October 26, 2010 05:58 PM Eurasia Daily Monitor, By: Vladimir Socor Center for American Progress President John Podesta in Turkey. (Daily News)
A new study from the Center for American Progress, the think-tank closely linked with the Obama White House, urges the US government to adopt a new, “comprehensive policy” toward Georgia and the Russia-Georgia conflict (“A New Approach to the Russia-Georgia Conflict,” October 2010, www.americanprogress.org.) The new approach implicitly removes Georgia from the framework of a US strategy in the South Caucasus-Caspian region. Instead, it treats Georgia in isolation from that region; and, in practice, subordinates US policy toward Georgia to the goal of protecting the administration’s own relationship with Russia.
The abandonment of a regional strategy is also apparent in the administration’s policy toward Azerbaijan. That strategy, while it existed, had treated Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey as parts of a whole: linchpins in the East-West energy corridor to Europe, a bridge from Central Asia to the European Union, and a foundation for regional security arrangements under Western aegis. Successfully initiated during the Clinton administration, and continued less successfully under the Bush presidency, this strategy seems consigned to oblivion by the current White House.
In a recent speech to the Turkish business association TUSKON in Ankara, Center for American Progress President and CEO, John Podesta, described former President Bill Clinton’s 1999 visit to Turkey as a tour of mosques, ancient monuments, and dispensing earthquake relief. The speech, however, omitted the oil and gas pipeline projects and the conventional arms control agreements, which were signed during that same Clinton visit as parts of a coherent US strategy in the South Caucasus. Although delivered to a business audience, the lengthy speech made no reference to Turkey’s present and prospective role in Caspian energy transit to Europe; and never mentioned Turkey’s regional partners Georgia and Azerbaijan. Instead, Podesta urged Turkey again on the administration’s behalf to open unconditionally the border with Armenia: “This is a major priority for the Obama administration, and senior US officials have spent considerable time in support of this initiative … It is my hope that we will see a revival of these initiatives soon” (www.americanprogress.org, October 19).
This border-opening proposal stems mainly from US electoral politics. During the 2008 campaign, candidate Barack Obama had pledged to support US recognition of an Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey, but could not deliver it as president without destroying US-Turkey relations. In lieu of genocide recognition, and to defuse US Armenian pressure toward that goal in Congress, the administration initiated a rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, centered on reopening the border unconditionally, in Armenia’s economic interest.
Under this proposal, Azerbaijan and Turkey would in effect bear the costs of the administration’s electoral calculus. The trade-off involves Turkey breaking ranks with Azerbaijan, while Armenia would desist from seeking genocide recognition in the US, thus easing pressure on the administration from its US-Armenian voters. Codified in the October 2009 Zurich protocols, the US initiative has stalled since December 2009-January 2010 as Turkey would not lightly abandon Azerbaijan, while Armenia would not give up its trump card of the genocide recognition campaign. Nevertheless, some US officials such as Assistant Secretary of State, Philip Gordon, now suggest (as has Podesta in Ankara) that the administration awaits a more favorable context for re-launching that proposal, calling again for ratification of the Zurich protocols (Armenian Reporter, October 18; News.az, October 20).
Opening the border unconditionally would remove the only major positive incentive by which Azerbaijan and Turkey can persuade Armenia to withdraw its troops from Azerbaijani districts around the Armenian-inhabited Karabakh. Opening of borders in return for withdrawal of Armenian troops from those districts is the trade-off that has all along underpinned the Azerbaijani-Turkish common position on the Karabakh conflict. This joint position does not oppose the opening of borders as such; on the contrary, it proposes to open the Azerbaijan-Armenia border as well as the Turkey-Armenia border, as part of the first stage of resolving the Karabakh conflict. This conditional linkage is also basic to the ongoing process of negotiations under the “Minsk Group” co-chairs’ mediation.
Breaking this linkage could derail that negotiating process. It would also further undermine Azerbaijan’s heavily-tested confidence in a resolution through peaceful means. Asking Turkey to turn away from Azerbaijan could fracture the mutually indispensable partnership between these two countries, which the US had encouraged when a US strategy for this region existed.
Unilateral, unconditional opening of the Turkish-Armenian border may cause Turkey to lose Azerbaijan, while pushing Baku into seeking Russia’s support for regaining those Armenian-occupied districts. Russia would undoubtedly exploit the situation in trying to change Azerbaijan’s Western orientation and its role in energy projects of Western interest. The Obama administration in any case is taking a back seat to Russia in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict-resolution negotiations. In August, Yerevan prolonged the basing of Russian forces in Armenia for almost half-a-century, and authorized possible increases in Russian forces based in that country. This development with region-wide implications does not seem to have occasioned a reassessment of US policy.
