Category: Azerbaijan

  • Why Turkey is right in demanding the end to occupation in Karabakh

    Why Turkey is right in demanding the end to occupation in Karabakh

    VUSALA MAHİRGİZİ

    In order to continue the “normalization” of Turkey-Armenia relations, it has become the major stipulation to bring the protocols signed in Zurich, Oct. 10, onto the agenda of the two parliaments.

    There are reports that in the meetings held in Washington on April 12-13, Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan faced pressures to immediately bring the Zurich protocols onto the agenda of the Turkish Parliament. Some media outlets in the West and Turkey have strongly criticized Erdoğan for linking the “normalization” of Turkey-Armenia relations to the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” and thus, “blocking up” the way of the process. While assessing from several aspects the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” in the process of the “normalization” of Turkey-Armenia relations, we see that Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statement in the Azerbaijani parliament on May 13, 2009, is in line with the principles of the international law and human rights.

    Armenia does not want the factor of “releasing Karabakh from occupation” to be put into circulation; because if this factor is put into circulation, Armenia will be constantly viewed as an “aggressor state” in the international arena. On the other hand, former president of Armenia Robert Kocharian and incumbent president Serge Sarkisian came to power in Yerevan with the dynamism caused by the wave of Karabakh’s occupation – having the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” on the table in the discussions with Turkey means their admitting the stain of being an aggressor. Therefore, the present authorities of Armenia will not want to hold discussions by admitting the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” – i.e. start the game with a score of 1-0.

    In this respect, we should underscore that Prime Minister Erdoğan has taken the rather right step by including the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” into the process of “normalization.” This “stipulation” has been put into the agenda because of the protest against the violation of international law and human rights in the region, not because of the loyalty to the principle “one nation, two states” between Turkey and Azerbaijan as stated by Armenia and the West. What could Erdoğan cite to while putting forward the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” in Turkey-Armenia discussions, if not to the fact of the occupation of 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territories and displacement of one million Karabakh residents of Azerbaijani origin? The solution to the regional conflicts requires divine justice: conscience and justice require it before the friendship and brotherhood between the countries.

    Therefore, it is impossible to understand why some in the West, Armenia and Turkey have criticized Erdoğan for this “stipulation.” Which position seems more just: to release the occupied territories and send one million refugees to their native lands, or to ignore the displacement of one million people from their native lands and switch on the green lights for 146,000 Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh to establish a monoethnic structure?

    As soon as the issue on releasing the occupied Azerbaijani territories was brought into the agenda in Turkey-Armenia discussions, Armenian authorities led by Sarkisian tried to put into circulation “the right of Karabakh Armenians to self-determination.” If so, who will ensure the self-determination of one million Azerbaijanis that lost everything as a result of the occupation?

    By putting into circulation “the right of Karabakh Armenians to self-determination” soon after the issue of “releasing of Karabakh” was included into the agenda in the process of “normalization,” Armenia is acting unfairly toward Azerbaijan, Turkey and the historical truths of the region.

    The occupation of Azerbaijani regions adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia with the support of outside forces, posed threat to the peace processes in the region. Just after this occupation, Armenian and Azerbaijani intellectuals, who gathered to speak about peace late in the 80s and early in the 90s, were deprived of this opportunity. If we make an excursion into history we can see Azerbaijani poet Sabir, who realized that outside forces backed the misunderstanding between Armenians and Turks in 1905 in Karabakh, wrote a poem “Beynelmilel” (International).

    Hovhannes Tumanyan, who did not want a contradiction between the two nations in Karabakh, visited the Armenian villages holding a white flag, explained the situation to the people and succeeded in calming down the situation. Outstanding Azerbaijani playwright Jafar Jabbarli depicted the background of those happenings in his play “1905-ci ilde” (In 1905).

    Viewing the happenings from the historical perspective we see that the separatism in Nagorno Karabakh and occupation of 20 percent of Azerbaijani territories left no place for the intellectuals and politicians of the two countries to maneuver. Therefore, the Turkish prime minister’s inclusion of the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” into the process of “normalization” of Turkish-Armenian relations becomes more important.

    Actually, the foundation of the future national conflict was laid when a referendum was held by Stalin on July 7, 1923, for Armenian autonomy in Karabakh. The plebiscite was scheduled the same day for the Turks in Armenia’s Zengezur region to “realize their self-determination,” but the plebiscite was not held, and in 1948-1952 approximately 500,000 Azerbaijani Turks were deported from Armenia.

