressional districts.

    The recalling of Turkish Ambassador Namık Tan was an expression of Turkey’s disappointment in what now appears to be a contradiction in the United States’ position on Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. It was also an expression in defense of the dignity of the Turkish people to whom the U.S. now appears to have denied fair and just treatment by this prejudicial resolution plagued with blatantly libelous falsifications.

    At this stage it is difficult to expect the Turkish people to support the ratification of the Turkey – Armenia protocols, as the people’s interest now turns to whether U.S. President Obama will attempt to rehabilitate U.S. credibility in Turkey and among Turkish Americans, or permit further deterioration in a Proclamation on April 24. Furthermore, an alleged agreement between the White House and HFAC not to bring H.Res. 252 to a floor vote appears empty, if not also deceptive, as confidence in the ability of the Resolution to actually pass Congress is meager.

    House Resolution 252 signals a turning point in Turkish American public advocacy. The 23-22 vote reflects the growing efficacy of the Turkish American public advocacy network, including its infrastructure, technical abilities, critical mass, cooperation, solidarity, and resolve. In 2007, H.Res. 106 passed the HFAC 27-21, after the late Congressman Tom Lantos voted in favor of the motion, and was followed by three standby members. In 2005, H.Res. 316 and 195 passed overwhelmingly 42-7 and 35-11, respectively. This is just the beginning, as an awakening Turkish American community and a resurging Turkish Republic take command of their destiny for “Peace at Home, Peace in the World.”

    I thank the Turkish American community, particularly YOU – the individual Turkish American and friend of Türkiye — for your tremendous efforts. In solidarity within diversity, over 5000 letters were submitted through the ATAA-FTAA-TCA campaign. ATAA visited most of the HFAC members at least once at the local level and three times on Capitol Hill. On March 3, 2010, the ATAA and FTAA joined in solidarity on Capitol Hill, as we visited each HFAC member one final time.

    I also thank the Azerbaijani, Crimean, Turkmen, Turcoman, Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Uighur American communities for their support. The Azerbaijan Society of America in New York – PaxTurcica in Los Angeles – USAN in Washington, DC supported the ATAA-FTAA-TCA letter campaign and Congressional visits. In addition, the Azerbaijanian American Cultural Alliance traveled from Texas to show its support at the March 4 HFAC Hearing.

    I thank the Turkish Coalition of America (TCA) for their invaluable support and guidance.

    Finally, I thank the ATAA Executive Committee, Board of Directors and Board of Trustees, and ATAA’s dedicated staff for their excellence in representing the Turkish American community in opposition to H.Res. 252 and in support of U.S.-Turkish relations. They have done this in parallel with four major ATAA projects, including Census 2010, SayTurk, Turkish American Broad Advocacy Network (TABAN) grassroots program, Turkish Student Outreach, and www.MediaWatchNow.com.

    Our task is not finished, though. In fact, it might be said that it is just starting now. First, we should build on this momentum to maintain our contact with our representatives to educate them on matters concerning Turkey USA relations, so that such “ill-informed” resolutions will not be supported in Congress. We should establish lasting bonds of friendship for future. Next, we should revive, reinvigorate, and grow our component organizations to reach out and touch every Turkish American in 50 states, to deter future misguided attacks on our heritage.

    Together we can do it and ATAA is here for you.

    Gunay Evinch
    President
    Assembly of Turkish American Associations

    ***

    Sevgili Türk Amerikalı’lar ve Türkiye’nin dostları:

    Sözde Ermeni soykırımı ilgili yasa tasarısı (H.Res. 252) Meclis Dı İlikiler Komitesi (HFAC) den 22 hayır ve 23 evet oyu alarak geçti. HFAC Bakanı Howard Berman oylama süresini 3 kez uzatıp oy vermekte isteksiz gözüken üyeleri zorlayarak tasarı lehine oy vermelerini sağladı.

    Etnik siyasetin en kötü ekilde temsil edildiği H.Res. 252 oylaması, Amerikan, yasama, yargı ve dı ilikiler süreçlerini maskaralık haline getirmitir. Nitekim, Amerika Birleik Devletleri’nin, Türkiye, Ermenistan ve bölge ülkelerle olan dı politikası aırı milliyetçi Ermenilerin Kongre seçim bölgelerindeki politikaları yüzünden gasp edilmitir.

    Bir hayal kırıklığı ifadesi olarak, Türk Büyükelçisi Namık Tan’ın geri çağrılması, Türk-Ermeni yakınlamasını destekleyen ABD için bir çeliki gibi görünüyor. Bu aynı zamanda, Türk insanının onurunu savunmanın da bir göstergesi olarak da algılanabilir. Bu sakıncalı karar tasarısı ile A.B.D adil tavrından uzaklamı duruyor.