The proposal for unilateral border-opening alienated Azerbaijan, a US strategic partner, without inducing Armenia to distance itself from genocide-recognition efforts in the US, as the administration had hoped. The administration seemed willing to trade off a strategic position in Baku for domestic political points courtesy of Yerevan. However, Baku reached out to Turkey at the governmental, parliamentary, and public opinion levels, helping to forestall Turkish ratification of the Zurich protocols. US officials responded in frustration by declining to invite Azerbaijan’s president to the nuclear-safety summit in Washington. Domestic politics and short-term diplomatic improvisation seemed to trump regional strategy –an impression strengthened when the administration briefly used the Armenian genocide-recognition debate in the US House of Representatives to influence Turkish policies on current issues. Some Turkish officials and analysts are concerned by a possible repeat of this tactic, in connection with Turkish policy decisions (on Israel, Iran, anti-missile defense) during the coming weeks and months (Hurriyet Daily News & Economic Review, October 21).
President Obama’s meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September was a symbolic step toward reestablishing top-level communication. However, the normal institutional channel cannot operate without a US ambassador in Baku –a post vacant since July 2009. The administration waited for more than one year before nominating a successor. However, the nomination is blocked by two Democratic senators, one of them (Barbara Boxer of California) relying on the militant Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) to mobilize its followers for Boxer’s re-election in the ongoing mid-term campaign. President Obama has weighed in, personally for Boxer in California (www.news.am, October 23). Preoccupied at this stage to retain that Senate seat for its party, the administration has again postponed moving on the ambassadorial nomination.
De-linking the re-opening of borders from the first stage of Karabakh conflict-resolution (Armenian troop withdrawal from inner-Azerbaijani districts) is a policy that failed. Ankara has re-instated that linkage and seems highly unlikely to de-link the two issues at US behest, at least until after the 2011 elections in Turkey. The US needs Turkey’s cooperation more than the other way around, on issues that Washington defines as top priorities. Thus, Washington has limited political capital to spend in Ankara. Rather than persisting with the Zurich protocols, Washington needs a graceful exit from this poorly conceived policy.
Foreign Ministers Eduard Nalbandian of Armenia (L) and Ahmet Davutoglu of Turkey sign landmark agreements to normalize Turkish-Armenian relations in Zurich.
11.10.2010
Tigran Avetisian, Suren Musayelyan
One year ago, on October 10, 2009, Armenia and Turkey signed two protocols aimed at normalizing relations. The signing of what many political pundits termed a “historic” deal took place in Zurich, the culmination of painstaking diplomatic efforts by the two countries’ presidents and by international mediators, primarily Switzerland and the United States.
The Western-backed process began with Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s historic September 2008 visit to Yerevan, following an invitation by his Armenian counterpart, Serzh Sarkisian, to attend a soccer World Cup qualifier between the national teams of the two neighbors.
The two leaders watched the return leg of the match in the Turkish city of Bursa a year later, just four days after their foreign ministers, Edward Nalbandian and Ahmet Davutoglu, inked two protocols committing to the establishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of their borders soon after the documents were ratified in both countries’ parliaments.
But a year on, the future of the protocols remains unclear, as no parliamentary ratification of the documents has taken place in either country. Meanwhile, the cautious optimism surrounding the future of the deal, which faced domestic opposition in both countries, has fizzled out.
Turkey — President Abdullah Gul (R) with his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sarkisian at Turkey vs Armenia FIFA 2010 World Cup group match in Bursa, 14Oct2009
Official Yerevan and political majority leaders in Armenia had repeatedly stated the country’s strong readiness to complete the ratification of the protocols in the Armenian legislature, but only after Turkey made that step first.
But since the signing ceremony, senior officials in Turkey have sought to link ratification of the protocols with progress in a separate dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Yerevan responded by saying the protocols contained no conditions regarding that issue and that Ankara should, therefore, proceed with the ratification of the agreements unconditionally.
The diplomatic bickering eventually led to Sarkisian suspending the ratification process in the Armenian parliament last April. But he indicated that Yerevan was not, for now, withdrawing its signature from the documents – a statement welcomed by the international community, in particular by the United States and the European Union.
Views on the future of the protocols remain largely pessimistic at this moment – at least on the Armenian side. Alexander Arzumanian, a senior member of the opposition Armenian Pan-National Movement (HHSh), believes true normalization is not a priority for Turkey.
“Turkey used the protocols to solve its most important issue, as [due to these protocols] it has become a full player in this region and has gotten its own place in the negotiating format for a Karabakh settlement,” he said.