    The process of Azerbaijanis’ deportation from Armenia took place in the Soviet Union, the “example of peoples’ friendship and brotherhood.” The last of the Azerbaijani Turks in Armenia was deported in March-June, 1988 – again during Soviet times. It was the last ring in Armenia’s turning into a monoethnic country.

    The autonomy given to Nagorno-Karabakh in 1923 contained the maximal rights that the present autonomous regimes in the world may envy. They managed themselves; headed their parliament, the great majority of the state agencies were led by Armenians; they had representatives in Azerbaijani government; the persons, who represented them in the Soviet parliament, were Armenian; they had school, university, radio, TV channels, newspapers and magazines in their language; even the labels of the products made there were in Armenian.

    With the rights of which autonomy can you compare the large rights of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh that was 120,000 approximately 25 years ago? We can see that “the right of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to self-determination” was the biggest injustice against Azerbaijan.

    A question arises: if as claimed by Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, they were indeed oppressed by Azerbaijan’s pressure in the autonomous province and passed a decision to unite with Armenia, can they show an example that during the 65-year autonomy an Armenian was injured on an ethnic basis?

    It is inadmissible that in the international discussions Armenia showing “Nagorno-Karabakh’s right to self-determination” tries to force Azerbaijan to the referendum in the monoethnic Nagorno Karabakh region with a population of 146,000.

    The question is not the “right of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to self-determination,” but the unification of a part of Azerbaijan to Armenia by occupation. Therefore, Prime Minister Erdogan’s inclusion of the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” into the process of “normalization” of Turkey-Armenia relations is an initiative serving to establish fair peace in the region, and should be necessarily supported in terms of international law and human rights.

    Armenian leaders, who are carrying on propaganda among the world community for opening the border with Turkey, constantly reiterate the following:

    “It is not normal that in the 21st century the border with the neighbor is closed.”

    If this remark is admitted, then how would the world community answer Azerbaijan’s right question: “Is it normal in the 21st century to occupy the territories of the neighbor, displace 1 million people, unite a part of the neighbor’s territories to its lands?”

    Assessing the matter in terms of the inactivity of the UN Security Council and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, it becomes more important that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan included the factor of “releasing Karabakh from occupation” into the “normalization” of the relations between Turkey and Armenia, while the international organizations are paralyzed concerning the occupation of Azerbaijani territories.

    * Vusala Mahirgizi is the director general of Azeri-Press Agency, or APA.

    Hurriyet Daily news

  • Azerbaijan, Turkey round off gas talks

    Azerbaijan, Turkey round off gas talks

    Azerbaijan and Turkey rounded off gas talks, Azerbaijani Industry and Energy Minister Natik Aliyev said at the 13th Eurasian Economic Summit in Istanbul.

    The Minister stated that both countries will sign a relevant agreement in the near future, Azertag news agency reports.

    Aliyev noted that Azerbaijani companies have increased investments in Turkey’s economy, adding that over 500 Azeri companies invested in various sectors.

    He also stressed that after SOCAR purchased a 51% share of Turkish petrochemical giant Petkim, it plans to invest additional $3-5 bn in the company.

    A.G.

    News

  • US Conflict Resolution Policy Backfires in Yerevan

    US Conflict Resolution Policy Backfires in Yerevan

    April 27, 2010 05:00

    By: Vladimir Socor

    The US State Department seems disappointed, but not entirely surprised, by Yerevan’s April 22 suspension of Armenian-Turkish “normalization.” Assistant Secretary of State, Philip Gordon, in charge of this policy, finds solace in Armenian President, Serzh Sargsyan’s decision to suspend, rather than terminate the effort; and hopes that Yerevan would continue to cooperate with the US-driven process goal. Gordon as well as State Department Spokesman, Philip Crowley, argued that such normalization meets the interests of Armenia, Turkey, and other [unnamed] countries in the region (press releases cited by News.Az and Arminfo, April 23).

    These statements, however, seem to ignore Azerbaijan’s view and the change in Turkey’s view. Inasmuch as the normalization focuses on opening the Turkish-Armenian border unconditionally, or no longer linked to a withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan’s interior –Baku deemed it to be against its interests all along. Ankara had rallied to Baku’s view last December already.

