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Category: Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan, Turkey round off gas talks

Azerbaijan and Turkey rounded off gas talks, Azerbaijani Industry and Energy Minister Natik Aliyev said at the 13th Eurasian Economic Summit in Istanbul.

The Minister stated that both countries will sign a relevant agreement in the near future, Azertag news agency reports.

Aliyev noted that Azerbaijani companies have increased investments in Turkey’s economy, adding that over 500 Azeri companies invested in various sectors.

He also stressed that after SOCAR purchased a 51% share of Turkish petrochemical giant Petkim, it plans to invest additional $3-5 bn in the company.

A.G.

News

May 6, 2010
US Conflict Resolution Policy Backfires in Yerevan

April 27, 2010 05:00

By: Vladimir Socor

The US State Department seems disappointed, but not entirely surprised, by Yerevan’s April 22 suspension of Armenian-Turkish “normalization.” Assistant Secretary of State, Philip Gordon, in charge of this policy, finds solace in Armenian President, Serzh Sargsyan’s decision to suspend, rather than terminate the effort; and hopes that Yerevan would continue to cooperate with the US-driven process goal. Gordon as well as State Department Spokesman, Philip Crowley, argued that such normalization meets the interests of Armenia, Turkey, and other [unnamed] countries in the region (press releases cited by News.Az and Arminfo, April 23).

These statements, however, seem to ignore Azerbaijan’s view and the change in Turkey’s view. Inasmuch as the normalization focuses on opening the Turkish-Armenian border unconditionally, or no longer linked to a withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan’s interior –Baku deemed it to be against its interests all along. Ankara had rallied to Baku’s view last December already.

Since April 2009, US President, Barack Obama’s administration has pressed for opening Turkey’s border with Armenia unconditionally Thus, the October 2009 Zurich protocols, strongly backed by the US, required Turkey to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia and open the mutual border “without preconditions.”

Washington’s policy seems driven primarily by domestic politics. The administration hopes to remove the annual drama of Armenian genocide recognition from the center-stage of US politics. It seeks its way out of the dilemma of losing Turkey versus any loss of the US Armenian vote. “Normalization” of Turkish-Armenian relations, centered on the re-opening of that border, was offered as a substitute for the unfulfilled electoral-campaign promises to recognize an Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey.

Washington’s normalization concept, however, has also turned out to be unfulfilled. Tilting sharply in Armenia’s favor at Azerbaijan’s expense, it backfired first in Azerbaijan and shortly afterward in Turkey. Instead of de-aligning Ankara from Baku, as seemed briefly possible, it led Turkey and Azerbaijan to close ranks against an unconditional “normalization” of Turkish-Armenian relations, prior to a first-stage withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan.

The US initiative seemed unrelated to any regional strategy in the South Caucasus. It actually coincided with an overall reduction of US engagement in that region, downgrading the earlier goals of conflict-resolution and promotion of energy projects. Moreover, it risked splitting its strategic partner Azerbaijan from Turkey, compromising the basis for a subsequent return to an active US policy in the region.

Previous US administrations had also proposed to open the Turkish-Armenian border, but never as a goal in itself, unconditionally, or by some deadline in the political calendar, as has most recently been the case. Moreover, those earlier discussions considered opening both the Turkish and Azeri borders with Armenia, as part of an overall settlement, without dividing Ankara and Baku from each other on that account. Those border-opening proposals were being discussed as one element in comprehensive negotiations toward stage-by-stage resolution of the Armenian-Azeri conflict, and in conditional linkage with Armenian troop withdrawal from inner-Azeri districts, again in contrast to Washington’s recent proposals.

Yet, there is an element of continuity between those earlier border-opening proposals and the latest one. That common element is the optimistic belief that open borders and freedom to trade are a prerequisite to resolution of conflict and durable peace. This carryover from Manchesterianism often colored US political debates about the possibility of opening the Azeri and Turkish borders with Armenia. Yet, the diplomatic process integrated this issue within the broader negotiations. It did not single it out from that context or allow it to become a currency of exchange in US domestic politics.

The logic of the administration’s initiative from 2009 to date has implied that Washington would “deliver” the re-opening of Turkey’s border with Armenia; while Turkey would in turn “deliver” Azerbaijan by opening the Turkish-Armenian border, without insisting on the withdrawal of Armenian troops from inner-Azeri territories. That conditionality is a long-established one in these negotiations. However, Washington currently insists that the two processes be separated and that Turkey opens that border unconditionally as per the October 2009 Zurich protocols.