The opposition member, who served as Armenia’s foreign minister from 1996 to 1998, argued that Armenian authorities should not have launched the process the way they did, since Turkey, he claims, views all things within one package — that is, to make Armenia abandon its long-standing effort to gain international recognition of the World War I-era mass killings and deportations of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as genocide, as well as to persuade Armenia to make concessions over Karabakh in favor of Turkey’s regional ally Azerbaijan.
The announcement of a road map for a Turkey-Armenia rapprochement in April 2009 made the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun) quit the governing coalition. Giro Manoyan, a foreign policy spokesman for the now opposition party, insists that Yerevan must move further toward withdrawing its signature, as the current process only benefits Turkey.
“I think the first anniversary [of the signing of the protocols] is a good occasion for Armenian authorities to withdraw their signature from the protocols,” Manoyan said, “considering the fact that Turkey has failed to show goodwill, and in reality is currently using the protocols for a different purpose than what they were meant for.”
Another opposition party, Heritage, which vehemently opposed the protocols from the outset, shares Dashnaktsutyun’s position. The leader of the Heritage party’s parliamentary faction, Stepan Safarian, says Armenia must withdraw its signature from the document considering the “constant speculations” from Turkey.
Armenian and Turkish flags
Armenia’s ruling party, meanwhile, thinks Armenia has benefited from the process in terms of “showing itself as a good partner” to the world.
“Armenia may consider the problems it has raised before itself in connection with the protocols solved, in the sense that the Armenian side has proved to the entire world that it is a good and constructive partner, that it seeks to solve problems with all neighbors peacefully, through negotiations, and is ready to start certain relations unconditionally,” says Republican Party of Armenia (HHK) lawmaker Karen Avakian. “This process needed to be started, and I think it was necessary to once again unmask Turkey, to make Turkey show its [true] face to the world.”
Avagian does not exclude that dialogue between Yerevan and Ankara may still continue “if Turkey shows constructive behavior.” “I think sooner or later Turkey will realize the gravity of these issues and will not take into consideration the Karabakh process,” Avagian added.
In a recent interview with the Austrian news magazine “Profil,” Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian also gave an indication that Armenia does not consider the process of normalization with Turkey as having completely failed. “We hope that the process is not dead, but suspended,” he said.
Turkey’s Foreign Ministry said on Sunday that October 3 was declared as the day of cooperation among Turkish speaking countries.
Turkey’s Foreign Ministry said on Sunday that October 3 was declared as the day of cooperation among Turkish speaking countries.
A ministry statement said the anniversary of signature of the Nakhichevan Agreement on establishment of Cooperation Council of Turkish Speaking Countries would from now on be celebrated as the “Day of Cooperation Among Turkish Speaking Countries”.
“This day will be marked with comprehensive activities in coming years,” the statement said.
On October 3, 2009, heads of state of Turkish speaking countries, including Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan held their ninth summit in Nakhichevan and signed the Nakhichevan Agreement.
Heads of state of the same countries met in Istanbul on September 16, 2010 for their tenth summit and decided to celebrate October 3 as the “Day of Cooperation Among Turkish Speaking Countries.”
The first meeting of the Turkish Cooperation Council Summit will take place in Kazakhstan in 2011 and the second will be in Kyrgyzstan in 2012.
“Turkey believes a synergy that will contribute to peace, stability and welfare in Eurasia will ocur as the historical experiences of the Turkish nation unite with today’s vision of Turkic states, and the Cooperation Council of Turkish Speaking Countries will strengthen regional cooperation mechanisms,” the statement also said.
Newly-arrived Baku Armenians worshipping in New York
BROOKLYN, N.Y. — Hundreds of thousands of Armenians fled Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the Karabagh conflict and violence against Armenians in Azerbaijan culminated in pogroms in Sumgait in February 1988, in Kirovabad (Ganja) in November 1988 and Baku in January 1990. It has been roughly 20 years now that members of this unique group of immigrants have lived in the United States. The purpose of this article is to examine how they have fared in the United States. This is admittedly an unscientific survey based on interviews of only a handful of individuals either involved professionally with this community, or active members of this community.
Most Armenians from Azerbaijan came to the US from roughly 1989 to 1996. The first wave came after the US agreed to give them refugee status. Before this time, it was very hard for Soviet Armenians except for repatriates (who came to settle in Armenia from outside the USSR in earlier years) and political dissidents to emigrate from the Soviet Union.
Armenians were settled in nearly every state of the US. The government divided them up between different non-profit American organizations located in different states. Sometimes there were not many American-Armenians at their destinations, which included far flung places like Fargo, ND and Boise, Idaho. In 1994, for example, seven families were sent to Alaska. Michael Guglielmo, who was director of the Social Services Department of the Diocese of the Armenian Church of America (Eastern) from 1992 to 1997, remembered that an old Armenian woman would call occasionally from Idaho. She had lived in large cities like Baku and Moscow all her life, and now, stuck in the boondocks, she would wake up and see elks. She was depressed.