    Since April 2009, US President, Barack Obama’s administration has pressed for opening Turkey’s border with Armenia unconditionally Thus, the October 2009 Zurich protocols, strongly backed by the US, required Turkey to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia and open the mutual border “without preconditions.”

    Washington’s policy seems driven primarily by domestic politics. The administration hopes to remove the annual drama of Armenian genocide recognition from the center-stage of US politics. It seeks its way out of the dilemma of losing Turkey versus any loss of the US Armenian vote. “Normalization” of Turkish-Armenian relations, centered on the re-opening of that border, was offered as a substitute for the unfulfilled electoral-campaign promises to recognize an Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey.

    Washington’s normalization concept, however, has also turned out to be unfulfilled. Tilting sharply in Armenia’s favor at Azerbaijan’s expense, it backfired first in Azerbaijan and shortly afterward in Turkey. Instead of de-aligning Ankara from Baku, as seemed briefly possible, it led Turkey and Azerbaijan to close ranks against an unconditional “normalization” of Turkish-Armenian relations, prior to a first-stage withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan.

    The US initiative seemed unrelated to any regional strategy in the South Caucasus. It actually coincided with an overall reduction of US engagement in that region, downgrading the earlier goals of conflict-resolution and promotion of energy projects. Moreover, it risked splitting its strategic partner Azerbaijan from Turkey, compromising the basis for a subsequent return to an active US policy in the region.

    Previous US administrations had also proposed to open the Turkish-Armenian border, but never as a goal in itself, unconditionally, or by some deadline in the political calendar, as has most recently been the case. Moreover, those earlier discussions considered opening both the Turkish and Azeri borders with Armenia, as part of an overall settlement, without dividing Ankara and Baku from each other on that account. Those border-opening proposals were being discussed as one element in comprehensive negotiations toward stage-by-stage resolution of the Armenian-Azeri conflict, and in conditional linkage with Armenian troop withdrawal from inner-Azeri districts, again in contrast to Washington’s recent proposals.

    Yet, there is an element of continuity between those earlier border-opening proposals and the latest one. That common element is the optimistic belief that open borders and freedom to trade are a prerequisite to resolution of conflict and durable peace. This carryover from Manchesterianism often colored US political debates about the possibility of opening the Azeri and Turkish borders with Armenia. Yet, the diplomatic process integrated this issue within the broader negotiations. It did not single it out from that context or allow it to become a currency of exchange in US domestic politics.

    The logic of the administration’s initiative from 2009 to date has implied that Washington would “deliver” the re-opening of Turkey’s border with Armenia; while Turkey would in turn “deliver” Azerbaijan by opening the Turkish-Armenian border, without insisting on the withdrawal of Armenian troops from inner-Azeri territories. That conditionality is a long-established one in these negotiations. However, Washington currently insists that the two processes be separated and that Turkey opens that border unconditionally as per the October 2009 Zurich protocols.

    Breaking that linkage would irreparably compromise the chances of a peaceful, stage-by-stage settlement of the Armenian-Azeri conflict. It would indefinitely prolong the Armenian military presence inside Azerbaijan, placing Russia in a commanding position to arbitrate the conflict, with unprecedented leverage on an Azerbaijan alienated from its strategic allies.

    Washington had persuaded Ankara to break that conditionality in the October 2009 protocols, which came close to splitting Turkey from Azerbaijan. However, Turkey reinstated that conditionality unambiguously from December 2009 onward. Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, declared this repeatedly and publicly, contradicting Obama and the US State Department on this account at the December 2009 and April 2010 Washington summits and afterward. Following the latter event, Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, flew to Baku with reassurances that Turkey would only open the border with Armenia if Armenian troops withdrew from inner-Azeri districts. The assurances were the more significant after the US White House had demonstratively excluded Azerbaijan from the Washington summit (Anatolia News Agency, April 14, 18-20).

    The US administration’s policy has now backfired on all sides, Yerevan being the last to abandon it after the policy had failed to “deliver” Ankara and Baku. The Obama administration can now be expected to revert to a balanced approach by taking Azeri and Turkish views more carefully into account.

    https://jamestown.org/program/us-conflict-resolution-policy-backfires-in-yerevan/

  • The real obstacle to Turkish-Armenian rapprochement (1)

    The real obstacle to Turkish-Armenian rapprochement (1)

    Mehmet Kalyoncu*

    Yerevan’s unilateral decision, as Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu describes it, to put the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement on hold should have had a cold shower effect on those who had long been fed up with the overcooked so-called Armenian genocide debate.

