Category: Azerbaijan

  • Turkish and Azerbaijani Diasporas against Armenians in Australia

    Turkish and Azerbaijani Diasporas against Armenians in Australia

    19 Apr 2010 13:58

    Baku – APA. Armenian Youth Federation of Australia attempted to hold protest action outside the Turkey’s Consulate in Sydney for so-called “Armenian genocide” anniversary. According to APA, Turkish and Azerbaijani Diaspora representatives gathered outside the Turkey’s Consulate General waving the flags of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Australia and chanting slogans to support Turkey.

    They hanged Turkish flags on the Consulate’s iron fence. Some of the Armenians gathered outside the building attempted to create confrontation and to resist to police cavalry. Representatives of the Turkish and Azerbaijani societies told Armenians that they claim 1915 events falsely and real genocide was committed by Armenians in Khojaly town of Azerbaijan in 1992. “Your dirty policy can not force the people to forget Aghdam, Kelbajar and Lachin. Sooner or later you will shame yourself with your false claims in the world”, they told Armenians.

  • Azeri-U.S. Military Drills Cancelled Amid Row

    Azeri-U.S. Military Drills Cancelled Amid Row

    Azerbaijan -- President Ilham Aliyev chairs cabinet meeting on first quarter 2010 socio-economic results, Baku, 14Apr2010Azerbaijan — President Ilham Aliyev chairs cabinet meeting on first quarter 2010 socio-economic results, Baku, 14Apr2010

    19.04.2010
    (Reuters) – Planned joint military exercises by Azerbaijan and the United States were cancelled on Monday against a backdrop of strained ties between Washington and the oil-producing former Soviet republic.

    The announcement by Azerbaijan followed its sharp criticism of Washington’s role in its festering conflict with Armenia over the breakaway mountain region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

    Diplomats say the criticism reflects Azeri anger over U.S. support for a deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan’s close Muslim ally Turkey to mend ties and reopen their border. Azerbaijan, a supplier oil and gas to the West, fears the deal will weaken its hand in talks over the rebel territory.

    Azerbaijan did not specify who cancelled the exercises planned for May, or why, but the U.S. embassy said it suggested “that the question be posed to the government of Azerbaijan”.

    An Azeri Defense Ministry spokesman told Reuters: “The exercises are cancelled, but the reason is not known.”

    In an interview with Reuters on Friday, a senior aide to Azeri President Ilham Aliyev accused the United States of siding with Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and warned that Baku could “reconsider” its relations with Washington.

    The United States is co-mediator with Russia and France in talks over the rebel region, where ethnic Armenians backed by Armenia threw off Azeri rule in the early 1990s in a war that killed 30,000 people. A peace deal has never been signed. Turkey closed its frontier with Armenia in 1993 in solidarity with Azerbaijan during the war, and Azerbaijan says it should stay closed until ethnic Armenian forces pull back.

    Despite misgivings over human rights under Aliyev, the United States has traditionally had good relations with Azerbaijan, which hosts oil majors including BP, ExxonMobil and Chevron.

    Stung by the Azeri backlash, Turkey now says it will only ratify the deal with Armenia if Yerevan makes concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh. Diplomats say the issue is weighing on negotiations between Turkey and Azerbaijan on gas supplies and transit, complicating plans for the U.S. and European-backed Nabucco pipeline.

  • Turkey Insists On Karabakh Linkage For Armenia Ties

    Turkey Insists On Karabakh Linkage For Armenia Ties

    Turkey -- Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses members of parliament from his ruling AK Party in Ankara, 19Apr2010Turkey — Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses members of parliament from his ruling AK Party in Ankara, 19Apr2010

    19.04.2010

    Turkey has again reiterated its long-standing linkage between the ratification of its fence-mending agreements with Armenia and a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict acceptable to Azerbaijan.

    “We shut the [Turkish-Armenian] border because of the occupation of Azeri soil,” Turkish Prime Recep Tayyip Erdogan was quoted as saying by the Anatolia news agency on Sunday in a report cited by Agence France Presse.