The largest groups ended up in Brooklyn and adjacent parts of New York, though substantial communities also settled in Los Angeles and parts of New England. The Congressional program allowing visas for Azerbaijani Armenians ended around 1994. By the late 1990s it became much harder to come to the US. Those who had initially come to Russia could no longer show any immediate threat to themselves because they were no longer in Azerbaijan.
Armenians from Baku and Azerbaijan are still trying to come to the US for family reunification, but it is very hard because of the limited numbers of visas available — 25,000 per year for people throughout the world with family in the US.
The khachkar in front of St. Vartan Cathedral dedicated to the pogroms in Baku
There is no reliable estimate as to how many Armenians from Azerbaijan now live in the United States. Three different State Department agencies were contacted while this article was being researched, and none of them had access to the necessary information. Neither did a number of Armenian-American organizations. Individual Azerbaijani-Armenian informants have given estimates ranging from around 10,000 to as high as 100,000. It should be kept in mind that there were approximately 400,000 Armenians in Azerbaijan, which included around 150,000 in Nagorno-Karabagh, in 1989, and most of those outside of Karabagh went to Armenia and Russia.
Guglielmo explained that there were several ways that Armenians from Azerbaijan came into the US. People involved in politics came to the US directly with tourist visas, and then applied here for asylum status as political refugees. The majority were already recognized as refugees however even before coming to the US. The United States government worked with nonprofit resettlement organizations, and it was the latter, which could choose the people they wanted, and where they wanted to settle them. These organizations were largely religious in nature, and included Catholic services, Church World Service, Lutheran Services and Catholic Migration.
Anna Baghdassarian, who was involved in helping refugees from Azerbaijan in the 1990s, and now works at the Interfaith Refugee and Immigration Service, explained how the process worked with the Church World Service program in Los Angeles. At that time, they brought roughly 800-900 people annually from various countries like Azerbaijan, Iran and Africa. The Armenians included Pentecostals as well as members of the Church of Armenia. Those who came to Los Angeles, “had to have a relative to meet them at the airport. We did the rest of the work. The relative would take them to find an apartment, but we assisted with furniture, objects for daily living, health exams, social security cards and employment services. If they could not find work, they went on welfare. Welfare would provide assistance for nine months for single people, and several years for families. Then we would do follow-ups with 30-day home visits to see if there were any other needs.”
Once the refugees received their residency papers and became US citizens, they were on their own.
The Social Services Department of the Armenian Diocese was the main Armenian organization in the United States providing assistance to the newcomers. Most of them had no financial means. In the New York area some had friends or family who helped them until they found jobs paying cash. The Diocese gave some food or clothing as direct help initially through a small fund, and helped do visa paperwork, if necessary. Guglielmo traveled to other parishes in the Diocese to try to help, as well as to get these local parishes to also participate in the effort. At that time, many Armenian-Americans still felt the refugees should have settled in Armenia but there was no light or heat there, and these people were traumatized after massacres.
Guglielmo pointed out that “in New York there were a lot more of the asylees. There was the crazy situation of people who were intermarried. They had no religious identity before 1989 and now it meant everything. Where were they going to go? Sometimes they themselves were already half-Jewish, half- Armenian, and were married to spouses who were half-Azerbaijani and half-Russian.”
When the asylees got here, they had to make their case to the government. Guglielmo stated that “proving Jewish ancestry helped, or if you were actually injured there in a pogrom and could prove it, that led to asylum.” The Diocese had a pro bono network of lawyers who assisted individuals, a Hebrew service and some committees of human rights lawyers. However, some people had no documents or proof, and could not prove their case. Many of these stayed illegally, without papers, or married an American citizen.
The immigrants themselves also made at least one attempt to organize in order to help one another. A group in Rhode Island, supported by Guglielmo and the local Diocesan priest, created the Armenian Refugee Social Economical [sic] Development Association. Garen Bagdasarian, who was a founder of this organization, described its work: “The main goal was to have a representative like a non-profit organization in Congress to act like our lawyer. Every year in Congress, there are debates over which groups will receive priority, or continue to receive priority, as refugees permitted to enter the US. It is necessary to explain why a particular group or nationality is in danger in a country.” At the time, a nonprofit group in Colorado that lobbied on behalf of Russian Jews was willing to help the Armenians, but asked for around $30,000. This group would have represented the Armenians to a committee of seven national organizations that helped refugees. The Armenians attempted to raise money through parties and other efforts, but it did not succeed. The main problem apparently was that the Armenian-American community at large felt that Armenians from Azerbaijan should go to Armenia, not America. Meanwhile, the Congressional program allowing Azerbaijani Armenians to receive a priority refugee status expired by the mid-1990s. The organization still exists, but only in Rhode Island and it chiefly helps local Armenians. For example, it provides assistance for the burial of needy Armenians.