    Bu aamada, Türk halkından Türkiye ve Ermenistan arasındaki protokolleri deskteklemesini beklemek oldukça zor görünmektedir. imdi merakla beklenen, Bakan Obama’nın, Amerika’nın Türkiye ve Türk Amerikalılar için güvenirliliği yeniden sağlamak için çaba gösterip göstermemesi ya da 24 Nisan resmi açıklamasını yaparak ilikileri daha da zor bir hale getirip getirmemesidir. Ayrıca, H.Res. 252 tasarısının oylamaya getirilmemesi konusunda Beyaz Saray ve HFAC arasında bir karar sağlanamamakla birlikte bu tasarının Kongre’ den geçip geçmemesi u an için belirsiz gözükmektedir.

    H.Res. 252, Türk-Amerikan ortak savunmasında dönüm noktasının sinyallerini vermektedir. 23-22’lik oy sonucu, altyapı, teknik becerileri, kritik kütle, ibirliği ve dayanıma da dahil olmak üzere Türk-Amerikan ortak savunma ağının artan etkinliğini yansıtmaktadır. 2007 yılında, H. Res. 106, Kongre üyesi Tom Lantosun lehte geç oyuyla HFAC de 27-21 oyla geçmiti. 2005 yılında H. Res. 316 ve 195 sırasıyla 42-7 ve 35-11 lik ezici bir çoğunlukla geçti. Bu sadece bir balangıç, aynı zamanda Türk Amerikan toplumu için büyük bir uyanı ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin Yurt ta ve Dünya da Barı” için komutayı ele almasıdır.

    Türk Amerikan toplumuna, özellikle de “Siz” değerli Türk Amerikalılara ve Türkiye’nin dostlarına göstermi olduğunuz muazzam gayretten dolayı teekkür ediyorum. Farklılıklar içinde dayanıma ilkesinden yola çıkarak, ATAA-FTAA-TCA olarak yürüttüğümüz mektup kampanyası kapsamında 5000’in üzerinde mektup Kongre’ye gönderildi. ATAA, ABD Temsilciler Meclisi Dı İlikiler Komisyonu’ndaki üyelerin ofisleri yerel düzeyde en az bir kere ve Capital Hill’de birkaç kez ziyaret edildi. 3 Mart 2010’da ATAA ve FTAA birlik olup tüm Komisyon üyelerinin ofislerini ziyaret ettik.

    Azeri, Kırımlı, Türkmen, Özbek, Kazak, Kırgız ve Uygur toplumlarına bizden desteklerini esirgemedikleri için teekkürlerimi iletiyorum. New York’taki Azerbaycan-Amerikan Toplumu, Los Angeles’daki Pax Turcica, Washington DC’deki Amerikan-Azeri Network ATAA-FTAA-TCA mektup kampanyasında ve Kongre ziyaretlerinde bize hep destek oldular. Bunun yanı sıra, Azerbaycan Amerikan Kültür Birliği 4 Mart’ta Dı İlikiler Komisyonu’ndaki oturumda Teksas’tan gelerek bizi yalnız bırakmadılar.

    Ayrıca, Amerika Türk Koalisyonu’na çok kıymetli destek ve katkılarından ötürü ükranlarımı sunuyorum.

    Son olarak, ATAA İcra Kuruluna, Yönetim Kuruluna ve Mütevelli Heyetine ve kendini iine adamı olan profesyonel ekibine, Türk Amerikan toplumunu 252 yasa tasarısına karı en iyi ekilde temsil ettikleri için ve Türk Amerikan ilikilerine yaptıkları katkılardan dolayı teekkür ediyorum. Ayrıca bir diğer önemli nokta, ATAA ekibinin bütün bu çalımaları dört büyük ATAA projesi ile birlikte yürütmü olmasıdır. Bunlar sırasıyla, Nüfus Sayımı için balattığımız Saytürk kampanyası, TABAN projesi, Türk Öğrenci Eriim programı ve medyada Türkiye hakkında çıkan yazıları takip ettiğimiz www.MediaWatchNow.com’ dur.