    “The occupation should end so that Turkey can easily open its [border] gates. But if the occupation continues, we will not take such a step,” he said.

    Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu on Monday dismissed some Armenian pro-government politicians’ suggestions that Ankara might open the frontier without ratifying the Turkish-Armenian protocols. “It is out of question for Turkey to open its border gate without the ratification of the protocols,” he said, according to Anatolia.

    Davutoglu was speaking at a news conference in Ankara ahead of his visit to Azerbaijan, Turkey’s closest regional ally strongly opposed to the unconditional normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations.

    The remarks by Erdogan are a further indication that he and Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian failed to make further progress in the normalization process at their talks held in Washington last week. The lack of such progress made a unilateral Armenian pullout from the agreements more likely.

    Still, Davutoglu insisted that the dramatic Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, which began two years ago, is not over. “We are positive on the process and we have full confidence that in the end it will lead us to a point,” he said.

  • Looking beyond the Golan Heights: Baku as a possible mediator in the Middle East

    Looking beyond the Golan Heights: Baku as a possible mediator in the Middle East

    Gulnara Inandzh
    Director
    International Online Information Analytic Center Ethnoglobus,

    related info www.turkishnews.com

    mete62@inbox.ru

    Syrian President Bashar Asad’s visit to Baku, which took place immediately after Israeli President Shimon Peres visited Azerbaijan and which Asad said bore a strategic character, points to a possible mediating role for Azerbaijan in negotiations between Syria and Israel. [1] That is all the more the case because over the last several years, both Israel and the United States have pushed for the strengthening of the position of Azerbaijan in the Middle East in order to have another partner there alongside Turkey.

    Indeed, now a suitable time has arisen as a result of that effort, and consequently, Tel Aviv and Washington have offered Azerbaijan a mediating mission in the Middle East and the role of a gas transit route to Europe bypassing Russia.  For the first role, Azerbaijan is a key to American and Israeli efforts to reduce Russian influence in Iran and Syria and more precisely to cut the tie among the members of this triangle.  And consequently, Israel and the US have offered concessions and attractive proposals.

    In the dialogue between Damascus and Jerusalem, the primary focus is on the return to Syria of the Golan Heights which have been under Israeli occupation since the Six day way in 1967.  During his visit to Baku, President Peres said that “Syrian President Bashar Asad must understand that he cannot  receive on a silver platter the Golan Heights if he continues his ties with Iran and his support of Hezbollah. [2] At the same time, he sent a message to Tehran with whom a discussion on the Syrian question appears to be in the offing.

    If it is able to achieve its goals, Israel may return the Golan Heights, but having given up these territories, Tel Aviv must receive a security guarantee for Israel.  However, Damascus cannot completely break its ties with Teheran and its satellite Hezbollah and give a full guarantee that after the return of the strategically important Heights, Iran will not terrorize Israel.  Only Tehran can give a guarantee of non-aggression against Israel whether or not the Golan Heights are returned. [3]

    The Golan Heights are only the visible part of a game behind which stand the economic security of the Middle East and the West.  After Peres and Asad visited Baku, US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg arrived, along with Philip Gordon, the assistant secretary for Europe and Eurasia.  During the visit, they discussed with Azerbaijan’s leadership the issue of US support for the diversification of energy supplies.  Stressing that the US is not seeking to exclude Russia from this process, he pointed to a variety of energy plans that would involve Azerbaijan with Syria and Iran.  At the same time, with this set of talks, conversations about the Nabucco gas pipeline, which would reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas, took off.

    And at the same time, US President Barak Obama decided to reopen the American embassy in Damascus which had been closed four years ago.

    All these statements and actions help explain why Damascus has now declared its readiness to be part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and to purchase oil from Iraq.