Brooklyn and the New York Metropolitan Area
The New York City metropolitan area, and Brooklyn in particular, contains one of the largest communities of Azerbaijani-Armenians in the US. It is difficult to make an estimate of its Azerbaijani-Armenian population precisely because of its largeness. Fr. Mardiros Chevian, Dean of St. Vartan Armenian Cathedral in Manhattan, estimated that there are several thousand in New York City and New Jersey.
Dr. Svetlana Amirkhanian, chairwoman of the St. Gregory the Illuminator Mission Parish Council, felt it was not possible to give an accurate number. There were approximately 400 families on the parish mailing list, but it was unclear what percentage of the total population of Azerbaijani-Americans this represents. The majority were in Brooklyn, but some moved out to Manhattan, Bronx, Queens and New Jersey, as their economic circumstances improved. They arrived at different times.
Angela Kazarian, treasurer of the same mission parish, had heard a figure of 5,000 bandied about for the NY metropolitan area.
Marina Bagdasarova, vice chair of the Brooklyn mission Parish Council and Armenian school principal, pointed out that the first wave of immigrants were those with some connections. They moved first to Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Greece and even Argentina, and from there came to the US. Some had money to go on their own. However, the majority came in the second wave, which began in 1993-4, but the biggest wave was in the spring of 1995, because it was done on a governmental level. More than 90 percent of the second wave came to Brooklyn originally and only moved out later.
They came from different places in Azerbaijan, chiefly Baku, Sumgait and Kirovabad. At the beginning of the second wave of immigrants, Bagdasarova related, Lutheran and other Christian churches and organizations provided help, but when the numbers became huge, it was very difficult. She said, “Although people had been in Russia a few years by then, they had to start from scratch. I myself only had $100 in my pockets.” In addition, before and after the Diocese had its Social Services Department, Jewish community centers filled the void and Armenians got pulled into their world of activities.
New immigrants still keep arriving via Russia or Armenia every year. Some manage to come through their relatives here, while others win green cards in the lottery.
Chevian pointed out that most of them initially connected with the Diocese for a variety of reasons, including the larger complex and resources of the Diocese, its direct affiliation with Echmiadzin, about which they would have at least some knowledge, and the fact that the Diocese was fairly tolerant of their not speaking Armenian. Individually, of course, some refugees also did join Prelacy-affiliated churches.
After the Department of Social Services of the Diocese was closed in 1997, some of the Azerbaijani Armenians were already attached to the Diocese, and made the cathedral their place of worship. There is no physical church in Brooklyn closer to them.
The Diocese soon intensified its efforts on behalf of the new group. A mission parish in Brooklyn had already been established with a visiting pastor. Then in 2000, the last Primate of Azerbaijan, former Archbishop Anania Arabajyan, came to the US, and focused his energies on the immigrants. For three years, through 2002, Arabajyan performed the Divine Liturgy monthly in Brooklyn in a rented church. The weekend school for the new immigrants was moved from St. Vartan to Brooklyn too. Arabajyan frequently traveled to other parts of the Eastern Diocese where there were communities of Azerbaijani-Armenians. These places included Hartford, Philadelphia, Nashville, Providence, Charlotte (North Carolina), Greenfield and Lansing (Mich.), Erie (Penn.), Columbus (Ohio), Syracuse (NY), Richmond (Va.), Kansas City (Missouri) and Jacksonville (Fla.).
In hopes of attracting more Russian-speaking Armenians to church, Arabajyan began a primarily Russian-language magazine (with several pages in Eastern Armenian) called Vera Nadezhda Lyubov/ Havadk hoyser, which was published for several years. After this was halted, he translated the Armenian Church periodical into Russian for several years. Arabajyan also translated various booklets about prayer and the church into Russian. His Russian translation of the Armenian Divine Liturgy was published in 2002.
In recent years, as there is no permanent priest for the Brooklyn mission parish, occasionally Chevian went to Brooklyn for sacraments and pastoral work, while Deacon Sebuh Oscherician visited the school to help with religious instruction. Oscherician exclaimed, “The kids are wonderful! They are learning Armenian, and recite without papers — unlike many Armenian-American children.”
At present, the Armenian School of Brooklyn is the main institution in the area for Azerbaijani-Armenians. The school was initially established at the Diocesan complex in Manhattan in 1995. Bagdasarova, the present principal of the school, explained that it was difficult for the parents who largely lived in Brooklyn to bring their children each week to Manhattan. It later was moved to Brooklyn, and then stopped for two or three years. Afterwards, it was revived, and worked continuously for the last eight years.