Breaking that linkage would irreparably compromise the chances of a peaceful, stage-by-stage settlement of the Armenian-Azeri conflict. It would indefinitely prolong the Armenian military presence inside Azerbaijan, placing Russia in a commanding position to arbitrate the conflict, with unprecedented leverage on an Azerbaijan alienated from its strategic allies.

Washington had persuaded Ankara to break that conditionality in the October 2009 protocols, which came close to splitting Turkey from Azerbaijan. However, Turkey reinstated that conditionality unambiguously from December 2009 onward. Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, declared this repeatedly and publicly, contradicting Obama and the US State Department on this account at the December 2009 and April 2010 Washington summits and afterward. Following the latter event, Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, flew to Baku with reassurances that Turkey would only open the border with Armenia if Armenian troops withdrew from inner-Azeri districts. The assurances were the more significant after the US White House had demonstratively excluded Azerbaijan from the Washington summit (Anatolia News Agency, April 14, 18-20).

The US administration’s policy has now backfired on all sides, Yerevan being the last to abandon it after the policy had failed to “deliver” Ankara and Baku. The Obama administration can now be expected to revert to a balanced approach by taking Azeri and Turkish views more carefully into account.

https://jamestown.org/program/us-conflict-resolution-policy-backfires-in-yerevan/

April 29, 2010
The real obstacle to Turkish-Armenian rapprochement (1)

Mehmet Kalyoncu*

Yerevan’s unilateral decision, as Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu describes it, to put the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement on hold should have had a cold shower effect on those who had long been fed up with the overcooked so-called Armenian genocide debate.

On April 22, Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan signed a decree suspending the ratification of the “Protocol on Establishing Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey” and “Protocol on Opening the Border between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey.”

In his televised address to his fellow Armenians, Sarksyan said, “Our political objective for normalizing relations between Armenia and Turkey remains valid, and we shall consider moving forward when we are convinced that there is the proper environment in Turkey and the leadership in Ankara is ready to reengage in the normalization process.” Referring to Ankara’s demand for Armenia to end its occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan before Parliament ratifies the protocols, the Armenian president charged Ankara with causing the breakup in the normalization process by making the end of Armenian occupation a precondition to the ratification.

While Ankara repeatedly reiterated its wish to continue the normalization of relations with Yerevan, on April 24 Armenian demonstrators burned Turkish flags as well as posters of Turkish President Abdullah Gül, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Davutoğlu during the so-called Armenian genocide commemoration ceremonies attended by President Sarksyan and other Armenian officials.

Like the Armenian officials, some inside and outside Turkey have criticized Ankara for pushing the end of Armenian occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh as a precondition to the ratification of the protocols. Some even argued that there was no relationship between the occupation and the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations and that Azerbaijan stood as an obstacle to normalization.

As a matter of fact, the real obstacle to Turkish-Armenian rapprochement is Armenia’s irredentist attitude toward its neighbors. As such, Armenia’s irredentism not only constitutes a national security threat to Turkey, but also is the major obstacle to any step toward sustainable security and stability in the South Caucasus. So long as Yerevan does not irreversibly change this attitude, it is unlikely to achieve any sustainable relationship between Turkey and Armenia.

Armenia is an irredentist country. That is, it is a country with aspirations on a part of another country’s land, over which it claims to have the political right to control. Article 11 of the Armenian Declaration of Independence reads, “The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia,” referring to contemporary eastern Turkey as Western Armenia. Article 12 reads, “This declaration serves as the basis for the development of the constitution of the Republic of Armenia and, until such time as the new constitution is approved, as the basis for the introduction of amendments to the current constitution; and for the operation of state authorities and the development of new legislation for the republic.” So obviously, the crux of the Armenian Constitution and of the guideline for the state authorities is Yerevan’s unrelenting aspirations to seize eastern Turkey as well as other possible monetary and political reparations.

Yerevan has proven its characteristic as such by invading and occupying 20 percent of a neighboring country — Azerbaijan. Consequently, another neighboring country, Turkey, which has long been the main target of Yerevan’s irredentist aspirations, closed its common border with Armenia. Although Turkey and Azerbaijan do have deep cultural, ethnic, social, economic and political ties and as such Turkey’s closure of the border may seem and has long been portrayed as an emotional response to Armenia’s invasion of Azerbaijan’s territories, Turkey’s response to the invasion is purely a rational one.

*Mehmet Kalyoncu is an international relations analyst

April 28, 2010
The real obstacle to Turkish-Armenian rapprochement

Mehmet Kalyoncu*

It is only normal for a country to seal its common border with an irredentist neighbor to maintain its national security and territorial integrity.