    Of course, the US and Israel, by attracting Syria to their side, intend to isolate Iran, but since all the major Iranian gas fields remain beyond the control of the West, it is hardly possible to gain the complete isolation of Iran.  Therefore, for the US and Israel, it is important to involve Iran in a dialogue through one or another third country, including among them Azerbaijan.  But the most important link in this chain is the freeing of Iran from Russian manipulation.  For that, Iran must become involved in one of the Western gas projects, otherwise the Iranian-Armenian gas pipeline through Georgia will become tied to Russia and Iranian gas will be under the control of the Kremlin.

    In addition to this, the time has come for the development of new gas fields in the Caspian, part of which are in disputed areas.  And here too it is necessary to free Iran from Russian influence since official Iranian circles consider that not Tehran but rather Russia is preventing the resolution of the status of the Caspian.  Therefore, a mediating role for Azerbaijan among the US, Israel and Syria will require the intensification of negotiations between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Iran.

    Notes

    [1] “Azerbaijan will reconcile Syria with Israel” [in Russian], 11 July, available at: (accessed 3 August 2009).
    [2] RosBalt (2009) “Israel: Syria will not be able to both get the Golan Heights and continue its friendship with Iran” [in Russian], RosBalt, 6 July, available at: (accessed 3 August 2009).

    [3] IzRus (2009) “Azerbaijan is ready to mediate in reconciling Israel with Syria and Iran”, 19 July, available at: http://izrus.co.il/dvuhstoronka/article/2009-07-19/5372.html (accessed 3 August 2009).

  • The Blooming Friendship Between Azerbaijan And Israel

    The Blooming Friendship Between Azerbaijan And Israel


    B43273C6 669D 4750 B4C3 4A8BB1475B84 w527 sIsraeli President Shimon Peres (left) and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, in Baku on June 28, 2009

    Last updated (GMT/UTC): 09.03.2010 15:24
    By Anna Zamejc
    When 13 years ago the late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev received Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Baku, it was considered a bold and politically risky decision. No red carpets were rolled out, and the meeting was purposely kept low-key.

    Today, however, no such precautions are needed, as visits of Israeli leaders to Azerbaijan are no longer matters of domestic controversy. However, the peculiar relationship of the two countries continues to elude easy characterizations. Some external observers see it as a typical marriage of convenience, while others tend to take it as an alarming threat.

    Although Azerbaijan is a predominantly Shi’ite Muslim country and a majority of ethnic Azeris live in neighboring Iran (a ferocious enemy of Israel), Baku routinely shares intelligence with the Jewish state, buys its arms, and considers it trustworthy in security matters, completely contradicting stereotypes about a “clash of civilizations.”

    Further, the informal alliance seems to undermine the geopolitical game that the strongest actors — Russia and Iran — are determined to play in the region.

    Given how advanced bilateral relations are and how strong the mutual trust appears, it might sound surprising that 18 years of diplomatic contacts have not produced a single official treaty between Israel and Azerbaijan. Moreover, Azerbaijani authorities remain vague to this day about the widely anticipated potential opening of an embassy in Israel.

    Why? The answer can be found in Iran.

    Thorn In The Side

    “Today, everyone understands why Iran wants to block the Azerbaijani-Israeli rapprochement by any means,” Baku-born former Knesset member Yosef Shagal, a major champion of Israeli-Azerbaijani ties, said in an interview with RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service. “It is one of the most important strategic priorities of the Islamic republic. Tehran is perfectly aware of the following: the stronger the connection between Baku and Jerusalem, the more weakened Iran will be.”

    Iran, which aspires to be a regional leader, would like to see Azerbaijan play by its rules. But Azerbaijan, whose secular system is a thorn in the side of the Islamic regime, not only refuses to conform to Tehran’s dictates but has also crossed a red line by befriending the sworn enemy of Iran’s president.