When Amirkhanian became involved in the administration of the school in 2001, there was barely a student. By the end of that year, there were 20, and soon the total number reached 40 to 50. “We teach Armenian history, music, dance and religion. There are English language classes for parents. I hope that we will have computer classes for adults this year.”
Bagdasarova explained that it took place on Sundays from noon to 6 p.m. There are now five teachers, including three for Armenian language (one also teaches kindergarten-age children), one for Armenian music and recitation, and one for traditional Armenian dance. The afternoon begins with Armenian language classes, then music, and finally dance. The children range in age from 2 ½ to 14-years-old, and are largely from Azerbaijan, though there are some from Armenia who are largely the newest arrivals in the area, as well as a few from other Soviet countries.
The children are grouped by age, but a complication is that some already have learned to speak some Armenian at home (though they don’t know how to read or write), while others do not know any Armenian at all. Textbooks are brought from Armenia and copied here, while Gilda Kupelian, Armenian Studies coordinator at the Diocese, provides some other materials.
The children are taught some of the major events in and issues of Armenian history, ranging from Vartanants to Sardarabad, and including tragedies like the pogroms in Sumgait and Baku, the Armenian earthquake of 1989, and the Genocide, all presented in a manner appropriate for children. They are also taught some of the basics of Christianity — some prayers and how to participate in services, when Chevian comes to Brooklyn. For example, the Divine Liturgy was conducted in the church whose rooms they are renting. They learn the anthem of the Republic of Armenia, and the meaning of its flag.
One of the unique things about the school is that it is the first school in the tri-state area to teach the Yerevan dialect of Eastern Armenian. Bagdasarova explained that “many of the children would speak the Karabagh dialect at home, like a lot of Armenians from Azerbaijan [whose roots are in Karabagh]. However, there are no textbooks and teaching materials for the latter. In addition, we thought that it is best for children to learn the language of the [Armenia] state, as it is the standard one.”
Bagdasarova stated that the school officially was part of the St. Gregory the Illuminator mission parish, and as such, was supervised by the Diocese. However, financially it is independent and always had to raise its own revenue for renting its hall weekly and paying the teachers a modest salary. Bagdasarova donates her own salary back to the school because the needs are so great and funds are always in short supply. The school organizes fundraising events and tries to get donations through mailings in the tri-state area.
Amirkhanian explained that the school and the mission parish did more than just school work: “We help preparing applications for green cards and other issues for no charge, so we are like a social services organization. We work with adults, as well as children.” Bagdasarova added that “We help newcomers with their English, and with American history. We do as much as we can to help with arranging things like insurance. We can’t help financially since all the money we raise goes to the school. We think that this is the most important thing, to keep our language and heritage alive.”
According to Amirkhanian, “the school participates in all the local Russian festivals and events, thus showing our existence and placing us on the map as an Armenian community. It participates in festivals organized by Jewish organizations with performances wearing Armenian costumes.” This participation is not important solely from a cultural point of view. In the local Russian-speaking world of New York, Armenians face an aggressive effort at propaganda by Brooklyn Azerbaijanis. Urged on by their consulate in the UN, they arrange for shows on Russian television programs which are broadcast throughout the world. On these shows they claim that Armenians were the aggressors who harmed them greatly and committed massacres. Amirkhanian pointed out that “this affects the newcomers who live in this Russian-language environment and makes them feel bad. We are not able to show information on Sumgait or Baku the way they [the Azerbaijanis] do. It is a matter of money, since we have to buy the television time. So our voices are cut off and we are forced to be on the defensive. We have to justify ourselves — it should be the opposite.”
Amirkhanian added, “The parents now are very enthusiastic and themselves have changed. They came from various places, but see the school now as a cultural center for them. We organize family evenings, celebrate various holidays, the children make friends. It is an important environment. Even my own grandchildren living in Baltimore are members of our parish.”
The Brooklyn Armenians feel that they could accomplish more with more resources. Amirkhanian felt that: “the parents are not that well off financially, being the first generation of immigrants here.” Furthermore, there was a different mentality in the USSR, where the government did everything. Thus, the immigrants are not used to paying money, or working as a community. In addition, “They see that Jewish centers provide services for free. They ask why the Armenian community or the church does not do the same. They don’t understand the way things work here.” She felt that hopefully the next generation will be in a better position to be helpful to the community, “but meanwhile more financial or administrative support would lead to even more successes. A cultural center would be helpful, with perhaps a chapel. This would be the permanent site of the school. We need the Church and cultural organizations to help us.”