    Daha görevimiz bitmedi. Hala iin baında sayılırız. Bu gibi temelsiz tasarıların Kongre’de destek bulmasını önlemek için, öncelikle yapmamız gereken; mecliste temsilcilerimizle ilikilerimizi sürdürmek ve onları Türk Amerikan ilikilerini ilgilendiren meseleler üzerinde eğitmek olmalıdır. Gelecek için sağlam temelli ilikiler kurmamız gerekir. Bundan sonra, mirasımıza yapılan asılsız saldırıları engellemek; canlanma, yenilenme ve yerel derneklerimize ve 50 farklı eyalette yaayan her Türk Amerikalıya ulamakla mümkün olacaktır.

    Beraber baarabiliriz ve ATAA her konuda sizin yanınızda.

    Gunay Evinch
    Bakan
    Türk Amerikan Dernekleri Kurulu

    ***

    Assembly of Turkish American Associations
    1526 18th St., NW Washington, DC 20036
    Ph: 202.483.9090 Fx: 202.483.9092
    www.ataa.org, assembly@ataa.org

  • How Gorbachev Contributed to the ‘Karabakhization’ of Azerbaijani Politics

    How Gorbachev Contributed to the ‘Karabakhization’ of Azerbaijani Politics

    Paul Goble

    Vienna, January 19 – Twenty years ago this week, Mikhail Gorbachev sent troops into Azerbaijan to crush the popular front there, but what the Soviet president achieved by his actions was the further radicalization of Azerbaijan and the “Karabakhization” of Azerbaijani politics, a situation that continues to this day, according to a leading Moscow commentator.
    In an article posted on the “Novaya politika” site yesterday, Sergey Markedonov says that the unwillingness of the Soviet government to force Armenia to return Karabakh to Azerbaijan and its dispatch of Soviet forces to Baku “became a transforming moment in the process of the national self-determination of Azerbaijan” (novopol.ru/text80474.html).
    Both Moscow’s failure to defend the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan SSR and the brutality of its forces in the Azerbaijani capital changed everything, Markedonov continues. Until then, Azerbaijan “had lacked a powerful dissident movement,” unlike Georgia or the Baltic states.
    However, “the striving of the Kremlin to refrain from the adoption of a one-sided resolution of the ‘Karabakh question’ and the refusal of Moscow to fulfill its political contract to guarantee Azerbaijani territorial integrity pushed Baku onto the path of the search for national independence and sovereignty.”
    And that drive, one based on a near universal popular consensus that Karabakh must be reintegrated into Azerbaijan, meant that nationalism rather than communism became the republic’s dominant ideology. Indeed, Markedonov says, it is possible to speak of “Karabakhization” as “the foundation” for Azerbaijan’s statehood.
    In response to the Soviet invasion, 45,000 Azerbaijanis quit the ranks of the CPSU, and Heidar Aliyev, who had been forced from the Politburo, reemerged as a national leader by speaking to a meeting of Azerbaijanis and others at the permanent representation of his republic in Moscow,
    For him and for all Azerbaijanis, Markedonov continues, “problem number one for independent Azerbaijan” was the question of the restoration of the territorial integrity of the country, because its military defeat by the Armenians had had such “a serious influence on the self-identification of Azerbaijanis.”
    In the judgment of the Moscow analyst, “Heidar Aliyev’s return to Azerbaijani politics” allowed the country to overcome ethnic separatism at home from the Talysh, Lezgins, and Avars) and “also to minimize the threat [to predominantly Shiite Azerbaijan] from the side of radical Islam.”
    After 1993, Markedonov says, “Baku easily dealt with both military risings and ‘rose revolutions,’ but “the main thing that Aliyev was able to achieve is an adequate assessment of the military and foreign policy resources of an independent Azerbaijan and on the basis of this assessment to form a sensible strategy.”
    Aliyev recognized that using military force to resolve the problem was not a promising strategy and thus was willing to reach a ceasefire accord with Armenia, and he also understood, Markedonov says, that Baku needed to “overcome the unique diplomatic vacuum around the republic” by reaching out to all major powers and portraying Azerbaijan as “a civilized state.”
    In recent years, many people have asked how long this “breathing space” and “concentration” can continue, Markedonov notes, but he argues that however emotionally powerful appeals to recover Karabakh may be, Azerbaijan would not profit from any use of military power anytime soon.
    First of all, the Moscow specialist on the Caucasus says, “both Armenia and unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh are serious competitors,” something that dashes any hopes for “a blitzkrieg.” Second, the unsuccessful use of force could threaten the stability of political arrangements in Azerbaijan, as the case of Elchibey in the early 1990s shows.
    And third, any military campaign “would create problems not only of a military but also of an informational-political character.” Overnight, such actions would “destroy the image of Azerbaijan, which has been carefully cultivated over the years, as a victim of ‘Armenian aggression.’”
    Even if Baku were successful, it would not be forgiven, Markedonov argues, saying that Azerbaijanis should not see the Russian moves in Chechnya as a precedent. That is because, he continues, “what the world forgave Moscow for is something it would not forgive Baku.” Consequently, Azerbaijan’s only option, he concludes is to “wait and ‘concentrate.’”
    But the passions ignited by the events of Black January and the centrality of the fate of Karabakh and the other occupied territories remain so great that it is perhaps no surprise that on this “round” anniversary, many Azerbaijanis are hoping against hope that the negotiations will lead to the recovery of their lands or seeking alternatives.
    And one of the most interesting – and, following Markedonov’s argument, instructive — is the call by the Sheikh ul-Islam Pasha-Zade, the head of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate in Azerbaijan, for Gorbachev to be brought to trial in the Hague for his crimes against the Azerbaijani nation (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=33786).
    That won’t happen, of course, but it is a reminder of the continuing sensitivity of the events of a generation ago in the Caucasus now, an impact that any who are seeking to address the problems there must not only acknowledge but also face up to, all the more now because these feelings have been allowed to fester so long.