It is more so given that Armenia has never officially recognized and acknowledged its common border with Turkey, constitutionally considers part of Turkey’s lands as its own and worse, has for almost two decades been occupying 20 percent of another neighboring country. So, the reason Turkey shut its border with Armenia and why Turkey should keep it as such is not simply Turkey’s affinity with Azerbaijan, but Armenia’s irredentist nature and the security threat that it clearly poses to its neighbors. The fact that Armenia cannot dare to confront Turkey militarily neither ceases its aspirations on Turkish territories nor changes its malignant nature that has long obstructed progress toward security and stability in the South Caucasus.

Moreover, the impunity Armenia has long enjoyed despite its continuous violations of international law, humanitarian law, Geneva conventions and United Nations Security Council resolutions during and after its invasion of Azerbaijani territory makes Yerevan even more reckless about paralyzing its peace talks with Turkey and Azerbaijan. On April 30, 1993, the UN Security Council adopted resolution S/RES/822 (1993), “noting with alarm the escalation in armed hostilities and, in particular, the latest invasion of the Kelbadjar district of the Republic of Azerbaijan by local Armenian forces, Expressing grave concern at the displacement of a large number of civilians and the humanitarian emergency in the region, Reaffirming also the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory, [and demanding] the immediate cessation of all hostilities and hostile acts with a view to establishing a durable cease-fire, as well as immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces from the Kelbadjar district and other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan.” This resolution came after Yerevan-backed local Armenian forces killed 613 Azerbaijani civilians, including 106 women and 83 children, in the town of Khojali on Feb. 25-26, 1992. Instead of ceasing their attacks, the Armenian forces expanded their killing campaign to beyond the Nagorno-Karabakh region into surrounding districts such as Lachin, Kubatly, Jebrail, Zangelan, Aghdam and Fizuli. As Armenian forces continued to invade these districts, the UN Security Council adopted resolutions 853, 874 and 884 in the same year demanding a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories.

To this day, however, these districts, totaling 8.9 percent of Azerbaijani territory, as well as the Nagorno-Karabakh region remain under the control of Armenia. The way Sarksyan recalls the Khojali massacres is quite telling: “We don’t speak loudly about these things. But I think the main point is something different. … Before Khojali, the Azerbaijanis thought that they were joking with us, they thought that the Armenians were people who could not raise their hand against the civilian population. We were able to break that [stereotype]. And that is what happened.” (Thomas de Waal, “Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War,” NYU Press 2004, p.172) By that, President Sarksyan also implies what they aspire to do so long as the circumstances permit.

The way forward

In the final analysis, the current leadership in Yerevan does not seem to be ready to acknowledge its past transgressions, let alone make due reparations to their victims. Yet it can start by revisiting Armenia’s irredentist characteristic and finding ways to get rid of it instead of asking Ankara to give up its precondition to the ratification of the protocols.

In the meantime, Ankara should recognize that the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations is directly contingent to not one but two preconditions: First, Armenia must end its occupation of the Azerbaijani territories in the Nagorno-Karabakh region as well as the surrounding districts, and second, it must remove from its constitution the articles that describe eastern Turkey as “Western Armenia.” In the absence of the other, satisfying one of these conditions is not enough, because while one literally certifies Yerevan’s irredentist aspirations toward Turkey, the other practically illustrates that Yerevan would seek to fulfill those aspirations once the circumstances permit. Until then, Turkey’s common border with Armenia should remain sealed.

*Mehmet Kalyoncu is an international relations analyst

April 28, 2010
Massachusetts State of the United States recognizes Khojaly tragedy as a massacre

The House of Representative of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts State (USA) has accepted relative document on the day of 18th Commemoration of Khojaly Massacre.

The document dated on 25 February 2010 is signed by Speaker of the House Robert De Leo says: “Be it hereby known to all that: The Massachusetts House of Representatives offers its sincerest acknowledgment of: the 18th Commemoration of Khojaly Massacre”.

Justice for Khojaly campaign expresses its gratitude for the initiative of Members of House of Representatives to commemorate the 18th anniversary of the Khojaly massacre in House’s session that took place on February 25, 2010.

We appreciate and applaud the initiative on remembrance and recognition of Hause of Representatives this historical tragedy of humanity perpetrated against the civilian population of the Khojaly town (Azerbaijan) by Armenian military gangs and Ex-Soviet 366th regiment in February 1992. By raising this issue in legislative institutions it will be possible to make it globally heard by decision-makers around the globe and condemn crimes that are perpetrated against innocent victims of conflicts.