Hartford, Conn.
Hartford was one of the smaller places on the East Coast which became a settlement site for Azerbaijani-Armenians. They largely came from the beginning of the 1990s to 1995, initially via Armenia and later through Russia, and were often settled through Church World Services or Catholic Charities.
Fr. Tateos Abdalian, now director of the Department of Mission Parishes for the Diocese, but the pastor of Hartford’s St. George Armenian Church from 1993 to 1999, declared that mostly families, some two or three generational, came to Hartford. There were roughly thirty to forty families in all. They were political asylees. According to Karine Abalyan, who came to Hartford with her family from Baku via Armenia as a young girl, there were as many as one hundred families in the Hartford and New Britain areas (there is another Armenian church in New Britain).
The people in Hartford welcomed the newcomers. They found them apartments, jobs, and schools for their children. They took them to doctors. Abdalian continued, “In exchange, the people that came from Baku stayed in the Hartford church community. They took positions in the church. They took over from the Armenian-Americans. They reenergized the community.”
Slowly they got involved. They helped out in the bazaars and picnic functions, sang in the choirs, and began to come to church regularly. Abdalian understood that “they had a simplicity of faith. They knew that there was a God. They did not know who he was, or anything about Trinitarian formulas, but they knew God was with us. I always found them to be really good people.” He felt that they struggled mightily to keep their identity while living in a Turkic land which was part of the Soviet Union: “I would refer to them as the heroes of our people. They kept whatever they were taught by their parents and grandparents as Armenians in their hearts and minds. They had no radio or television programs in Armenian, or books, but transmitted whatever they could to their children.”
Karine Abalyan, today working at the Diocese as coordinator of public relations, left Baku with her family in the fall of 1988. They were assigned to Hartford upon arrival in the US in 1992. Catholic Charities provided initial assistance and job placement.] She thought that one of the greatest unifying factors for the Armenians from Azerbaijan was the church — St. George of Hartford — which organized clothing drives and help for the newcomers. They established an unofficial school in our church club in the first few years where kids would recite poetry, sing songs, and act in plays, all in Russian. Then people developed their own friendships and networks. Most of the families stayed in the area, though they moved from the inner city to the suburbs and purchased homes.” Some children took Armenian lessons on weekends at the parish school, “but it is hard to get fluent with once-a-week classes.”
(Part 2 will appear next week, on Baku Armenians in the US.)
Turkey hosted the tenth summit of Turkic-speaking countries in Istanbul on September 16. The Istanbul summit, bringing together Turkish, Kazakh, Azeri, Kyrgyz and Turkmen leaders, took steps towards furthering institutionalizing this inter-governmental platform, in line with the conclusions of the previous meeting in Nakhchivan in October 2009. Through the Nakhchivan declaration, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had formed a Turkic-Speaking Countries Cooperation Council –or Turkish Council, as Turkey seeks to promote it. In Istanbul, the leaders agreed to implement measures to make the new bodies operational, including the Council of Heads of State, Council of Foreign Ministers, Council of Senior Foreign Ministry Officials, Wise Men’s Council and Permanent Secretariat. Moreover, they agreed to set up other institutions to protect joint cultural heritage, form a union of universities, and create a fund to support research activities (Anadolu Ajansi, September 16; for an English text of the final declaration, see: Today’s Zaman, September 17).
Turkish President, Abdullah Gul, the host of the summit, emphasized the importance of the meeting to strengthen the commonalities among the brotherly nations in terms of language, history, religion and cultural values. He called upon the leaders to diversify relations in various areas. The leaders attending the summit highlighted the role of this burgeoning cooperation in contributing to peace and pledged to deepen solidarity to boost regional stability, human rights and a market economy.
The conclusions of the meeting reflect the Turkish government’s desire to play a greater leadership role in the Turkish speaking world. Although Ankara sought to forge closer ties among these states in the early post-Cold War period, it failed to realize this ambitious objective. However, in recent years, the Turkish government has demonstrated its willingness to revitalize cooperation among Turkic countries. The recent decisions are, thus, products of Ankara’s determined moves in that direction (EDM, November 23, 2008). After the Nakhchivan declaration was passed last year, Gul presented it as a major success on Turkey’s part (www.euractiv.com.tr, October 6, 2009). Turkey expects the Turkish Council to develop based on the model of other similar organizations, such as the Commonwealth, Arab League or Francophonie (www.tcbb.gov.tr, September 16). Nonetheless, in an example of the limitations before this objective the Kazakh, Turkmen and Kyrgyz leaders spoke at times in Russian during the summit (Dogan Haber Ajansi, September 16).