    Azerbaijan has always felt threatened and continues to feel threatened [by Iran] from an ideological, economic, and political point of view.
    “Very characteristic in this regard is the reaction of Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad to the official visit of Israeli President Shimon Peres to Azerbaijan in…2009. In hysterical tones, the Iranian leader demanded that the leadership of Azerbaijan immediately cancel the visit of ‘the head of the Zionist entity’ and ‘the main enemy of Muslims,’” Shagal recalls, adding that all Tehran’s efforts proved counterproductive as Peres was received in Azerbaijan with the highest honors.

    “It is worth noting the dignity and tact with which Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev recommended that his Iranian counterpart refrain from giving advice to a leader of a sovereign state on to whom to show hospitality and to whom to refuse it,” he added.

    Although Iran may not be in a position to keep Israel and Azerbaijan completely apart, it has been successful in one respect: Despite numerous calls from the Jewish state, Azerbaijan has still not opened an embassy in Israel because of pressure from Tehran.

    This creates a sort of diplomatic asymmetry as it has been 16 years since Israel established its embassy in Azerbaijan. However, Baku has thus far been reluctant to reciprocate. The advanced contacts with Israel have already put a grave chill on Baku’s relations with Tehran, and provoking Iran with an embassy in Israel could prove too costly for Azerbaijan, even triggering a backlash from other Muslim states.

    “Repeated efforts by Baku to find out how its southern neighbor would react to opening an Azerbaijani Embassy in Israel have always encountered Iranian ultimatums,” Shagal says, stressing that it would not only be Iranian-Azerbaijani relations that would suffer a massive blow, but Baku would eventually have to pay the price in the area that is of vital importance for the Caucasus republic: Nagorno-Karabakh.

    “If Azerbaijan opens an embassy in Israel, then Iran will declare on behalf of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) a refusal to support Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia, and would also disavow all the efforts of Azerbaijan and its supporters in the OIC for the restoration of its territorial integrity and the return of Nagorno-Karabakh,” Shagal says.

    Influence Stability

    Alexander Murinson, an independent researcher and academic writer who follows developments in Israeli-Azerbaijani relations, is also afraid that Baku could face difficulties once it decides to open the embassy.

    “Iran can cause trouble for authorities in Azerbaijan and influence the stability of the country. So obviously that’s another way of Iran trying to influence the diplomatic relationship between Israel and Azerbaijan,” Murinson says.

    “Azerbaijan has always felt threatened and continues to feel threatened [by Iran] from an ideological, economic, and political point of view. Iran obviously has a religious network in Azerbaijan that could undermine the secular nature of the current regime in Azerbaijan,” Murinson adds.

    Despite those dangers, the IzRus portal reported last month, quoting Israel’s ambassador to Azerbaijan, Michael Lavon-Lotem, that Baku will soon open an embassy in Tel Aviv. Murinson warns that this might be mere posturing, like a similar announcement in 2006. But he believes that this time it could be for real.

    “That development has been expected for many years, because the relationship is thriving both in terms of economic trade ties and also in the military field,” Murinson says. “It might be an indication that some agreement has been reached on very deep strategic cooperation between the two parties that may not have been publicized.”

    A potential embassy would certainly be a culmination of Israel’s long-term efforts to persuade Baku to formalize relations and could boost Israel’s position abroad.

    “For Israel, which is now faced by tremendous diplomatic pressure around the globe for many reasons, when a Muslim country, especially a Shi’ite country, makes this kind of announcement, it indicates for Israel that it has a friend in the region. In such an environment, Azerbaijan making this diplomatic move [would] create a very important, positive dynamic for the state of Israel,” Murinson says.

    What’s In It For Baku?

    Aran Amnon, an expert on the Middle East who lectures at City University in London, adds that Israel might be now particularly interested in strengthening ties with Baku as the threat of Iranian nuclear capacity takes center stage in Israeli foreign policy.

    “Israel has an interest in trying to improve its standing with as many countries as possible, especially those who may be directly affected by Iran and might by persuaded to be supportive of Israeli efforts,” Amnon says.

    But in international relations, every nation acts on its own interests. The gains seem obvious for Israel, but why should Baku be willing to take the risk? Murinson links the potential switch to the new dynamics that were created by Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and the deteriorating relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv.