    http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2010/01/window-on-eurasia-how-gorbachev.html

  • Azerbaijan and Iran to sign gas agreement next week

    Azerbaijan and Iran to sign gas agreement next week

    Date: Sunday, December 13, 2009
    The State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) is due to sign an agreement with the National Iranian Gas Company to sell natural gas to Iran, said SOCAR President Rovnag Abdullayev.

    According to him, the agreement will be signed in Tehran next week during the visit of Azerbaijani delegation led by foreign minister to Tehran.

    According to the memorandum signed between the two countries on November 14, SOCAR will deliver at least 500 million cubic meters of gas to Iran a year from 2010 at the initial stage, and the volume will be gradually increased later.

    Azerbaijan will charge Iran a price “close to the world market prices” calculated on the basis of an agreed formula, said officials.

    Azerbaijan has natural gas agreements with Georgia, Turkey and Russia at present.


    Yusif Babanly
    Board of Directors
    Azerbaijani American Council (AAC)

  • Lessons Learned About Turkey and Azerbaijan After Erdogan’s Washington Visit

    Lessons Learned About Turkey and Azerbaijan After Erdogan’s Washington Visit

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 228 December 11, 2009

    By: Vladimir Socor

      Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan (L) with US President Barack Obama in Washington, DC

     

    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s December 7-8 visit to Washington (EDM, December 9) underscored the decline in Washington’s ability to influence Turkish foreign policy decisions. It is within this broader context, Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu turned down Washington’s demands for Turkey to normalize relations with Armenia swiftly and unconditionally. This would have broken the linkage between the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations and withdrawal of Armenian troops from certain Azerbaijani districts, as part of the Karabakh conflict resolution process.

    That withdrawal and linkage are top national priorities for Azerbaijan –a fact that the US administration apparently discounted, amid pressures from Armenian advocacy groups and parts of Congress. Breaking that linkage would have undermined Azerbaijan’s position severely, with potentially lasting effects.

    By asking Turkey to undercut Azerbaijan in that way, Washington jeopardized its de facto strategic partnership with Baku and put long-term US policy goals in the South Caucasus at risk. The Turkish government’s disagreement with Washington on this issue, however, has opened a fresh opportunity for the U.S.-Azerbaijan relationship to continue on a lessons-learned basis and develop further.

    This turn of events is not without irony, given that Ankara is distancing itself strategically from Washington on a number of issues that the United States regards as its top policy priorities. This process gained added momentum in the run-up to Erdogan’s Washington visit.

    Thus, Ankara turned down US requests to increase the Turkish troop presence in Afghanistan beyond the 1,600 currently deployed (a strikingly low ratio for NATO’s second-largest army after that of the United States). Ankara, moreover, reaffirmed its caveats against military operations and combat missions, confining Turkish troops instead to training and reconstruction projects, even as Washington urged support for its military “surge” on December 1.

    Demonstratively, Turkey abstained from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) November 27 resolution censuring Iran (while Russia and China voted in favor alongside the United States). Erdogan had visited Tehran in October for the signing of economic agreements that could boost bilateral trade from $11 billion to $30 billion annually within this decade. The agreements of intent include exploration, production, and transportation of Iranian natural gas, notwithstanding U.S. sanctions in that sector. Ankara differs with Washington’s threat assessment regarding the Iranian nuclear program and is reaching out politically to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Hurriyet, December 6; Zaman, December 6, 7).