In a move that underscored Turkey’s leadership role, the first rotating presidency was assumed by Turkey and a senior Turkish diplomat, Halil Akinci, former ambassador to Moscow, was appointed as the Secretary-General of the council (Zaman, September 16). So far, there have been irregular summits as well as bilateral meetings between different states. Ankara believes the establishment of a permanent secretariat in Istanbul would increase the visibility of the council in regional and international affairs and contribute to the institutionalization of governmental ties.
Speaking at the summit, Gul went as far as maintaining that “from now on, we are one nation, but six states.” The phrase “one nation, two states,” has been used to define the warm ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan. It remains to be seen if other Turkic states will embrace it to the same extent to identify themselves so closely with Turkey. Ankara has been unable to convince all Turkic states to participate. Uzbekistan has deliberately avoided attending the summits since the early 2000’s. Turkmenistan has also been aloof to this platform for some time. In that sense, Turkmenistan’s representation at the Istanbul summit can be considered as a positive step. Nonetheless, referring to its foreign policy principle of “positive neutrality,” Turkmenistan did not sign the Nakhchivan declaration. Uzbekistan again was absent from the Istanbul summit, underscoring continuing divisions.
Besides its importance for intra-Turkic cooperation, the Istanbul summit also provided a venue for the participating leaders to hold various bilateral meetings with their counterparts to discuss issues of specific relevance. Turkey, for its part, used that opportunity to deepen ties with Azerbaijan. On the margins of the summit, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Azeri President, Ilham Aliyev, signed a framework agreement to form the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (Hurriyet, September 15). Ankara has signed similar agreements with several countries, mainly its Middle Eastern neighbors. The agreement with Baku was in preparation for some time, and its conclusion further highlights Ankara repairing its ties with Azerbaijan following the row caused by the Turkish-Armenian normalization process.
Moreover, the energy ministers from Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan discussed energy cooperation. Ankara already has an agreement to purchase Turkmen gas, provided that transit problems are resolved. Thus, Turkey wants to contribute to the resolution of the disputes between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, for it would also deepen cooperation as part of the East-West energy corridor and enable the export of Turkmen gas to Europe through Turkey. Turkish Energy Minister, Taner Yildiz, noted that they avoided discussing the status of the Caspian Sea, especially border issues. He stressed that it could still be possible to develop trilateral cooperation in some undisputed sectors of the Caspian even before other major issues were resolved. Azeri Energy Minister, Natiq Aliyev, also expressed hope that the remaining disagreements could be resolved so that Turkmen gas could be exported through the Caspian and Azerbaijan. The Turkish side welcomed this meeting as a positive step, which might boost prospects for the Nabucco pipeline (Anadolu Ajansi, September 15).
For some time, the Turkish government has been criticized for its neglect of Central Asia in its foreign policy priorities (EDM, June 25). In contrast, the government has presented its recent steps in the South Caucasus and Central Asia as proof that it has been pursuing a multidimensional foreign policy. Therefore, Ankara widely publicized the Istanbul summit as a great success. Nonetheless, those skeptical of the government urge caution and argue that one should wait to see if the declaration will be matched with deeds before judging the success of the government’s recent initiatives within the Turkic world (www.211yyte.org, September 17).
Azerbaijani state companies are planning to invest some $5bn in Turkey in the next two to three years, a minister has said.
“The investments of Azerbaijani state companies in Turkey top $3bn today. In the coming two to three years our state companies are planning investments of $5bn in the Turkish economy, not to mention investment from the private sector,” Azerbaijan’s minister of industry and energy, Natig Aliyev, told a conference in Baku today.
Azerbaijan invests in Turkish energy projects in particular, with state oil company SOCAR holding the majority of shares in Turkey’s petrochemical giant, Petkim
Natig Aliyev told the international conference, entitled the Azerbaijani Model of Economic Development, that Azerbaijani companies were actively investing in Georgia too. He said that Azerbaijan met 90% of Georgia’s needs for gas and Azerbaijan’s state company, SOCAR, was modernizing the gas distribution network in Georgia.
Natig Aliyev also said that Azerbaijan was working to increase oil and gas production.
Economic Development Minister Shahin Mustafayev told the conference that Azerbaijan had become the region’s economic power house, accounting for 75% of the total gross domestic product (GDP) of the three South Caucasus states.
“In Azerbaijan, the years of reform by late President Heydar Aliyev and current President Ilham Aliyev have created a liberal and independent economy, relying on its own resources and integrated into the global economy,” Mustafayev said.
He said that Azerbaijan’s status was reflected in the country’s international credit rating and in global assessments on the ease of doing business.
Foreign Ministers Eduard Nalbandian of Armenia (L) and Ahmet Davutoglu of Turkey sign landmark agreements to normalize Turkish-Armenian relations in Zurich.