    In fact, Baku has a lot of other reasons for being interested in deepening ties with Israel. Israel is an important source of military equipment, and reportedly it was Israel who helped Baku rebuild its army after the heavy losses it suffered during the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. The military aspect of the relationship has been present ever since.

    “During the visit of Simon Peres, a very important contract was signed which included construction of a plant in Azerbaijan that would produce unmanned aerial vehicles. By doing so, Azerbaijan would become an important producer of very advanced systems in the region — even Russia doesn’t have advanced unmanned aerial vehicles,” Murinson says, stressing that the lack of such systems proved problematic during the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war.

    Israel plays an important role in Azerbaijani security arrangements. The electronic fence around Baku’s international airport was built by Israeli companies. Reportedly, Israeli firms are supplying equipment to ensure the safety of Azerbaijan’s energy infrastructure, and there were also rumors that Israelis provide security for Azerbaijan’s president on his foreign visits.

    Last but not least, Azerbaijan is the home of an ancient Jewish community, which remains an important aspect in mutual contacts.

    “We estimate that there are approximately 25,000 Jews living in Azerbaijan,” Mark Levin, the executive director of National Conference of the Soviet Jewry says. “Azeri Jews have lived side by side with their non-Jewish neighbors for centuries, and they are treated very well.”

    https://www.rferl.org/a/The_Blooming_Friendship_Between_Azerbaijan_And_Israel/1978312.html
  • Gazprom-SOCAR gas deal: Should Azerbaijan commit to a long-term contract?

    Gazprom-SOCAR gas deal: Should Azerbaijan commit to a long-term contract?


    By Efgan Niftiyev
    Today’s Zaman

    WASHINGTON — In the last quarter of 2009, State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and Russian gas giant Gazprom signed a medium-term deal — in the presence of both Azerbaijani President İlham Aliyev and Russian President Dimitry Medvedev — to supply Azerbaijani gas to Russia.

    The contract initially envisioned export of about 500 million cubic meters of gas per year.
    Gazprom’s Web site said the two companies would conduct joint technical inspections of the 200-kilometer Baku-Novo Filya pipeline, which runs along Azerbaijan’s Caspian coast to the Russian border, and ultimately modernize the pipeline. “Azerbaijani gas will be supplied to Russia along this route,” the company’s Web site reported.

    A few months later, Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller announced that his company is willing to buy as much Azerbaijani gas as possible. He also mentioned that Gazprom — the world’s biggest natural gas producer — will be paying market prices for Azerbaijani gas. SOCAR’s chief, Rovnag Abdullayev, also expressed his company’s interest in increasing the amount of natural gas sold to the Russian side. Since then, Gazprom has tried to push SOCAR for a long-term gas deal.

    At first it seems like a pretty good deal for Azerbaijan since Azerbaijan lacks a direct gas link to Europe and has been unable to agree with Turkey on terms for the transit of larger planned volumes. A SOCAR-Gazprom deal would be an excellent opportunity for Azerbaijanis to sell their gas at market prices right at the “door” without hassling with transit countries such as Turkey and Georgia or waiting for the implementation of the Nabucco pipeline. Thus, Gazprom’s network is the “optimal” route for gas from Azerbaijan to reach Europe.

    For diversification of export routes and for certain geopolitical and commercial reasons, Gazprom’s offer requires careful examination and analysis by the Azerbaijani side. As of now, Azerbaijan is capable of carrying out its commitments toward exporting approximately 1 billion cubic meters (bcm) to Russia (the Dagestan region) annually. The second phase of Shah Deniz gas production is expected to add 12 billion to 14 billion cubic meters of annual gas output in three to five years once a market is found and transit for the fuel ensured. Committing all possible gas supply to Gazprom beforehand cannot be viewed as a viable option for Azerbaijan.