    On April 22, Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan signed a decree suspending the ratification of the “Protocol on Establishing Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey” and “Protocol on Opening the Border between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey.”

    In his televised address to his fellow Armenians, Sarksyan said, “Our political objective for normalizing relations between Armenia and Turkey remains valid, and we shall consider moving forward when we are convinced that there is the proper environment in Turkey and the leadership in Ankara is ready to reengage in the normalization process.” Referring to Ankara’s demand for Armenia to end its occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan before Parliament ratifies the protocols, the Armenian president charged Ankara with causing the breakup in the normalization process by making the end of Armenian occupation a precondition to the ratification.

    While Ankara repeatedly reiterated its wish to continue the normalization of relations with Yerevan, on April 24 Armenian demonstrators burned Turkish flags as well as posters of Turkish President Abdullah Gül, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Davutoğlu during the so-called Armenian genocide commemoration ceremonies attended by President Sarksyan and other Armenian officials.

    Like the Armenian officials, some inside and outside Turkey have criticized Ankara for pushing the end of Armenian occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh as a precondition to the ratification of the protocols. Some even argued that there was no relationship between the occupation and the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations and that Azerbaijan stood as an obstacle to normalization.

    As a matter of fact, the real obstacle to Turkish-Armenian rapprochement is Armenia’s irredentist attitude toward its neighbors. As such, Armenia’s irredentism not only constitutes a national security threat to Turkey, but also is the major obstacle to any step toward sustainable security and stability in the South Caucasus. So long as Yerevan does not irreversibly change this attitude, it is unlikely to achieve any sustainable relationship between Turkey and Armenia.

    Armenia is an irredentist country. That is, it is a country with aspirations on a part of another country’s land, over which it claims to have the political right to control. Article 11 of the Armenian Declaration of Independence reads, “The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia,” referring to contemporary eastern Turkey as Western Armenia. Article 12 reads, “This declaration serves as the basis for the development of the constitution of the Republic of Armenia and, until such time as the new constitution is approved, as the basis for the introduction of amendments to the current constitution; and for the operation of state authorities and the development of new legislation for the republic.” So obviously, the crux of the Armenian Constitution and of the guideline for the state authorities is Yerevan’s unrelenting aspirations to seize eastern Turkey as well as other possible monetary and political reparations.

    Yerevan has proven its characteristic as such by invading and occupying 20 percent of a neighboring country — Azerbaijan. Consequently, another neighboring country, Turkey, which has long been the main target of Yerevan’s irredentist aspirations, closed its common border with Armenia. Although Turkey and Azerbaijan do have deep cultural, ethnic, social, economic and political ties and as such Turkey’s closure of the border may seem and has long been portrayed as an emotional response to Armenia’s invasion of Azerbaijan’s territories, Turkey’s response to the invasion is purely a rational one.

    *Mehmet Kalyoncu is an international relations analyst

  • The real obstacle to Turkish-Armenian rapprochement

    The real obstacle to Turkish-Armenian rapprochement

    Mehmet Kalyoncu*

     

    It is only normal for a country to seal its common border with an irredentist neighbor to maintain its national security and territorial integrity.

    It is more so given that Armenia has never officially recognized and acknowledged its common border with Turkey, constitutionally considers part of Turkey’s lands as its own and worse, has for almost two decades been occupying 20 percent of another neighboring country. So, the reason Turkey shut its border with Armenia and why Turkey should keep it as such is not simply Turkey’s affinity with Azerbaijan, but Armenia’s irredentist nature and the security threat that it clearly poses to its neighbors. The fact that Armenia cannot dare to confront Turkey militarily neither ceases its aspirations on Turkish territories nor changes its malignant nature that has long obstructed progress toward security and stability in the South Caucasus.