    Ankara is also distancing itself markedly from Israel, Washington’s closest Middle Eastern ally. Following Erdogan’s war-crimes accusations against Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Turkish public television produced an inflammatory serial in which performers impersonating Israeli soldiers enacted killings of Arab children. In October, Turkey revoked its invitation to Israel in the Anatolia Eagle air force exercise, prompting the United States to cancel its participation, and thus the event as such. Meanwhile, Ankara conducts a rapprochement with Hamas and other politically defined Muslim anti-Western forces (Jerusalem Post, December 7).

    The Turkish government relies heavily on Russia to turn Turkey into an “energy hub” –an ambition that tends to work against Western energy security interests and US-backed projects. In the Black Sea, Turkey pursues a de facto condominium with Russia, sidelining NATO allies and partners and frustrating the United States in the process.

    Without and beyond any value judgments, however, these trends demonstrate Turkey’s capacity to pursue policies contradicting those of Washington, when Ankara’s views and perceived interests so dictate. Common US-Turkish interests –most saliently on Iraq and the Kurdish problem– persist despite the multiple disagreements elsewhere. In the South Caucasus, meanwhile, Washington and Ankara both lost their former strategic focus and clear definition of common interests. Course corrections are possible, however.

    Ankara’s decision to rally to Azerbaijan’s support in the negotiating process, despite US calls for a premature agreement with Armenia, is a case in point. On the eve of the Erdogan-Davutoglu visit to Washington, Davutoglu summed up bilateral relations as: “The United States always wants something from us” (Zaman, December 6). Such a situation inherently provides Turkey with ample bargaining power and even counter-leverage, which it has employed in this case with regard to Azerbaijan.

    At least for now, Ankara’s move has prevented Azerbaijan’s isolation in the Karabakh conflict-resolution process. Isolation could have forced Baku to turn toward Moscow as arbiter of last resort in the Karabakh conflict, which ranks as Azerbaijan’s uppermost national priority. And such an about-turn could have compromised the energy security and regional security agendas for Europe and the South Caucasus-Caspian region. Washington and Brussels discounted the danger signals from Baku and underestimated the mounting sentiment of alienation there.

    The problem can soon return, if Washington and Brussels renew pressure on Turkey to open the border with Armenia unconditionally, at Azerbaijan’s expense, before next April’s climactic debate on an Armenian genocide resolution in the US Congress.

    https://jamestown.org/program/lessons-learned-about-turkey-and-azerbaijan-after-erdogans-washington-visit/

  • Conference on human rights and Khojaly massacre

    Conference on human rights and Khojaly massacre

    Baku – APA. Three-day conference entitled “The truth is the way leading to reconciliation” on the theme “Forgotten victims – Jews and Azerbaijanis in the Caucasus” ended in Berlin, Media Department of the Islamic Conference Youth Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation told APA. The main organizer of the event, Coordinator of “Justice for Khojaly” international campaign in Germany, executive director of the Coordination Center of the Azerbaijanis in Germany Samir Patzer-Ismailova said the conference was devoted to the Khojaly massacre and the genocide committed by the Armenian dashnaks against Azerbaijanis in Guba in 1918. The event was held at Germany-Azerbaijan Relations Development Center (GeFDAB) with the participation of more than100 guests.

    Member of European Parliament Eduard Lintner sharply condemned the aggressive policy carried on against Azerbaijan and urged Europe to be more active in the solution of Nagorno Karabakh conflict.
    Ambassador of Azerbaijan to Germany Parviz Shahbazov provided information about the history of Day of International Human Rights Day, and the crimes committed by Armenians in Azerbaijan throughout the history.

    Chairperson of EuraKaukAsia Society, professor of the Bonn and Berlin universities Dr. Eva Maria Auch made a report entitled “Azerbaijani Jews – Forgotten Community” bringing historic facts about historic settlement of the Jews in Azerbaijan and their peaceful life as an ethnic minority.

    “Marches of Death”, the book written by late professor Rovshan Mustafayev was presented at the event. Director of the Human Rights Institute of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences Ayten Mustafayeva presented the German version of the book.

    KAD Executive Director Samira Patzer-Ismayilova called on the international community to recognize the Khojaly genocide legally and politically and noted that it is inevitable to deliver realities of Khojaly to the world community.

    Fariz Gasimli presented the international information campaign “Justice for Khojaly” carried out on the initiative of the Chief Coordinator of the Islamic Conference Youth Forum Leila Aliyeva.

    The international information and agitation campaign “Justice for Khojaly” was declared on May 8, 2008 by the Chief Coordinator of the Islamic Conference Youth Organization for Dialogue and Cooperation.