We also invite the friends of Justice for Khojaly campaign to sign the petition to World leaders and call them to recognize the Khojaly massacre as a crime against humanity at the following link http://www.justiceforkhojaly.org/?p=petition. By signing the petition the one can address the drafted letter to UN, President of the US, European Union, Council of Europe, OIC Parliamentary Unit chairpersons and other decision-makers of your geographical organizations.

If you want peace, work for justice.

Justice for Khojaly

on http://www.facebook.com/pages/Khojaly-town/Justice-for-Khojaly-Campaign/101823787520

April 28, 2010
Excluding Azerbaijan Can’t Bring Stability To The South Caucasus

Azerbaijani football fans at the Turkey-Armenia World Cup qualifying match in Bursa in October 2009
April 21, 2010
By Novruz Mammadov
The United States has recently stepped up efforts to repair relations between Turkey and Armenia. Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993 in response to the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding Azerbaijani territories by Armenian forces. Lately, U.S. officials have been urging Turkey to ignore Armenia’s continuing occupation and reopen the border. While Washington says that its aim is to improve stability and development throughout the region, in reality U.S. policies have become increasingly pro-Armenian — and exclusive of Azerbaijan.

Washington believes that a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement could kill two birds with one stone. First, it might smooth over — at least temporarily — one of the major trouble spots in U.S.-Turkish relations: the issue of Armenian genocide claims. Second, some U.S. officials argue that improving ties between Armenia and Turkey will ultimately contribute to a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. They appear to believe improved relations will lead to a moderation of Armenian policies and open the way to new initiatives on Karabakh.

However, we must disagree. Armenia continues to occupy almost 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territory. It is ironic that while claiming to be the first victim of genocide in the 20th century, Armenia itself carried out one of the century’s major ethnic-cleansing campaigns in Europe — a campaign that resulted in thousands of deaths and the displacement of nearly 1 million Azerbaijanis. Many members of the Armenian political elite — including President Serge Sarkisian — rose through the ranks because of their personal involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh war. They have used the war as a pretext for strengthening their own hold over Armenian politics, so it is not surprising that they have not been constructive in settlement talks.

Pretext For Occupation

Azerbaijan has proposed granting the highest form of autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh and is prepared to invest heavily in the region’s development once a peace deal is reached. Baku has been cooperating closely with the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to resolve the conflict peacefully.

However, Armenia remains intransient, and this creates the suspicion that Yerevan wants to keep the conflict unresolved as an excuse for indefinite occupation.

In this context, Armenia’s closed borders are the main form of leverage that might compel Yerevan to engage seriously in the resolution of the conflict. There is no reason to believe that opening the borders will make Armenia more willing to compromise; on the contrary, removing this sole punishment will only increase Armenia’s interest in further entrenching the status quo.

We understand that Armenia has a powerful diaspora and that justice does not necessarily always prevail. Over the last 15 years, despite maintaining the occupation of part of a neighboring country, Armenia has received preferential treatment from the West, which has actually punished Azerbaijan. The infamous Section 907 of the U.S. Freedom Support Act, which banned direct U.S. aid to Azerbaijan, is a clear example of this. Western governments and media have largely been silent on the plight of the nearly 1 million Azerbaijanis who were displaced by Armenian aggression. This has naturally led the Azerbaijani public to think that the West’s talk of democracy and human rights is nothing more than a selectively applied method of promoting its own interests.

In Defense Of Justice

It is high time for the United States and Europe to adopt a fair position and to prevent the narrow interests of their Armenian lobbies from prevailing over justice and their own national interests.

In any event, attempts to pressure Ankara to abandon Azerbaijan are shortsighted and likely to backfire. Azerbaijan and Turkey are strategic allies with deep historical ties. Turkey has played an important role in Azerbaijan’s partnership with the West on key security and energy projects. Azerbaijan spearheaded the opening of Caspian energy resources to the West and insisted that major oil and gas pipelines be routed through Georgia and Turkey.

Baku has also wholeheartedly supported U.S. security initiatives by sending troops to Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Azerbaijan also provides supply-transit support for the NATO effort in Afghanistan. Those who know the region understand the significant risks Azerbaijan took and the pressure it overcame in order to pursue close cooperation with the West on energy and security issues.

Long-term peace and normalization of relations in the South Caucasus cannot be achieved by rewarding aggression and by excluding the region’s strategically most important country. By pushing Turkey to abandon Azerbaijan, the United States risks alienating one of its most important and reliable partners in a critical region of the world.

Novruz Mammadov is head of the Foreign Relations Department of the Presidential Administration of Azerbaijan. The views expressed in this commentary are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL

https://www.rferl.org/a/Excluding_Azerbaijan_Cannot_Bring_Stability_To_The_South_Caucasus/2020228.html

April 21, 2010