    Moreover, the impunity Armenia has long enjoyed despite its continuous violations of international law, humanitarian law, Geneva conventions and United Nations Security Council resolutions during and after its invasion of Azerbaijani territory makes Yerevan even more reckless about paralyzing its peace talks with Turkey and Azerbaijan. On April 30, 1993, the UN Security Council adopted resolution S/RES/822 (1993), “noting with alarm the escalation in armed hostilities and, in particular, the latest invasion of the Kelbadjar district of the Republic of Azerbaijan by local Armenian forces, Expressing grave concern at the displacement of a large number of civilians and the humanitarian emergency in the region, Reaffirming also the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory, [and demanding] the immediate cessation of all hostilities and hostile acts with a view to establishing a durable cease-fire, as well as immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces from the Kelbadjar district and other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan.” This resolution came after Yerevan-backed local Armenian forces killed 613 Azerbaijani civilians, including 106 women and 83 children, in the town of Khojali on Feb. 25-26, 1992. Instead of ceasing their attacks, the Armenian forces expanded their killing campaign to beyond the Nagorno-Karabakh region into surrounding districts such as Lachin, Kubatly, Jebrail, Zangelan, Aghdam and Fizuli. As Armenian forces continued to invade these districts, the UN Security Council adopted resolutions 853, 874 and 884 in the same year demanding a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories.

    To this day, however, these districts, totaling 8.9 percent of Azerbaijani territory, as well as the Nagorno-Karabakh region remain under the control of Armenia. The way Sarksyan recalls the Khojali massacres is quite telling: “We don’t speak loudly about these things. But I think the main point is something different. … Before Khojali, the Azerbaijanis thought that they were joking with us, they thought that the Armenians were people who could not raise their hand against the civilian population. We were able to break that [stereotype]. And that is what happened.” (Thomas de Waal, “Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War,” NYU Press 2004, p.172) By that, President Sarksyan also implies what they aspire to do so long as the circumstances permit.

    The way forward

    In the final analysis, the current leadership in Yerevan does not seem to be ready to acknowledge its past transgressions, let alone make due reparations to their victims. Yet it can start by revisiting Armenia’s irredentist characteristic and finding ways to get rid of it instead of asking Ankara to give up its precondition to the ratification of the protocols.

    In the meantime, Ankara should recognize that the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations is directly contingent to not one but two preconditions: First, Armenia must end its occupation of the Azerbaijani territories in the Nagorno-Karabakh region as well as the surrounding districts, and second, it must remove from its constitution the articles that describe eastern Turkey as “Western Armenia.” In the absence of the other, satisfying one of these conditions is not enough, because while one literally certifies Yerevan’s irredentist aspirations toward Turkey, the other practically illustrates that Yerevan would seek to fulfill those aspirations once the circumstances permit. Until then, Turkey’s common border with Armenia should remain sealed.

     *Mehmet Kalyoncu is an international relations analyst

  • Massachusetts State of the United States recognizes Khojaly tragedy as a massacre

    Massachusetts State of the United States recognizes Khojaly tragedy as a massacre

    MassachusettsHoRThe House of Representative of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts State (USA) has accepted relative document on the day of 18th Commemoration of Khojaly Massacre.

    The document dated on 25 February 2010 is signed by Speaker of the House Robert De Leo says: “Be it hereby known to all that: The Massachusetts House of Representatives offers its sincerest acknowledgment of: the 18th Commemoration of Khojaly Massacre”.

    Justice for Khojaly campaign expresses its gratitude for the initiative of Members of House of Representatives to commemorate the 18th anniversary of the Khojaly massacre in House’s session that took place on February 25, 2010.

    MassachusettsWe appreciate and applaud the initiative on remembrance and recognition of Hause of Representatives this historical tragedy of humanity perpetrated against the civilian population of the Khojaly town (Azerbaijan) by Armenian military gangs and Ex-Soviet 366th regiment in February 1992. By raising this issue in legislative institutions it will be possible to make it globally heard by decision-makers around the globe and condemn crimes that are perpetrated against innocent victims of conflicts.

    We also invite the friends of Justice for Khojaly campaign to sign the petition to World leaders and call them to recognize the Khojaly massacre as a crime against humanity at the following link http://www.justiceforkhojaly.org/?p=petition. By signing the petition the one can address the drafted letter to UN, President of the US, European Union, Council of Europe, OIC Parliamentary Unit chairpersons and other decision-makers of your geographical organizations.

    If you want peace, work for justice.

    Justice for Khojaly

    18thCommemorationofKhojalyMassacre

    on http://www.facebook.com/pages/Khojaly-town/Justice-for-Khojaly-Campaign/101823787520