    Azerbaijan may

    lose its bargaining power

    Early commitments to Gazprom will decrease Azerbaijan’s bargaining power in terms of pricing. Central Asian gas producers Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan had to sell their natural gas for significantly lower prices compared to world market prices because Gazprom was the only buyer. It was only when China became another possible buyer for Central Asian gas that the Russian company offered fairly good prices to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.

    Along with commercial concerns, geopolitical ramifications of a possible long-term commitment to Gazprom cannot be disregarded. Russia is widely known to use its economic advantage as political leverage in dealing with its neighbors and other countries. In the cold winter of 2009, Russia did not hesitate to cut the gas supply to its consumers in order to push its political agenda forward. Since then, European countries have started looking for alternative natural gas supply routes. Russia’s intransigency forced them to think about their energy security and be cautious in their future dealings with Russia.

    In line with this new approach, the Nabucco pipeline has been proposed to create another supply route that is projected to bring about 31 bcm of natural gas to Europe. Gazprom applies different pricing approaches to different countries. The price that is given to Armenia — its closest ally in post-Soviet hinterland — is much lower than the prices given to Ukraine or Georgia, the latter started to import natural gas from Azerbaijan instead. Thus, it is not that hard to see political motivation in Gazprom’s business.

    Azerbaijani gas is one of the possible — maybe the most viable — sources to fill the Nabucco pipeline, and it is in Azerbaijan’s utmost interest to diversify its natural gas exporting options. Being a major supplier of the Nabucco pipeline would serve Azerbaijan’s interests, and Azerbaijan can play an important role in European energy security. Currently Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz is the only deposit mature enough to be considered a base for forming contracts for the Nabucco project.

    Russia with the hand of Gazprom is doing its best to cut the possible supply for Nabucco. It takes all re-export expenses and pledges to pay market prices for all future possible Azerbaijani exportable gas, meaning that to re-export Azerbaijani volumes, Gazprom would need to cut production and exports of Russian gas, its main source of profit. This makes Gazprom’s offer a politically motivated rather than commercially viable deal. If Azerbaijan happens to commit all its future exportable gas to the Russian company, the Nabucco project will receive a fatal blow, and Azerbaijan will become highly dependent on Russia to export its natural gas. This will ultimately enable Russia to gain more leverage in its relations with Azerbaijan, and Russia will hardly hesitate to use this leverage in dictating its political ambitions.

    ‘Absurd scenarios’

    Some argue that Azerbaijan may “bribe” Russia to make her apply pressure on Armenia so that Russia forces the latter to take a more constructive position in peace talks over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This scenario is totally absurd. Although Russia has a great deal of political and economic influence on Armenia, this scenario is unlikely to happen because Russia is not interested in resolving the frozen Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, contrary to official Russian statements and its role as a mediator. Instead she has always used separatist conflicts to overpower post-Soviet countries. On the other hand, Azerbaijan, under the leadership of father Aliyev, pursued a similar purpose while making oil contracts with Western companies. Along with commercial gains, Azerbaijan expected to strengthen its bargaining position against Armenia while trying to become an important partner of the West. The commercial side of the story has played out quite well, and Azerbaijan also bolstered its independence and sovereignty. However, this policy did not produce desired outcomes for Azerbaijan in terms of making Western countries exert more pressure on Armenia. For all these reasons, it would not be wise for Azerbaijan to pursue the same tactic in its dealings with Russia.

    Azerbaijan has to consider all possible ramifications of signing long-term deals with Gazprom and granting all its possible exportable gas to the Russian company. Azerbaijan should never be willing to experience what Turkmenistan experienced in its dealings with Gazprom. Gazprom’s unilateral reduction — at short notice — of the gas that it takes from Turkmenistan showed that Gazprom is far from being reliable and has the potential to carry out irresponsible actions. Along with Gazprom’s credibility, commercial viability and geopolitical implications of the agreement should be carefully analyzed given Gazprom’s stature as a reliable and a credible gas buyer. Having vast natural sources is not enough. The wise management of those sources is much more important.